


John De Witt's his booke



OF
WISDOME
THREE BOOKES
WRITTEN IN FRENCH
by
PETER CHARRO
Doct^r of Lawe in Paris.
Translated by Samson
Lemard

AT LONDON PRINTED
For Edward Blount & Willm Aspley

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1625

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1625

TO THE RIGHT
WORTHY, AND MY
HONOVABLE COSEN
M^r. SAMSON LENNARD
Esquire.

SIR,



*He first fruits of these
my Labours in this
Booke of WIS-
DOME I dedicated
to the late renoumed
Prince HENRY,*

*who if there were no other reasons, yet
might iustly challenge them, because he
was my Prince, to whom first and especi-
ally I held my selfe in all duty and obedi-
ence to be bound ; But the subiect of this
booke containing much matter fit for a
Prince*

THE EPISTLE

Prince to know, I thought it a sin to thinke of any other protector than him whom it most concerned, & who was best able to defend me. God having changed his earthly crowne into a crowne of glorie, England hath lost a hope, Religion and the State a prop, and this Booke a Patron, which instantly upon his death, comming to a new impression, with some additions, seemes to seeke for new helps. And why should it seeke farther than to your worthy selfe, to whom nature, and duty, and desert, and all the bands that may any way tie loue and affection haue euer bound me? And so much the rather because there wants not honor in you to giue countenance, nor iudgment to censure a worke of this nature. For honor, can there be a greater, than to be honourable in all your children, than to liue to see my Lord your son invested into an ancient Baronie euen in your owne
time,

DEDICATORY.

time, and him, and the rest of your honorable progenie descended from so many great Princes, and euen the most renowned and victorious Kings of this land? As for your selfe, although you haue not respected the degree of Knight-hood, yet it hath pleased HIS MAIESTIE to dignifie you with greater honor, euen an honor seldome or neuer granted by any King or Prince heretofore, not only to ranke you aboue all Knights, but to giue you the precedence of men of greater place than any Knight whatsoeuer. These reasons thus concurring with your iudicious grauity, & the subiect so well suting to the wisdom of your selfe, (for AV SAGE LA SAGESSE as CHARRON himselfe saith in his Epistle to the Duke ESPERNON) I should haue wronged your worth, wronged this worke of WISDOME, and my selfe most of all; to deprive this booke of so wor-

THE EPISTLE

thy a Patron; so worthy a Patron the honor of this booke, and my selfe of so good a meanes to grace the WISDOME of this worke. But my purpose is not (as perhaps some will take it) to pay your fauours with flatterie, which I can by no meanes sufficiently remunerate. Nor by circumstances to commend that, which I can neuer enough commend, but rather derogate from the worth thereof by commending too little: Leauing therefore the worke to speake for it selfe, and my labours herein for my selfe; both this, and all my seruice I humbly present vnto you: And so wishing you all happinesse in this life, with increase of honour, and length of daies, and daies that neuer shall end in the life to come: I rest

Your VVorships in all

dutie to be commanded,

SAMSON LENNARD.



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The end of the Table.

OF



OF WISDOME

Three Bookes.

THE PREFACE.

*Where the Name, Subject, Purpose, and
Method of this Worke is set downe,
with an Aduertisement to
the Reader.*



It is required at the first entry in-
to this Worke, that wee know
what this Wisdome is; and since
it beareth that name and title,
how we purpose to speake there-
of. All men in generall at the first
view of the simple word it selfe,
doe easily conceiue and imagine it to be some qualitie,
sufficiencie, or habit, not common or vulgar, but ex-
cellent, singular, and eleuated aboue that which is
common and ordinarie, be it good or euill: For it is
taken and vsed (though perhaps improperly) in both
kinds: *Sapientes sunt ut faciant mala: They are wise to doe*

¹
Of the word
Wisdome.

*Hierem. 4.
Arist. lib. 5.
Metaphy.
euill:*

The Preface.

euill : and signifieth not properly a good and laudable qualitie, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoeuer it be. And therefore wee doe as well say a wise Tyrant, Pirat, Theefe; as a wise King, Pilot, Captaine : that is to say, Sufficient, prudent, aduised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently : For there is opposite vnto Wisdome not onely follie, which is an irregularitie or loosenesse of life, and Wisdome a regularity or moderation, well measured and proportioned : but also common basenesse and vulgar Simplicitee : For Wisdome is high, strong, and excellent ; yea, whether it be in good or euill, it containeth two things : Sufficiencie, that is, Prouision or furniture for whatsoeuer is required and necessary ; and that it be in some high degree of excellencie. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdome to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word ; whereby they conclude, That there are few wise men, that they are rare as euerie excellencie is ; and that to them by right it appertaineth to command and gouerne others ; that they are as Oracles : from whence is that saying, *Beleeue others, and referre thy selfe to the wise.* But well to define this thing, and according to truth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one accord, nor is it easie; for otherwise doe the common people, otherwise the Philosophers, otherwise the Diuines speake thereof. These are the three floores and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by order, and rules, and precepts ; the former confusedly and very imperfectly.

2
The diuision
of Wisdome.

Now then we may say, That there are three sorts and degrees of Wisdome, Diuine, Humane, Mundane, which correspond vnto God ; Nature pure and entire ;
Nature

The Preface.

Nature vitiated and corrupted. Of all these sorts and euerie of them doe all these three orders of the world, which before we speake of, write and discourse, euerie one according to his owne manner & fashio[n]; but properly and formally the common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wisdom, the Philosopher of humane, the Diuine of diuine wisdom.

Worldly wisdom, and of the three the more base, (which is diuers according to the three great Capitaines and Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulencie, Pleasure, Glorie, or rather Auarice, Luxurie, Ambition: *Quicquid est in mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vitæ; All that is in the world is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life*: For which cause it is called by Saint Iames, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica; Earthly, Sensuall, Deuillish*) is reprobued by Philosophie and Diuinitie, which pronounceth it follie before God: *Stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi: God hath made the wisdom of this world foolishnesse*. Of this wisdom therefore we speake not in this Booke, except it be to dispraise and condemne it.

Diuine wisdom, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Diuines, but somewhat diuersly. As for the common or worldlie wisdom, I disdain it, and passe by whatsoeuer may be spoken thereof as prophane, and too vnworthie in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculatiue, saying, That it is the knowledge of the principles, first causes, and highest power to iudge of all things, euen of the most Soueraigne, which is God himselfe: and this wisdom is Metaphysicall, and resideth wholly in the vnderstanding, as being the chiefe

The Preface.

Thom. 1. 2.
quest. 57. 2.
2. 9. 19.

chiefe good and perfection thereof : it is the first and highest of the five intellectuall vertues, which may be without either honestie, action, or other morall vertue. The Diuines make it not altogether so speculatiue, but that it is likewise in some sort Practique ; for they say, That it is the knowledge of Diuine things, from which there ariseth a iudgement and rule of humane actions ; and they make it two-fold, The one acquired by studie, and comes neere to that of the Philosophers ; which I am to speake of: The other infused and giuen by God, *De sursum descendens, Comming from aboue.* This is the first of the seuen gifts of the holie Ghost, *Spiritus Domini, Spiritus sapientia, The spirit of God is the spirit of wisdom.* Which is not found but onelie in those that are iust and free from sinne, *In malevolam animam non introibit sapientia : Wisdom cannot enter into a wicked heart.* Of this Diuine wisdom likewise our purpose is not here to speake, it is, after some sort and measure, handled in my first Veritie, and in my Discourses of Diuinitie.

Sap. 1.

5
Humane.

Wisdom acc-
ording to the
common sort.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane wisdom which in this booke wee are to deliuer vnto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place wee must giue some brieve and generall view, which may be as an Argument and Summarie of this whole Worke. The common descriptions are diuers and insufficient ; Some, and the greatest part thinke that it is onely a wisdom, discretion, and aduised carriage in a mans affaires and conuersation. This may well be called common, as respecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and considereth not at all any other thing than that which outwardly appeareth. It is altogether in the eies and eares of men, without any respect

The Preface.

speekt or very little of the inward motions of the minde: so that according to their opinion wisdom may bee without essentiall pietie or probitie, that is, a beautifull cunning, a sweet and modest subtiltie. Others thinke that it is a rude, vnreasonable, rough singularitie, a kinde of sullen frowning and frampole austeritie in opinions, manners, words, actions and fashion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humour, Philosophers, that is to say, in their counterfeited language, fantastickall, diuers, different and declining from the customes of other men.

Now this kinde of wisdom according to the doctrine of our booke, is rather a follie and extrauagancie. You must therefore know, that this wisdom whereof wee speake, is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Diuines, whereof both haue written in their Morall learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly, as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and formall subiect they write of, because they applie themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Diuinitie mounteth much higher, and is occupied about vertues infused, Contemplatiue and Diuine, that is to say, about Diuine wisdom and Beleefe. So that Philosophers are more stayed, dispersed more certaine, and more common, ruling and instructing not onely the particular knowledge or actions of men, but the common and publique, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weales, Empires. Diuinitie is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principally into the eternall good and saluation of euerie one. Againe, the Philosopher handleth this subiect more sweetly and pleasingly, the Diuine more
austerely

According to
Philosophers
and Diuines.

A comparison
betwixt Diuini-
tie and Philo-
sophie.

The Preface.

austerely and drily. Againe, Philosophie which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient than Grace, and the Naturall than the Supernaturall) seemeth to perswade graciously, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh :

Horac.

*Simul & jucunda & idonea dicere vita,
Lectorem delectando, pariterq; monendo :*

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inuentions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apophthegmes, sententious mots, adorned with Eloquence and Art. Theologie, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command, and imperiously like a Master to enioine. And to conclude, the vertue and honestie of Diuines is too anxious, scrupulous, deiect, sad, fearefull and vulgar. Philosophie, such as this Booke teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton too; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare. Doubtlesse the Philosophers haue herein beene excellent, not onely in writing and teaching, but in the rich and liuely representation thereof in their honourable and heroicall liues. I vnderstand here by Philosophers and Wise men, not onely those that haue carried the name of Wise men, such as *Thales, Solon*, and the rest of that ranke, that liued in the time of *Cyrus, Cresus, Pisistratus*; nor those that came afterwards, and haue publike-ly taught it, as *Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aristippus, Zenon, Antisthenes*, all chiefe Professours apart, and many other their Disciples different and di-
uided in sects; but also all those great men who haue made singular and exemplarie profession of vertue and
wisdome,

The Preface.

wisdom, as *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Pericles*, *Alexander*, whom *Plutarch* called as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and diuers other Greekes: The *Fabricij*, *Fabij*, *Camilli*, *Caton*, *Torquati*, *Reguli*, *Lelij*, *Scipiones*, Romans, who for the most part haue beene Generals in Armies. And these are the reasons why in this my Booke I doe more willingly and ordinarily follow the aduice and sayings of Philosophers, not in the meane time omitting or reiecting those of the Diuines: For both in substance they doe all agree, and are very seldom different, and Diuinity doth nothing disdain to employ, and to make good vse of the wise sayings of Philosophie. If I had vndertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, that profession which attendeth the secrets Euangelicall, I must necessarily haue followed *ad amussim* the aduice of the Diuines: but our Booke instructeth a ciuill life, formeth a man for the world, that is to say, to humane wisdom, not diuine.

We say then naturally and generally both with the Philosopher and the Diuine, that this humane wisdom is a kinde of law or reason, a beautifull and noble composition of the entire man, both in his inward part of his outward, his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his motions. It is the excellency and perfection of man as he is man, that is to say, according to that which the first fundamentall and naturall law doth require; as we say, That that worke is well wrought and excellent, that is compleat and perfect in all the parts thereof, and wherein all the rules of Art haue beene obserued; that man is accounted a wise man, that best knoweth after the best and most excellent manner to play the man, that is to say, (to giue a

A

more

6

A generall description of humane wisdom.

The Preface.

more particular picture thereof) that knowing himselfe and the condition of man, doth keepe and preserve himselfe from all vices, errours, passions and defects as well inward and proper to himselfe as outward and common to other men, maintaining his spirit pure, free, vniuersall, considering and iudging of all things without band or affection, alwaies ruling and directing himselfe in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and vniuersall law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in vs, vnto which he doth apply and accommodate his owne proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their lawes, customes, and ceremonies of the countrey where he is, without the offence of any, carrying himselfe wisely and discreetly in all affaires, walking alwaies vprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himselfe, attending peaceably whatsoeuer may happen, and at the last death it selfe. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facility may be drawn to foure principall heads; Knowledge of our selues, Liberty of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise. He that hath an erroneous knowledge of himselfe, that subiecteth his minde to any kinde of seruitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himselfe partiall; and by enthralling himselfe to some particular opinion, is deprived of the liberty and iurisdiction of discerning, iudging and examining all things. He that striueth against Nature, vnder what pretence soeuer it be, following rather opi-
nion

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nion or passion than reason ; he that carrieth himselfe troubledly, disquietly, malcontent, fearing death, is not wise. Behold herein a few words the picture of Humane wisdom and folly, and the summe of that which I purpose to handle in this Worke, especially in the Second Booke, which expressely containeth the rules, treatise, and offices of Wisdom, which is more mine than the other two, and which I once thought to haue published by it selfe. This verball description of Wisdom is represented vnto the eie euen at the entrance or threshold of this Booke by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her selfe vpon nothing, in her pure and simple nature, beholding her selfe in a glasse, her countenance cheerefull, merry and manly, vpright, her feet close ioyned, vpon a square pillar, and imbracing her selfe, hauing vnder her feet inchained foure other women as slaues vnto her, that is to say, *Passion* with a changed and hideous countenance ; *Opinion* with wandering eies, inconstant, giddie, borne vpon the heads of the people ; *Superstition* astonished and in a trance, and her hands fastned the one to the other ; *Vertue* or Honesty and Pedanticall Science with a sullen visage, her eie-lids eleuated reading in a Booke, where was written, *Yea, No*. All this needs no other explication, than that which hereafter followeth : but hereof more at large in the Second Booke.

To attaine vnto this wisdom, there are two meanes ; the first is in the originall forming and first temper, that is to say, in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milke of the Nurse, and the first education ; whereby a man is said to be either well borne, or ill borne, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed vnto wisdom. A man would little thinke of what power

7
Two waies to
attaine this
wisdom.

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and importance this beginning is, for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence vsed therein than there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so retchlesse a carelesnesse should be in vs, of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selues, when in matters of lesse importance we take more care, vse more diligence, more counsell than we should, neuer thinking of our greatest affaires and most honourable, but by hazard and peradventure. Who is he that taketh counsell with himselfe, or endeuoureth to doe that which is required for the preserving and preparing of himselfe as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthfull of spirit, and apt for wisdom? For that which serueth for the one, serueth for the other, and Nature after one manner attendeth them all. This is that which men thinke of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustfull pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Common-weale, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law, or rule, or publicke aduice. It is most certaine, that if men did herein carry themselves as they ought, we should haue other men, of more excellent spirit and condition than we haue amongst vs. What is required herein, and to the first nourishment and education, is briefly set downe in our Third Booke, *Chap. 14.*

8
Acquired.

The second meanes to attaine wisdom is the study of Philosophie, I meane not of all the parts thereof, but Morall (yet not forgetting the Naturall) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth
neth

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neth and representeth vnto vs the law of Nature, instructeth man vniuersally in all things, both publique and priuate, alone and in company, in all domesticall and ciuill conuersation, taketh away all that sauage nature that is in vs, sweetneth and tameth our natural rudenesse, crueltie and wildnesse, and worketh and fashioneth it to wisdome. To be brieft, it is the true science of man; all the rest in respect of it, is but vanitie, or at the leastwise not necessarie, or little profitable: for it giueth instructions to liue and to die well, which is all in all; it teacheth vs perfect wisdome, an apt, iudicious, well aduised honestie. But this second meane is almost as little practised, and as ill employed as the first: for no man careth greatly for this wisdome, so much are all giuen to that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principall meanes to attaine to wisdome, the Naturall and Acquired. He that hath bene fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath bene fauourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet temperature, which bringeth forth a great goodnesse in nature, and sweetnesse in manners, hath made a faire march without great paine to the second: But that man with whom it is otherwise, must with great and painfull studie of the second beautifie and supply that which is wanting, as *Socrates* one of the wisest said of himselfe, That by the studie of Philosophie hee had corrected and reformed his naturall infirmities.

There are contrariwise two formall lets or hindrances to wisdome, and two counter-meanes or powerfull wayes vnto follie, Naturall and Acquired. The first, which is naturall, proceedeth from the originall temper and temperature, which maketh the braine either too soft, moist, and the parts thereof grosse and

2
The lets to
Wisdome, and
meanes to fol-
lie, are two.

1
Naturall.

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materiall, whereby the spirits remaine sottish, feeble, lesse capable, plaine diminished, obscure, such as that is, for the most part, of the common sort of people; or too hot, ardent, and dry, which maketh the spirits foolish, audacious, vitious. These are the two extremes, *Sottishnesse* and *Folly*, Water and Fire, Lead and Mercurie, altogether improper or vnapt to wisdome, which requireth a spirit full of vigor and generous, and yet sweet, pliant, and modest: but the second is more easily amended by discipline than the former.

2
Acquired.

The second, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture and instruction, or from that which is euill, which amongst other things consisteth in an obstinate and sworne preiudicate preuention of opinions, wherewith the minde is made drunken, and taketh so strong a tincture, that it is made vnapt and vncapable to see or to finde better whereby to raise and enrich it selfe. It is said of these kinde of men, That they are wounded and stricken, that they haue a hurt or blow in the head: vnto which wound if likewise learning be ioyned, because that puffeth vp, it bringeth with it presumption and temerity, and sometimes armes to maintaine and defend those anticipated opinions: it altogether perfecteth the forme and frame of folly, and maketh it incurable. So that naturall weaknesse, and acquired preuention are two great hinderances; but science, if it doe not wholly cure them, which seldome it doth, strengthneth them and maketh them invincible, which turneth not any way to the dishonour of learning (as a man may well thinke) but to the greater honour thereof.

10
Of Learning.

Science or Learning is a very good and profitable staffe or waster, but which will not be handled with all hands;

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hands; and he that knowes not well how to rule it, receiueth thereby more hurt than profit. It besotteth and maketh foolish (saith a great learned Writer) the weake and sicke spirit, it polisheth and perfecteth the naturally strong and good. The feeble spirit knowes not how to possesse science, how to handle it, and how to make vse thereof as he should: but contrariwise is possessed and ruled by it, whereby he submits himselfe, and remaines a slaue to it, like a weake stomacke ouercharged with more victuals than it can digest. A weake arme wanting power and skill well to weld a waster or staffe that is somewhat too heauy for it, wearie it selfe and fainteth. A wise and couragious spirit ouer-mastereth his wisdom, enioyeth it, vseth it, and employeth it to his best aduantage, enformeth his owne indgement, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifieth his naturall light, and maketh himselfe more quicke and actiue; whereas the other is made thereby more sottish, more vnapt, and therewithall more presumptuous: so that the fault or reproach is not in learning, no more than that Wine or other good drugge is faulty which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his owne needs: *Non est culpa vini, sed culpa bibentis.* The fault is not in the Wine, but in the infirmitie of him that drinks it. Now then against such spirits weake by nature, preoccupied, puffed vp, and hindred by acquired wisdom I make open warre in this Booke, and that oftentimes vnder the word *Pedante*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authors is vsed in this sense. In it owne Greeke Originall it was taken in the better sense, but in other later Languages, by reason of the abuse, and bad carriage of such men in the profession of their learning, it is accounted

Of the word
Pedante, or
Schoole-~~ma-~~
ster.

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base, vile, questuous, contentious, opinatiue, vaine-glorious and presumptuous, by too many practised, and vsed but by way of iniurie and derision, and is in the number of those words that by continuance of time haue changed their signification, as *Tyrant*, *Sophister*, and diuers other. *Le sieur de Bellay*, after the rehearfall of many notorious vices, concludeth as with the greatest, *But of all the rest, Knowledge pedanticall I detest*. And in another place.

*Sayd I thou didst liue but to eat and drinke,
Then poore were my reuenge, thy faults scanty :
But that which most doth make thy name to stinke,
Is, to be short, thou art a Pedanty.*

An aduertisement.

It may be some will take offence at this word, thinking it likewise toucheth them, and that I thereby haue a will to tax or scoffe the Professors and Teachers of learning; but let them be pleased to content themselues with this free and open declaration which I here make; That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any gowne-men or learned profession whatsoever: yea I am so farre from it, that Philosophers are in so high esteeme with me, that I should oppose my selfe against my selfe, because I account my selfe one of them, and professe the same learning: only I touch a certaine degree and quality of spirits, before deciphered, that is, such as haue naturall capacitie and sufficiencie after a common and indifferent manner, but afterwards not well tilled, preoccupied, possessed with certaine opinions: and these are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and goe as well in short garments as in long gownes: *Vulgum tam chlamydatos, quàm coronam voco*: I reckon amongst the vulgar sort, as well Kings and Crownes, as Pedantes and clownes. If any man can furnish me with any other

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other word as significant as this to expresse these kinde of spirits, I will willingly forgoe this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himselfe agrieved, shall but accuse and shew himselfe too scrupulous. It is true that a man may finde other opposites to a wise man besides a *Pedante*, but it is in some particular sense, as the common, prophane, vulgar sort of people; and oftentimes I vse these opposits: but this is as the low is opposite to the high, the weake to the strong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the seruant to the master, the prophane to the holy; as also a foole, which indeed according to the true sound of the word, is his truest opposite: but this is a moderate man to an immoderate, a glorious opinatiue man to a modest, the part to the whole, the preiudicate and tainted to the neat and free, the sicke to the sound: but this word *Pedante* in that sense we take it, comprehendeth all these and more too, for it noteth and signifieth him that is not only vnlike and contrary to a wise man, as those before mentioned, but such a one as arrogantly and insolently resisteth it to the face, and as being armed on all sides, raiserh himselfe against it, speaking out of resolution and authority. And forasmuch as after a sort he feareth it, by reason that he seeth himselfe discouered euen from the top to the bottome, and his sport troubled by it, he prosecuteth it with a certaine intestine hatred, he taketh vpon him to censure it, to defame it, to condemne it, accounting and carrying himselfe as the truely wise, though he be a foole without peere and an ignorant self-conceited Gull.

After the purpose and argument of this Worke, we come to the order and method thereof. There are 11 The method of this Book.
three Bookes: The first is wholly in the knowledge of
our

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our selues and humane condition, as a preparatiue vnto wisdom, which is handled at large by fīue maine and principall considerations, each one including in it diuers others. The second Booke containeth in it the treatises, offices, and generall and principall rules of wisdom. The third, the particular rules and instructions of wisdom, and that by the order and discourse of foure principall and morall vertues, *Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance*; vnder which foure is comprised the whole instruction of the life of man, and all the parts of dutie and honesty. Finally, I heere handle this matter, not Scholarlike or Pedantically, nor with enlarged discourse, and furniture of Eloquence or other Art; (For wisdom (*qua si oculis ipsis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui*) If it could be seene with our corporall eyes, would stirre vp in vs an admirable desire thereof) needs no such helps to commend it selfe, being of it selfe so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingenuously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times dry and sowre, like Aphorismes, ouertures and seeds of discourse.

Some thinke this Booke too foole hardie and free to contradict and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in foure or fīue words I thus answer: First, that wisdom which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this liberty and authority, *Iure suo singulari*, to iudge of all, (it is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man, *spiritualis omnia dyndicat, & à nemine indicatur, The spirituall man iudgeth all, and is iudged of none*) and in iudging to censure and condemne (as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she doe?

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doe ? for the case standing thus, it cannot be, but shee must incurre the disgrace and enuie of the world. In another place I complaine of these kinde of men, and reprove their popular weaknesse and feminine daintinesse as vnworthy, being ouer-tender and delicate, to vnderstand any thing of worth, and altogether vn capable of wisdom. The hardest and hardiest propositions are best besfitting a hardy and eleuated spirit, and there can nothing seeme strange vnto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weaknesse to be astonished at any thing, we must rowze vp our hearts, confirme and strengthen our mindes, harden and inure our selues to heare, to know, to vnderstand, to iudge of all things seeme they neuer so strange. All things are agreeing and well besfitting the palat of the spirit, so a man be not wanting vnto himselfe, and neither doe any thing, or yeeld his consent to whatsoeuer is not good and truly faire, no though the whole world perswade him vnto it. A wise man sheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weaknesse in them both.

Thirdly, in all that I shall propose, my meaning is not to binde any man vnto it, I only present things, and lay them out as it were vpon a stall ; I grow not into choler with any man that giues me no credit, or dislikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedante*. *Passion* witnesseth that it is not reason so to doe, and he that out of passion doth any thing out of reason cannot doe it. But why are they angry with me ? Is it because I am not altogether of their opinion ? Why, I am not angry with them because they are not of mine. Is it because I speake something which is not pleasing to their taste,

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taste, or to the palat of the vulgar sort ? Why therefore I speake it. I speake nothing without reason, if they knew how to vnderstand it, how to relish it. If they can bring better reason to disproue mine, I will hearken vnto it with delight and thanks to him that shall shew it me. But yet let them not thinke to beat me downe with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other men, for these haue but small credit in my iurisdiction, saue in matter of Religion, where only authority preuailes without reason. This is authorities true Empire, reason onely bearing sway in all other Arts without it, as *St. Augustine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an vniust tyrannie and an intraged folly to subiect and inthrall our spirits to beleue and to follow whatsoeuer our Ancestours haue said, and what the vulgar sort hold to be true, who know neither what they say, nor what they doe. There are none but fooles that suffer themselues to be thus led by the noses : and this Booke is not for such, which if it should popularly be receiued and accepted of the common sort of people, it should faile much in it first purpose and designment. We must heare, consider, make account of our ancient Writers, not captiuate our selues vnto them but with reason. And if a man would follow them, what should he doe ? for they agree not among themselues. *Aristotle* who would seeme to be the most sufficient amongst them, and hath aduentured to challenge and to censure all that went before him, hath vttered more grosse absurdities than them all, and is at no agreement with himselfe, neither doth he know many times where he is ; witness his Treatises of the Soule of man, of the Eternitie of the world, of the Generation of the windes and waters,

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waters, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion ; but it were rather strange and wonderfull, that all men were of one opinion : for there is nothing more befitting Nature and the spirit of man than varietie. That wise Diuine Saint *Paul* giueth vs this libertie, in that he willeth Rom. 14. euery man to abound in his owne vnderstanding, not iudging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or thinke otherwise. And hee speaketh it in a matter of greater moment and more ticklish, not in that which consisteth in outward action and obseruation, wherein wee say wee are to conforme our selues to the common sort, and to that which is prescribed and accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is, the religious obseruance of viands and dayes : whereas all that libertie and boldnesse of speech which I challenge vnto my selfe, is but in thoughts, iudgements, opinions, in which no man is quarter-master, but he that hath them, euery man about himselfe.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seeme too harsh and brieft, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser haue stomacks warme enough to concoct and digest all) I haue for the loue of them explicated, enlightned and sweetened in this third Edition, reviewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly aduertise the Reader that shall vndertake to iudge of this Worke, to take heed that hee fall not into any of these seuen ouer-sights, as some others haue done ; that is: To referre that vnto law and dutie, which is proper vnto action ; that vnto action, which is onely to be censured ; that to resolution and determination, which is onely proposed, consulted of, and

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and problematically and Academically disputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliuer from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward state, profession, and condition, which is proper to the spirit and inward sufficiencie; that to Religion and Faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and supernaturall inspiration, which is proper to naturall and morall vertue and action. All passion and preoccupation being taken away, hee shall finde in these seuen points well vnderstood how to resolute himselfe in his doubts, how to answer all obiections, made by himselfe or by others, and informe himselfe touching my intention in this Worke. And if neuerthelesse after all this, hee will neither rest satisfied and contented, nor approue what I haue written, let him boldly and speedily disprove it (for onely to speake ill, to bite, to slander the name of another man, though it be easie enough, yet it is base and pedanticall) and hee shall as speedily receiue either a free confession and assent, (for this Booke doth glorie and feast it selfe in the truth and ingenuitie thereof) or an examination of the impertinencies and follies thereof.

(* *)

FINIS.

The subiect and order of these three Bookes.

THE first Booke teacheth the knowledge of our selues and our humane condition, which is the foundation of Wisdome, by five great and principall considerations of man, and containeth 62. Chapters.

The Second containeth the principall rules of Wisdome, the priuiledges and proper qualities of a wise man, and hath 12. Chapters.

The Third, in a Discourse of the foure Morall vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance, setteth downe the particular instructions of Wisdome in 43. Chapters.


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OF
WISDOME,

THE
FIRST BOOKE:

*Which is the Knowledge of our selues
and our humane condition.*

An Exhortation to the studie and
knowledge of our selues.

THE PREFACE TO THE
First Booke.



HE most excellent and diuine counsell,
the best and most profitable aduertise-
ment of all others, but the least practi-
sed, is to study and learne how to know
our selues: This is the foundation of
Wisdom and the high way to whatso-
euer is good; and there is no folly com-
parable to this, To be painfull and dili-
gent to know all things els whatsoeuer rather than our selues:
For the true science and studie of man, is man himselfe.

God, Nature, the wise, the world, preach man and exhort
him both by word and deed to the studie and knowledge of
himselfe. God eternally and without intermission behold-
eth, considereth, knoweth himselfe. The world hath all the
lights thereof contracted and vnited within it selfe, and the

1
*The knowledge
of our selues,
the first thing.*

2
*Enioyned to all
by all reason.*

cies open to see and behold it selfe. It is as necessarie for man to learne how to know himselfe, as it is naturall vnto him to thinke, or to be neere vnto himselfe : Nature hath enioyned this worke vnto all. To meditate & to entertaine our thoughts therein is a thing aboue all things easie, ordinarie, naturall ; it is the food, sustentation, life of the spirit, *Cujus vivere est cogitare : Whose life is cogitation.* Now where can a man begin or continue his meditations more truly, more naturally than with himselfe ? Is there any thing that toucheth him more neerely ? Doubtlesse, to studie other learnings, and to forget our selues, is a thing both vnnaturall and vniust. The true & principall vacation of euery man is to imploy his thoughts vpon himselfe, & to tie himselfe vnto himselfe : for so doth euery thing els, setting bounds and limits to their other businesse and desires. And thou man which wilt seeme to containe the whole vniuerse, to know all things, to controll, to iudge, neither knowest nor endeourest the knowledge of thy selfe ; and so going about to make thy selfe skilfull & a Iudge of Nature, thou prouest the only foole of the world : thou art of all other the most beggerly, the most vaine & miserable ; and yet most proud and arrogant. Looke therefore into thy selfe, know thy selfe, hold thy selfe to thy selfe ; thy spirit and will which is elswhere imployed, reduce it vnto thy selfe. Thou forgettest thy selfe, and lovest thy selfe about outward things ; thou betrayest and dis-robest thy selfe ; thou lookest alwaies before thee ; gather thy selfe vnto thy selfe, and shut vp thy selfe within thy selfe : examine, search, know thy selfe.

Nasce te ipsum : nec de quaesitis extra ;

Respice quod non es.

Tecum habita & noris quam sit tibi curta supellex,

Tute consule.

Te ipsum concute, nunquid vitiorum

Inseuerit olim natura, aut etiam consuetudo mala.

Know well thy selfe, and seeke to know no more ;

And what thou art not, shaine the same therefore.

Looke truly to thy selfe, then shalt thou see

How short abode thou hast, aduised therefore be.

Examine still thy conscience, which doth witnesse beare,

What vice or euill is (by nature) sowed there.

By

By the knowledge of himselfe man arriueth sooner & better to the knowledge of God, than by any other meanes, both because he findeth in himselfe better helps, more marks and footsteps of the diuine nature, than in whatsoeuer besides he can any way know, and because he can better vnderstand and know that which is in himselfe than in another thing. *Formasti me & posuisti super me manum tuam, ideo mirabilis facta est scientia tua, id est, tui, ex me: Thou hast formed me, and put thy hands vpon me, therefore thy science is become maruellous in me, that is, scientia tui, ex me: the science of thee in me.* And therefore there was engrauen in letters of gold ouer the porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (according to the *Panims*) of Knowledge & Light, this sentence, KNOW THY SELFE, as a salutation and aduertisement of God vnto all; signifying vnto them, that he that would haue accesse vnto that *Diinitie*, and entrance into that Temple, must first know himselfe, and could not otherwise be admitted. *Si te ignoras, ô pulcherrima, egredere, & abis post hædos tuos. If thou know not who thou art, ô thou the fairest among women, get thee forth, and follow thy kids.*

3
The ladder to
the knowledge of
the diuine
nature.

Psalms.

Cantic.

To become truly wise, and to leade a life more regular and pleasant, there needs no other instruction but from our selues: and doubtlesse, if we were good scholars, there are no bookes could better instruct vs, than we teach our selues. He that shall call to minde, and consider the excelsse of his passed choller, euen how farre this feuer and frensie hath caried him, shall better be perswaded of the foule deformitie of this passion, than by all the reason that *Aristotle* or *Plato* can alledge against it: and so of all other passions and motions of the soule whatsoeuer. He that shall call to minde how often he hath miscaried in his iudgement, and been deceiued by his memorie, shall learne thereby to trust it no more. He that shall note how often he hath held an opinion, and in such sort vnderstood a thing euen to the engaging of his owne credit, and the satisfying of himselfe and any other therein, and that afterwards time hath made him see the truth euen the contrarie to that he formerly held, may learne to distrust his owne iudgement, and to shake off that importunate arrogancie and querulous presumption; a capitall enemy to discipline and truth.

4
Disposition vnto
wisdom.

He that shall well more and consider all those euils that he hath run into, that haue threatned him ; the light occasions that haue altered his courses and turned him from one estate to another ; how often repentances and mislikes haue come into his head ; will prepare himselfe against future changes, learne to know his owne condition ; will preferue his modestie, containe himselfe within his owne ranke, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterprise any thing that may passe his owne forces : And what were this but to see *justice* and *peace* in euery thing ? To be brieft, we haue no cleerer looking glasse, no better booke than our selues, if as we ought we doe studie our selues, alwaies keeping our eyes open ouer vs, and prying more narrowly into our selues.

5
Against such as
misknow them-
selues.

But this is that which we thinke least of, *Nemo in se tentat descendere : No man endeuors to descend directly into himselfe* : whereby it commeth to passe that we fall many times to the ground, and tumble headlong into the same fault, neither perceiuing it, nor knowing to what course to betake vs : we make our selues fooles at our owne charges. Difficulties in euery thing are not discerned, but by those that know them : and some degree of vnderstanding is necessary euen in the marking of our owne ignorance. We must knocke at the doore to know whether the doore be shut : for when men see themselves resolu'd and satisfied of a thing, and think they sufficiently vnderstand it, it is a token they vnderstand nothing at all : for if we knew our selues well, we would provide farre better for our selues and our affaires ; nay, we should be ashamed of our selues and our estate, and frame our selues to be others than we are. He that knowes not his owne infirmities, takes no care to amend them ; he that is ignorant of his owne wants, takes as little care to provide for them ; he that feels not his owne euils and miseries, aduiseh not with himselfe of helps, nor seekes for remedie. *Deprehendas te oportet priusquam emendes: sanitatis initium, sentire sibi opus esse remedio. Thou must of necessitie know thy selfe, before thou amend thy selfe* : it is the very first beginning of health, to acknowledge the sicknesse, & that thou hast need of remedie. And heere behold our unhappinesse ; for we thinke all things goes well with vs, and we are in safetie, and we liue in content with our selues, and so double

our miseries. *Socrates* was accounted the wisest man of the world, not because his knowledge was more compleat, or his sufficiency greater than others ; but because his knowledge of himselfe was better than others ; in that he held himselfe within his owne ranke, and knew better how to play the man. He was the king of men, as it is said, that he that hath but one eye is a king in respect of him that hath neuer an eye ; that is to say, doubly deprived of his sense : for they are by nature weake and miserable, and therewithall proud, and feeble not their miserie. *Socrates* was but purblind ; for being a man as others were, weake and miserable, he knew it, and ingenuously acknowledged his condition, and liued, and gouerned himselfe according vnto it. This is that which the Truth it selfe spake vnto those which were full of presumption, and by way of mockery said vnto him, Are we blind also? If ye were blind, saith he, that is, if you thought your selues blinde, you should see, but because ye thinke ye see, therefore you are blinde ; therefore your sinne remaineth. For they that in their owne opinion see much, are in truth starke blinde ; and they that are blinde in their owne opinion see best. It is a miserable thing in a man, to make himselfe a beast by forgetting himselfe to be a man. *Homo enim cum sis, id fac semper intelligas: Seeing thou art a man, see thou alwaies remember it.* Many great personages as a rule or bridle to themselues haue ordained that one or other should euer buz into their eares that they were men. O what an excellent thing was this, if it entred as well into their hearts, as it sounded in their eares ? That the Mot of the *Athenians* to *Pompey* the Great, Thou art so much a God, as thou acknowledgedst thy selfe to be a man, was no ill saying : for at the least to be an excellent man, is to confesse himselfe to be a man.

Ioh. 9.

The knowledge of our selues (a thing as difficult and rare as to misdeeme and deceiue our selues easie) is not obtained by any other, that is to say, by the comparison, rule, or example of another.

6
False meanes
to know our
selues.

Plus alijs de te quam tu tibi credere noli: Doe not beleene others more of thy selfe, then thou thy selfe knowest of thy selfe. Much lesse also by our speech and iudgement, which oftentimes commeth short to discern, and we disloyall and feare-

full to speake : not by any singular act, which sometimes vnawares hath escaped a man, pricked forward by some new, rare and accidentall occasion, and is rather a trick of *Fortune*, or an eruption of some extraordinarie lunacy, than any production of fruit truly ours. A man iudgeth not of the greatnesse or depth of a riuer, by that water which by reason of some sudden inundation of neighbour-riuers ouerfloweth the bankes. One valiant act makes not a valiant man, nor one iust a iust man. The circumstances and source of occasions doth import much and alter vs, and oftentimes a man is prouoked to doe good by vice it selfe : So hard a thing is it for man to know man. Nor likewise by all those outward things that are outwardly adiacent vnto vs, as offices, dignities, riches, nobilitie, grace, and applause of the greatest peeres and common people. Nor by the cariages of a man in publike places is a man knowne ; for as a king at chesse, so he standeth vpon his guard, he bridleth and contracteth himselfe ; feare, and shame, and ambition, and other passions make him play that part that you see : But truly to know him we must looke into his inward part, his priuy chamber, and there not how to day, but euery day he carieth himselfe. He is many times a different man in his house from that he is in the countrey, in the palace, in the market place ; another man amongst his domesticall friends from that he is amongst strangers : when he goeth forth of his house into some publike place, he goeth to play a Comedy, and therefore stay not thou there, for it is not himselfe that plaieeth, but another man, and thou knowest him not.

7
True meanes,

The knowledge of a mans selfe is not acquired by all these foure meanes, neither must we trust them, but by a true, long, and daily study of himselfe, a serious and attentiuue examination not only of his words, and actions, but of his most secret thoughts (their birth, progresse, continuance, repetition) and whatsoeuer is in him, euen his nightly dreames, prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all houres, pressing and pinching him euen to the quicke. For there are many vices hid in vs and are not felt for want of force and meanes ; so that the venomous serpent that is benumbed with cold, suffereth himselfe to be handled without danger : neither doth

doth it suffice afterwards to acknowledge the fault by tale or peccemeale, and so thinke to mend it by marring it, but he must in generall reacknowledge his weaknesse, his misery, and come to an vniuersall amendment and reformation.

Now if we will know man, we must take more than ordinary paines in this first booke, beholding him with all visages, feeling his pulse, sounding him to the quicke, entring into him with a candle and a snuffer, searching and creeping into euery hole, corner, turning, closet, and secret place: and not without cause; for this is the most subtile and hypocriticall couert and counterfeit of all the rest, and almost not to be knowne. Let vs then consider him after five manners set downe in this table, which is the summe of the booke:

8
and division of
this Booke.

The first, Naturall, of all the parts whereof he is composed, and their appurtenances.	
The second, Naturall and Morall, by comparison of man with beasts.	
The third, of his life in declining state.	
There are five con- siderations of man & humane condition:	The fourth, Morall, of his manners, humours, conditions, which are referred to five things:
	1 Vanitie.
	2 Weaknesse.
	3 Inconstancie.
	4 Miseric.
	5 Presumption.
The fifth, Natu- rall and Mo- rall, of the dif- ferences that are betweene men in their	1 Natures.
	2 Spirits and sufficiencies.
	3 Charges and degrees of superi- oritie, inferioritie.
	4 Professions and conditions of life, aduantages and disaduantages
{ Naturall. Acquired. Casuall.	

The first consideration of Man,
which is naturall, by all the parts and
members whereof he is
composed.

CHAPTER I.

Of the frame or formation of Man.



I
Man made last.
Gen. 1. 2. & 6.

IT is twofold, and to be considered after a twofold manner: the first and originall, once immediatly by God in his supernaturall creation; the second and ordinary in his naturall generation. According to that description which *Moses* setteth down touching the workmanship and creation of the world (the boldest and richest peece of worke that euer man broght vnto light; I meane the historic of the nine first chapters of *Genesis*, which is of the world newly borne and reborne) man was made of God, not only after all other creatures, as the most perfect, but the master & superintendent of all, *Vt praest piscibus maris, volatilibus caeli, bestijs terra*: That he might rule over the fish of the sea, the fowles of the aire, and the beasts of the earth. And in the selfe same day wherein the foure-footed beasts of the earth that come neerest vnto him were created (although those two that resemble him most are for the inward parts the Swine, for the outward the Ape) but also after all was done and ended, as the closing vp, seale, and signe of his workes, he hath also there imprinted his armes, and his pourtrait, *Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parua. Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui*. Every man is a short compendious image of God. The light of his countenance is sealed vpon vs, as a summary recapitulation of all things, and an epitome of the world, which is all in man, but gathered into a small volume, whereby he is called, The little world, as the whole vniuerse may be called, The great man: as the tie and ligament of Angels and beasts, things heauenly and earthly, spirituall

Of the frame or formation of man.

9

spirituall and corporall : and in one word, as the last hand, the accomplishment, the perfection of the worke, the honor and miracle of Nature. The reason is, because God hauing made him with deliberation, counsell and preparation, & dixit, *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram*; and he said, *Let vs make man in our image, according to our likenesse*, he rested. And this rest also was made for man : *Sabbatum propter hominem, non contra. The Sabbath is for man, not man for it.* And afterward he had nothing to make new, but make himselfe man ; and that he did likewise for the loue of man : *Propter nos homines & propter nostram salutem : For vs men, and for our saluation.* Whereby wee see, that in all things God hath aimed at man, finally in him and by him, *breui manu*, In a short summe or summarily, to accomodate all vnto himselfe, the beginning and end of all.

Secondly, he was created all naked, because more beautifull then the rest, being pure, neat, and delicate, by reason of 2.
his thin humours well tempered and seasoned. Naked.

Thirdly, vpright, but little touching the earth, his head directly tending vnto heauen, whereon he gazeth, and sees 3.
and knowes himselfe as in a glasse ; quite opposite vnto the plant, which hath it head and root within the earth : so that Vpright.
man is a diuine plant, that flourisheth & growes vp vnto heauen : a beast as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant, goes as it were athwart, hauing his two extremes towards the bounds or extremities of the *horizon* more or lesse. The cause of this vprightnesse in man, besides the will of his Master-workman, is not properly the reasonable soule, as we see in those that are crookedbacked, crupshouldered, lame; nor in the straight line of the back-bone, which is likewise in serpents, nor in the naturall or vitall heat, which is equalled or rather greater in diuers beasts, although all these may perhaps serue to some purpose ; but this vpright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man the holiest and diuine creature,

Sanctius his animal mentisq; capacius alta :

Apostrophe from these, in making man

He made a sacred Creature, beasts prophane.

Who (though they were not made enough to see't)

Was made the meanes, where they and God doe meet.

Dumbe.

*Dumbe workes for man ; but God made man we finde
To contemplate the workes and know his minde.*

and as king in this lower region. To small and particular royalties there belong certaine marks of Maiestie, as we see in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocodile, the Lion with his collar, the colour of his haire, and his eies ; in the Eagle, the king of the Bees : so man the vniuersall king of these lower parts walketh with an vpright countenance as a master in his house ruling, and by loue or force taming every thing.

His body was first framed of virgin earth, and red, from whence he tooke his proper name *Adam*, for the appellatiue was *Ish* : and that being not yet moistned with raine, but with the water of the fountaine,

4.
How framed.
Gen. 2.

— *Mixtam fluminalibus undis
Finxit in effigiem.*

*Of running water, and of setled earth
Did God build man (the Poet knew not breath)
Grace ran away, or rather he from that,
Yet man stood still, or rather nature sate,
But not in Paradise ; Globe of earth and seas,
Now only earth, past ouer Euphrates.*

By reason the body is the first borne or elder than the soule, as the matter than the forme ; the house must bee made and trimmed before it be inhabited, the shop before the workman can vse it. Afterwards the *Soule* was by diuine inspiration infused, and so the body by the soule made a liuing creature, *Inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum vite &c.* He breathed in his face, breath of life.

5.
He is made in
the matrix.

Conceiued of co-
agulated seed.

Changed.

In that ordinary and naturall generation and formation, which is made of the seed in the wombe of the woman, the selfe same order is obserued : The body is first formed as well by the elementary force of the *Energie* and forming vertue which is in the seed, aiding in some sort the heat of the matrix, as the celestially, which is the influence and vertue of the Sunne, *Sol & homo generant hominem.* The Sunne and man doe engender man. In such order that the seuen first daies the seed of the father and mother doe mingle, vnite, and curdle together like creame, and are made one body, which is the conception. *Nonne sicut lac mulsisti me, & sicut caseum me coagulasti ?*

The first and generall distinction of man. 11

lasti? Hast thou not milked me like milke, & hast thou not coagulated, and curdled me as cheese? The next seuen daies this seed is concocted, thickned and changed into a masse of flesh and indigested formelesse bloud, which is the proper matter of a humane body. The third seuen daies following, of this masse or lump is made and fashioned the bodie in grosse; so that about the twentieth day are brought forth the three noble and heroicall parts, the *Liver, Heart, Braine*, distant an ouall length, or as the *Hebrewes* say, holding themselves by thin *commissures* or ioynts, which afterwards fill themselves with flesh after the fashion of an ant, where there are three grosser parts ioyned by two thin. The fourth seuen daies which end neere thirrie, the whole body is ended, perfected, ioynted, organized; and so it beginnes to be no more an *Embrion*, that is, vnperfect in shape, but capable, as a matter prepared to it forme, to receiue the soule; which faileth not to insinuate and inuest it selfe into the body towards the seuen and thirtieth or fortieth day after the fise weekes ended. Doubling this terme, that is to say, at the third moneth, this infant indowed with a soule, hath motion and sense, the haire and nailes begin to come. Tripling this terme, which is at the ninth moneth, he commeth forth, and is brought into the light. These termes or times are not so iustly prefixed, but that they may either be hastened or prolonged, according to the force or feebleness of the heat both of the seed and of the matrix; for being strong it hasteneth, being weake it sloweth: whereby that seed that hath lesse heat and more moisture, whereof women for the most part are conceiued, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a soule vntill the fortieth day or after, and mooueth not till the fourth moneth, which is neere by a quarter more late then that of the male children.

Formed in grosse.

Ioynted, organized.

First furnished with fit instruments for sense.

Indowed with soule, motion.

Brought forth.

CHAP. II.

The first and generall distinction of Man.

MAN as a prodigious creature is made of parts quite contrary and enemies to themselves. The soule is a little God, the body as a beast, as a dunghill. Neuerthelesse, these two

The diuision of man in two parts.

two parts are in such sort coupled together, haue such need the one of the other to performe their functions, *Alterius sic altera poscit opem res, & coniuuat amice*: So one thing doth aske the fellowship and helpe of another: and doth as it were friendly conuirt it; and doe so with all their complaints embrace each other, that they neither can continue together without wars, nor separate themselues without griefe and torment; and as holding the Wolfe by the eares, each may say to other, *I can neither liue with thee nor without thee, Nec tecum nec sine te.*

Into three
parts.

But againe, forasmuch as there are in this soule two parts very different, the high, pure, intellectuall, and diuine, wherein the beast hath no part, and the base, sensitiue, and brutish, which hath bodie and matter, and is as an indifferent meane betwixt the intellectuall part and body; a man may by a distinction more morall and politicke, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit*, the *Soule*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit*, and *Flesh*, hold the place of the two extremes, as heauen and earth; the *Soule* the middle region, where are ingendred the Metheors, tumults and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heroicall part, a diminutiue, a sparke, and image, & deaw of the Diuinitie, is in man as a King in his Commonweale, it breatheth nothing but good, and heauen to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* contrariwise as the dregs of a people be-sorted and common sinke of man, tendeth alwaies to the matter and to the earth; the *Soule* in the middle, as the principall of the people betwixt the best and the worst, good and euill, is continually sollicitied by the spirit and the flesh, and according vnto that part towards which it applieth it selfe, it is either spirituall and good, or carnall and euill. Heere are lodged all those naturall affections, which are neither vertuous nor vicious, as the loue of our parents and friends, feare of shame, compassion towards the afflicted, desire of good reputation.

3.
The vilitie
thereof.

This distinction will helpe much to the knowledge of man, and to discerne his actions, that he mistake not himselfe as it is the manner to doe, iudging by the barke and outward appearance, thinking that to be of the Spirit which is of the Soule, nay of the flesh; attributing vnto vertue that which is due vnto nature, nay vnto vice. How many good and excellent

cellent actions haue beene produced by passion, or at least by a naturall inclination, *Vt seruiant genio, & suo indulgent animo?* That they may serue their humour, and satisfie their pleasure?

CHAP. III.

Of the body, and first of all the parts thereof, and their places.

THe body of man consisteth of a number of parts inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular, or comming neere vnto that figure.

1.
The diuision
of the body.

The inward are of two sorts: the one in number and quantitie spread thorow the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the bases and vpholding pillers of the whole building, & within them for their nourishment the *marrow*; the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veines* issuing from the *liver* as chanelles of the first and naturall blood; the *arteries* comming from the heart as conduits of the second blood more subtile and vitall. These two mounting higher then the *liver* and the *heart* their originall sources, are more strait then those that goe downwards, to the end they should helpe to mount the blood; for that narrowness more straitned, serues to raise the *humours*, the *sinewes* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body, and conduits of the animall spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seven paires which serue the senses of the head, *Sight*, *Hearing*, *Taste*, *Speech*, the other are hard, whereof there are thirtie couples, proceeding from the reins of the backe to the muscles; The *Tendrels*, *Ligaments*, *Gristles*; The foure *Humours*, *Blood*, *Choler*, which worketh, prouoketh, penetrateth, hindreth obstructions, casteth forth the excrements, bringeth cheerefulness; *Melancholy*, which prouoketh an appetite to euery thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Fleame*, which sweeteneth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats; The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the naturall heat and radicall humour, and they are in three degrees of excellency, the *Naturall*, *Vitall*, *Animall*; The *Fat* which is the thickest and grossest part of blood.

2.
Inward and
many.

The

3.
Singular.
Foure regions of
the body.

1
2.

The other are singular (saue the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certaine place. Now there are foure places or regions, as degrees of the body, shops of nature, where shee exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lowest is for generation, in which are the priuy parts seruing therunto. The second neere vnto that, in which are the intralles, *viscera*, that is to say, the *stomacke*, yeelding more to the left side, round, straiter in the bottome than at top, hauing two orifices or mouthes, the one aboue to receiue, the other beneath, which answereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it selfe. It receiueth, gathereth together, mingleth, concocteth the victuals and turnes them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kinde of white *Suc* fit for the nourishment of the bodie, which is likewise wrought within the *Meseraique* veines by which it passeth vnto the Liuer. The *Liner* hot and moist inclining towards the right side, the store-house of bloud, the chiefe or rather fountaine of the veines, the seat of the naturall nourishing faculty, or vegetatiue soule, made and ingendered of the bloud of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Meseraique* veines, and receiueth into it lap by the *vena porta*, which entreteth into the concauities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thorow the whole body by the helpe of the great *vena cava*, which ariseth from the bunch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the riuers of a fountaine. The *Splene* towards the left side, which receiueth the discharge and excrements of the Liuer: The *Reines*, the *Entralles*, which though they are all in one, yet are distinguished by six differences and names, equalling seuen times the length of a man, as the length of a man is equalled by seuen foot. In these two first parts or degrees which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very different, the one generatiue for the continuance of the kinde, the other nutritiue for euery particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscible soule.

3. The third degree compared to the *Etherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midrise*, and from that aboue by the narrowness of the throat; in which

is the irascible soule, and the pectorall parts *Præcordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fift rib, hauing his point vnder the left pap or dug, the originall fountaine of the *Arteries*, which are alwaies moued and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which as by channels it sendeth and distributeth thorow the whole body the vitall bloud which it hath concocted, and by it the spirit and vertue vitall. The *Lungs*, of substance very soft and spongeous, supple to draw to and inforce forth like a paire of bellowes, instruments both of respiration whereby the heart is refreshed, drawing vnto it the bloud, the spirits, the aire, and disburthening it selfe of those fumes and excrements which oppresse it, and of the voice by meane of the rough *Arterie*.

The fourth and highest, which answereth to the celestiaall region, is the head, which containeth the *Braine*, cold and spongeous, wrapped within two skinnes, the one more hard and thicke, which toucheth the braine-pan, *Duramater*; the other more easie and thin, which includeth the Braine, *Piamater*: from it do issue and are deriued the *Sinewes* and marow that descendeth and falleth downe into the reines of the backe. This *Braine* is the seat of the reasonable soule, the fource of sense and motion, and of the most noble animall spirits, composed of the vitall, which being raised from the heart by the *Arteries* vnto the braine are concocted and reconcocted, elaborated and made subtile by the helpe of the multiplicity of small *Arteries*, as fillets diuersly wouen and interlaced by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double ner, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vitall spirit being retained and sojourning, oftentimes passing and repassing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, spirituall in an excellent degree.

The outward and visible parts, if they bee single, are in the middle; as the *Nose*, which serueth for respiration, smell, and the comfort of the braine, and the disburthening thereof, in such sort that by it the aire entereth and issueth both downe into the lungs and vp into the braines. The *Mouth*, which serueth to eat and to speake, and therefore hath many parts seruiceable thereunto; without, the lips; within, the tongue, soft and very subtile, which iudgeth of sauors; the *Teeth*,

4.

3

Outward parts
singular.

16 *Of the singular properties of the body of man.*

Teeth, which bruise and grinde the victuals; the *Navell*, the two sinkes or waies to ease and disburden the body.

4.
Double and e-
quall.

If they be double and alike, they are collaterals and equall, as the two *eyes*, planted in the highest stage as centinels, composed of many and diuers parts; three *humours*, seuen *tunics*, seuen *muscles*, diuers colours, of many fashions and much art. These are the first and most noble outward parts of the body, in beautie, vtilitie, mobilitie, actiuitie, yea in the action of loue *ὡς ἰδοὺ ὡς ἐμαυτὸν*, they are to the visage that which the visage is to the body, they are the face of the face: and because they are tender, delicate and precious, they are fenced and rampaired on all parts with *skins*, *lids*, *browes*, *haire*. The *eares* in the selfe-same height that the eies are, as the scouts of the body, Porters of the spirit, the Receiuers and Iudgers of sounds which alwaies ascend; they haue their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the aire and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might bee hindered and iudge the worse. The *armes* and *hands*, the worke-masters of all things and vniuerfall instruments. The *legs* and *feet*, the props and pillars of the whole building.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the singular properties of the body of man.

1.
Peculiar pro-
perties in the
body of man.

THE body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiar and proper vnto themselues, not common with other creatures. The first and principall are speech, vpright stature, the forme or feature, the port or cariage, whereof the wise, yea the Stoicks themselues made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a foole in a humane shape, than wise in the forme of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be tearmed a hand) His naturall nakednesse, laughter, crying. The *Sense* of tickling, haire on the lower lid of the eye, a visible nauell, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at nose, a strange thing, considering that hee carieth his head vpright, and a beast downwards. To blush for shame, wax pale for feare. To be an ambidexter;

ambidexter; disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to moue the cares, which bewraieth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them knowne, by his blushing, palenesse, motion of the eies and nose.

The other properties are likewise peculiar vnto man, but not wholly but by way of excellency; for they are also in beasts, but in a lesse degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and haire in the head. The pliant facilitie of the body and the parts thereof to all motion and euery sense. The eleuation of the breasts. The great abundance of the braine. The greatnesse of the bladder. The forme of the foot long forward, short backward. The quantity and pure subtility of the bloud. The mobility and agility of the tongue. The multitude and variety of dreames, insomuch that he seemeth the only dreamer. Sneeling. And to beshort, the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips.

2

Peculiar properties by way of excellency.

There are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificiall and affected countenances; others are so proper and naturall, that they that haue them neither feele them nor know them in themselves; as to goe stooping: but all haue that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, naturall and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hands before him when he falleth.

3.

Diners habits.

CHAP. V.

Of the goods of the bodie: Health, Beautie, &c.

THe goods of the body are Health, Beauty, Cheerefulness, Strength, Vigor, a prompt readinesse and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautifull and rich present that Nature can bestow vpon vs, and aboue all other things to bee preferred, not onely Science, Nobilitie, Riches, but Wisdome it selfe, which the austereft amongst the wise doe affirme. It is the only thing that deserueth our whole imployment, yea our life it selfe to attaine vnto it; for without it life is no life, but a death, vertue and wisdome grow weake and faint. What comfort can all the wisdome of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be thorowly stricken with an *Apoplexie*?

1

The praise of Health.

C

Doubtlesse

18 *Of the goods of the body : Health, Beautie, &c.*

Doublelesse there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health, but *Honestie* which is the health of the *Soule*. Now it is common vnto vs with beasts, yea many times it is greater and farre more excellent in them then in vs : and notwithstanding it be a gift of nature, *gaudeant bene nati*.

He that is gently borne may well reioyce,

To haue by nature what he would by choice :

giuen in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milke, Good government, which consisteth in sobriety and moderate exercises, lightnesse of heart, and a continuall auoidance of all passions, doe preferue it much. Griefe and sicknesse are the contraries vnto it, which are the greatest, if not the only euills that follow man, whereof we shall speake hereafter. But in the preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature, which hath giuen them health, doe far exceed men, they oftentimes forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearly for it.

2
Beautie.

Next followeth Beautie, a good of great account in the society of men. It is the first meane of reconciling or vniting one to another, and it is very likely that the first distinction that hath bene of one man from another, and the first consideration that giuerh preheminance to one aboue another, hath bene the aduantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerfull quality, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the society of men ; for there is none so barbarous, none so resolute, that hath not bene beaten by it. It presenteth it selfe vnto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the iudgement, it makes deepe impressions, and presseth a man with great authority ; and therefore *Socrates* called it a short tyranny, and *Plato* the priuiledge of Nature : for it seemeth that he that carieth in his countenance the fauours of Nature imprinted in a rare and excellent beauty, hath a kinde of lawfull power ouer vs, and that wee turning our eies towards him, he likewise turneth our affections, and enthralleth them in despite of our selues. *Aristotle* saith that it appertaineth to those that are beautifull to command ; that they are venerable next to the Gods themselves ; that there are none, but such as are blinde, but are touched with it. *Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar*, three great Commanders, haue made

made great vse thereof in their greatest affaires, yea *Scipio*, the best of them all. *Faire* and *Good* are neere neighbours, and are exprest by the selfe same words both in *Greece* and in the Scriptures. Many great Philosophers haue attained to their wisdome, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable and much required in beasts themselves.

There are in Beauty diuers things to be considered : That of men is properly the forme and feature of the body ; as for other beauties, they belong vnto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one setled which moueth not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion and colour of the members, a body that is not swolne or puffed vp, wherein the finewes and veines appeare not from far, nor the bones presse not the skin, but full of bloud and spirit, and in good state, hauing the muscles eleuated, the skin smooth, the colour vermillion : the other moueable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding or cariage of the motion of the members, and aboue all, the eyes. The former beauty of it selfe is as it were dead, this actiue and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sowre, others that are sweet, yea though they be fading.

3
*The distinction
of Beautie.*

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. There is nothing more beautifull in man than his soule ; and in the body of man than his visage, which is as it were the soule abreuiaed, that is, the patterne or image of the soule ; that is, her Escuchion with many quarters representing the collection of all her titles of honour, planted and placed in the gate and forefront, to the end that men may know that here is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man ; and therefore Art which imitatch Nature, takes no care to represent the person of man, but only to paint or carue the visage.

4
Of the visage.

There are many speciall singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beasts, (for to say the truth they haue no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man ; As the number and diuersitie of the parts and formes of them, in beasts there is neither chin, nor cheekes, nor forehead, much lesse any forme or fashion of them. Variety of colours, as in the eye onely there

5
*Seven singularities
in the visage
of man.*

- 3 there is blacke, white, Greene, blew, red, crystalline. Proportion, for the senses are there double, answering the one to the other, and in such a manner, that the greatnesse of the eye is the greatnesse of the mouth, the largenesse of the forehead the length of the nose, the length of the nose that of the chin and lips. An admirable diuersitie of countenances, and such, that there are hardly found two faces in all respects like one another : this is a chiefe point of workmanship, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable, yea necessarie for humane society ; first to know one another, for infinite euils, yea the dissipation of humane kinde must needs follow, if a man should mistake himselfe by the semblance and similitude of diuers visages, yea it would be a confusion worse than that of *Babel*. A man would take his daughter for his sister, for a stranger, his enemy for his friend. If our faces were all alike, we should not discern a man from a beast ; and if they were not all vnlike one another, we could not know how to discern a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent Art of Nature to place in this part some secret that might giue contentment to one another thorow the whole world : for by reason of this varietie of faces, there is not a person that in some part is not beautifull. The dignity and honour of it round figure, forme vpriight and eleuated on high, naked and vncovered without haire, feathers, scales,
- 4 as in other creatures, looking vp vnto heauen. Grace, sweetness, a pleasant and decent comeliness, euen to the giuing vp of a mans Soule, and the rauishing of his will, as hath beene shewed before. To be briefe, the visage is the throne of beautie and loue ; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and agreeable vnto man, the true and most significant symboles of amitie and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations, to declare the inward motions and passions of the soule, as Ioy, Heauinesse, Loue, Hatred, Enuie, Malice, Shame, Choler, Jealousie, and so forth. It is as the hand of a diall which noteth the houres and moments of time, the wheelles and motions themselues being hid within. And as the aire which receiueth all the colours and changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & detegit,*
- 5
+
6
7

de tegit, in facie legitur homo. The Body couereth, and discouereth the soule, and man is knowne euen by his face.

¶ The beautie of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and cleere front, eye-browes well ranged, thin and subtil, the eye well diuided, cheerefull, sparkling : as for the colour, I leaue it doubtfull, the nose leane, the mouth little, the lips coralline, the chinne short and dimpled, the cheekes somewhat rising, and in the middle the pleasant *gelasin*, the eares round and well compact, the whole countenance with a liuely tincture white and vermilion. Neuerthelesse, this description of Beauty is not generally receiued ; the opinions of Beauty are different according to the diuersitie of nations. With the Indians the greatest Beautie consisteth in that which we account the greatest deformitie, that is, in a tawny colour, thicke and swollen lips, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with blacke or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendent, to the end they may giue their little ones sucke ouer their shoulders : and to attaine to this forme of beauty, they vse all manner of Art. But not to wander so farre, in *Spaine* the chiefeft beautie is leane and nealy compr ; in *Italie* fat, corpulent and solid : the soft, and delicate, and flattering please the one ; the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding, the other.

6
A description
of the beautie
of the face.

The Beautie of the Bodie, especially the visage, should in all reason demonstare and witnesse the beauty of the soule, (which is a qualitie and rule of opinions and iudgements, with a certaine stedfastnesse and constancie) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, than the conformitie and relation of the body to the spirit : and when this is not, we must needs thinke, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to passe, and we often times see it : for the milke of the Nurse, the first institution, conuersation, bring great alterations to the originall nature of the soule, whether in good or euill. *Socrates* confessed that the deformitie of his body did iustly accuse the naturall deformitie of his soule, but that by industrie and institution he had corrected that of the soule. This outward countenance is a weake and dangerous suertie, but they that bely their owne physiognomie, are rather to be punished

7
The beautie of
the soule and
bodie.

than others, because they falsifie and betray that good promise that Nature hath planted in their front, and deceiue the world.

CHAP. VI.

Of the vestments of the Body.

Nakednesse is
naturall.

THERE is great likelihood that the custome or fashion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the first and originall amongst men; and that of couering and adorning the bodie with garments was artificiall, and inuented to helpe and enlarge Nature, as they which by artificiall light goe about to increase the light of the day: for Nature hauing sufficiently provided for all other creatures a couering, it is not to be beleueed that she hath handled man worse than the rest, and left him only indigent, and in such a state that he could not helpe himselfe without forren succours, and therefore those reproches that are made against Nature as a stepmother, are vniust. If men from the beginning had beene clothed, it is not likely that they would euer haue disrobed themselues and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and shame it selfe: and neuerthelesse, it is done and obserued amongst many nations. Neither can it be alleged that we clothe our selues either to couer our nakednesse or priuy parts, or to defend vs against cold (for these are the two reasons pretended; for against heat there is no appearance of reason) because Nature hath not taught vs, that there is any thing in our nakednesse that we should be ashamed of: it is we that by our owne fault and fall haue told it our selues: *Quis indicavit tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi ne comederes comedisti? Who told thee that thou wast naked, unlesse thou hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?* And Nature hath already sufficiently hid them, put them farre from our eies, and couered them. And therefore it is lesse needfull to couer those parts only, as some doe in those countries where they goe all naked, and ordinarily are not couered: for why should he that is the lord of all other creatures, not daring to shew

shew himselfe naked vnto the world, hide himselfe vnder the spoiles of another, may adorne himselfe? As for cold, and other particular and locall necessities, we know that vnder the selfe same aire, the selfe same heauen, one goes naked, another apparelled; and we haue all the most delicate part vncouered: and therefore a wandering person being asked, How he could goe so naked in Winter, answered, That our faces are alwaies naked, and he was all face: Yea many great personages haue euer gone with their heads vncouered, *Massinissa, Caesar, Hannibal, Seuerus*: and many nations there are, which goe to the warres and fight all naked: and the counsell that *Plato* giueth for the continuance of health is, neuer to couer either head or feet. And *Varro* saith, that when it was first ordained that men should vncouer their heads in the presence of the gods and of the magistrate, that it was rather for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the iniuries of the times, than for reuerence. Lastly, the inuention of couers and houles against the iniuries of heauen and men, is more ancient, more naturall, more vniuersall, than of garments, and common with many creatures, but an industrious search for victuall more naturall than either. Of the vse of garments and aliments hereafter. Lib. 3. c. 43.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Soule in generall.

BEhold heere a matter of all others most difficult, handled and discoursed by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians, Greeks, Arabians* and *Latines*: by our latter Writers more shallowly as all other Philosophy, but with great diuersitie of opinions, according to the diuersitie of Nations, Religions, Professions, without any certaine accord or resolution. The generall knowledge and discourse thereof may be referred to these ten points: The definition, Essence or Nature, Faculties and Actions, Vnitie or Pluralitie, Source, Entrance into the bodie, Residencetherein, Seat, Sufficiencie to exercise her functions, the End and Separation from the body.

It is first very hard to define, or truly to say what the soule is, as generally all other formes, because they are things relative

The Preface.

The Definition very difficult.

tiue which subsist not of themselves, but are parts of a whole, and this is the reason why there is such and so great diuersitie of definitions of them, whereof there is not any receiued without contradiction. *Aristotle* hath confuted twelue that were before him, and could hardly make good his owne.

2
Easie to say what
it is not.

It is easie to say what it is not : That it is not *Fire, Aire, Water* ; Nor the temperature of the *Four*e Elements, or qualities, or humors, which is alwaies changeable, without which a creature is and liues ; and besides that, this is an accident, the *Soule* a substance. Againe, Metals and things inanimate haue likewise a temperature of the *four*e Elements and first qualities. Neither is it bloud, (for there are many things animate and liuing without bloud, and many creatures die without the shedding of a drop of bloud.) Nor the beginning and cause of motion (for diuers things inanimate moue, as the adamant moues the iron, amber or iet straw ; medicines and roots of trees being cut and dried, draw and moue.) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Energie*, or perfection (for that word *Entelechia* is diuersly taken and interpreted) of a liuing body: for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe, as to liue, to see, to vnderstand is the action of the *Soule*. And it would likewise follow, that the *Soule* should be an accident, not a substance, and could not subsist without that body whereof it is the act and perfection, no more than the couer of an house may be without the house, and a relative without his correlative. To be briefe, it is to say what the soule doth and is to another, not what it is in it selfe.

3
Hard to say
what it is.

But to say what the *Soule* is, is very difficult : A man may simply say that it is an essentiall quickning forme, which giueth to the plant the vegetatiue or growing life ; to a beast a sensible life, which comprehendeth the vegetatiue ; to a man an intellectuall life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in numbers the greater contains the lesse, and in figures the *Pentagone* contains the *Tetragone*, and this the *Trigone*. I call it the intellectuall soule rather than the reasonable, which is comprehended in the intellectuall as the lesse in the great : for the reasonable in some sense and measure, according to the opinion of the greatest Philosophers and experience it selfe, is likewise in beasts, but not the intellectuall, as being more high.

high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus: Like a horse and mule in whom there is no understanding.* The Soule then is not the beginning or source, that word doth properly belong to the soueraigne first author, but an inward cause of life, motion, sense, vnderstanding. It moueth the body, and it selfe is not moued; as contrarily, the body is moued and moueth not at all: it moueth I say the body, and not it selfe, for nothing but God moueth it selfe; and whatsoeuer moueth it selfe is eternall and Lord of it selfe: and in that it moueth the body, it hath it not of it selfe, but from an higher cause.

Concerning the nature and essence of the Soule, I meane a humane Soule (for the Soule of a beast is without all doubt corporall, materiall, bred and borne with the matter, and with it corruptible) there is a question of greater importance than it seemeth: for some affirme it to be corporall, some incorporall: and this is very agreeable to reason, if a man bee not opinatiue. That it is corporall, see what the grounds are; *Spirits* and *Deuils*, good and ill, which are wholly separated from all matter are corporall, according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Diuines, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, *S. Basil*, *Gregory*, *Augustine*, *Damascene*; how much more the Soule of man, which hath society and is vnited to a matter? Their resolution is, that whatsoeuer is created, being compared vnto God, is grosse, corporall, materiall, and only God is incorporall; that euery spirit is a body and hath a bodily nature. Next vnto authority almost vniuersall the reason is irrefragable. Whatsoeuer is included in this finite world is finite, limited both in vertue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and naturall conditions of a body: for there is nothing but a body which hath a superficiall part, and is barred and fastened in a place. God only is wholly infinite, incorporall; the ordinary distinctions, *circumscriptivè*, *definitivè*, *effectivè*, are but verball, and in nothing either helpe or hurt the cause: for it alwaies stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the selfe same time that they are in a place they cannot bee elsewhere; and they are not in a place either infinite, or very great, or very little, but equall to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it.

4.

The nature and
essence of the
soule.

In homil. l. de
spir. l. 3. de l. b.
arb. Hom. de
Epiph.

it were not so, spirits could nor change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they doe : and so they should be immouable, indiuisible, indifferently in all. Now if it appeare that they change their place, the change conuicteth that they are moueable, diuisible, subiect vnto time and to the succession therof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a bodie. But because many simple men vnder this word corporall, do imagine visible, palpable, and thinke not that the pure aire, or fire without the flame or coale are bodies, haue therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both separated and humane are not corporall, as in truth they are not in that sense : for they are of an inuisible substance, whether airie, as the greatest part of Philosophers and Diuines affirme; or celestially, as some *Hebrewes* and *Arabiques* teach, calling by the selfe same name both the heauen and the spirit an essence proper to immortalitie; or whether (if they will haue it so) of a substance more subtile and delicate, yet they are alwaies corporall, since limited by place, moueable, subiect to motion and to times. Finally, if they were not corporall, they should not be passible and capable of suffering as they are : the humane receiueth from his bodie pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turne, as the bodie from the spirit and his passions many good qualities, many bad, vertues, vices, affections, which are all accidents : and all as well the spirits separated and Devils, as humane, are subiect to punishment and torments. They are therefore corporall : for there is nothing passible, that is not corporall, and it is onely proper vnto bodies to be subiect to accidents.

3.
The faculties
and actions of
the Soule.

Now the *Soule* hath a great number of vertues and facultes, as many almost as the body hath members : There are some in plants, more in beasts, most in man, to know, to liue, to feele, to moue, to desire, to allure, to assemble, to retaine, to concoct, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reiect, to see, to heare, to taste, to smell, to speake, to breathe, to ingender, to thinke, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, iudge; all which are no parts of the *Soule* : for so it should be diuisible, and should consist vpon accidents, but they are her naturall qualities. The actions come after and fol-

follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to the doctrine of Great *S. Denys* followed of all, that is, we must consider in spirituall creatures three things, *Essence, Facultie, operation*: By the latter, which is the action, we know the facultie, and by it the essence. Tho actions may be hindered and wholly cease without any preiudice at all vnto the soule, and her faculties, as the *Science* and faculty of Painting remaineth entire in the Painter, although his hands bee bound, and so bee made vnable to paint: But if the faculties themselves perish, the *Soule* must needs bee gone, no otherwise then *Fire* is no longer fire hauing lost the facultie of warming.

The essence and nature of the *Soule* being after a sort explicated, one of the busiest questions that belongeth vnto the *Soule* offereth it selfe to our consideration, that is, whether there bee in a creature, especially in man, one soule or many? Touching which point there are diuers opinions, but may be reduced into three. Some of the *Greekes*, and almost all the *Arabiques* imitating them, haue thought (not onely in euery particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortall *Soule*. The *Egyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrary, that there was a pluralitie of soules in euery creature, all diuers and distinct, two in euery beast, and three in man; two mortal, the vegetatiue & sensible, and the third intellectuall, immortall. The third opinion as the meane betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all nations is, that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, not more. In euery of these opinions there is some difficulty. I leaue the first, as being already sufficiently confuted and reiected. The pluralitie of soules in euery creature and man, on the one side seemeth very strange and absurd in Philosophie, for that were to giue many formes to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances and subiects in one, two beasts in one, three men in one; on the other side it giueth credit and helpeth much our beleefe touching the immortality of the intellectuall *Soule*; for there being three soules, there can follow no inconuenience, that two of them should die, and the third continue immortall. The vnitie of the *Soule* seemeth to resist the immortality

The vnitie of
the soule.

mortality thereof; for how can one and the same indiuisible, be in a mortall part and an immortall? as neuerthelesse *Aristotle* would haue it. Doubtesse it seemeth that of necessitie the *Soule* must be either altogether mortall, or altogether immortall, which are two very foule absurdities. The first aboliseth all religion and sound Philosophy: the second maketh beasts likewise immortall. Neuerthelesse it seemes to bee more true that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, for the plurality and diuersity of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplieth in any thing this vnitie, no more than the diuersity of riuers the vnitie of one spring or fountaine, nor the diuersitie of effects in the Sunne, to heat, to enlighten, to melt, to drie, to whiten, to make blacke, to dissipate the vnitie and simplicitie of the Sunne; for should they, there would bee a great number of soules in one man, and Sunnes in one world. Neither doth this essentiall vnitie of the *Soule* any thing hinder the immortality of the humane *Soule* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, which are but accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soule* not hauing a subiect or instrument whereby to doe it, but the third intellectuall *Soule* is alwaies well, because for it there is no neede of the body, though whilest it is within it, it make vse thereof to exercise it selfe; insomuch that if it did returne vnto the body, it were onely againe to exercise her vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, as we see in those that are raised vnto life to liue heere below, not in those that are raised to liue elsewhere, for such bodies need not to liue by the exercise of such faculties: Euen as there is no want or decay in the Sunne, but it continueth in it selfe wholly the same, though during a whole eclips it neither shine nor warme, nor performe his other effects in those places that are subiect vnto it.

The source of
the soule.

Hauing shewed the vnity of the soule in euery subiect, let vs see from whence it cometh, and how it entereth into the body. The originall beginning of soules is not held to be the same of all, I meane of humane soules; for the vegetatiue and sensitiue, of Plants and beasts, is by the opinion of all, altogether materiall, and in the seed, for which cause it is
likewise

likewise mortall. But concerning the *Soule* of man there are foure celebrated opinions. According to the first, which is of the *Stoicks*, held by *Philo Iudæus*, and afterward by the *Maniches*, *Priscilianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought forth as a part or parcell of the substance of God, who inspireth it into the bodie, allcaging to their best aduantage the words of *Moyse*, *Inspirauit in faciem ejus spiraculum vite*: He breathed in his face breath of life. The second opinion, held by *Textullian*, *Apollinaris*, the *Luciferians*, and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soule* proceedeth and is deriued from the soules of our parents with the seed, as the *Soule* of a beast. The third opinion, which is that of the *Pythagorians* and *Platonists* held by many *Rabbins* and *Doctors* of the *Iewes*, and afterwards by *Origen* and other *Doctors*, teacheth that the soules of men haue beene from the beginning all created of God, made of nothing and reserued in heauen, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receiue them: and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the soules of men here below, were either well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sicke, according to that life which they had led aboue in heauen, before they were incorporated. And truly the master of *Wisdome* himselfe sheweth, that the *Soule* of the two, was the elder, and before the body, *Eram puer, bonam adolem sortitus, imo bonus cum essem, corpus incontaminatum reperi*. I was a boy, who by lot obtained a good disposition and nature, yea each being good, I obtained also an undefiled body. The fourth opinion received and held through all Christendome is, that they are all created of God, and infused into bodies prepared, in such manner that the creation and infusion is done at one and the same instant. These foure opinions are all affirmatiue, but there is a fifth much retained which determineth nothing, and is content to say, that it is a secret unknowne to man, of which opinion was *S. Austin*, *Greg.* and others, who neuerthelesse thought the two latter affirmatiue opinions more like to be true than the former.

De orig. Epist.
28. 157.

6

Let vs now see when and how the *Soule* entereth into the bodie, whether altogether at one instant, or successiue; I meane

The entrance of
the soule into the
body.

meane the humane *Soule* ; for of that of a beast there is no doubt, since it is naturall in the seed, according to *Aristotle* (whom most doe follow) that is by succession of times and by degrees, as an artificiall forme which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other ; the head, afterwards the throat, the belly, the legs, insomuch that the vegetatiue and sensitive *Soule* altogether materiall and corporall, is in the seed, and with the descent of the parents, which fashioneth the bodie in the matrix: and that done, the reasonable *Soule* arriueth from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three soules, neither together nor successiue, neither is the vegetatiue corrupted by the arriuall of the sensitive, nor the sensitive by the arriuall of the intellectuall ; but it is but one *Soule* which is made, finished and perfected in that time which nature hath prescribed. Others are of opinion, that the soule entreth with all her faculties at one instant, that is to say then, when all the bodie is furnished with organs, formed, and wholly finished, and that vntill then there was no *Soule*, but only a naturall vertue and *Energie*, an essentiall forme of the seed, which working by the spirits which are in the said seed, with the heat of the matrix and materiall blood, as with instruments, doe forme and build vp the body, prepare all the members, nourish, moue and increase them: which being done, this *Energie* and seminall forme vanisheth and is quite lost, so that the seed ceaseth to be seed, losing it forme, by the arriuall of another more noble, which is the humane *Soule*, which causeth that which was seed, or an *Embryon*, that is, a substance without shape, to be no longer seed, but a man.

7
The residence of
the Soule in the
Bodie.

The *Soule* being entred into the bodie, we are likewise to know what kinde of existence therein it hath, and how it is there resident. Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, or how to ioyne and vnite the *Soule* with the bodie, make it to abide and reside therein, as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his ship, a Coach-man in his coach: but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soule* should not be the forme, nor inward and essentiall part of a creature, or of a man, it should haue no need of the members of the bodie to abide there, nor any feeling at all of the contagion of the body, but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the bodie, of it selfe subsisting,
which

which at it pleasure might come and goe, and separate it selfe from the body, without the distinction and diminution of all the functions thereof, which are all absurdities. The *Soule* is in the bodie, as the forme in the matter, extended and spread thorowout the body, giuing life, motion, sense to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one intire subiect, which is the creature, and there is no meane or middle that doth vnite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the forme there is no middle, according to all Philosophie. The *Soule* then is all in all the bodie; I adde not (though it be commonly said) and all in euery part of the bodie: for that implieth a contradiction, and diuiderh the *Soule*.

Now notwithstanding the *Soule*, as it is said, be diffused and spread thorow the whole bodie, yet neuerthelesse, to excite and exercise it faculties, it is more specially and expressly in some parts of the bodie, than in others; in which it is said to haue place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without Soule without forme. And as it hath foure principall and chiefe faculties, so men giue it foure seats, that is, those foure regions, which we haue noted before in the composition of the bodie, the foure first principall instruments of the soule, the rest referre themselves vnto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the ingendring faculty to the ingendring parts, the naturall to the liuer, the vitall to the heart, the animall and intellectuall to the braine.

8
The seat and instruments of the Soule.

We are now come to speake in generall of the exercise of the faculties of the *Soule*, whereunto the soule of it selfe is wise and sufficient, insomuch that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, and to exercise it functions as it ought, if it be not hindred, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, That nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistres which maketh a man apt to all things: *In fita sunt nobis omnium artium ac virtutum semina, magisterq; ex occulto Deus producit ingenium.* We haue, as it were, sown in vs the seed of all arts and vertues, and God as a good master doth produce, extend, and teach our wit: which is easily shewed by induction. The vegetatiue soule without instruction formeth the body in the matrix

9
The sufficiencie of the Soule for the exercise of her faculties.

trix with excellent Art, afterwards it nourisheth it, and makes it grow, drawing the victuall vnto it, retaining and concealing it, afterwards casting out the excrements, it ingendreth and reformeth the parts that faile; these are things that are scene in plants, beaſts, and men. The ſenſitiue *Soule* of it ſelfe without inſtruction, maketh both beaſts and men to moue their feet, their hands and other members; to ſtretch, to rub, to ſhake, to moue the lips, to preſſe the dug, to cry, to laugh. The reaſonable, of it ſelfe, not according to the opinion of *Plaro*, by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body; nor according to *Ariſtotle*, by reception and acquiſition; comming from without by the ſenſes, being of it ſelfe as a white paper, void of impreſſion, although that ſerue to good purpoſe; but of it ſelfe without inſtruction, imagineth, vnderſtandeth, retaineth, reaſoneth, diſcourſeth. But becauſe this of the reaſonable *Soule* ſeemeth to bee more difficult than the other, and woundeth in ſome ſort *Ariſtotle* himſelfe, it ſhall be handled againe in his place, in the diſcourſe of the intellectuall *Soule*.

10

The ſeparation
of the body two-
fold.

1. Naturall and
ordinary.

It remaineth that wee ſpeake of the laſt point, that is, of the ſeparation of the *Soule* from the body, which is after a diuers ſort and manner; the one, and the ordinary is naturall by death, and this not the ſame in beaſts and men: for by the death of beaſts, the *Soule* dieth, and is annihilated, according vnto that rule, by the corruption of the ſubiect the forme periſheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the *Soule* is ſeparated from the body, but is not loſt, but remaineth in-
as much as it is immortall.

2. The immor-
talitie of the
Soule.

The immortality of the *Soule* is a thing vniuerſally, religi-ouſly, (for it is the principall foundation of all religion) and peaceably receiued and concluded vpon throughout the world, I meane by an outward and publike profeſſion; ſeriously and inwardly, not ſo; witneſſe ſo many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers, in the world: yea the *Saducees*, the greateſt Lords of the Iewes, did not ſticke with open mouth to deny it; though a thing profitable to be beſeued, and in ſome ſort proued by many naturall and humane reaſons, but properly and better eſtabliſhed by the authority of religion than any other way. It ſeemeth that there is in a man a kinde

of

of inclination and disposition of nature to beleue it, for man desireth naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea furious care and loue of our posterity and succession. Again two things there are that giue strength thereunto, and make it more plausible, the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortalitie of our name, which how vaine so euer it be, carrieth a great credit in the world : the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane iustice, remaining alwaies opposite to the diuine iustice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death : so that besides that a man is altogether carried and disposed by nature to desire it, and consequently to beleue it, the Iustice of God doth conelude it.

From hence we are to learne that there are three differences and degrees of *Soules*, an order required euen to the perfection of the vniuerse. Two extremes, the one is that which being altogether materiall, is plunged, and ouerwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithall corruptible, which is the *Soule* of a beast : the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or societie with the matter or body, as the soule of immortall Angels or Deuils. In the middle as the meane betwixt these two, is the humane soule, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is ioyned with it, and may likewise subliſt and liue without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortality ; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformitie too absurd in nature, dishonourable to the author, and a kinde of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extremes, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle ; that is partly the one and partly the other : there must needs be one that ties and ioynes the two ends or extremes together, and that can be none but man. Below the lowest and wholly materiall, is that which hath no *Soule* at all, as stones ; aboue the highest and immortall, is the eternall only God.

The other separation not naturall nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impulsions and at times, is very difficult to vnderstand, and perplex. It is that which is done by extrasies

D

and

3
The prooffe.

4
2. Not naturall.

and rauishments, which is diuers and done by different meanes: for there is a separation that is diuine, such as the Scripture reporteth vnto vs, of *Daniel, Zachary, Esdras, Ezechiel, S. Paul*. There is another that is dæmoniacall, procured by deuils, and good spirits and bad, as we reade of many, as of *Iohn D'vns*, called *Lescot*, who being in his extasie a long time held for dead, was caried into the aire, and cast downe vpon the earth; but so soone as he felt the blow that he receiued by the fall, he came to himselfe: but by reason of the great store of bloud which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardantellèth* it of himselfe, and of his father, and it continueth autentiquely verified in many and diuers parts of the world, of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weake and women possessed, whose bodies remaine not only without motion, and the beating of the heart and arteries, but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blowes, either with iron or fire, that could be giuen them, and afterwards their soules being returned they haue felt great paine in their limmes, and recounted that which they haue seene and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is a humane separation, which proceedeth either from that malady which *Hipocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called the falling sicknesse, *Morbus comitialis*, the signe whereof is a foming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed; but in stead thereof they haue a stinking sauour, or it is occasioned by stiptickes, stupifying and benumbing medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it selfe with too deepe an attention about a thing, carieth away the whole strength and power of the Soule. Now in these three kindes of extasies or rauishments, *Diuine, Diabolicall, Humane*, the question is, Whether the Soule be truly and really separated from the body; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort imployed and busied about some outward thing which is forth of the body, that it forgetteth it owne bodie; whereby followeth a kinde of intermission and vacation of the actions and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the diuine extasie, the *Apostle* speaking of himselfe and his owne act, dares not define any thing, *Si in corpore vel extra corpus nescio, Deus scit. Whether in the body,*

body, or without, I know not, God knoweth. An instruction that may serue for all others, and for other separations of lesse qualitie. Touching the *Damoniacall* extasie, as not to feele a blow be it neuer so great, to report what hath beene done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent coniectures of a true separation from the bodie, but not altogether necessarie: for the deuill can so alienate and occupie the soule within the bodie, that it shall not seeme to haue any action or commerce with the bodie for some certaine time, and in that time so besotteth the soule by presenting things vnto the imagination that haue beene done as farre off, that a man may speake and discourse thereof: for to affirme that certainly the *Soule* doth wholly depart and abandon the bodie, Nature is too bold and foolehardie: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginatiue or intellectuall is carried out, and that the vegetatiue soule remaineth, were more to intangle our selues; for so the *Soule* in it essence should be diuided, or the accident onely should be caried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane extasie, doubtlesse there is no separation of the *Soule*, but onely a suspension of the patent and outward actions thereof.

What becometh of the *Soule*, and what the state thereof is after the naturall separation by death, diuers men thinke diuersly: and this point belongeth not to the subiect of this booke. The *Metempsychose* and transanimation of *Pythagoras* hath in some sort beene embraced by the *Academicks*, *Stoicks*, *Egyptians*, and others; but yet not of all in the same sense: for some doe admit it only for the punishment of the wicked, as we reade of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the iudgement of God. Others, and some great, haue thought that good soules, being separated, become Angels, the wicked, Devils. It had beene more pleasing to haue said, Like vnto them; *Non nubent, federunt sicut Angeli. They marry not, but shall be as the Angels of God.* Some haue affirmed, that the soules of the wicked, at the end of a certaine time, were reduced to nothing. But the truth of all this we must learne from Religion, and diuines, who speake hereof more cleerely.

II
The estate of
the Soule after
death.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Soule in particular; and first of the vegetative facultie.

I
The faculties
of the Soule.

2
Of the vege-
table and bir
subalternals.

AFTER this generall description of the *Soule*, in these ten points, we must speake thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties thereof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetative, Sensitiue, Apprehensible or Imaginative, Appetible, Intellectiue, which is the soueraigne *Soule* and truly humane. Vnder euery one of these three are diuers others which are subiect vnto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their rancke.

Of the vegetable and basest *Soule*, which is euen in plants, I will not speake much; it is the proper subiect of Physicians, of health and sicknesse. Let me only say, that vnder this there are contained other three great faculties; which follow one the other: for the first serueth the second, and the second the third; but the third neither of the former. The first then is the nourishing facultie, for the conseruation of the *Individuum* or particular person, which diuers others doe serue, as the *Attractive* of the victuall, the *Concoctiue*, the *Digestiue*, separating the good & proper, from the naught and hurtfull; the *Retentive* and the *Expulsive* of superfluities: The second, the increasing or growing facultie, for the perfection and due quantitie of the *Individuum*: The third, is the *Generatiue*, for the conseruation of the kinde. Whereby we see, that the two first are for the *Individuum*, and worke within in the body; the third is for the kinde, and hath it effect and operation without in another body, and therefore is more worthy than the other, and commeth neerer to a facultie more high, which is the *Sensitiue*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it selfe.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sensitiue facultie.

Six things re-
quired to the
exercise of this
facultie.

IN the exercise of this facultie and function of the Senses these six things doe concur, whereof foure are within and two without. That is to say, the *Soule*, as the first efficient cause.

cause. The facultie of *Sense* (which is a qualitie of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe) that is, of perceiuing and apprehending outward things; which is done after a fīue-fold manner, which we call *The fīue senses* (of this number wee shall speake hereafter) that is to say, *Hearing, Seeing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching*. The corporall instrument of the *Sense*, whereof there are fīue, according to the number of the *Senses*; the Eye, the Eare, the high concauitie of the Nose, which is the entrance to the first ventricles of the braine, the Tongue, the whole Skin of the body. The *Spirit* which ariseth from the braine the fountaine of the sensitiue *Soule*, by certaine sinewes in the said instruments, by which spirit and instrument the soule exerciseth her facultie. The sensible *Species*, or object offered vnto the instruments, which is different according to the diuersitie of the sense. The object of the eie or sight according to the common opinion is colour, which is an adherent quality in bodies, whereof there are six simple, as *White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Greene and Blew*; some adde a seuenth, which is blacke; but to say the truth, that is no colour, but a priuation, being like vnto darknesse, as the other colours more or lesse vnto the light. Of compound colours the number is infinite: but to speake more truly, the true object is light, which is neuer without colour, and without which the colours are inuisible. Now the light is a quality which commeth forth of a luminous body, which makes both it selfe visible and all things else; and if it be terminated and limited by some solid body, it reboundeth and redoubleth it beames: otherwise if it passe without any stop or termination; it cannot be seene except it be in the roote of that light or luminous body from whence it came, nor make any thing else to bee seene. Of the Eare or Hearing, the object is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies, and it is diuers: the pleasant and melodious sweetneth and appeaseth the spirit, and for it sake the body too, and driues away maladies from them both: the sharpe and penetrant doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of Tasting the object is a sauour or smacke, whereof there are six diuers simple kindes, *Sweet, Sowre, Sharpe, Tart, Salt, Bitter*; but there are many compounds. Of smell, the object is an odour

or sent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous object ascending by the nose to the first ventricles of the braine: the strong and violent hurteth the braine, as an ill sound the eare: the temperate and good doth contrariwise reioyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching, the object is heat, cold, drouth, moisture either pleasant and polite, or sharpe and smarting, motion, rest, tickling.

6 The middle or space betwixt the object and the instrument, which is the Aire neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be.

2 So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth it selfe by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and that therein the spirit assisting, receiveth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion; and the senses are not purely passive: for notwithstanding they receive, and are stricken by the object, yet neuertheless in some sense and measure they doe worke or react in apprehending the species and image of the object proposed.

3 In former times and before *Aristotle*, they did make a difference betwixt the sense of *Seeing* and the rest of the senses, and they all held, that the sight was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye the beames thereof vnto the outward objects, and that the other senses were passive, receiving the sensible object: but after *Aristotle*, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds and images of things, and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered. There is more and more excellent matter to be deliuered of the senses hereafter.

4 Now besides these five particular senses which are without, there is within the common sense; where all the diuers objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together, to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other, which the particular senses could not doe, being euery one attentive to his proper object, and not able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

CHAP. X.

Of the senses of Nature.

All knowledge is begun in vs by the senses; so say our Schoole-men: but it is not altogether true, as we shall see heereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoil farther backe: euery one of them is a captaine & soueraigne lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great, although the one haue a farre greater extent, and traine, and affaires, than the other, as a little king is as well a soueraigne in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate.

1
The importance
of the naturall
senses.

It is an opinion amongst vs, that there are but five senses of Nature, because wee marke but five in vs; but yet there may very well be more, and it is greatly to be doubted that there are; but it is impossible for vs to know them, to affirme them, or to denie them, because a man shall neuer know the want of that sense which he hath neuer had. There are many beasts which liue a full and perfect life, which want some one of our five senses; and a creature may liue without the five senses, saue the sense of *Feeling*, which is onely necessary vnto life. We liue very commodiously with five, and yet perhaps we doe want one, or two, or three, and yet it cannot be knowne. One sense cannot discouer another: and if a man want one by nature, yet he knowes not which way to affirme it. A man borne blinde can neuer conceiue that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight: it may be he will say that he would see, but that is because hee hath heard say and learned of others, that it is to be desired: the reason is because the senses are the first gates, and entrances to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more than the five that he hath, he cannot know how to iudge whether there be more in Nature; yet he may haue more. Who knoweth whether the difficulties that we finde in many of the works of

2
The number.

Nature, and the effects of creatures, which wee cannot vnderstand, doe proceed from the want of some sense that wee haue not? Of the hidden properties which we see in many things, a man may say that there are sensible faculties in Nature proper to iudge and apprehend them; but yet he must confesse that we haue them not, and that the ignorance of such things proceedeth from our owne default. Who knoweth whether it be some particular sense, that discovereth in the Cocke the houre of mid-night and morning, and that moues him to crow? Who taught some beasts to chuse certaine herbes for their cure, and many such like wonders as these are? No man can affirme or deny, say this it is, or that it is.

3
Their sufficiency.

Some haue assaied to giue a reason of this number of the five senses, and to proue the sufficiency of them, by distinguishing and diuersly comparing their outward obiects; which are, either all neere the body or distant from it: if neere, but yet remaining without, it is the sense of Touching; if they enter, it is Taste; if they be more distant and present by a right line, it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflection, it is the Hearing. A man might better haue said thus, That these five senses being appointed for the seruice of an entire man, some are entirely for the body, that is to say, *Taste* and *Touching*; that, in that it entereth; this, in that it remains without. Others first and principall for the soule, as sight and hearing: the sight for inuention, the Hearing for acquisition and communication, & one in the middle, for the middle spirits, and ties of the soule and body, which is the *Smell*. Againe, they answer to the foure Elements, and their qualities: The sense of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the aire; of *Taste* to the water and moisture; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and partakes both of water and fire, by reason of the bright splendor of the eie. Againe they say that there are so many senses as there are kinds of sensible things, which are colour, sound, odour, taste or saour, and the fift which hath no proper name, the obiect of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plaine, and so forth. But men deceive themselues, for the number of the senses is not to bee iudged by the number of sensible things, which are no cause that there

there are so many. By this reason there should be many more, and one and the same sense should receiue many diuers heads of obiects, and one and the same obiect be apprehended by diuers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus* are distinguished from the five Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attaine to the knowledge of things, but by the five Senses, and that Nature hath giuen it so many, because it was necessary for it end and benefit.

Their comparisons are diuers in dignity and nobilitie. The Sense of *Seeing* excelleth all the rest in five things: It apprehenderth farther off, and extendeth it selfe euen to the fixed starres. It hath more variety of obiects, for to all things & generally in all, there is light and colour, the obiects of the eie. It is more exquisite, exact and particular euen in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending euen in a moment and without motion, euen the heavens themselves: in the other senses there is a motion that requireth time. It is more diuine, and the markes of Diuinitie are many. Liberty incomparable aboue others, whereby the eie seeth, or seeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoile it selfe, and not to suffer it selfe to be seene; Actiuitie and abilitie to please or displease, to signifie and insinuate our thoughts, wils and affections: for the eye speaketh and striketh, it serueth for a tongue and a hand; the other Senses are purely passive. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the priuation of the obiect thereof, which is darknesse, brings feare, and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himselfe robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of companie. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spirituall, and the seruice thereof more inward. But the particular comparison of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, and of speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the Sense of Feeling receiueth greatest griefe, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily the Taste

Taste great delight, and almost no griefe. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is vniuersall, spread thorow the whole bodie, to the end the bodie should feelee heat and cold; the organs of the rest are assigned to a certaine place and member.

5

*The weaknesse
and vncertain-
nesse of the
Senses.*

From the weaknesse and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error and mistakings: for sithens that by their meanes and mixture we attaine to all knowledge, if they deceiue vs in their report, we haue no other helpe to sticke vnto. But who can say, or accuse them, that they doe deceiue vs, considering that by them we begin to learne and to know? Some haue affirmed that they doe neuer deceiue vs, and when they seeme to doe it, the fault proceedeth from some thing else; and that we must rather attribute it to any other thing than to the senses. Others haue said cleane contrary, that they are all false, and can teach vs nothing that is certaine. But the middle opinion is the more true.

6

*The mutuall de-
ceit of the spirit
and senses.*

Now whether the Senses be false or not, at the least it is certaine that they deceiue, yea ordinarily enforce the discourse, the reason, and in exchange are againe mocked by it. Doe then but consider what kinde of knowledge and certaintie a man may haue, when that within, and that without is full of deceit and weaknesse, and that the principall parts thereof, the essentiall instruments of science doe deceiue one another. That the senses doe deceiue and enforce the vnderstanding, it is plaine in those senses whereof some doe kindle with furie, others delight and sweeten, others tickle the *Soule*. And why doe they that cause themselues to be let blood, lanced, cauterised and burnt, turne away their eies, but that they doe well know that great authoritie that the Senses haue ouer their reason? The sight of some bottomlesse depth or precipitate downfall, astonisheth even him that is settled in a firme and sure place: and to conclude, doth not the Sense vanquish and quite ouercome all the beautifull resolutions of vertue and patience? So on the other side, the senses are likewise deceiued by the vnderstanding, which appeareth by this, that the *Soule* being stirred with Choler, Loue, Hatred, or any other passion, our senses doe see and heare euery thing others than they are, yea sometimes our senses are altogether dulled by the passions of the *Soule*, and it seemeth that the *Soule* retireth and shutteth yp
the

the operation of the Senses, and that the spirit being otherwise employed, the eie discerneth not that which is before it, and which it seeth: yea, the sight and the reason iudge diuersly of the greatnesse of the Sunne, the Starres, nay of the figure of a staffe any thing distant.

In the Senses of Nature the beasts haue as well part as we, and sometimes excell vs: for some haue their hearing more quicke than man, some their sight, others their smell, others their taste: and it is held, that in the sense of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smell, the Dogge; of Taste, the Ape; of Feeling, the Tortuis: neuerthelesse, the preheminance of that sense of Touch is giuen vnto man, which of all the rest is the most brutish. Now if the Senses are the meanes to attaine vnto knowledge, and that beasts haue a part therein, yea sometimes the better part, why should not they haue knowledge?

7
The senses common to man and beast, but diuersly.

But the Senses are not the only instruments of knowledge, neither are our Senses alone to be consulted or beleueed: for if beasts by their Senses iudge otherwise of things than we by ours, as doubtlesse they doe; who must be beleueed? Our spetle cleanseth and drieth our wounds, it killeth the Serpent; What then is the true qualitie of our spetle? To drie and to cleanse, or to kill? To iudge well of the operation of the senses, we must be at some agreement with the beasts, nay with our selues: for the eie pressed downe and shut, seeth otherwise than in it ordinary state; the eare stopt, receiueth the objects otherwise than when it is open: an infant seeth, heareth, tasteth, otherwise than a man; a man than an old man; a sound than a sicke; a wise than a foole. In this great diuersitie and contrarietie what shall we hold for certaine? Seeing that one sense beliet another, a picture seemeth to be held vp to the view, and the hands are folded together.

8
The iudgement of the Senses hard and dangerous.

CHAP. XI.

Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.

THESE are the three most rich and excellent iewels of all those that are in this muster, and of whose preheminance it is disputed. Touching their Organes, that of the Sight

I
A comparison of the three.

in

in it composition and forme is admirable, and of a liuely and shining beautie, by reason of the great varietie and subtiltie of so many small parts or pieces ; and therefore it is said that the eye is one of those parts of the bodie which doe first begin to beformed, and the last that is finished : and for this verie cause it is so delicate, and said to be subiect to fixe score maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the sense of Hearing to many great aduantages. For the seruice of the bodie the Sight is most necessary, and therefore doth more import a beast than Hearing. But for the spirit, the Hearing challengeth the vpper place. The Sight serueth well for the inuention of things, which by it haue almost all beene discouered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Againe, the Sight is not capable but of corporall things and particular, and that only of their crust or superficial part ; it is the instrument of ignorant men and vnlearned, *qui mouentur ad id quod adest, quodque prasens est : Who are moued with the present object.*

2

The prehem-
nencie of hear-
ing.

The Eare is a spirituall Sense, it is the Intermedler, and Agent of the vnderstanding, the instrument of wise and spirituall men, capable not only of the secrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriueth not, but also of the generall kindes, and of all spirituall things and diuine, in which the Sight serueth rather to disturbe than to helpe : and therefore we see not only many blinde, great and wise, but some also that are deprived of their sight to become great Philosophers : but of such as are deafe we neuer heard of any. This is the way by which a man entreth the fortresse, and makes himselfe master of the place, and imploietieth his spirit in good or ill ; witness the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her duty of chastitie by the sound of a Harpe : and *Dauid* by the selfe-same meane chased away the euill spirit from *Saul*, and restored him to health : and that skilfull player of the Flute, that sweetned the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brieft, Science, Truth, and Vertue haue no other entrance into the Soule, but by the Eare : Christianitie it selfe teacheth that faith and saluation commeth by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, than helpe thereunto ; that faith is the beleeve of those things
that

that are not seene, which beleefe is acquired by hearing ; and it calleth such as are apprentices or nouices therein, Auditors, ~~and~~ catechised. Let me adde this one word, that the Hearing giueth succour and comfort in darknesse, and to such as are asleepe, that by the sound they may be awaked, and so prouide for their preseruatiō. For all these reasons haue the wisest so much commended Hearing, the pure and virgin gardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man, as for the safety of a Citie, the gates and wals are garded that the enimie enter not.

Speech is peculiarly giuen vnto man, an excellent present and very necessary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth : it is the interpreter and image of the Soule, *animi index & speculum*, the messenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within issueth forth, and committeth it selfe to the the view, all things come forth of darknesse and secret corners into the light, and the spirit it selfe makes it selfe visible : and therefore an ancient Philosopher said once to a childe, Speake that I may see thee, that is to say, the inside of thee. As vessels are knowne whether they be broken or whole, full or emptie, by the sound, and mettals by the touch ; so man by his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is neere the heart is the tongue by the root thereof ; so that which comes neere vnto our thought, is our speech : for from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. In regard of him which receiueth it, it is a powerfull master, an imperious commander, which entrencheth the fortresse, possesseth it selfe of the possessor, stirreth him vp, animateth, exasperateth, appealeth him, maketh him sad, merrie, imprinteth in him whatsoeuer passion, it handleth and feedeth the Soule of the hearer, and makes it pliable to euery sense ; it makes him blush, wax pale, laugh, crie, tremble for feare, mad with choler, to leape for ioy, and pierceth him thorow with passion. In regard of all, Speech is the hand of the spirit, wherewith, as the bodie by his, it taketh and giueth, it asketh counsell and succour and giueth it. It is the great Intermedler and Huckster : by it we trafficke, *Merx à Mercurio*, peace is handled, affaires are managed, Sciences and the good of the spirit are distributed, it is the band

3
The force and
authority of
Spee. h.

Of a good and
euill tongue.

Prouerb.

band and cement of humane societie (so that it be vnderstood: For, saith one, A man were better to be in the companie of a dog that he knoweth, than in the companie of a man whose language he knoweth not, *Vt externus alieno, non fit hominis vice.*) As a stranger vnto a stranger, and not in place of a man. To be brieft, it is the instrument of whatsoeuer is good or ill, *Vita & mors in manibus lingue*: life and death is in the power of the tongue: There is nothing better, nothing worse than the tongue. The tongue of a wise man is the doore of a royall Cabinet, which is no sooner opened, but incontinently a thousand diuersities present themselues to the eie, euery one more beautifull than other, come from the *Indies, Peru, Arabia*; So a wise man produceth and rangeth them in good order, sentences, and Aphorismes of Philosophie, similitudes, examples, histories, wise sayings drawne from all the mines, and treasuries old and new, *Qui profert de thesauro suo noua & vetera*, who brings forth of his treasure old and new things, which serue for a rule of good manners, of policie, and all the parts both of life and of death, which being applied in their times and to good purpose, bring with it great delight, great beautie and vtility, *Mala aurea in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore suo*. Like golden apples in beds of silver, so are words spoken in due season. The mouth of a wicked man is a stincking and contagious pit, a slanderous tongue murdereth the honour of another, it is a sea and vniuersitie of euils, worse than fetters, fire, poison, death, hell, *Uniuersitas iniquitatis, malum inquietum, venenum mortiferum, ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, utilis potius infernus quam illa*. The generalitie of iniquitie, an vnquiet euill, a deadly poison, a fire consuming all, whose death is most wicked and more vnprofitable than hell it selfe.

4
The correspondency of Hearing and Speech.

Now these two, Hearing and Speech answer and are accommodated the one to the other, there is great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by nature in one and the same subiect, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soule doth trafficke, and hath her intelligence: By these two, the soules are powred the one into the other, as vessels when the mouth of the one is applied to the entrie of the other: So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deafe and dumbe, the

the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable : Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiveth all things from without, and conceiveth as the female : Speech is the gate to goe forth, by it the spirit acteth and bringeth forth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints or irons together, there comes forth the sacred fire of truth, for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, and purifie and cleanse themselves, and all manner of knowledge comes to perfection. But Hearing is the first, for there can nothing come forth of the soule, but that which first entreteth, and therefore he that by nature is altogether deafe, is likewise dumbe. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moueables and vtensiles, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distributethem, so that the good and ill of the tongue and almost of the whole man, dependeth vpon the eare : He that heares well, speakes well, and he that heares ill, speakes ill. Of the vse and gouernment of the tongue hereafter, *Lib. 3. Chap. 43.*

CHAP. XII.

Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitiue.

THE fantasticke or imaginative facultie, hauing recollected, and withdrawne the kindes and images apprehended by the senses, retaineth and reserueth them ; in such sort that the obiects being absent and farre distant, yea a man sleeping, and his senses being bound and shut vp, it presenteth them to the spirit and thought, *Phantasmata idola, seu imagines dicuntur ; The Phantasmes are called Idols, images and representations of things*, and doe almost worke that within in the vnderstanding, which the obiect doth without in the sense.

The memoratiue facultie is the Gardian and Register of all the species or kindes and images, apprehended by the sense, retired and sealed vp by the imagination.

The Appetitiue faculty seeketh and pursueth those things, which seeme good and conuenient.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the intellectuall facultie and truly humane.

1
The seat and
instrument of
the reasonable
Soule.

TWO things are to be knowne, before we enter into this discourse, the seat or instrument of this intellectuall facultie, and the Action. The seat of the reasonable soule, *ubi sedet pro tribunali, where he sitteth as in his throne or tribunall seat*, is the braine and not the heart, as before *Plato* and *Hippocrates* it was commonly thought, for the heart hauing feeling and motion, is not capable of wisdom.

Now the braine which is farre greater in man than in all other creatures, if it be well and in such manner made and disposed, that the reasonable soule may worke and exercise it powers, it must come neere vnto the forme of a ship, and must not be round, nor too great nor too little, although the greater be lesse vicious. It must be composed of a substance and parts subtile, delicate and delieious, well ioyned and vnited without separation, hauing foure little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals betweene and behinde them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and coniunction of the vitall spirits, afterwards to be made animall and caried to the three ventricles before, wherein the reasonable soule doth exercise it faculties, which are three, *Vnderstanding, Memorie, Imagination*, which doe not exercise their powers apart and distinctly, each one in each ventricle, as some haue commonly thought, but in common all three together in all three, and in euery of them, according to the manner of the outward senses, which are double and haue two ventricles, in each of which the senses doe wholly worke, whereby it comes to passe that he that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the pallsie) ceaseth not neuerthelesse to exercise all the three; though more weakly, which he could not doe, if euery facultie had his chamber or ventricle apart.

2
The reasonable
Soule is organ-
icall.

Some haue thought that the reasonable Soule was not organically, that is, had no need of any corporall instrument to exercise

exercise it functions, thinking thereby the better to proue the immortalitie of the *Soule*. But not to enter into a labyrinth of discourse, ocular and ordinarie experience disproueth this opinion, and conuinceth the contrary; For it is well known that all men vnderstand not, nor reason not alike and after one manner, but with great diuersity; yea one and the same man may be so changed, that at one time hee may reason better than at another, in one age, one estate and disposition better than in another, such a one better in health than in sicknesse, and another better in sicknesse than in health, one and the same man, at one and the same time, may be strong in iudgement and weake in imagination. From whence can these diuersities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence commeth it that drunkennesse, the bite of a mad dog, a burning feuer, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomacke, and other accidents peruert and turne topsie turuy the iudgement, intellectuall spirit, and all the wisedome of Greece, yea constraîne the *Soule* to dislodge from the body? These accidents being purely corporall cannot touch nor arriue to this high spirituall facultie of the reasonable soule, but only to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the *Soule* cannot well and regularly act and exercise it functions, and being violently inforced, is constrained either to absent it selfe, or depart from the body. Againe, that the reasonable soule should haue need of the seruice of the instruments, doth no way preiudice the immortality thereof: for God maketh vse thereof, and accommodates his actions; and as according to the diuersity of the aire, region and climate, God brings forth men very diuers in spirit and naturall sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italy* men more ingenious, than in *Moscouy* and *Tartarie*: So the spirit according to the diuersitie of the organicall dispositions, and corporall instruments, discourseth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable *Soule*, is the braine, and the temperature thereof, whereof we are to speake.

Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the foure first qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fifth besides, which is the harmony of these foure. Now from the

E

Tempe-

3
Of the tempera-
ture of the
braine, and the
faculties thereof.

The vnderstand-
ing dry.
Old age.

Southernes.

2.

The Memory
moist.
Infancy.

Septentrionals.

3.

The imagination
hot.
Youth.

The middle
region.

4.

A comparison
of the tempera-
tures.

Temperature of the braine proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable Soule, but that which is the cause of great miserie vnto man, is, that the three faculties of the reasonable Soule, Vnderstanding, Memorie, Imagination, doe require and exercise themselves by contrary Temperatures. The temperature which serueth, and is proper to the vnderstanding is drie, whereby it comes to passe that they that are stricken in yeares, doe excell those in their vnderstanding that are yoong, because in the braine as yeares increase, to moisture decreaseth. So likewise melancholike men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heauinelle and fasting are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor siccus, animus sapientissimus, vexatio dat intellectum*: Heat and drieth refines the wit, *afflictio gines vnderstanding*: And beasts that are of a drie temperature, as *Ants, Bees, Elephants*, are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moist temperature are stupid and without spirit, as *Swine*: And the Southerne people of the world are drie, and moderate in the inward heat of the braine, by reason of their violent outward heat.

The temperature of the memorie is moist, whereof it is that infants haue better memorie than old men, and the morning after that humidity that is gotten by sleepe in the night, is more apt for memory, which is likewise more vigorous in Northerne people. I heere vnderstand a moisture that is not waterish or distilling, wherein no impression may be made, but airie, viscous, fat and oily, which easily receiue, and strongly retaineth, as it is seene in pictures wrought in oile.

The temperature of the imagination is hot, from whence it commeth that franticke men, and such as are sicke of burning maladies, are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry, Diuination*, and that it hath greatest force in yoong men, and of middle yeares (Poets and Prophets haue flourished in this age) and in the middle parts betwixt North and South.

By this diuersity of temperatures it commeth to passe, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weake in the rest: that the temperatures of the
memory

memory and vnderstanding are very different and contrary, it is cleere, as dry and moist; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drouth and moisture: and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sicke in vnderstanding and memory, and held for fooles and madde men: but the reason thereof is, because the great heat that serueth the imagination, consumeth both the moisture which serueth the memory, and the subtilty of the spirits and figures which should be in that drinelle which serueth the vnderstanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two.

By that which hath beene spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principall temperatures, which serue and cause the reasonable Soule to worke, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Drinelle, Moisture: Cold is not actiue, nor serueth to any purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions of the Soule: and when we finde in some authors, that Cold serueth the vnderstanding, and that they that haue cold braines, as Melancholike men and the Southerne, are wise and ingenious; there Cold is taken, not simply, but for a great moderation of heat: for there is nothing more contrarie to the vnderstanding, and to wisdom, than great heat, which contrariwise serueth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soule; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receiue diuers degrees, subdiuisions and distinctions.

5
Three only temperatures.

There are three principall offices and differences of vnderstanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase: these Sciences which appertain to the vnderstanding, are Schoole Diuinitie, the Theorike of Physicke, Logicke, Philosophy naturall and morall. There are three kinds of differences of memorie, easily to receiue and lose the figures, easily to receiue and hardly to lose, hardly to receiue and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammar, the Theorike of the Law, Positiue Diuinitie, Cosmography, Arithmeticke. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a farre greater number than either of the memory or vnderstanding: to it doe properly appertaine, Inuentions, Merry-conceits, and

6
Subdiuision of the faculties.

7
The propriety
of the faculties
and their order.

Iests, Trickes of subtilty, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatnesse, Elegancy, Gentility : because to it appertaine, Poetry, Eloquence, Musicke, and generally whatsoeuer consisteth in Figure, Correspondencie, Harmony and Proportion.

Hereby it appeareth that the viuacity, subtilty, promptitude, and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination ; solidity, maturity, verity, to a drie vnderstanding . The imagination is active and stirring, it is it that vndertaketh all, and sets all the rest a worke : the vnderstanding is dull and cloudy : the memory is purely passive, and see how : The imagination first gathereth the kindes and figures of things both present, by the seruice of the five senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense : afterwards it presenteth them, if it will, to the vnderstanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and iudgeth ; afterwards it putteth them to the safe custody of the memory, as a Scriuener to his booke, to the end he may againe, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscentia*, Remembrance) or else, if it will, it commits them to the memory before it presents them to the vnderstanding : for to recollect, represent to the vnderstanding, commit vnto memory, and to draw them forth againe, are all workes of the imagination ; so that to it are referred, the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would haue it, to the end they may make more than three faculties of the reasonable Soule.

8
Their comparison
in dignitie.

The common sort of people, who neuer iudge aright, doe more esteeme of memory, and delight more in it, than in the other two, because they haue much vse of counting, and it makes greater shew and stirre in the world ; and they thinke, that to haue a good memorie is to be wise, esteeming more of Science than of Wisedome ; but yet of the three it is the least, being such as may be euen in fooles themselues : for very seldome is an excellent memory ioyned with vnderstanding and wisedome, because their temperatures are contrary . From this error of the common people comes that ill course, which euery where we see, in the instruction of our youth, who are
always

alwaies taught to learne by heart (so they terme it) that which they reade in their bookes, to the end they may afterwards be able to repeat it; and so they fill and charge the memory with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the vnderstanding, and to forme the iudgement, whereby he may be made able to make vse of his owne proper good, and his naturall faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things: so that wee see that the greatest scholars that haue all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their heads, are the veriest sots, and most vnskilfull in publike affaires, and the world is gouerned by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the vnderstanding is the first, the most excellent and principall piece of harnesse: if that speed well, all goes well, and a man is wise; and contrariwise, if that miscarry, all goes a crosse. In the second place is the imagination: the memory is the last.

*See of this lib.
3. cap. 14.*

All these differences, it may be, will bee better vnderstood by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable soule. In euery Court of iustice there are three orders or degrees; the highest are the Iudges, with whom there is little stirre but great action, for without the mouing or stirring of themselues, they iudge, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of iudgement, the highest part of the Soule. The second are the Aduocates and Proctors, in whom there is great stirre and much adoe, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, onely they hatch and prepare the businesse: this is the picture of the imagination, an vndertaking, vnquiet faculty, which neuer resteth, no not in the profoundest sleepe; and it makes a noise in the braine, like a pot that seetheth, but neuer setteth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stirre nor action, but pure passion, as the Gardian or Custos of all things: and this representeth the memory.

9
*An image of the
three faculties
of the soule.*

The action of the reasonable Soule is the knowledge and vnderstanding of all things: The spirit of man is capable of vnderstanding all things, visible, inuisible, vniuersall, particular, sensible, insensible, *Intellectus est omnia: Vnderstanding is all*: but it selfe either vnderstands it not at all, as some

10
*The action of
the reasonable
Soule.*

are of opinion (witness so great and almost infinite opinions thereof, as wee haue seene before by those doubts and objections that haue alwaies crossed it) or very darkly, imperfectly, and indirectly, by reflexion of the knowledge of things vpon themselves, by which it perceiueth and knoweth that it vnderstandeth, and hath power and faculty to vnderstand: this is the manner whereby the spirit knowes it selfe. The first soueraigne Spirit, G O D, doth first know himselfe, and afterwards in himselfe all things; the latter spirit, Man, quite contrary, all other things rather than himselfe, and is in them as the eye in a glasse: how then should it act or worke in it selfe without meane, and by a strait line?

II
The meane
whereby it
worketh.

But the question is concerning the meane whereby it knoweth and vnderstandeth things. The common received opinion that came from *Aristotle* himselfe is, that the Spirit knoweth and vnderstandeth by the helpe and seruice of the Senses, that it is of it selfe as a white empty paper, that nothing commeth to the vnderstanding, which doth not first passe the Senses: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu. There is nothing in the vnderstanding, which is not first in the sense.* But this opinion is false: first because (as all the wisest haue affirmed, and hath beene before touched) the seeds of all sciences and vertues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their owne: and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then they sufficiently abound. Besides, it is iniurious both to God and nature: for this were to make the state of the reasonable Soule worse than that of other things, than that of the vegetatiue and sensitiue, which of themselves are wise enough to exercise their functions, as hath beene said; for beasts without the discipline of the senses know many things, the vniuersals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know all men, and are taught to auoid the danger of things hurtfull, and to seeke and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shamefull and absurd, that this so high and so diuine a faculty should begge it good of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which doe apprehend onely the simple accidents, and not the formes, natures, essence of things, much lesse things

things vniuersall, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Againe, if the Soule were made wise, by the aid of the senses, it would follow, that they that haue their senses most perfect and quicke, should be most witty, most wise; whereas many times we see the cleane contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more vnapt, and that many haue of purpose depriued themselues of the vse of some of them, to the end the soule might better, and more freely execute it owne affaires. And if any man shall obiect, that the soule being wise by nature, and without the helpe of the senses, all men must necessarily bee wise, and alwaies vnderstand and reason alike: which being so, how commeth it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that vnderstand, exercise their functions more weakely at one time than at another, the vegetatiue soule farre more strongly in youth, the reasonable soule more weakely than in old age, and in a certaine state of health or sicknesse than at another time? I may answer, that the argument is not good: for as touching the first, that is, That all men must bee wise: I say that the faculty and vertue of vnderstanding is not giuen alike vnto all, but with great inequality, and therefore it is a saying as ancient as honourable, euen of the wisest; that the acting vnderstanding was giuen but to few; and this inequality proueth that Science comes not of sense: for as it hath beene said, they that excell others in their senses, come short of others in their vnderstanding and Science. Touching the second; The reason why a man doth not exercise his functions alwaies after one manner, is because the instruments whereby the Soule must necessarily worke, cannot alwayes be disposed as they should; and if they befor some special kinde of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the braine, by which the Soule worketh, is diuers and changeable; being hot and moist, in youth it is good for the vegetatiue, naught for the reasonable; and contrarily, being cold and dry, in old age it is good for the reasonable, ill for the vegetatiue. The braine by a hot and burning malady being heated and purified, is more fit for inuention and diuination, vnfit for maturity and soundnesse of iudgement and wisdom. By that which hath beene spoken let no man thinke, that I affirme that the spirit

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hath no seruice from the senses, which I confesse to bee great, especially in the beginning, in the discouery and inuention of things : but I say in the defense of the honour of the spirit, that it is false that it dependeth vpon the senses, and that wee can not know any thing, vnderstand, reason, discourse, without the sense : for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can doe nothing without it.

12

The spirit in this vnderstanding faculty proceedeth diuersly, and by order : It vnderstandeth at the first instant, simply and directly a Lion to bee a Lion, afterwards by consequents that he is strong : for seeing the effects of his strength, it concludeth that hee is strong. By diuision or negatiue, it vnderstandeth a Hare to be fearefull ; for seeing it flie and hide it selfe, it concludeth that a Hare is not strong, because fearefull. It knoweth some by similitude, others by a collection of many things together.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reasons, inuention, verity thereof.

THis humane Spirit, and *Oeconomie* of this great and high intellectuall part of the soule, is a depth of obscurity, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and inuolued labyrinth, and bottomlesse pit, consisting of many parts, faculties, actions, diuers motions, hauing many names, doubts and difficulties.

1

The first office thereof is simply to receiue and apprehend the images and kindes of things, which is a kinde of passion and impression of the Soule, occasioned by the obiects and the presence of them ; this is imagination and apprehension.

2

The force and power thereof, to feede, to handle, to stirre, to concoct, to digest, the things receiued by the imagination: this is reason, λόγος.

3

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conioine, separate, diuide the things receiued, and to adde likewise others : this is discourse, reasoning, λόγισμος διαλογία, quasi διαουσι.

The

The subtile facilitie, and cheerefull readinesse to doe all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium*; and therefore to be ingenious, sharpe, subtile, piercing, is all one.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and reworking of it, to frame a resolution more solide: this is iudgement.

The effect in the end of the vnderstanding: this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it selfe, to put forward, and to aduance the thing knowne: this is will, *Intellectus extensus & promotus*.

Wherefore all these things, *Vnderstanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Iudgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same essence, but all diuers in force, vertue and action: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weake in another: and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtiltie, may be weake in iudgement and soliditie.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatnesse of the Spirit of man, the capacitie, viuacitie, quicknes thereof: let it be called the image of the liuing God, a taste of the immortall substance, a streame of the Diuinitie, a celestially ray, whereunto God hath giuen reason, as an animated sterne to moue it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmony; that by it there is a kinde of kindred betwixt God and man: and that he might often remember him, hee hath turned the root towards the heauens, to the end he should alwayes looke towards the place of his natiuitie: to be brieve, that there is nothing great vpon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit: if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth aboue the heauens. These are all pleasing and plausible words, whereof the Schooles doe ring.

But I desire, that after all this we come to sound and to studie how to know this spirit; for we shall finde after all this, that it is both to it selfe and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a tedious and importune parasite, and which as a juggler and player at fast and loose, vnder the shaddow of some gentle motion,

subtile

2
The generall
description and
commendation
of the Spirit.

3
The dispraise.

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subtile and smiling, forgeth, inuenteth, and cauſeth all the miſchiefs of the world: and the truth is, without it there are none.

4
Diuersitie of di-
stinctions of the
spirit. See beere-
of more chap. 39.

There is farre greater diuerſitie of ſpirits than of bodies, ſo is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more formes or faſhions to be ſpoken of: we may make three claſſes or formes, whereof each one hath many degrees: The firſt, which is the loweſt, are thoſe weake, baſe, and almoſt brutiſh ſpirits, neere neighbors to beaſts themſelues, whether by reaſon of the firſt temper, that is to ſay, of the ſeed and temperature of the braine, either too cold or too moiſt, as amongſt other creatures fiſhes are the loweſt; or by reaſon that they haue not been, in ſomeſort, remoued and reviewed, but ſuffered to ruſt, and grow dull and ſtupid. Of theſe wee make no great account, as being vnfit to be ordered and ſetled into any certaine and conſtant ſocietie, becauſe both for their owne particular they cannot poſſibly endure it, and it were neceſſary they ſhould alwaies be vnder the tuition of another, this is the common and baſe people, *qui vigilans ſterit; mortua cui vita eſt; prope iam vivo atque videnti; who waking ſnoreth, whoſe life is dead, or rather almoſt aliue, and ſeeing, which vnderſtands not, iudgeth not it ſelfe.* The ſecond which is the higheſt, are thoſe great and rare ſpirits, rather deuils than ordinary men, ſpirits well borne, ſtrong and vigorous. Of theſe kinde of people, there was neuer age yet could tell how to build a common-weale. The third which is the middle, are all thoſe indifferent ſpirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of theſe almoſt is the whole world compoſed. Of this diſtinction and others, heereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this ſpirit, as hard to be knowne, as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwayes in motion.

5
The particular
deſcription.
Agent perpe-
tuall.

Fiſt therefore it is a perpetuall agent, for the ſpirit cannot be without action, but rather than it will, it forgeth falſe and phantaſticall ſubjects, in earneſt deceiuing it ſelfe, euen to it owne diſcredit. As idle and vnmanured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thouſand kinds of wilde and vnprofitable hearbs, vntill they be ſowed with other ſeeds, and women alone without the company of men, bring forth ſome-
times

times great abundance of vnformed, indigested lumps of flesh: so the *Spirit*, if it be not busied about some certaine obiekt, it runnes riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not, and if it haue not a setled limit, it wandreth and loseth it selfe. For, to be euery where is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*, but yet it must proceed from else-where, than from it selfe. If it be solitary, and wanteth a subiect to worke on, it creepeth along and languisheth, but yet it must not be enforced. For too great a contention and intention of the *Spirit* ouer-bent, and strained, deceiueth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

It is likewise vniuersall, it medleth and mingleth it selfe with all, it hath no limited subiect or iurisdiction. There is not any thing wherewith it playeth not his part, as well to vaine subiects and of no account, as high and weighty; as well to those we can vnderstand, as those we vnderstand not: For to know that wee cannot vnderstand or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must sticke in the bone and barke thereof, is an excellent signe of iudgement, for science, yea truth it selfe, may lodge neare vs without iudgement, and iudgement without them, yea to know our owne ignorance, is a faire testimony of iudgement.

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy, running in a moment from the one end of the world to the other, without stay or rest, stirring it selfe and penetrating through euery thing, 7
Prompt and
sudden.
Nobilis & inquiet a mens homini data est, nunquam se tenet, spargitur vaga, quietis impatiens, novitate rerum latissima. Non mirum ex illo celestis spiritus descendit, celestium autē natura semper in motu est. A noble and vnquiet minde is giuen vnto man, who neuer with-holdeth her motion, inconstant, euery where dispersed, impatient of rest, delighted most with nouelties; No maru. ll if she descend of a celestiall spirit, for that the nature of celestiall things is to be in perpetuall motion. This great speed and quicknesse, this agility, this twinkling of the eye, as it is admirable, and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propension vnto folly and madnesse, as presently you shall heare.

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpe-

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perpetuall agent without repose, vniuersall, prompt and sudden, it hath been accounted immortall, and to haue in it selfe some marke and sparkle of diuinitie.

8

*The action of
the Spirit.*

The action of the spirit is alwayes to search, ferret, contriue without intermission, like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seeke, and therefore *Homer* calles men *ἀλγεςαυς*. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pursuits of the spirit of man are without limits, without forme: the food thereof is double ambiguitie; it is a perpetuall motion without rest, without bound. The world is a schoole of inquisition; agitation and hunting is it proper dish: to take, or to faile of the prey, is another thing.

9

*It worketh
rashly.*

But it worketh and pursueth it enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order, and without measure, it is a wandring instrument, moueable, diuersly turning; it is an instrument of lead and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it selfe to all, more supple and facill than the water, the aire, *flexibilis omni humore obsequentior*, & *ut spiritus qui omni materia facillior ut tenuior*; It is flexible, and more yeelding to euery humor, and as the spirit which is more facill and easie to euery matter or substance; It is the shooe of *Theramenes*, fit for all. The cunning is to finde where it is, for it goes alwayes athwart, and crosse, as well with a lie, as with a truth: it sporteth it selfe and findeth a seeming reason for euery thing; for it maketh that which is impious, vniust, abominable in one place, piety, iustice and honour in another: neither can we name any law or custome, or condition, that is either generally receiued of all, or reiected; the marriage of those that are neere of blood, the murther of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, lawfull in another. *Plato* refused an embrodered and perfumed robe offered him by *Dionysius*, saying that he was a man, and therefore would not adorne himselfe like a woman. *Aristippus* accepted of that robe, saying the outward acoutrement cannot corrupt a chaste minde. *Diogenes* washing his colewarts, and seeing *Aristippus* passe by, said vnto him; If thou knewest how to liue with colewarts, thou wouldest neuer follow the Court of a Tyrant. *Aristippus* answered him, If thou knewest how to liue with Kings, thou wouldest neuer wash colewarts. One perswaded *Salon* to cease from the bewailing the

10

*Reason hath
diuers faces.*

the death of his sonnes, because his teares did neither profit nor helpe him. Yea therefore, saith he, are my teares iust, and I haue reason to weepe. The wife of *Socrates* redoubled her grieve, because the Iudges put her husband to death vniustly: What, saith hee, wouldst thou rather I were iustly condemned? There is no good, saith a wise man, but that, to the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared, *In aquo enim est dolor amissa rei, & timor amittende*: Alike troublesome is the grieve of a thing already lost, and the feare lest it should be lost.

Quite contrary, saith another, wee embrace and locke vp that good a great deale the more carefully, which we see lesse sure, and alwayes feare will be taken from vs. A Cynique Philosopher demanded of *Antigonus* the king, a dram of siluer. That, saith he, is no gift fit for a king. Why then giue me a Talent, saith the Philosopher. And that, saith the King, is no gift for a Cynique. One said of a King of *Sparta* that was gentle and debonaire, He is a good man euen to the wicked. How should he be good vnto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked? So that we see that the reason of man hath many visages: it is a two-edged sword, a staffe with two pikes, *Ogni medaglia ha il suo riuerso*: There is no reason but hath a contrary reason, saith the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this volubilitie and flexibilitie proceedeth from many causes; from the perpetuall alteration and motion of the body, which is neuertwice in a mans life in one and the same estate; from the objects which are infinite, the aire it selfe, and the serenitie of the heauen,

Tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse

Iupiter auctiferas lustravit lampade terras:

Mens mindes on earth, the selfe-same course do runne,

Being faire or foule as is th'Olimpicke Sunne.

and all outward things: inwardly from those shakings and tremblings which the Soule giues vnto it selfe by the agitation, and stirreth vp by the passions thereof: insomuch that it beholdeth things with diuers countenances; for whatsoever is in the world hath diuers lustres, diuers considerations. *Epictetus* said it was a pot with two hands. Hee might better haue sayd with many.

The reason heereof is, because it entangleth it selfe in it
owne

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*The reason of
this intangle-
ment.*

13

*The end is ve-
rity, which it
can neither at-
taine nor finde.*

*Reade before
Chap. 9.*

owne worke like the Silke-worme: for as it thinketh to note from farre, I know not what appearance of light, and im aginarie truth, and flies vnto it: there are many difficulties that crosse the way, new sents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

The end at which it aimeth is two-fold, the one more common and naturall, which is Truth, which it searcheth and pursueth; for there is no desire more naturall than to know the truth: we assay all the meanes we can to attaine vnto it, but in the end all our endeouours come short; for Truth is not an ordinary booty, or thing that will suffer it selfe to be gotten and handled, much lesse to be possessed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosome of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, vnderstandeth not any thing aright, in purity and in truth as he ought: appearances doe alwayes compasse him on euery side, which are as well in those things that are false as true. We are borne to search the truth, but to possesse it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himselfe into it, but his that runnes the fairest course towards the marke. When it fallies out that he hits vpon a truth, it is by chance and hazzard, he knowes not how to hold it, to possesse it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errours are receiued into our soule, by the selfe same way and conduit that the truth is: the spirit hath no meanes either to distinguish or to chuse: and as well may he play the sot, that tells a truth as a lie. The meanes that it vseth for the discouery of the truth, are reason and experience, both of them very weake, vncertaine, diuers, wauering. The greatest argument of truth, is the generall consent of the world: now the number of fooles doth farre exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how should that generall consent be agreed vpon, but by corruption and an applause giuen without iudgement and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began to dance.

14

*The second end
Inuention.*

The other end lesse naturall, but more ambitious, is Inuention, vnto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honour, to the end it may raise it selfe and preuaile the more: this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an image of the Diuinity. From the sufficiency of this inuention,
haue

haue proceeded all those workes, which haue rauished the whole world with admiration; which if they be such as are for the publique benefit, they haue deified their Authours. Those workes that shew rather finenesse of wit, than bring profit with them, are painting, caruing, Architecture, the Art Perspective; as the vine of *Zeuxis*, the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the image of *Memnon*, the horse of *Airain*, the wooden pigeon of *Architas*, the cow of *Myron*, the flie and the eagle of *Montroyall*, the spheare of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimides* with his other engins. Now Art and inuention seeme not onely to imitate Nature, but to excell it, and that not onely in this *Individuum* or particular (for there is not any bodie either of man or beast, so vniuersally well made, as by Art may be shewed) but also many things are done by Art which are not done by Nature: I meane besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diet, and proper subject of Art, those distillations of waters and oiles, made of simples, which Nature framed not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we thinke; and to speake properly and truly, there is no inuention but that which God reueleth: for such as we account and call so, are but obseruations of naturall things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the Art Opricke from shadowes, Sundials from the shadowes of trees, the grauing of scales from precious stones.

The praise of
Inuention.

By all this that hath before beene spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quicke and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and vniuersall, making it motions so irregularly, vsing it liberty so boldly in all things, not tying it selfe to any thing; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an vniust tyranny: it will vndertake to examine all things, to iudge the greatest part of things plausibly receiued into the world, to be ridiculous and absurd, and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it selfe against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way, and loseth it selfe: and we can not but see, that they that haue any extraordinary viuacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest roose of that middle

15

The Spirit very
dangerous.

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middle classis before spoken of) are, for the most part, lawlesse both in opinions and manners. There are very few of whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the libertie of whose iudgements a man may wade without temeritie, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to finde a great and liuely spirit, well ruled and gouerned: it is a dangerous sword which a man knowes not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, reuolts, heresies and troubles in the world, but for this? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingenijs: nihil sapientia odiosius acumine nimio.* Great errors proceed not but from great wits: nothing is more preiudiciall to wisdom than too much sharpnesse of wit. Doubtlesse that man liues a better time, and a longer life, is more happy and farre more fit for the gouernment of a Common-wealth, saith *Thucydides*, that hath an indifferent spirit, or some-what beneath a mediocritie, than he that hath a spirit so eleuated and transcendent, that it serues not for any thing but the torment of himselfe and others. From the firmest friendships doe spring the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies: and euen so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our soules the most desperate resolutions and disorderly frensies. Wisdom and follie are neere neighbours; there is but a halfe turne betwixt the one & the other; which wee may easily see in the actions of madde men. Philosophie teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest follie, but of the finest wit? And therefore, saith *Aristotle*, there is no great spirit without some mixture of follie. And *Plato* telleth vs, that in vaine a temperate and sound spirit knocketh at the doore of Poetrie. And in this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets doe loue sometimes to play the foole, and to leape out of the hindges. *Insanire iucundum est, dulce desipere in loco: non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.* It is a delightfull thing sometimes to be madde, a sweet matter in some cases to be foolish: The minde vnlesse it be altogether imployed, can doe no great matter, or attempt any thing of moment as long as it is wholly collected within it selfe.

16

It must be bridled, & why.

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keepe it within narrow bounds, to bridle and binde it with Religions,

ons, Lawes, Customes, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Promises mortall and immortall, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawlesse kinde of liberty it freeth it selfe, and escapeth all these, so vnruely is it by nature, so fierce, so opiniatiue: and therefore it is to be led by Art, since by force it can not. *Natura contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium atq; arduum nitens, sequiturq; facilius quàm ducitur, ut generosi & nobiles equi melius facili frano reguntur.* The minde of man is naturally stubborne, alwayes inclining to difficult and contrary things, & doth easier follow than is led by force, like vnto generous horses, that are better gouerned with an easie bridle, then a cutting bit. It is a surer way gently to tutor it, and to lay it asleepe, than to suffer it to wander at it owne pleasure: for if it be not well and orderly gouerned, (as they of the highest classis which before wee spake of) or weake, and soft and pliant (as those of the lower ranke) it will lose it selfe in the liberty of it owne iudgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by some meanes or other held backe, as hauing more need of lead than wings, of a bridle than of a spurre; which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing, that people of an indifferent spirit, liued in more quiet and content, than the ouer-quicke and ingenious. There haue been more troubles & seditions in ten yeeres in the onely city of *Florence*, than in fūe hundred yeeres in the countries of the *Heluetians* and the *Retians*. And to say the truth, men of a common sufficiencie are more honest, better citizens, more pliant, and willing to submit themselues to the yoke of the lawes, their superiours, reason it selfe, than those quicke and cleere sighted men, that cannot keepe themselues within their owne skinnes. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

The Spirit hath it maladies, defects, tares or refuse, as well as the body and much more, more dangerous, and more incurable: but that wee may the better know them, wee must distinguish them: Some are accidentall, and which come from else-where, and those arise from three causes; the disposition of the body, for it is manifest that the bodily malady which alter the temperature thereof, do likewise alter the spirit and iudgement; or from the ill composition of the substance of

17
The defect of
the spirit.

Accidentall proceeding from
three causes.
1. The body.

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2. *The world.*

the braine, and organs of the reasonable *Soule*, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that haue their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the vniuersall contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the world, wherewith the *Spirit* being preoccupied, tainted, and ouercome, or which is worse, made drunken, and manacled with certaine fantastick opinions, it euer afterwards followeth and iudgeth according to them, without regard either of farther enquiry, or recoiling backe: from which dangerous deluge all spirits haue not force and strength to defend themselves.

3. *The passions.*

The third much more neere, is the maladie and corruption of the will, and the force of the passions, this is a world turned topsie turvy: the will is made to follow the vnderstanding as a guide and lampe vnto it; but being corrupted and seized on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of our first father *Adam*) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the vnderstanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous iudgements: Enuy, Malice, Hatred, Loue, Feare, make vs to respect, to iudge, to take things others than they are, & quite otherwise than we ought, from whence commeth that common cry, Iudge without passion. From hence it is that the beautifull and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base mis-constructions, that vaine and wicked causes and occasions are feined. This is a great vice and a prooofe of a malignant nature and sicke iudgement, in which there is neither great subtilty nor sufficiency, but malice enough. This proceedeth either from the enuy they beare to the glory of another man, or because they iudge of others according to themselves, or because they haue their taste altered, and their sight so troubled, that they cannot discern the cleere splendor of vertue in it natiue purity. From this selfesame cause and source it commeth, that wee make the vertues and vices of another man to preuaile so much, and extend them farther than wee ought, that from particularities wee draw consequents and generall conclusions: if he be a friend all sits well about him, his vices shall be vertues: if hee be an enemy or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: info-

inſomuch that we ſhame our owne iudgement, to ſmooth vp our owne paſſions. But this reſts not heere, but goeth yet farther; for the greateſt part of thoſe impieties, heresies, errors in our faith and religion, if we looke well into it, is ſprung from our wicked and corrupt willes, from a violent and voluptuous paſſion, which afterwards draweth vnto it the vnderſtanding it ſelf, *Sedit populus manducare, & bibere &c. quod vult non quod eſt credit, quicquid errare: The people ſitteth downe to eat and drinke &c. Hee that hath a meaning to goe aſtray, beleeueth euery thing as hee would haue it, not as it is indeed.* In ſuch ſort that what was done in the beginning with ſome ſcruple and doubt, hath beene afterwards held and maintained for a verity and reuelation from heauen: that which was onely in the ſenſualiry, hath taken place in the higheſt part of the vnderſtanding: that which was nothing elſe but a paſſion and a pleaſure, hath beene made a religious matter and an article of faith: ſo ſtrong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soule amongſt themſelues. Theſe are the three outward cauſes of the faults and miſ-carriages of the *Spirit*, iudgement and vnderſtanding of man; The body, eſpecially the head, ſicke, or wounded, or ill fashioned; The world with the anticipated opinions and ſuppoſitions thereof; The ill eſtate of the other faculties of the reaſonable Soule, which are all inferiour vnto it. The firſt are pitifull, and ſome of them to be cured, ſome not: the ſecond are excuſable and pardonable: the third are accuſable and puniſhable for ſuffering ſuch a diſorder ſo neere them as this is; thoſe that ſhould obey the Law, to take vpon them to giue the Law.

There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more naturall vnto it, and in it. The greateſt and the root of all the reſt is pride & preſumption (the firſt and originall fault of all the world, the plague of all ſpirits, and the cauſe of all euils) by which a man is only content with himſelfe, will not giue place to another, diſdaineth his counſels, repoſeth himſelfe in his owne opinions, takes vpon him to iudge and condemne others, yea euen that which he vnderſtands not. It is truly ſaid, that the beſt and happieſt diſtribution that God euer made, is of iudgement, becauſe euery man is content with his owne,

Exod 31.

2. Paral. 15.

3. Reg. 15.

August. lib. 2.

De ciuitate Dei.

and thinkes he hath enough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selues. We neuer vnderstand sufficiently and truly the weaknesse of our spirit: but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance, not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writings of others, but of it selfe, for which cause this first booke hath beene written.

CHAP. XV.

Of Memory.

Memory is many times taken by the vulgar sort for the sense and vnderstanding, but not so truly and properly: for both by reason (as hath beene said) and by experience, the excellencie of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weaknesse of the other, and to say the truth, it is a faculty very profitable for the world, but yet comes farre short of the vnderstanding, and of all the parts of the Soule is the more delicate, and most fraile. The excellency thereof is not very requisite, but to three sorts of people: Merchants or men of Trade, great talkers, (for the store-house of the memory is more full and furnished, than that of inuention, for hee that wants it comes short, and must be faine to frame his speech out of the forge of his owne inuention) and liars, *mendacem oportet esse memorem*: It becometh a liar to haue a good memory. From the want of memory proceed these commodities: to lie seldome, to talke little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory sufficeth for all.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Imagination and opinion.

THe Imagination is a thing very strong and powerfull, it is it that makes all the stirre, all the clatter, yea the perturbation of the world proceeds from it (as wee haue said before, it is either the onely, or at least the most active and stirring faculty of the Soule.) The effects thereof are marvellous and strange: it worketh not onely in it owne proper bodie

The effects of
the Imagination
marvellous.

die and Soule, but in that of another man, yea it produceth contrary effects : it makes a man blush, wax pale, tremble, dote, to wauer; these are the least and the best : it takes away the power and vse of the ingendring parts, yea when there is most need of them, and is the cause why men are more sharpe and austere, not only towards themselves but others, witnesse those ties and bands whereof the world is full, which are for the most part impressions of the apprehension and of feare. And contrariwise, without endeuour, without obiekt, & euen in sleepe it satisfieth the amorous desires, yea changeth the sex, witnesse *Lucius Cossinius*, whom *Plinie* affirmeth to haue seene to be changed from a woman to a man, the day of his mariage; and diuers the like : it maketh sometimes ignominiously, yea it killeth and makes abortiue the fruit within the wombe; it takes away a mans speech, and giues it to him that neuer had it, as to the sonne of *Cræsus* : it taketh away motion, sense, respiration. Thus we see how it worketh in the body. Touching the Soule : it makes a man to lose his vnderstanding, his knowledge, iudgement; it turnes him foole and mad-man, witnesse *Gallus Vibius*, who hauing ouer-bent his spirits in comprehending the essence and motions of folly, so dislodged and dis-joynted his owne iudgement, that he could neuer settle it againe : it inspireth a man with the fore-knowledge of things secret and to come, and causeth those inspirations, predictions, and maruellous inuentions, yea it rauisheth with extasies : it killeth not seemingly but in good earnest, witnesse that man whose eyes being couered to receiue his death, and vncouered againe, to the end he might reade his pardon, was found starke dead vpon the scaffold. To bee brieue, from hence spring the greatest part of those things which the common sort of people call miracles, visions, enchantments. It is not alwayes the deuill, or a familiar spirit, as now adayes the ignorant people thinke, when they cannot finde the reason of that they see; nor alwayes the spirit of God (for these supernaturall motions we speake not of heere) but for the most part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent who sayth & doth such things; or of the patient and spectator, who thinks he seeth that he seeth not. It is an excellent thing and necessary in such a case, to know wisely

how to discerne the reason thereof, whether it be naturall or supernaturall, false or true, *Discretio spirituum*, *A discerning of spirits*. And not to precipitate our iudgements, as the most part of the common people doe by the want thereof.

In this part and faculty of the soule doth opinion lodge, which is a vaine, light, crude and imperfect iudgement of things drawne from the outward senses, and common report, setting and holding it selfe to be good in the imagination, and neuer arriuing to the vnderstanding, there to be examined, sifted, and laboured; and to be made reason which is a true, perfect and solide iudgement of things: and therefore it is vncertaine, inconstant, fleeting, deceitfull, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vaine and vntrue. It is the mother of all mischiefes, confusions, disorders: from it spring all passions, all troubles. It is the guide of fooles, fots, the vulgar sort, as reason of the wise and dexterious.

3
The world is led
by opinion.

It is not the truth and nature of things which doth thus stirre and molest our soules, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying; Men are tormented by the opinions that they haue of things, not by the things themselues. *Opinione sapius quàm re laboramus: plura sunt quæ nos tenent, quàm quæ premunt.* We are more troubled with the opinion of things, than with the things themselues; there are more things that hold vs, than which presse or vrge vs. The verity and Essence of things entreteth not into vs, nor lodgeth neere vs of it selfe, by it owne proper strength and authority: for were it so, all things should be receiued of all, all alike, and after the same fashion; all should be of like credit, and truth it selfe, which is neuer but one and vniforme, should be embraced thorowout the whole world. Now forasmuch as there is so great a variety, yea contrariety of opinions in the world, and there is not any thing concerning which all doe generally accord, no not the wisest and best borne and bred; it giueth vs to vnderstand, that things enter into vs by composition, yeelding themselues to our mercy and deuotion, lodging themselues neere vnto vs, according to our pleasure, and humour, and temper of our soules. That which I belecue, I cannot make my companion belecue; but, which is more, what I doe firmly belecue to day,

I cannot assure my selfe that I shall beleue to morrow : yea it is certaine that at another time I shall iudge quite otherwise. Doubtlesse euery thing taketh in vs such place, such a taste, such a colour, as wee thinke best to giue vnto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soule is, *Omnia munda mundis, immunda immundis* : All things are cleane, to the pure and cleane, as also vncleane to the impure and vncleane. As our apparell and accoutrements doe as well warme vs, not by reason of their heat, but our owne, which they preferue, as likewise nourish the coldnesse of the ice and snow; we do first warme them with our heat, and they in recompence thereof preferue our heat.

Almost all the opinions that we haue, wee haue not but from authority : we beleue, we iudge, wee worke, we liue, we die, and all vpon credit, euen as the publique vse and custome teacheth vs; and we doe well therein : for wee are too weake to iudge and chuse of our selues; no the wise doe it not, as shall be spoken.

Lib. I. chap. I.
& 2.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Will.

THe will is a great part of the reasonable soule, of very great importance, and it standeth vs vpon about all things to study how to rule it, because vpon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

The preheminance and importance of the will.

It onely is truly ours, and in our power; all the rest, vnderstanding, memory, imagination may be taken from vs, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents : not the will.

The comparison thereof with the vnderstanding.

Secondly, this is that, that keepeth a man intire, and importeth him much : for he that hath giuen his will, is no more his owne man, neither hath he any thing of his owne.

Doubtfull, if not erroneous.

Thirdly, this is it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giueth vs the temper and the tincture.

As of all the goods that are in man, vertue or honesty is the first and principall, and which doth farre excell knowledge, dexterity; so wee cannot but confesse, that the will where vertue and goodnesse lodgeth, is of all others the most

excellent:

excellent : and to say the truth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dishonest, because he vnderstandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and faire, and honest, or wicked and dishonest; but because he loueth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The vnderstanding hath other preheminences : for it is vnto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light vnto the traoueller, but in this it giueth place vnto the will.

2 The true difference betwixt these faculties is, in that by the vnderstanding things enter into the soule, and it receiueth them (as those words, to apprehend, conceiue, comprehend, the true offices thereof doe import) but they enter not entire, and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacity of the vnderstanding : whereby the greatest and the highest do recoile and diuide themselues after a sort, by this entrance, as the Ocean entreth not altogether into the *Mediterrane* sea, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibraltar*. By the will, on the other side, the soule goeth forth of it, and lodgeth and liueth elsewhere in the thing beloued, into which it transformed it selfe; and therefore beareth the name, the title, the liuery, being called vertuous, vicious, spirituall, carnall: whereby it followeth, that the will is enobled by louing those things that are high and worthy of loue; is vilified, by giuing it selfe to those things that are base and vnworthy; as a wife honoureth or dishonoureth her selfe by that husband that shee hath taken.

Experience teacheth vs, that three things doe sharpen our will, Difficultie, Raritie, and Absence, or feare to lose the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facility, Abundance, or Satiety, and daily presence or assured fruition. The three former giue price and credit to things, the three latter ingender contempt. Our will is sharpened by opposition, it opposeth it selfe against deniall. On the other side, our appetite contemneth and letteth passe that which it hath in possession, and runnes after that which it hath not, *Permissum sit vile nefas : quod licet ingratum est, quod non licet acris vrit* : Things permitted we despise, and that which is lawfull we lothe, but violently pursue those things that are prohibited. Yea it is seene
in

in all sorts of pleasures, *Omnium rerum voluptas ipso quo debet fugare periculo crescit*: All pleasures are increased euen with the danger wherewith they ought to be despised. Insomuch that the two extremes, the defect and the abundance, the desire and the fruition, doe put vs to like paine. And this is the cause why things are not truly esteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his owne Countrey.

How wee are to direct and rule our willes, shall bee said heereafter.

PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

An Aduertisement.

THe matter of the passions of the minde is very great and plentifull, and takes vp a great roome in this doctrine of Wildome. To learne how to know them, and to distinguish them, is the subiect of this booke. The generall remedies to bridle, rule, and gouerne them, the subiect of the second booke. The particular remedies of euery one of them, of the third booke, following the method of this booke, set downe in the Preface. Now that in this first booke wee may attaine the knowledge of them, we will first speake of them in generall in this first Chapter, afterward in the Chapters following particularly of euery one of them. I haue not scene any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, than *Le Sieur du Vair* in his little morall bookes, whereof I haue made good vse in this passionate subiect.

*Lib. 2. cap. 6.
& 7. Lib. 3. in
the vertues of
fortitude and
temperance.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the passions in generall.

PAssion is a violent motion of the Soule in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the Soule thinketh to bee good for it, or to flie that which it takes to bee euill.

*The description
of passions.*

But it is necessary that wee know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselves in vs; which a man

*1
2
1. Their agita-
tion.*

man may represent by diuers meanes and comparisons : first in regard of their agitation and violence. The Soule which is but one in the body hath many and diuers powers, according to the diuers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh vse, and the objects which are presented vnto it. Now when the parts wherein it is inclosed, doe not retaine and occupy it, but according to the proportion of their capacity, and as farre forth as it is necessary for their true vse; the effects thereof are sweet, benigne, and well gouerned: but when contrariwise the parts thereof haue more motion and heat than is needfull for them, they change and become hurtfull; no otherwise than the beames of the Sunne, which wandering according to their naturall liberty, doe sweetly and pleasingly warme; if they be recollected and gathered into the concauities of a burning glasse, they burne and consume that they were wont to nourish and quicken. Againe, they haue diuers degrees in their force of agitation; and as they haue more or lesse, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselves to bee tasted and digested, expressing themselves by words and teares, the greater and more violent astonish the soule, oppresse it, and hinder the liberty of it actions. *Cura leues loquuntur, ingentes stupent.* Light cares mooue the tongue, but great cause astonishment and silence.

2
Of their vice and
irregularity.

Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and iniustice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Commonweale, and the state of the soule to a state royall, wherein the Soueraigne for the gouernment of so many people hath vnder-magistrates, vnto whom for the exercise of their charges hee giueth lawes and ordinances, reseruing vnto himselfe the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Vpon this order dependeth the peace and prosperity of the state: and contrariwise, if the Magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Prince and the people, shall suffer themselves either to bee deceiued by facility, or corrupted by fauour; and without respect either of their Soueraigne, or the lawes by him established, shall vse their owne authority in the execution of their affaires, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Euen so in man, the vnderstanding is the Soueraigne,

ueraigne, which hath vnder it a power estimatiue, and imaginatiue, as a Magistrate, both to take knowledge, and to iudge by the report of the senses of all things that shall be presented, and to moue our affections, for the better execution of the iudgements thereof: for the conduct and direction whereof in the exercise of it charge, the law and light of Nature was giuen vnto it: and moreouer, as a helpe in all doubts, it may haue recourse vnto the counsell of the superior and soueraigne, the vnderstanding. And thus you see the order of the happy state heereof: but the vnhappy is when this power which is vnder the vnderstanding, and aboue the senses, whereunto the first iudgement of things appertainerth, suffereth it selfe for the most part to bee corrupted and deceived, whereby it iudgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and mooueth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth vs with much trouble and vnquietnesse. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, are first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but onely the face and outward forme, carrying vnto the soule the image of things, with some fauourable commendation, and as it were a fore-iudgement and preiudicate opinion of their qualities, according as they finde them pleasing and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessary for the vniuersall good of man: and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent iudgement of the vulgar sort. From these two, false aduiselements and reports of the Senses, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soule an inconsiderate opinion, which we conceiue of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtfull, to be followed or eschewed; which doubtlesse is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistresse: for it is no sooner conceiued, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and vnderstanding, it possesseth it selfe of our imagination, and as within a Citadell, holdeth the fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and remooueth our affections, with violent motiues of hope, feare, heauinesse, pleasure. To bee brieue, it makes all the fooles, and the seditions of the soule, which are the passions, to arise.

Opinion.

I will likewise declare the same thing, by another similitude

tude of military policy: The *Senses* are the *Sentinels* of the *Soule*, watching for the preservation thereof, and messengers or scouts to serve as ministers and instruments to the vnderstanding, the soueraigne part of the *Soule*. And for the better performance heereof, they haue receiued power to apprehend the things, to draw the formes, and to embrace or reiect them, according as they shall seeme agreeable or odious vnto their nature. Now in exercising their charge, they must bee content to know, and to giue knowledge to others of what doth passe, not enterprising to remoue greater forces, lest by that meanes they put all into an *alarm* and confusion. As in an *Armie*, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watchword, and knowledge of the desseigne and purpose of the Captaine that commandeth, may bee deceiued, and take for their succour their enemies disguised which come vnto them, or for enemies those that come to succour: So the *Senses* by not apprehending whatsoeuer is reason, are many times deceiued by an appearance, and take that for a friend which is our enemy. And when vpon this thought and resolution, not attending the commandement of reason, they goe about to remoue the power concupiscible and irascible, they raise a sedition and tumult in our soules, during which time, reason is not heard, nor the vnderstanding obeyed.

4
The distinction
of the Passions
according to
their object and
subject.
Of the concupis-
cible fix.

By this time we see their regiments, their rankes, their generall kindes and speciall. Euery passion is moued by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the soule doe simply so consider of it, this motion is called Loue. If it be present and such whereof the *Soule* in it selfe taketh comfort, it is called pleasure and ioy: if it bee to come, it is called desire: if by that which is euill, it is hate: if it be present in our selues, it is sorrow and grieve: if in another, it is pity: if it bee to come, it is feare. And these which arise in vs by the object of an apparent euill, which wee abhor and flie from, descend more deepe into our hearts, and arise with greater difficulty. And this is the first band of that seditious rout, which trouble the rest and quiet of our soules, that is, in the concupiscible part, the effects whereof notwithstanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not so violent as those that follow them: for these
first

first motions formed in this part, by the object which presenteth it selfe, doe passe incontinently into the irascible part, that is to say, into that compasse where the soule seeketh the meanes to obtaine or auoid that which seemeth vnto it either good or ill. And then euen as a wheele that is already in motion, receiuing another motion by a new force, turnes with farre greater speede; so the Soule being already mooued by the first apprehension, ioyning a second endeouour to the first, carrieth it selfe with farre more violence than before, and is stirred vp by passions more puissant and difficult to be tamed; inasmuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, vniting themselves, and backing the one this other by a mutual consent: for the first passions, which are formed vpon an object of an appearing good, carrying into consideration of meanes whereby to obtaine it, stirre vp in vs either hope or despaire. They that are formed vpon an object of an euill to come, stirre vp in vs either feare, or the contrary which is audacity; of a present euill, choller and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly peruert the reason which they finde already shaken. Thus you see the principall windes from whence arise the tempests of our Soule, and the pitte whereout they rise is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandring, vncertaine, cōtinuity to nature, verity, reason, certaintie) that a man hath, that the things that present themselves vnto vs, are either good or ill: for hauing conceiued them to be such, we either follow them, or with violence flie from them. And these are our passions.

In the irascible
five.

OF PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR.

An Advertisement.

WE will inreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanity, misery, iniustice, & that foulness that is in them, to the end wee may know and learne how iustly to hate them. The counsell that is giuen for the auoidance of them, is in the bookes following. These are the two parts of physicke, to shew the malady, and to giue the remedy. It remaineth therefore, that heere wee first speake of all thole that respect

Lib. 3. in the
vertue of Forti-
tude and Tem-
perance.

respect the appearing good, which are loue and the kindes thereof, desire, hope, despaire, ioy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, enuy, ialousie, reuenge, cruelty, feare, sadnesse, compassion.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Loue in generall.

The distinction
of loue and com-
parison.

Lib. 3.

THe first and chiefe mistresse of all the passions is Loue, which consisteth of diuers subiects, and whereof there are diuers sortes and degrees. There are three principall kindes vnto which all the rest are referred (wee speake of the vitious and passionate loue, for of the vertuous, which is Amity, Charity, Dilection, wee will speake in the vertue of Iustice) that is to say, Ambition or Pride, which is the loue of greatnesse and honour; Couetousnesse, the loue of riches; and voluptuous or carnall loue. Behold heere the three gulfes, and precipitate steepes, from which few there are that can defend themselues: the three plagues and infections of all that wee haue in hand, the minde, body and goods: the armories of those three captaine enemies of the health and quiet of mankinde, the Deuill, the flesh, the world. These are in truth three powers, the most common and vniuersall passions: and therefore the Apostle hath diuided into these three, whatsoeuer is in the world; *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum, aut carnis, aut superbia vite*: All that is in the world, is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life. Ambition, as more spirituall, so it is more high and noble than the others. Voluptuous loue, as more naturall and vniuersall (for it is euen in beasts themselues, where the rest are not) so it is more violent, and lesse vitious: I say simply violent, for sometimes Ambition excels it: but this is some particular malady. Couetousnesse of all the rest is the sickest and most sortish.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of Ambition.

Ambition (which is a thirst after honour and glory, a
gluttonous and excessive desire of greatnesse) is a sweet ¹ *The description.*
and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous
spirits, but is not without paine got forth againe. We thinke
it is our duties to embrace what is good; and amongst those
good things, wee account of honour more than them all. See
heere the reason, why with all our strength wee runne vnto it.
An ambitious man will alwayes be the first, hee neuer looks
backward; but will forward to those that are before him: and
it is a greater griefe vnto him to suffer one to go beyond him,
than it is pleasure vnto him, to leaue a thousand behinde him.
Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio, non respicit: All ambition hath Seneca.
this vice, not to looke backe. It is twofold: the one of glory
and honour, the other of greatnesse and command: that is
profitable to the world, and in some sense permitted, as shall
be proued: this pernicious.

The seed and root of ambition is naturall in vs. ² *It is naturall.* There is a
prouerbe that saith, That nature is content with a little: and
another quite contrary, That nature is neuer satisfied, neuer
content: but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and
to enrich it selfe, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with
a loose bridle it runneth headlong to greatnesse and glory.
Natura nostra imperij est auida, & ad implendum cupiditatem
preceps: Wee are naturally greedy of authority and empire, and
runne headlong to the satisfying of our desires. And with such
force and violence doe some men runne, that they breake
their owne necks, as many great men haue done, euen at the
dawning as it were, and vpon the point of entrance and full
fruition of that greatnesse which hath cost them so deare. It
is a naturall and very powerfull passion, and in the end it is
the last that leaueth vs: and therefore one calleth it, The shirt
of the soule: because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiam Tacitus,*
sapientibus cupido glorie nouissima exiit, The last vice which
euen the wise abandon is desire of glory.

3
The force and
Primacy thereof.

Ambition, as it is the strongest and most powerfull passion that is, so is it the most noble and haughty; the force and puissance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmounteth all other things, euen the strongest of the world, yea all other passions and affections, euen loue it selfe, which seemeth neuerthelesse to contend with it for the Primacy: As we may see in all the great men of the world, *Alexander, Scipio, Pompey*, and many other, who haue courageously refused to touch the most beautifull Damosels, that were in their power, burning neuerthelesse with ambition; yea that victory they had ouer loue, serued their ambition, especially in *Cesar*; For neuer was there a man more giuen to amorous delights, euen of all sexes, and all sorts of people; witnesse so many exploits both at *Rome* and in strange Countries, nor more carefull and curious in adorning his person; yet ambition did alwayes so carry him, that for his amorous pleasures hee neuer lost an houre of time which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatnesse; for ambition had the soueraigne place in him, and did fully possesse him. Wee see on the other side that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of loue hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affaires. But yet both of them being weighed in equall ballance, ambition carrieth away the price. They that hold that loue is the stronger, say that both the soule and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it selfe dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spirituall. And in as much as loue possesseth the body, it is therefore the more weake, because it is subiect to satiety, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporall, naturall and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by diuers meanes haue alaied, yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of satiety, yea it is sharpened by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soule it selfe and in the reason.

4
The care of life.

It doth likewise vanquish loue and robbeth it, not onely of it health and tranquillity (for glory and tranquillity are things that cannot lodge together) but also of it owne proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly prooue, who desiring

ring and consulting with others to make her sonne Emperour, and vnderstanding that it could not be done, but with the losse of her owne life, shee answered, as if Ambition it selfe had spoken it, *Occidar modò imperet : Let me be slaine, so he may raigne.*

Thirdly, ambition enforceth all the Lawes, and conscience it selfe; the learned haue said of ambition, that it is the part of euery honest man alwayes to obey the Lawes, except it be in a case of soueraignty for a kingdome, which only deserueth a dispensation, being so dainty a morsell, that it cannot but breake a mans fast; *Si violandum est ius, regnandi causa violandum est, in ceteris pietatem colas.* If a man may at any time violate Iustice, it must be to gaine a kingdome; in the rest obserue iustice and pietie.

It likewise trampleth vnder foot and contemneth the reuerence and respect of Religion, witnesse *Ieroboam, Mahomet*, who neuer tooke thought for Religion; but tolerated all religions, so he might raigne: and all those arch-heretickes who haue liked better to be chiefe leaders in errours and lies with athousand disorders, than to be disciples of the truth: and therefore saith the Apostle, that they that suffer themselues to be puffed vp with this passion and affection, make shipwracke, and wander from the faith, piercing themselues thorow with many sorrowes.

To be short, it offereth violence euen to the lawes of Nature it selfe. This hath beene the cause of so many murders of parents, infants, brothers; witnesse *Absalon, Abimelech, Athalias, Romulus, Sei King of the Persians*, who killed both his father and brother, *Soliman* the great Turke his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it beats all to the ground, so high and haughty is it. It lodgeth onely in great mindes, euen in the Angels themselues.

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and daily enterprises: Renowne and glory doth not prostitute it selfe to so base a price; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange and vnusuall. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts downe a man, and makes him a begger,

and to ducke and stoop to all sorts of people, and by all means yea the most abiect, at what base price soeuer, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedy of greater glory than hee is capable of; and to swell and to be puffed vp for euery good and profitable action, is to shew his taile while he lifts vp his head.

Ambition hath many and diuers wayes, and practised by diuers meanes: there is one way strait and open, such as *Alexander*, *Cesar*, *Themistocles* tooke; there is another oblique and hidden, which many Philosophers and professors of piety haue taken, who goe forwards by going backward; goe before others by going behinde them, not vnlike to wiew-drawers, who draw and goe backward; they would faine be glorious by contemning glory. And to say the truth, there is greater glory in refusing and trampling glory vnder foot, than in the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is neuer better carried, better guided, than by wandering, and vnusuall wayes.

Ambition is a folly and a vanity, for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the sinoake in stead of the light, the shadow in stead of the body, to fasten the contentment of his minde vpon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his owne liberty, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himselfe, to displease himselfe; for the pleasure of the beholders, to let his owne affections depend vpon the eyes of another; so farre forth to loue vertue as may be to the liking of the common sort; to doe good, not for the loue of good, but reputation. This is to be like vnto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before hee giue them a vent.

Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulf that hath neither brinke nor bottome; it is that vacuity which the Philosophers could neuer finde in Nature; a fire which increaseth by that nourishment that is giuen vnto it. Wherein it truly payeth his master: for ambition is onely iust in this, that it sufficeth for his own punishment, and is executioner to it selfe. The wheele of *Ixion* is the motion of his desires, which turne and returne vp and downe, neuer giuing rest vnto his minde.

They that will flatter ambition, say it is a seruant or helpe vnto

9
It hath diuers
wayes.

10
It is a folly.

11
It is insatiable.

12

vnto vertue, and a spurre to beautifull actions ; for it quitteth a man of all other sinnes, and in the end, of himselfe too ; and all for vertue : but it is so farre from this, that it hideth sometimes our vices, but it takes them not away, but it couereth or rather hatcheth them for a time vnder the deceitfull cinders of a malicious hypocrisie, with hope to set them on fire altogether, when they haue gotten authority sufficient to raigne publicly and with impiety. Serpents lose not their venome, though they be frozen with cold, nor an ambitious man his vices though with a cold dissimulation hee couer them : for when he is arriued to that pitch of height that hee desired, he then makes them feelee what he is. And though ambition quit a man of all other vices, yet it neuer taketh away it selfe. An ambitious man putteth himselfe forth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publique good, but yet he is neuer the better man that performes them, because they are not the actions of vertue but of passion, no though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not borne for our selues but the weale publique. The means men vse to mount themselues to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arriued thereunto, doe sufficiently shew what men they are, and their owne consciences tell the most that follow that dance, that howsoeuer the publique good be their outward colour, yet their owne particular is that they intend.

The excuses of ambition vaine.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill you shall finde *Lib. 3. cap. 42.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of Couetousnesse and her counter-passion.

TO loue and affect riches is couetousnesse ; not onely the loue and affection, but also euery ouer-curious care and industry about riches, yea their dispensations themselues and liberty, with Art and too much attention procured, haue a sent of couetousnesse : for they are not worthy an earnest care and attention.

^I
What it is.

The desire of goods, and the pleasure we take in possessing of

84 *Of Couetousnesse and her counter-passion.*

The force thereof. of them is grounded onely vpon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soule, which with a venomous heat consumeth our naturall affections, to the end it might fill vs with virulent humours. So soone as it is lodged in our hearts, all honest and naturall affection which wee owe either to our parents or friends, or our selues, vanisheth away. All the rest, in respect of our profit, seemeth nothing, yea wee forget in the end, and contemne our selues, our bodies, our mindes, for this transitory trash, and as the Prouerbe is, We sell our horse to get vs hay.

3
The folly and misery of couetousnesse in five points.

Couetousnesse is the vile and base passion of vulgar fooles, who account riches the principall good of man, and feare pouerty as the greatest euill, and not contenting themselues with necessary meanes, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Goldsmiths ballance, when nature hath taught vs to measure it by the ell of necessity. For what greater folly can there be than to adore that which Nature it selfe hath put vnder our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth, as vnworthy to be seene, yea rather to be contemned, and trampled vnder foot? This is that that the onely sinne of man hath torne out of the intrailles of the earth, and brought vnto light, to kill himselfe. *In lucem propter qua pugnaremus excutimus: non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, qua fuerunt ima terrarum.* We digge out of the bowels of the earth, and bring to light those things for which we would fight; wee are not ashamed to esteem those things most highly, which are in the lowest and nethermost parts of the earth. Nature seemeth euen in the first birth of gold, and wombe from whence it proceedeth, after a sort to haue prefaged the misery of those that are in loue with it: for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those Countries where it groweth, there growes with it neither grasse, nor plant, nor other thing that is worth any thing, as giuing vs to vnderstand thereby, that in those mindes where the desire of this metall growes, there cannot remaine so much as a sparke of true honour and vertue: for what thing can be more base, than for a man to disgrace, and to make himselfe a seruant, and a slaue to that, which should be subiect vnto him? *Apud sapientem diuitia sunt in seruitute, apud stultū in imperio: Riches serue a wise man, but command a foole.* For a couctous

conetous man serues his riches, not they him, and he is said to haue goods as he hath a feuer, which holdeth and tyrannizeth ouer a man, not he ouer it. What thing more vile than to loue that which is not good, neither can make a good man, yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times peruert good manners, but neuer amend them? Without which so many wise men haue made themselues happy, and by which many wicked men haue comè to a miserable end. To be brieft, what thing more miserable than to binde the liuing vnto the dead, as *Mezentius* did, to the end their death might be languishing and the more cruell; to tie the spirit to the excrement and scumme of the earth; to pierce thorow his owne soule with a thousand torments, which this amorous passion of riches brings with it; and to intangle himselfe with the ties and cords of this malignant thing, as the Scripture calleth them, which doth likewise terme them thornes, and theeues which steale away the heart of man, snares of the Deuill, idolatry, and the root of all euill. And truly he that shall see the Catalogue of those enuies and molestations which riches ingender within the heart of man, as their proper thunder-bolt and lightning, they would be more hated than they are now loued. *Desunt inopia multa, avaritia omnia: in nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus. Poverty wanteth many things, but conetousnesse all; a conetous man is good to none, and worst of all to himselfe.*

There is another contrary passion to this, and vicious, to hate riches, and to spend them prodigally; this is to refuse the meanes to doe well, to put in practise many vertues, and to flie that labour which is farre greater in the true command and vse of riches, than in not hauing them at all; to gouerne himselfe better in abundance than in poverty. In this there is but one kinde of vertue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firme and constant. In abundance there are many, Temperance, Moderation, Liberality, Diligence, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not expressed, but that he looke to himselfe: here, that he attend first himselfe, and then the good of others. He that is spoyled of his goods hath the more liberty to attend the more weighty affaires of the spirit: and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians,

stians, out of the greatnesse of their courage, haue put it in practise. He doth likewise discharge himselfe of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest gouernment of our riches, in their acquisition, conseruation, distribution, vse and employment: but he that quitteth himselfe of his riches, for this reason, flieth the labour and businesse that belongs vnto them; and quite contrary doth it not out of courage, but cowardize: and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but because he knoweth not how to make vse of them, how to vse them. And not to be able to endure riches, is rather weaknesse of minde, than wisdome, saith *Seneca*.

CHAP. XXII.

Of carnall Loue.

It is strong, naturall and common.

Carnall Loue is a feuer and furious passion, and very dangerous vnto him that suffereth himselfe to be carried by it: For what becomes of him? He is no more himselfe; his body endureth a thousand labours in the search of his pleasure; his minde a thousand hells to satisfie his desires, and desire it selfe increasing, growes into furie. As it is naturall, so is it violent and common to all, and therefore in the action thereof it equalleth and coupleth fooles and wisemen, men and beasts together. It maketh all the wisdome, resolution, contemplation and operation of the soule beastly and brutish. Hereby, as likewise by sleepe, *Alexander* knew himselfe to be a mortall man, because both these suppress the faculties of the soule.

Why ignominious.

Philosophy speaketh freely of all things, that it may the better finde out their causes, gouerne and iudge of them; so doth Diuinitie, which is yet more chaste and more strait. And why not, since that all things belong vnto the iurisdiction and knowledge thereof? The Sunne shines on the dung-hill, and is neither infected, nor annoyed therewith. To be offended with words, is a token either of great weaknesse, or some touch or guilt of the same malady. Thus much bee spoken for that which followeth, or the like if it shall happen.

Nature

Nature on the one side with violence thrusteth vs forward vnto this action ; all the motion of the world resolueeth and yeeldeth to this copulation of the male and female : on the other side it causeth vs to accuse, to hide our selues, to blush for shame, as if it were a thing ignominious and dishonest. Wee call it a shamefull act, and the parts that serue thereunto our shamefull parts. But why shamefull, since naturall, and (keeping it selfe within it owne bounds) iust, lawfull and necessarie? Yea, why are beasts exempted from this shame? Is it because the countenance seemes foule and deformed? Why foule, since naturall? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted: Is it to the end it may serue as a bridle and a stay to such a kinde of violence? why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serueth as a spurre, and as sulfure; or that the instruments thereof mooue without our consent, yea against our wills? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashfull: and many other things mooue of themselues in vs without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shamefull: not onely inward and hidden (as the pulse & motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serue the appetite, of eating, drinking, discharging the braine, the belly, and their shuttings and openings, are besides, nay many times against our wills; witnesse those sneefings, yawnings, teares, hoquets and fluxions, that are not in our owne power, and this of the body: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, beleeueth, misbeleueth, and the will it selfe, which many times willeth that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparant: the visage blusseth, waxeth pale, wan, the body groweth fat, leane, the haire turneth gray, blacke, white, growes, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that heereby the pouerty and weaknesse of man may bee the more truly shewed? that is as well scene in our eating and drinking, our griefes, wearinesse, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoeuer the reason be, the action in it selfe, and by nature is no way shamefull, it is truly naturall; so is not shame: witnesse the beasts. Why say I beasts? The naturt of man, saith Diuinitie, maintaining it selfe in it first originall state, had neuer

knowne what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence commeth shame but from weaknesse, and weaknesse but from sinne, there being nothing in nature of it selfe shamefull? The cause then of this shame not being in nature, wee must seeke it else-where. It is therefore artificiall. It is an invention forged in the closet of *Venus* to giue the greater prise to the businesse, and to inkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burne the cleerer, as Smithes vse to doe, to inflame the desire to see what it is that is hidden; to heare and know what it is that is muttered and whispered. For, to handle things darkly as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giueth taste and estimation vnto them. Contrariwise, a loose, free and open permission and commodity, derogateth from the worth, and taketh away the true relish and delight thereof.

3
In what sense
vicious.

This action then in it selfe; and simply taken, is neither shamefull nor vicious, since it is naturall and corporall, no more than other the like actions are: yea, if it be well ordered, it is iust, profitable, necessary at the least, as it is to eat and drinke. But that which doth so much discredit it, is, that moderation is seldome kept therein, and that to attaine thereunto, wee make great stirres, and many times vse bad meanes, whereby it draweth after it, if it goe not before, many euils all worse than the action it selfe. The charge riseth about the principall, and this is to fish (as it is said) with threeds of gold and purple. And all this is purely humane. Beasts that follow simple nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the Art of man on the one side sets a strait guard about it, planteth at the gate shame to giue it a relish: on the other side (ô the couisage of men!) it inflameth and sharpneth the desire, it deuisseth, remoueth, troubleth, turneth all topsie turuy to attaine vnto it, (witnesse Poetry, which sporteth not it selfe in any thing so much as in this subiect) and findeth euery entrance vnto it to be better, than by the gate, and the lawfull way, and followeth euery wandring way, rather than the common way of mariage.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Desires, Concupiscence.

THere arise not so many billowes and waues in the Sea, as desires in the heart of man : it is a bottomlesse depth, it is infinite, diuers, inconstant, confused, and irresolute, yea many times horrible and detestable, but ordinarily vaine, and ridiculous in it owne desires.

¹
The bottomlesse
depth of desire.

But first it shall not bee amisse to distinguish them. Some are naturall, and they are iust and lawfull : they are likewise in beasts, they haue their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them ; and liuing according to those, there is no man a begger. Of these shall bee spoken heereafter more at large : for (to say the truth) these are not passions. Others are besides nature proceeding from our opinions and fantasie artificiall, superfluous, which wee may, for distinctions sake, call concupiscences or Lusts. These are purely humane, beasts know not what they are, onely man is immoderate in his appetites : these are without limits, without end, and are nought else but confusion. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascentia, ubi desinant non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est : via eunti aliquid extremum est, error immensus est. Naturall desires haue their bounds, but those which grow of a false opinion are without end ; For in that which is false there is no limit : hee that trauellet in his right way, comes to an end of his iourney ; but hee that is out of his way, knowes not whither hee wanders.* And therefore liuing according to these, there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that we haue spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions ; It is for these that a man sweats, and trauels, *Ad supervacua sudatur*, that a man journeyeth by sea and by land, goeth to warre, kils himselfe, drownes, betrayes, loseth himselfe : and therefore it was well said, That concupiscence is the root of all euill. Now it falleth out many times (a iust punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfie his desires, and to glut himselfe with the goods

²
Their distinction.
Naturall necessary, lib. 2. cap. 6.
Not naturall.

Seneca.

goods and pleasures of Fortune, hee closeth and is depriued of those of Nature : and therefore *Diogenes* hauing refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to giue him that he had taken from him, to goe out of the Sunne.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Hope, Despaire.

OUr desires and concupiscences gather heat and redouble their force by hope, which inflameth with the soft and gentle aire thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our mindes a fire, from whence ariseth a thicke smoake, which blindeth our vnderstanding ; carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes vs dreame waking. So long as our hopes endure, or desires endure with them : it is a play-game wherewith Nature busieth our mindes. Contrariwise, when despaire is once lodged neere vs, it tormenteth our soules in such sort, with an opinion of neuer obtaining that wee desire, that all businesse besides must yeeld vnto it. And for the loue of that which wee thinke neuer to obtaine, wee lose euen the rest of whatsoeuer we possesse. This passion is like vnto little children, who to be reuenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry with it selfe, and requireth of it selfe the punishment of it owne folly and infelicity. After those passions that respect the apparent good, come wee to those that respect the euill.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Choler.

I
The description.

CHoler is a foolish passion which putteth vs wholly out of our selues, and with seeking the meanes to withstand and beat backe the euill which it threatneth vs, or hath already procured vs, maketh the bloud to boile in our hearts, and stirreth vp furious vapors in our spirits, which blinde vs and cast

cast vs headlong to whatsoeuer may satisfie the desire which wee haue of reuenge. It is a short fury, a way to madnesse: by the prompt and ready impetuosity and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentina & vis uersa ejus est: Sudden and violent is the force thereof.*

The causes that dispose and mooue vnto choler are first
weaknesse of spirit, as wee see by experience in women, old
men, infants, sicke men, who are commonly more cholericke
than others. *In validum omne, natura querulum est: All weak
things are full of complaint.* A man deceiueth himselfe to thinke
that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions
are like the endeouours of children and old men, who runne
when they thinke to goe: for there is nothing more weak
than an immoderate motion: and a great imbecillity is it in a
man to bee cholericke. Secondly, the malady of the minde,
whereby it is made ouer-tender to beare blowes, as the vlc-
erate parts of the body, where the sound being interessed there-
in, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nusquam
sine querela agra tanguntur: Sore things are neuer touched with-
out complaint.* The losse of a penny, or the omission of a gaine,
puts into choler a couetous man; a laughter or glance of his
wife stirres this passion in a ialous man. Thirdly, lust, vaine
nicenesse, selfe-loue, which makes a man anxious and angry,
puts him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nulla res
magis iracundiam alit quam luxuria: Nothing doth more nourish
anger than luxury.* This loue of trifles, of a glasse, a dogge,
a bird, is a kinde of folly that troubleth vs much, and stirres vp
this cholericke passion in vs. Fourthly, too much curiosity:
*Qui nimis inquirat, seipsum inquietat: Hee that searcheth too
much, disquieteth himselfe.* This is to seeke occasions, and out
of the lightnesse of the heart to cast a man into choler, not
attending any cause thereof. *Sape ad nos ira venit, sapius nos ad
illam: Anger often commeth vnto vs, we oftner to it.* Fifthly, light-
nesse in beleeuing what comes first to the eare. But the princi-
pall and formall cause is, an opinion of contempt and mis-
usage, either by word, deed, countenance. These are the rea-
sons whereby we pretend to iustifie our choler.

The signes and symptomes are very manifest, and more
than of any other passion; and so strange that they alter and
change

change the whole estate of man, they transforme and disfigure him, *Vt sit difficile utrum magis detestabile vitium, aut deforme: So that it is difficult to know, whether it be a more detestable or deformed vice.* Some of them are outward, the facer and deformed, the eies fiery, the lookes furious, the eare deafe, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulse beating, the veines swollen, the tongue stammering, the teeth gnashing, the voice loud and hoarse, the speech imperfect, and to bee brieft, it puts the whole body into a fire and a feuer. Some haue broken their veines, suppress their vrine, whereby present death hath ensued. What then can the estate of the spirit be within, when it causeth so great a disorder without? Choler at the first blow driueth away and banisheth reason and iudgement, to the end it may wholly possesse the place; afterwards it fillles all with fire, and smoake, and darknesse, and noise; like vnto him that puts the master out of the house, and then sets fire and burnes himselfe aliue within; or like vnto a ship, that hath neither sterne, nor Pilot, nor sailes, nor oares, which commits it fortune to the mercy of the waues, windes, and tempest in the midst of a furious sea.

4
The effects.

The effects thereof are great, many times miserable and lamentable. *Choler* first enforceth vs to iniustice, for it is kindled and sharpened by a iust opposition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reason hee hath to bee angry. Hee that is moued to anger vpon a false occasion, if a man yeeld him any good reason why hee should not be angry, hee is presently more incensed euen against the truth and innocencie it selfe: *Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas ira, quasi argumentum sit iuste irascendi graviter irasci.* The iniquity of anger doth make vs more stubborne, as if it were an argument and prooffe of iust anger, to bee grievously angry. The example of *Piso* is very notable and proues this true, who excelling otherwise in vertue (the history is very well knowne) being moued to choler, did vniustly put three to death, and by a subtile accusation caused them to be found guilty, onely because they acquitted one as vnguiltly whom hee by his former sentence had condemned. It is likewise sharpened by silence and cold replies, as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his choler; which is proper vnto women, who many

times

times are angry to the end they may stirre vp that passion in another, and increase their choler euen to fury, when they see that a man vouchsafeth not to nourish that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* sheweth it selfe to bee more sauage than a beast, since neither by defense or excuse, nor by silence and patience without defense, it will not bee wooen nor pacified. The iniustice thereof is likewise in this, that it will be both a Iudge and a party, that it will that all take part with it, and growes to defiance with as many as will seeme to contradict it. Secondly, forasmuch as it is inconsiderate and heady, it casteth vs headlong into great mischieses, and sometimes euen into those which wee most flie, and doe wish and would willingly procure another man: *Dat poenas dum exigit, It is punished whilst it punisheth*, or far worse. The passion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burst themselves in pieces vpon that which they fall, it pursueth with such violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the auoiding of it owne. It intrappeth and intangleth vs, makes vs to speake and to doe things shamefull, vncomely, vnworthy our selues. Lastly, it carrieth vs so beyond our selues, that it makes vs to doe things scandalous, dangerous, and irreuocable, murders, poisonings, treasons, whereby follow great and too late repentances: witnesse *Alexander* the Great after he had slaine *Clytus*, and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to say, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

This passion feedes vpon it selfe, flattereth and tickleth it selfe, with a perswasion that it hath reason, that it is iust, excusing it selfe vpon the malice and indiscretion of another, but the iniustice of another cannot make that iust, nor the losse that we receiue by another make that profitable vnto vs: it is too rash and inconsiderate to doe any thing that is good, it would cure an euill with an euill; for to yeeld the correction of an offence to *Choler*, is to correct a vice by it selfe. Reason which should haue the command ouer vs, needs no such officers as of their owne heads execute lawes, nor attending her ordinance; shee would haue all things done according to nature by measure, and therefore violence doth no way besit it. But what, shall vertue see the insolency of vice and not be angry with it? shall the liberty thereof bee so bridled as not to dare

dare to be mooued against the wicked? vertue desires no indent liberty, it needs not turne it owne strength against it selfe, nor that the wickednesse of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well bear the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperity without enuy. Hee must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the selfe same patience that Physitians doe the iniuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdom, nor more profitable in the world, than to endure the folly of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, wee make it our owne. That which hath heretofore bene spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, enuie, reuenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill are
Lib. 3. cap. 31.

CHAP. XXVI.

Hatred.

HAtred is a strange passion, which strangely and without reason troubleth vs: and to say the truth, what is there in the world that tormenteth vs more? By this passion wee put our selues into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex vs; the sight of him mooueth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea wee neuer present him to our memories but with despight and gnawing of teeth, which puts vs besides our selues, and teares our owne hearts; whereby we suffer in our selues, the punishment of that euill we wish vnto another. He which hateth is the patient, he that is hated, the agent: contrary to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what doe we hate? Men, or their matters and affaires? Doubtlesse we hate nothing that we should; for if there be any thing to be hated in this world, it is hate it selfe, and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in vs.

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. cap. 32.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Enuie.

ENuie is couſen germaine to Hatred ; a miſerable paſſion and outragious beaſt, which in torment excelleth hell it ſelfe. It is a deſire of that good that another poſſelleth, which gnaweth our heart, and turneth the good of another man to our owne hurt. But how ſhould it torment vs, ſince it is as well againſt that which is ill, as that which is good ? Whileſt an enuious man looketh obliquely vpon the goods of another man, hee loſeth what is good in himſelfe, or at leaſt wiſe takes no delight in it.

Particular aduiſements and remedies againſt this euill, are
Lib. 3. cap. 33.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Ieaſouſie.

IEaſouſie is a paſſion like almoſt both in nature and effect, vnto Enuie, but that it ſeemeth that Enuy conſidereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the poſſeſſion of another man, and that wee deſire it for our ſelues ; and Ieaſouſie concerneth our owne proper good, whereof wee feare another doth partake.

Ieaſouſie is a weake malady of the ſoule, abſurd, vaine, terrible and tyrannicall, it inſinuateth it ſelfe vnder the title of amity, but after it hath gotten poſſeſſion, vpon the ſelfeſame foundation of loue and good will, it buildeth an euerlaſting hate. Vertue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries of this rage, or rather the ſewell vnto this fury.

It is likewiſe the Gaule that corrupteth all the Hony of our life : it is commonly mingled with the ſweeteſt and pleaſanteſt actions, which it maketh ſo ſharpe and ſower as nothing more: it changeth loue into hate, reſpect into diſdaine, aſſurance into diffidence : it ingendreth a pernitiouſ curioſity and deſire in a man to cleere himſelfe of that euill, which be-
ing

ing past remedy, by too much stirring stinketh the more: For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring in to the light, sound with a trumpet his owne shame and misery, and the dishonour of his owne children?

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 35.*

CHAP. XXIX.

Reuenge.

1
A cowardly
passion.

THedefire of Reuenge is first a cowardly and effeminate passion, proceeding from a base, weake and abiect minde, which experience telleth vs to be true: for we commonly see the weakest mindes the most malicious and reuengefull, as women and children. The valiant and generous minde doth little feele this passion, but contemneth and disdaineth it, either because the iniury toucheth him not, or because hee that offereth the iniury is not worthy his reuenge, as not dayning so farre to debase himselfe: *Indignus Caesaris ira. Unworthy the anger of Caesar.* The haile, thunder, and tempests, and those fearefull motions that are in the aire, doe neither trouble nor touch the superiour celestially bodies, but onely the weake and inferiour: and euen so the indiscretions and childish brawles of fooles wound not great and high mindes. All the great men of the world, *Alexander, Caesar, Epaminondas, Scipio*, haue beene so farre from reuenge, that quite contrary, they haue done good vnto their enemies.

2
Biting.

Secondly, it is a boyling and biting passion, and like a worme it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with it, it molesteth them by day, and by night keeps them awaked.

3
Vniust.

It is likewise full of iniustice, for it tormenteth the innocent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, to feele that euill and punishment, which the desire of reuenge giueth to a mans heart; and the party offended goes to lay on the burthen, as if hee had not already hurt enough by the iniury receiued; in such sort, that many times and ordinarily, whilest hee tormenteth himselfe to seeke meanes of reuenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes himselfe

himselfe merry with it . But it is also farre more vniust in the meanes of the execution , which many times is wrought by treasons and villanous practises.

Lastly, the execution is not onely painfull but dangerous too ; for experience telleth vs, that he that seeks to be reuenged, doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not, comes to passe, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his owne. The feare of iustice tormenteth him, and the care to hide him those that loue him.

4
Dangerous.

Againe, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not reuenge, but meere cruelty , which proceedeth from cowardlinesse and feare. To be reuenged is to beat his enemy, to make him stoope; not to kil him: for by killing he feeles not the power of his wrath, which is the end of reuenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be reuenged vpon a dogge or a beast, because hee can no way taste or conceit his reuenge. In true reuenge there must be a kinde of pleasure and delight in the reuenger : and hee vpon whom hee is reuenged must feele the weight of his displeasure, suffer paine, and repent him of the cause, which being killd he cannot doe: yea, he is rather freed thereby from all misery, and contrariwise he that is the reuenger endureth many times that torment and feare which he wished to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardlinesse and feare, lest his enemy feeling the force of his reuenge, should liue to requite him with the like; which though it make an end of the quarrell, yet it woundeth his reputation, it is a trick of precaution and not of courage, and is the way to proceed safely, but not honourably. *Qui occidit longè, non ulciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur*: Hee that killeth a farre off, doth neither reuenge, nor obtaine renowne.

5
To kill, is not to reuenge.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are

Lib. 3. cap. 34.

CHAP. XXX.

Cruelty.

Crueltie is a villanous and detestable vice, and against nature, and therefore it is likewise called Inhumanitie. It proceedeth from weaknesse; *Omnis ex infirmitate feritas est: All cruelty proceedeth of infirmity.* And it is the daughter of cowardlinesse: for a valorous man doth alwayes exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercy, but he is satisfied: *Romana virtus, parcere subiectis, debellare superbos: The Roman virtue was to spare the humble, and subdue the proud.* Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weaknesse cannot be of this ranke, to the end it may yet get the name of Valour, it makes blood and massacres the prooffe thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloody, because they feare, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them; and therefore they exercise their cruelty against all, euen women too, because they feare all; *Cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timeo: He strikes all, because he feares all.* Cowardly dogs bite and teare with their teeth, within the house, the skinnes of those wild beafts, which in the open field they durst not looke vpon. What makes ciuill warres so cruell, but that tie where with the common people are led and linked, who like dogges that are backt by their master backe one another? The Emperour *Mauritius* being told that one *Phocas* a souldier should kill him, enquired what he was, and of what nature and condition; and being told by his sonne in law *Philip*, that he was a base coward: Why then, saith he, no maruell if he be a murderer and cruell. It proceedeth likewise from the inward malignity of the soule, which feedeth and delighteth it selfe with the hurt of another. Monsters like *Caligula*.

CHAP. XXXI.

Sadnesse, or heavinesse of heart.

SAdnesse is a languishing feebleness of the spirit, and a skinde of discouragement ingendered by the opinion that wee haue of the greatnesse of those euils that afflict vs. *The description.* It is a dangerous enemy to our rest, which presently weakneth and quellerh our soules, if we take not good heed, and takerh from vs the vse of reason and discourse, and the means whereby to prouide for our affaires, and with time it rusteth and fenoweth the soule, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his vertues asleepe, euen then when he hath most neede to keepe them awaked, to withstand that euill which oppresseth them: but we must discouer the foulness and follie, the pernicious effects, yea the iniustice that is in this cowardly, base, and feeble passion, to the end wee may learne with all our might to flie and auoyd it, as most vnworthy the wisest men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks, which is not so easie to be done because it excuseth and couereth it selfe with many beautifull colours of nature, pietie, goodnesse, yea the greatest part of the world it drawes to honour and fauour it, making it an ornament to wisdom, vertue, conscience.

First then it is so farre from being naturall (as it would make men beleue) that it is formall, and an enemy to nature, as may easily be proued. Touching ceremonious sorrowes and publike mournings, so much affected and practised in former times, and likewise at this present (my meaning is not to touch the honesty and moderation of obsequies and funerals, nor that sorrow that belongs to piety and religion) what greater imposture or deceitfull couenage can there be in any thing besides? How many fained and artificiall counterfeited couenages are there with no small cost and charges, both in those whom it concerneth, the authors of the sport, and those whose offices they make vse of in that businesse? For to giue the better credit to their iuggling tricks they hire people to lament and to send vp their shreeking cries and lamentations, which all men know to be fained and extorted for money,

2
Not naturall.
Publike mournings.

teares that are not shed but to be seene, and so soone as they are out of sight, are dried vp; where is it that Nature hath taught vs this? Nay, what is there that Nature doth more abhorre and condemne? It is a tyrannicall, false and vulgar opinion (the worst, as hath beene said, almost of all the passions) that teacheth vs to weepe and lament in such a case. And if a man cannot finde occasion of teares & a heavy countenance in himselfe, he must buy it at a deare price in another, in such sort that to satisfie this opinion, hee must enter into a great charge whereof nature if we would credit it, would willingly discharge vs. Is not this willingly and publickely to betray reason, to enforce and to corrupt nature, to prostitute his owne manhood, to mocke both the world and himselfe, to satisfie the vulgar sort, which produce nothing but error, and account of nothing that is not counterfeited and disguised? Neither are those more particular sorrowes naturall, as it seemes to many; for if they did proceed from Nature, they should be common to all men, and almost touch all men alike. Now wee see that the selfe-same things that are causes of sorrow to some, giue occasion of ioy vnto others, that one Province, one person laugheth at that whereat another weepeth; that they that are conuersant with those that lament, exhort them to resolution, and to quit themselves of their teares. Yea the greatest part of those that thus torment themselves, when you haue talked with them, or that themselves haue had the leisure but to discourse vpon their owne passions, they confesse that it is but a folly thus to afflict themselves, and praise those who in the like aduersities, haue made head against Fortune, and with a manly and generous courage haue withstood their afflictions. And it is certaine that men doe not accommodate their mourning to their cause of sorrow, but the opinion of those with whom they liue. And if a man marke them well, he shall finde that it is opinion, which the more to annoy vs presenteth the things vnto vs which torment vs either more than they should, or by anticipation, feare, and preuention of that which is to come, sooner than they should.

3
Against nature. But it is against nature, inasmuch as it polluterh and defaceth whatsoeuer nature hath made beautifull and amiable in vs, which is drowned by the force of this passion, as the beautie

tie of a pearle is dissolued in vinegar. Wee make our selues hereby spectacles of pittie, we goe with our heads hanging, our eyes fastned on the earth, our mouthes tonguelesse, our members immouable, our eyes serue for no other vse than to weepe, that you may say wee are nothing but sweating statues, turned (as the Poets faine) like *Niobe* into a stone by the power of this passion.

Now it is not onely contrary and an enemy vnto nature, but God himselfe : for what other thing is it, but a rash and outrageous complaint against the Lord and common law of the whole world, which hath made all things vnder the Moone changeable and corruptible ? If we know this law, why do we torment our selues ? If we know it not, whereof doe we complaine, but of our owne ignorance, in that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world ? Wee are heere not to giue a law, but to receiue it, and to follow that which we finde established : for to torment our selues by contradicting it, doth but double our paine.

4

*Iniust and
impious.*

Besides all this, it is pernicious and hurtfull vnto man, and by so much the more dangerous, because it killeth when wee thinke it comforts, hurterh vnder the colour of doing good; vnder a false pretence of plucking the iron out of the wound, it driues it to the heart, and the blowes thereof are so much the more hardly auoyded, and the enterprises broken, because it is a domesticall enemy brought vp with vs, which we haue engendred for our owne punishment.

5

Pernicious.

Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited; it dishonoureth and defameth man. Doe but consider when it entreth into vs, it filleth vs with shame, in such sort, that wee dare not shew our selues in publike place, no not priuately to our dearest friends; and after we are once possessed of this passion, we doe nothing but seeke corners to hide our selues from the sight of men. What is this to say, but that it condemneth it selfe, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is ? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantonneisse to hide her selfe, and to feare to be knowne. Againe, doe but consider the vestments and habits of sorrow, how strange and effeminate they are; which sheweth, that it taketh away whatsoeuer is manly and generous in vs, and

6

Outwardly.

puts vpon vs the countenances and infirmities of women: and therefore the *Thracians* adorned those men that mourned, like women. And some say, that sorrow makes men eunuchs. The first and more manly and generous lawes of the *Romans* forbade these effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men should so degenerate from their owne natures, and doe things contrary to manhood; allowing only of those first teares which proceed from the first encounter of a fresh and new griefe, which may fall euen from the eyes of Philosophers themselves, who keepe with their humanitie their dignitie: and may fall from the eyes, vertue not falling from the heart.

7
Inwardly.

Now it doth not onely alter the visage, change, and dishonestly disguise a man outwardly, but piercing euen to the marrow of the bone, *Tristitia exsiccat ossa: Heavinesse drieth the bones.* It weakeneth likewise the soule, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man vnapt to good and honourable enterprises, taking away the taste, the desire, and the disposition to doe any thing that is profitable either to himselfe or to another, and not onely to doe good, but to receiue it. For euen those good fortunes that light vpon him displease him; euery thing is tart vnto his soule, as victuals to a corrupted stomacke: and lastly, it maketh bitter our whole life, and poysoneth all our actions.

8
The distinction.

It is two-fold, great and extreme, or at leastwise, though not great in it selfe, yet great when by reason of a sudden surprise, and furious vnexpected alarum it seisseth vpon the heart of a man, pierceth it thorow, depriueth him of motion and sense, like a stone, & not vnlike that miserable mother *Niobe*.

Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,

Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur.

She sounded at the halfe, all being too much,

To see at once and line; her griefe was such:

She falls, she fluctuates, she resounds and breakes,

And scarce at length, with much adoe she speaks.

And therefore the Painter diuersly & by degrees presenting vnto vs the sorrow and miserable estate of the parents and friends of *Iphygenia* when she was sacrificed, when he came to her father, he painted him with his face couered, as confessing

sing his Art not sufficient to expresse in the visage a griefe of that degree. Yea, sometimes a sorrow may be such, that it killeth out-right. The second degree is the indifferent sorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater than the former, yet in time it is lessened and eased, and is expressed by teares, sobs, sighs and lamentations: *Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Light cares doe speake, great confound.*

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are
Lib. 3. cap. 29.

CHAP. XXXII.

Compassion.

WE sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pity their miseries, either because by a secret consent we participate one the others euils, or because we feare that in our selues, which hath happened to others. But this is done two wayes, whereby there is likewise a two-fold compassion; the one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himselfe, not effeminating his owne nature, and without impeachment of equity or honour, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted. This is that vertue so much commended in religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: the other is a passion of a feeble minde, a sottish and feminine pity, which proceedeth from a delicate tendernes, a troubled spirit, proper to women, infants, and to cruell and malicious mindes (which are consequently base and cowardly, as hath beene proued in the Chapter of Cruelty) who pity the punishments of offenders, which produceth vniust effects, not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state and condition.

Aduiselements and remedies against this euill, you shall finde

Lib. 3. cap. 30.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Feare.

The description.

FEare is the apprehension of an euill to come, which holdeth vs in a continuall care, and runnes before those euils that fortune threatneth vs.

We speake not here of that feare of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that feare which proceedeth from loue, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloued, commendable in subiects and all inferiours towards their superiours; but of that vicious feare that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sinne, the twinne of shame, both of one wombe, sprung from that close and cursed marriage of the spirit of man with a diabollicall perswasion. *Timco cò quèd nudus essem, & abscondi me. I feare, because I was naked, and therefore I hid my selfe.*

2
The malice and
tyranny thereof.

It is a deceitfull and malicious passion, and hath no other power ouer vs, but to mocke and seduce vs: it serues it turne with that which is to come, where though we seeme to foresee much, we see nothing at all; and in that doubtfull darknesse it holdeth vs, as in a darke place, as thieves doe by night, to the end they may robbe a man and not be knowne, and giue a great and sudden affright with a small number. And therefore it tormenteth vs with masks and shewes of euils, as men feare children with bug-bears; euils that haue nothing but a simple appearance, and haue nought in themselves whereby to hurt vs, yea, are not euils, but that wee thinke them so. It is the onely apprehension which wee haue, which makes that euill to vs which is not so, and draweth euill euen from our owne good to afflict vs withall. How many doe we see every day, that with feare to become miserable, become that they feare, and turne their vaine feare into certaine miseries? How many haue lost their friends, by distrusting their friends; haue got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in such sort conceiued an opinion that his wife hath played false play with him, that for griefe he languisheth; another hath in such sort apprehended such a conceit of pouerty, that hee falleth

falleth sicke: and to bee briefe, some haue died for feare to die. And euen so may a man say almost of whatsoeuer wee feare: for feare seemeth not to other end, than to make vs finde that which wee flie from. Doubtlesse, feare is of all other euils the greatest and most tedious: for other euils are no longer euils than they continue, and the paine endureth no longer than the cause; but feare is of that which is, and that which is not, and that perhaps which neuer shall be, yea sometimes of that which cannot possible bee. Behold then a passion truly malicious and tyrannicall, which draweth from an imaginarie euill true and bitter sorrowes, and is ouer-greedy by thought and opinion to ouertake, nay out-runne them.

Feare doth not onely fill vs with euils, and many times by false appearances, but it likewise spoileth all the good that we haue, and all the pleasure of our life, as an enemy to our rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good which he feareth to lose; life it selfe cannot be pleasant, if a man feare to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient writer) can bring pleasure with it, but that against the losse whereof a man is alwaies prepared.

It is also a strange passion, indiscreet and inconsiderate, and proceeds as often from the want of iudgement, as of heart. It riseth from dangers, and many times casteth vs into dangers; for it ingendreth in vs such an inconsiderate desire to get out, that it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindereth vs from taking that order that is fit to get out. It bringeth a violent kinde of trouble, whereby the soule being affrighted, withdraweth it selfe into it selfe, and debateth with it selfe how to auoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on vs with such an astonishment, that we lose our iudgement, and there is no longer reason or discourse in vs: it maketh vs to flie when no man pursueth, yea many times our owne friends and succours: *Adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat: Insomuch that feare dreadeth his owne helpes.* Many haue runne mad herewith, yea the senses themselues haue hereby lost their vse: we haue our eies open, and see not; one speakes to vs, and we hearken not vnto him; we would flie, and we cannot goe.

An indifferent feare puts wings to our heeles; a great naile fast

fast our feet, and intangles them. Feare peruerteth and corrupteth the intire man, both the spirit, *Pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat*, Feare depriueth my minde of all wisdom and vnderstanding : And the body,

Obstupui, steteruntque coma, vox faucibus haesit.

Cold sudden feare, supplants his natine heat,

And layes him speechlesse, till his blond retreat.

Sometimes it makes vs desperate, & therefore resolutelike that Romane Legion vnder the conduct of the Consull *Sempronius* against *Hannibal*, *Audacem fecerat ipse timor* : Feare made him bold. There are feares and affrightments without any apparent cause, and as it were by some celestially impulsion, which they call Panique terrors, *Terrores de caelo, arescentibus hominibus pra timore*, Terrors from heauen, men consuming away with feare ; such as once happened in the City of Carthage, and wherewith whole people and armies haue bene confounded.

Luk. 21.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. Cap. 28.*

The second Consideration of Man, by comparing him with all other creatures.

CHAP. XXXIV.

A profitable and difficult comparison, wherein man is suspected.

WE haue considered man wholly and simply in himselfe : now let vs consider him by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent meanes to know him. This comparison hath a large extent and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, and very profitable, if it bee well done. But who shall doe it? Shall man? Hee is a party and to be suspected; and to say the truth, deales partially therein : which may easily bee proued, because hee keepes neither measure nor mediocrity. Sometimes hee placeth himselfe farre aboue all, hee termes himselfe a Master, and disdaineth the rest : diuides vnto them their morsels, distribureth such a portion of faculties and powers vnto them as shall seeme good vnto him. Sometimes as it were in despight, hee debaseth himselfe beneath all ; hee murmureth,

murmureth, complainerh, wrongeth Nature as a cruell step-mother, makes himsef the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extremes are equally against reason, verity, modesty. But how would you haue him to walke vp-rightly and euenly with all other creatures, when hee doth it not with man his companion, nor with God himsef, as shall be shewed? This comparison is also difficult to doe; for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moueth within them? But yet let vs doe our ende-uour to doe it without passion.

In the chapter of
presumption.

First, the policy of the world is not so vnequall, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion betweene the parts thereof, but that they that are neere neighbours and touch one another haue a resemblance, some more some lesse. So is there a great vicinity and kindred betwixt man and other creatures: they haue many things alike and common to each other, and they haue differences likewise, but not so farre distant and vnlike, but that they may hold together. Man is neither altogether aboue, nor beneath the rest. Ecclesiast. All that is vnder heauen, saith the Wisdome of God, runnes the same fortune.

2

Let vs first speake of those things that are common to all, and almost alike, which are to ingender, nourish, to doe, moue, liue, die: *Idem interitus hominis & jumentorum, & aqua utriusque conditio: As the death of men, so of beasts, and condition of them both is alike.* And this is against those that finde themselves agriued, saying, that man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked vpon the naked earth, without couert, without armour, bound, swaddled, without instruction of what is fit for him: whereas all other creatures are clothed and couered with shels, husks, haire, wooll, feathers, scales: armed with teeth, hornes, tallants, both to assault and to defend: taught to swim, to runne, to flie, to sing, to seeke their reliefe, and man knowes neither how to goe, nor to speake, nor to eat, nor any thing but cry, without an apprenticeship and much labour. All these complaints to him that considereth the first composition and naturall condition, are vniust and false: our skinne is as sufficiently provided against the iniuries of times and seasons as theirs, witnesse many Nations

3

Things common.

Eccles. 4.

1 Nakednesse.
cap. 5.

tions

2. Swadling
clothes.

3. Crying.

4. Armes.

5. Eating.

6. Speech.

tions (as hath beene said) that neuer knew what garments meant : yea those parts that we thinke good we keepe vncovered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands, the stomacke, and the delicatest damosels their breasts. Bands and swadling clothes are not necessary, witnesse the *Lacedemonians*, and in these daies the *Switzers*, *Almaines*, which dwell in cold countries, the *Bisques* and vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common vnto beasts: all creatures almost complaine, and groane for a time after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is naturall, and haue more motion of our members, vse their seruice more naturally and without instruction. If some beasts excell vs in this, wee in the same excell diuers others. The vse of eating is both in them and in vs naturall and without instruction. Who doubteth that an infant, being once able to feede himselfe, knowes how to seeke his sustenance? And the earth likewise bringeth foorth and offereth enough vnto him for his necessity, without other culture or Art, witnesse so many Nations, which without labour, industry and care liue plenteously. As for speech, a man may well say that if it bee not naturall, it is not necessary : but it is common to man with other creatures : What else but speech is that faculty we see in them of complaining, reioycing, of calling others to their succour, of making loue? And as wee speake by gestures and motion of the eies, the head, the shoulders, the hands (wherein deafe men are very cunning) so beasts, as wee see in those which haue no voice, who neuerthelesse do interchange their mutuall offices; and as in some kinde of measure beasts vnderstand vs, so wee them. They flatter vs, threaten vs, intreat vs, and we them, wee speake to them, and they to vs, and if wee perfectly vnderstand not one another, where is the fault? in vs or in them? That is to bee determined. They may as well account vs beasts by that reason, as wee them, yea they reproch vs for that we our selues vnderstand not one another. We vnderstand not the *Bisques*, the Britons, and they all vnderstand the one the other, not onely of the same, but (which is more) of a diuers kinde. By a certaine barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

Again

Againe they haue their intelligence with vs. In the warres ^{7 Mutuall intelligence.} in the middest of the fight, Elephants, Dogs, Horses vnderstand with vs, they frame their motions according to the occasion, they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they haue their pay, and diuide the booty with vs, as it hath beene practised in the new conquests of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

Let vs now come to those differences and aduantages that the one hath ouer the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things aboue other creatures, and in others, beasts haue the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby be knit and chained together in this generall policy of the world and nature. The certaine aduantages or excellencies ^{4 Differences and aduantages.} of man, are those great faculties of the soule; the subtiltie, viuacitie, and sufficiencie of the spirit to inuent, to iudge, to chuse, speech to demand and to offer and to succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath inuented either of it selfe, or learned from another. The forme also of the body, the great diuersity of the motion of the members, whereby his body doth him better seruice. ^{Of man.}

The certaine aduantages that beasts haue ouer men, and such as are past all doubt, are either generall or particular. The ^{5 Of beasts generall.} generall are health, and strength of body far more perfect, constant, and strong in them, among whom there are no blinde, deafe, lame, mute, diseased, defectiue, and ill borne, as amongst men. The *Sereno* hurts them not, they are not subiect to rheumes from whence proceed almost all other diseases; from which man though hee couer his head with a hat and a house too, can hardly defend himselfe. Moderation in diet and other actions, innocency, safety, peace and tranquillity of life, a plaine and intire liberty without shame, feare, or ceremony in things naturall and lawfull (for it is onely man that hath cause to hide himselfe in his actions, and whose faults and imperfections offend others.) Exemption from so many vices and disorders, superstition, ambition, avarice, enuy, yea mighty dreames trouble not them as they doe men, nor so many thoughts and fantasies. The particular aduantages are ^{Particular.} the pure, high, healthfull, pleasant habitation, and abode of birds in the aire. Their sufficiency in some Arts, as the swallow ¹
²
low

3

low and other birds in building, the Spider in spinning and weauing, diuers beasts in Physicke, and the Nightringale in Musicke. Maruellous effects and properties, not to bee imitated, no nor imagined, as the property of the fish *Remora*, to stay the greatest vessels of the Sea, as we reade of the chiefe galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the selfe same of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedo* or Crampe fish, to benum and dead the members of another, though farre distant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foresee the windes; of the Chameleon, to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their passages from countrey to countrey, according to the diuer-
 lity of the seasons; of all beasts that are dammes, in knowing which of their young is the best; for some happe falling out of defending them from danger, or conueying them to their nests, they alwayes begin with that they know and foresee to be the best. In all these things man is farre their inferiour, and in some of them hee hath no skill at all. A man may adde vnto this, if hee will, the length of their liues, which in some beasts doth seuen or eight times exceed the longest terme of the life of man.

6

Disputable ad-
 uantages.

I

Reason.

Those aduantages that man pretendeth to haue aboue beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many: First, the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, iudgement, prudence. There are heere two things to be spoken, the one of the verity of the thing it selfe. It is a great question, whether beasts be depriued of all these spirituall faculties. The opinion that they are not depriued, but haue them, is the more true and the more authenike. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphry*, *Plutarch*, and maintained by this reason. The composition of the braine, which is that part which the soule makes vse of, and whereby it reasoneth, is all alike, as the same in beasts and men, confirmed by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals, by the sight of one onely man they know all men, they know how to ioine, and diuide, and distinguish the good from the ill, for the safegard of their liues, liberty, and little ones. Yea, we reade and see, if we would but marke and consider it, many things done by beasts, that doe farre excell

excell the sufficiency, subtiltie, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men ; some of those that are best worth the noting, I will note vnto you. The Fox being to passe ouer a riuer that is frozen with ice, applieth his eare vnto the ice, to finde whether hee can heare any noise, and that the water doe runne vnder it, that thereby hee may resolue either to goe forward, or to retire backe; of whom the *Thracians* haue learned the same cunning, being to passe their frozen riuers. A Dogge, to the end hee may know which way of three either his master or that beast hee hunteth is gone, hauing assured himselfe by senting them, that hee hath not passed by two of them, because he findes not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground or farther trauersing, he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a riuer with a sacke of salt on his backe, and being plunged into the deepe with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter ; which the Mule (falling into the deepe by chance) hauing found, being afterwards loaden with wooll, vsed the same remedie, and funcke the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a ship casting stones into a pipe of oile, to make the oile to mount, that hee might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crowes of *Barbarie*, who by that meanes raise the water when it is too low, that they may drinke. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch whereinto their companion is fallen, to helpe him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Suze*, being taught to goe in a wheele a iust hundred turnes, to draw water to water the gardens, they would neuer exceed that iust number, and were neuer deceiued in their account. All these things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and diuision ? To say they know not this, were to deny that wee see they doe. What should wee thinke of that dexterity that is in the Elephant, in plucking those darts and iuelins forth of his body with little or no paine at all ? of the Dogge that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publike play vpon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiffe, and suffering himselfe to bee carried forth, by little and little comming to himselfe,

selfe, and lifting vp his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Iuglers doe? of the policies and inuentions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults wee make vpon them? of the husbandry and great prouidence of the Ant in laying abroad his graine to dry, lest it take moisture and so corrupt, in nipping the ends thereof that it grow not? of the policie of the Bee, where there is such diuersity of offices and charges so firmly established?

7
An opposition of
the naturall in-
stinct.

To beat downe all this, some doe maliciously attribute these things to a naturall, seruile and forced inclination; as if beasts did performe their actions by a naturall necessity, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downeward, the fire mounteth vppward. But besides that, that cannot be, nor enter into our imagination; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and diuision, and consequents; they likewise know not what this naturall inclination and instinct is; they bee words which they abuse to small purpose, that they may not be deafe and mute altogether. Againe, this saying is retorted against them: for it is beyond all comparison more noble, honourable, and resembleth more the Diuinity to worke by nature than by Art & apprenticeship; to be led and directed by the hand of God, than by our owne; regularly to act by a naturall and ineuitable condition, than regularly by a rash and casuall liberty.

By this obiection of the naturall instinct, they would likewise depriue them of instruction and discipline both actiue and passiue, but experience giues them the lie; for they doe both receiue it: witnesse the Pie, the Parrer, the Black-bird, the Dogge, the Horfe, as hath beene said; and they giue it, witnesse the Nightingale, and aboue all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beasts in docility, and all kinde of discipline and sufficiency.

8

As for this faculty of the spirit whereof man doth so much glory, which is to spiritualize things corporall and absent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceiue them after it owne manner, *Nam intellectum est intelligente ad modum intelligentis*; For that which is understood, is in him that understandeth, after the manner of the understander, beasts themselves

selues doe the like. The horse accustomed to the warres sleeping in his stable, trembleth and groaneth as if he were in the midst of the fight; conceiue the sound of the drumme, the trumper, yea an army it selfe. The Hare in sleepe panting, listeth vp her scut, shaking her legs, conceiue a spirituall Hare. Dogs that are kept for guard, in their sleepe doe snar, and sometimes barke out-right, imagining a stranger to become. To conclude this first point, wee must confesse that beasts doe reason, haue the vse of discourse and iudgement, but more weakly and imperfectly than man; they are inferiour vnto men in this, not because they haue no part therein at all; they are inferiour vnto men, as amongst men some are inferiour vnto others; and euen so amongst beasts there is such a difference: but yet there is a greater difference between men; for (as shall be said hereafter) there is a greater distance betweene a man and a man, than a man and a beast. But for all this we must not heereby inferre a kinde of equality or parity betwixt a beast and a man (though as *Aristotle* saith, there are some men so weake and blockish, that they differ from a beast onely in figure) and that the soule of a beast is immortall as that of a man, or the soule of a man mortall as that of a beast: for these are but malicious illations. For, besides that in this reasoning faculty, a man hath a very great aduantage aboue beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spirituall, whereby he is said to be like vnto God himselfe, and is capable of immortality, wherein beasts haue no part, and are signified by that vnderstanding, which is more than a simple discourse; *Nolite fieri sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus*: Be not like horse and mule in whom there is no vnderstanding.

The other point which wee are to speake of in this matter is, that this preheminance and aduantage of vnderstanding, and other spirituall faculties that man pretendeth, is sold him at a deare rate, and brings with it more hurt than good: for it is the principall source of all those euils that oppresse him; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolution, trouble, despaire, which beasts want, by the want of this great aduantage: witnesse the Hogge of *Pyrrho*, which did eat his meat peaceably in the shippe in the midst of a great tempest, when all

the men were almost dead for feare. It seemeth that these great parts of the soule haue beene denied vnto beasts, or at leastwise lessened, and giuen them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed vpon man for his torment: for it is long of them that he toileth and trauelleth, tormenteth himselfe with what is past, and that which is to come; yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those euils that are not, nor euer shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill vntill they feele it; and being escaped, they are presently in security and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable euen in that wherein hee thought himselfe most happy: whereby it seemeth that it had beene better for man, not to haue beene indued and adorned with all those beautifull and celestiallyl armes, since he turneth them against himselfe, euen to his owne destruction. And to say the truth, wee see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, liue at best content, and feele not their euill accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spirituall.

10

2. Signorie and command.

Another aduantage that man pretendeth aboue beasts, is a signory and power of commanding, which hee thinketh hee hath ouer beasts: but besides, that it is an aduantage that men themselues haue and exercise the one ouer the other, this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beasts? It is a monster that was neuer seen, yea men doe more feare beasts, than beasts them. It is true that man hath a great preheminance ouer beasts; *Vt præsūt piscibus maris, volatilibus cæli, bestiis terræ*: That he might rule ouer the fish of the sea, the fowles of the aire, and the beasts of the earth. And this by reason of his beautifull and vpright forme, of his wisdom and the prerogative of his spirit: but not that he should either command, or they obey.

Gene 1.

11

3. Liberty.

There is likewise another aduantage, neere neighbour to this, pretended by man, which is a plaine liberty, reproching beasts with their seruitude, captiuitie, subiection: but this is to small purpose. There is farre greater reason why man should reproch man; witnesse those slaues, not onely made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntary, who either sell for money their liberty or giue it, out of the lightnesse of their hearts, or for some commodity,

as

as the ancient Fensors sold out-right women to their mistresses, souldiers to their captaines. Now there is none of all this in beasts, they neuer serue one another, nor yeeld themselues to any seruitude either actiue or passiue, either to serue or to be serued, and are in euery thing more free than men. And as man goeth to the chase, taketh, killeth, eateth the beasts; so is he taken, killed, eaten by them in his turne, and more honourably too, by maine strength, not by wit and Art, as man doth: and not onely by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonourable. Beasts assemble not themselues in troops to goe to kill, to destroy, to ransacke, to inthrall another troope of their kind, as men doe.

The fourth and greatest aduantage pretended by man, is in vertue, but of morall it is disputable (I meane morall materially by the outward action): for formally the moralitie good or euill, vertue and vice, cannot be in a beast. Kinde acknowledgement, officious amity, fidelity, magnanimitie, and many other vertues, which consist in society and conuersation, are more liuely, more expresse and constant, than can be in the common sort of people. *Hircanus* the dogge of *Lyfsmachus* continued vpon the bed of his dead master, refusing all kinde of sustenance, and afterwards cast himselfe into that fire wherein his master was burnt, and there died with him. The selfe-same did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dogge of wise *Hesiodus* discovered the murther of his master. Another in like sort in the presence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole Army. Another which neuer ceased, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from city to city, vntill that sacrilegious robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to iudgement. That historie is famous, of the Lion that was host and nurse to *Androdus* the slaue and his Physitian, which would not touch him being cast out vnto him: which *Appion* affirmeth to haue scene at *Rome*. An Elephant hauing in choler killed his gouernour, repenting himselfe of it, refused any longer to eat, drinke, or liue. Contrariwise, there is not a creature in the world, more vniust, vnthankfull, traiterous, perfidious, lying and deceitfull than man. Againe, forasmuch as vertue consisteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleasures, beasts are much

12
4. Vertue.

Humanity.
Cruelty.

more moderate therein than we, and doe better containe themselves within the limits of nature. For they are not only nor touched with vnnaturall, superfluous and artificiall passions and desires, which are all vicious and infinite, as men who for the most part are plunged in them, but also in the naturall, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the female, they are farre more moderate and stayed. But that we may see which is the more vertuous or vicious, a man or a beast, and in good earnest to shame a man more than a beast, let vs take the vertue most proper and agreeable vnto man, that is, as the word it selfe importeth, humanity: as the most strange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now herein beasts haue aduantage enough euen to make men blush for shame. They neuer assaile, and seldome offend those of their kinde; *Major serpentum ferarumq; concordia quam hominum: Greater is the concord and agreement amongst serpents and wilde beasts, than among men.* They neuer fight but for great & iust causes, as the defence and preservation of their liues, liberty, and their little ones: and that they doe with their naturall and open armes, by their onely force and valour, and that one to one as in single combats, and not in troupes, nor by designements. Their combats are short and soone ended, vntill one of them be either wounded or yeeldeth; and the combat ended, the quarrell, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrell but against man, for not onely light, vaine and frivolous causes, but many times vniust, with artificiall and traiterous armes, by deccits and wicked meanes, in troupe and assembly gathered by assignement; and lastly, his warres are long and neuer ended but with death, and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

12
The conclusion
of the second
consideration.

The conclusion of this comparison is, that vnruly and vainely doth man glorifie himselfe aboue beasts. For if man haue in him something more than they, as especially the viuacity of the spirit and vnderstanding, and those great faculties of the soule; so likewise in exchange is hee subiect to a thousand euils from which the beasts are freed, inconstancy, irresolution, superstition, a painfull care of things to come, ambition, auarice, enuy, curiosity, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations.

This

This spirit wherewith man maketh himselfe so mery, brings him a thousand inconueniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not onely hurt the body, trouble, breake and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it selfe. What casteth man into folly and madnesse, but the sharpnesse, agility, and proper force of the spirit? The most subtile follies and excellent lunacies proceed from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirit, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities, and from soundest healths mortall maladies. Melancholiemen, saith *Plato*, as they are more capable of knowledge and wisdom, so likewise of folly. And hee that well marketh it, shall finde, that in those elcuations and salies of a free soule, there is some mixture of folly; for to say the truth, these things are neere neighbours.

Touching a simple life, and such as is according to nature, beasts doe farre exceed men; they liue more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth hereof, and benefiteth himselfe by making them an instruction vnto himselfe, which doing, hee frameth himselfe to innocency, simplicity, liberty, and that naturall sweetnesse which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupted in vs by our artificiall inuentions, and vnbridled licentiousnesse, abusing that wherein we say we excell them, which is the spirit and iudgement. And therefore God doth many times send vs to schoole, to birds, beasts themselues, to the kite, the grasshopper, the swallow, the turtle, the ant, the ox, the aile, and diuers others. Lastly, wee must remember that there is a kinde of commerce betwixt beasts and vs, a certaine relation and mutuall obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one and the same master, & are of the same family that wee are. It is an vnworthy thing to tyrannize ouer them; wee owe iustice vnto men, and pitty and gentlenes to such other creatures as are capable thereof.

13
An exhortation.

The third Consideration of Man, which is by his life.

CHAP. XXXV.

*The estimation, breuity, description of the life of man,
and the parts thereof.*

I
Of the estima-
tion and worth
of life.

IT is a great and principall point of wisdom, truly to know how to esteeme of life, to hold and preserue it, to lose or to take it away, to keepe and direct it, as much as after such a manner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindred. The vulgar vnlearned for accounteth it a soueraigne good, and preferreth it aboue all things; yea hee will not sticke to redeeme and prolong it by all the delays that may be, vpon what conditions soeuer, thinking it can neuer be bought too deare: for it is all in all with him, his mot is *Vita nihil charius: Nothing is dearer than life*. He esteemeth and loueth his life for the loue of it selfe: he liues not but to liue. It is no maruell if hee faile in all the rest, if he be wholly compounded of errours, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamentall point he mistakes himselfe so grossly. It may bee likewise with some lesse esteemed, and more basely accounted of than it should, either by reason of some insufficiency in iudgement, or a proud misknowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselves and others. And I cannot be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to be at all; and that the best is the shortest life: *Optimū non nasci aut quā citissimē aboleri: The best thing is, not to be borne, or presently to die*. And it is neither well nor wisely said, What hurt or what matter had it beene if I had neuer beene? A man may answer him with the like question: Where had that good beene which is come, and being not come, had it not been euill not to haue beene? It is a kinde of euill that wanteth end, whatsoeuer it be, yea though not necessary. These extremities are too extreme
and

and vicious, though not equally: but that seemes true that a wise man spake, That is such a good as a man would not take, if hee knew well what it were before hee tooke; *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus*: No man would accept of life if he knew what it were. It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hudwinckt into it. Now when they are within, some doe so cocker and flatter themselves therein, that vpon what condition soeuer they will not goe forth againe; others doe nothing but mur-
mure and vex themselves: but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves (for a man neither liues nor dies when and how he will) and that though the way be rough and hard, yet neuerthelesse it is not alwayes so, without win-
sing, or struing and troubling any thing, they accom-
modate themselves vnto it as they may, and so passe their life in quietnesse, making of necessity a vertue; which is a token of wisdom and industry: and so doing, they liue as long as they should, and not like fooles, as long as they can. For there is a time to liue, and a time to die: and a good death is far better than an ill life. A wise man liues no longer, than that his life may be worth more than his death: for the longest life is not alwayes the better.

See here of lib.
2. cap. 11.

2

Of the length &
breuitie of life.

All men doe much complaine of the breuitie of the life of man; not onely the simple vulgar sort, who wish it would neuer haue end, but also (which is more strange) the greatest and wisest make it the principall ground of their complaints. To say the truth, the greatest part thereof being diuer-
ted and otherwise employed, there remaines little or nothing for it selfe: for the time of our infancy, old age, sleepe, maladies of minde and body, and many other times, both vnprofitable and vnfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth is little or nothing at all. Neuerthelesse, without op-
posing the contrary opinion to them that hold a short life to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaining seemeth to haue little equitie and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For, to what end serueth a long life? Simply to liue, to breathe, to eat, to drinke, to see this world: for all this what needs so long time? We haue seene, knowne, tasted all in a short space; and knowing it, to desire so long a time to
practise

practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to doe alwayes one and the same thing? If it be not tedious and irkesome, at the least it is superfluous: it is a turning wheele where the same things come and goe: it is alwayes to begin where we end, and to re-spinne the same webbe. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life, to learne and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowledge and vertue. Alas good soules that wee are, what should wee know, or who should teach vs? Wee employ but badly that litle which is giuen vs, not onely in vanities and those things that yeeld vs no profit, but in malice and sinne; and then wee cry out and complaine, that we haue not enough giuen vnto vs. And to say the truth, to what end serues so great store of knowledge and experience, since in the end wee must leaue it and dislodge it; and hauing dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise? But you will say, that there are beasts that doe triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are told heereof; Be it so: but yet there are a number that liue not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that liue out their time. By what right or reason, or priuiledge, can man challenge a longer life than other creatures? Is it because hee doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthy life? By this reason hee should liue lesse time than all other creatures; for there is none comparable to man in the ill employment of his life, in wickednesse, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodesty in manners, as hath beene shewed before in the comparison of man with beasts: so that as I asked euen now, to what end a long life serued; now I aske what euils there would be in the world, if the life of man were long? What would he not enterprise, since the shortnesse of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast, and the vncertainty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, cannot stay him, liuing as if he should liue euer? On the one side he feareth, perceiuing himselfe to be mortall, but notwithstanding that, hee cannot bridle himselfe from not coueting, hoping, enterprising, as if he were immortall.

Tanquam semper victuri vivitis, nunquam vobis fragilitas vestra succurrit:

succurrit: omnia tanquam mortales timetis, tanquam immortales concupiscitis. Ye live as though ye were alwaies to live, your frailty neuer comes into your minde, ye feare all things as mortall, but ye desire all things as immortall. And to say the truth, what need hath Nature of all these great and goodly enterprises and imployments, whereby man challengerh a longer life than other creatures? Man therefore hath no subiect whereof to complaine, but to be angry with himselfe. We haue life enough, but we are not good husbands, we mannage it not well; life is not short, but we make it so; we are not in want, but prodigall; non inopes vita, sed prodigi: we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought worth, as if we had more than enough: we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vaine. Magna vita pars elabitur male agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus. A great part of life is lost to those that doe ill, a greater to those that doe nothing, and all to those that doe that they should not doe. A man studieth not to liue, but rather busieth himselfe in any other thing; he shall neuer know how to doe a thing well by acquitting himselfe of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserve their liues vntill they can liue no longer, then take comfort in life when there is nothing left but the lees and dregges thereof. Oh what folly, what misery is this! Yea there are some that haue sooner ended than begunne to liue, and life is past before they thought of it. Quidam vivere incipiunt, cum definendum; quidam antè desierunt, quàm inciperent. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia, semper incipit vivere. Some beginne to liue, when they should die; some ended, before they beginne: amongst other euils, folly hath this, that it alwaies beginnes to liue.

Seneca.

Looke lib. 3. ca. 6.

Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedie, a perpetuall issue of errours, a web of vnhappy aduentures, a pursuit of diuers miseries inchained together on all sides; there is nothing but euill that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one euill driues forward another euill, as one waue another; torment is euer present, and the shadow of what is good deceiueth vs; blindness and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, the middle is euer in paine and trauell, the end in sorrow; and beginning, middle, and end in error.

3

A description of
the life of man.

The

4

The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries common, ordinary and perpetuall; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diuersity of the parts, ages and seasons; infancy, youth, virility, old age; euery one haue their proper and particular discommodities.

5

A comparison
betwixt youth
and old age.

The greatest part of the world speake more honorably and fauourably of old age, as the more wise, ripe, moderate, accusing and shaming youth of a vitious, foolish, licentious, but very vniustly: for in truth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome than those of youth, it fillles the minde more with wrinkles, than the visage; and there is not a soule growing old, growes not sowre and rotten. With the body the spirit is vsed, and the worse for the vse; and at the last returnes to infancy againe, *Bis pueri senes: Old men twice children.* Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth vs insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to terme wisdom a difficultie of humours, an anxiety and distaste of things present, an impotencie to doe as in former times: Wisdom is too noble to be serued with such officers. To wax old is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices, but to change them into worse. Old age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it cannot taste or relish it aright, like *Esops* dogge, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it cannot ioy in it: for old age leaueth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdaines old age; for it is alwayes wanton and sporting: and it is no reason that impotency should corrupt iudgement, which should in youth know vice in pleasure, and in old age pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temerity, indiscreet forwardnesse, and vnbridled liberty and ouergreedy desire of pleasure, which are naturall things proceeding from the heat of the bloud and naturall vigour, and therefore the more excusable; but the vices of old age are far otherwise. The lighter are a vaine and fraile proteruity, an enuious prating, vsociable humours, superstition, care to get riches, euen then when the vse of them is lost, a sottish avarice, and feare of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because old men are long acquainted and as it were cockered in this world, whereby their affections are

are knit vnto it, which is not in young men : but besides these they are enuious, froward, vniust : but that which is most foolish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not onely bee reuerenced but feared, and therefore they put vpon them an austere looke and disdainfull, thinking thereby to extort feare and obedience : but they are therein much deceiued, for this stately and furious gesture is receiued of youth with mockery and laughter, being practised onely to blinde their eyes, and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in old age so many faults on the one side, and so many impotencies on the other, and therefore so fit for contempt, that the best way to compasse their desires is loue and affection : for command and feare are no longer fit armes for them. It ill befits them to make themselues to bee feared : and though they could doe it, yet loue and honour is a fairer purchase.

The fourth Consideration of Man, morall
by his manners, humours, conditions,
very liuely and notable.

THE PREFACE.

ALL the descriptions the wise, and such as haue taken greatest paines in the study of humane knowledge haue giuen vnto man, seeme all to note in man foure things, *Vanity, Weaknesse, Inconstancy, Misery* ; calling him the spoile of times, the play-game of Fortune, the image of inconstancy, the example and spectacle of infirmity, the balance of enuie and misery, a dreame, a fantasie, ashes, a vapor, a morning dew, a flower that presently fadeth and withereth, a winde, grasse, a bladder or bubble, a shadow, leaues of trees carried with the winde, vncleane seed in his beginning, a sponge of ordures, a sacke of miseries in his middle age, a stench and meat for wormes in his end ; and to conclude, the most miserable and wretched thing in the world. *Iob*, one of the most sufficient in this matter, as well in the practise

life and contemplation thereof, hath well and at large described him, and after him, *Salomon*, in their bookes. To be short, *Pliny* seemeth very properly to haue deciphered him, in calling him the most miserable, and yet the most arrogant creature of the world, *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec miserius quicquam homine aut superbius*: That it is onely certaine, that there is nothing certaine, neither any thing more proud, and miserable than man. By the first word (miserable) hee comprehendeth all those former descriptions, and as much as all the rest haue said; but by the other (the most proud) he toucheth another chiefe point very important: and hee seemeth in these two words to haue vttered whatsoeuer can bee said. These are those two things that seeme to hurt and hinder one the other, Misery and Pride, Vanity and Presumption. See then how strange and monstrous a patch-coat man is.

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diuers parts, the soule and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe him entire in his perfection and declining state. Some referre vnto the body whatsoeuer ill can bee spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and in regard of his spirit extoll him aboue all other creatures: but on the other side, whatsoeuer is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forged and proceedeth from this spirit of man, and in it there is farre more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, than in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproach in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plutarch* proueth it in a booke written of that subiect. Now let vs consider man more according to the life, than heretofore wee haue done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these fīue points, *vanity, weakness, inconstancy, misery, and presumption*, which are his more naturall and vniuersall qualities, but the two latter touch him more neerely. Againē there are some things common to many of these fīue, which a man knowes not to which to attribute it, and especially imbecillity and misery.

CHAP. XXXVI.

I. Vanity.

VAnity is the most essentiall and proper quality of humane nature. There is nothing so much in man, bee it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is alwaies abundance) as base feebleness, sottishness, and ridiculous vanity: And therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kinde of disdaine of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, than *Heracitus* that wept and tormented himselfe, whereby hee gaue some testimony, that hee made some account thereof; and *Diogenes* who scorned it, than *Timon* that hater and flier of the company of men. *Pindarus* hath expressed it more to the life than any other, by the two vainest things in the world, calling it the dreame of a shadow, *μαλα ὄνειρος ἀνδρῶν*.

I

This is that, that hath wrought in the wisest so great a contempt of man; that hearing of some great designement and honourable enterprize, and iudging it such, were wont neuertheless to say that the world was not worthy a mans labour and paines, (so answered *Statilius* to *Brutus*, talking with him about the conspiracy against *Cesar*) and that a wise man should doe nothing but for himselfe, for it is not reason that wise men, and wisdom should put themselves in danger for fooles.

This vanity is shewed and expressed many waies, and after a diuers manner; first in our thoughts and priuate imaginations, which are many times more than vaine, friuolous, and ridiculous, wherein neuertheless wee spend much time, and yet perceiue it not. Wee enter into them, we dwell in them, and wee come forth againe insensibly, which is a double vanity, and a great forgetfulness of our selues. One walking in a hall considereth how hee may frame his paces after a certaine fashion vpon the boords of the floure: another discourseth in his minde, with much time and great attention, how hee should carry himselfe if hee were a King, a Pope, or some other thing that he is assured can neuer come to passe; and so hee

2

Thoughts.

hee feedeth himselfe with winde, yea lesse than winde, that, that neither is, nor euer shall be. Another dreameth how hee shall impose his body, his countenances, his gestures, his speech after an affected fashion, and pleaseth himselfe therein, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that euery man should take delight in. But what a vanity and sottish weaknesse in our desires is this, that brings forth beliefes and hopes farre more vaine? And all this falleth out not onely when wee haue nothing to doe, when wee are swallowed vp with idlenesse, but many times in the midst of our most necessary affaires: so naturall and powerfull is vanity, that it robberh and plucketh out of our hand, the truth, soliditie, and substance of things, and filles vs with winde, yea with nothing.

3
*Care for time to
come.*

Another more sottish vanity is a troublesome care of what shall here fall out when wee are dead. Wee extend our desires and affections beyond our selues, and our being; wee would prouide that some thing should bee done vnto vs, when wee know not what is done vnto vs; wee desire to be praised after our death, what greater vanity? It is not ambition, as it seemeth and a man may thinke it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honor: if this praise of our selues when we are gone, might any way profit either our children, our parents, or our friends that suruiue vs, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selues; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch vs, nor benefit others, is a meere vanity, like that of those who feare their wiues will marry after their departure; and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue vnmarried, and binde them by their willes so to doe, leauing vnto them a great part of their goods vpon that condition. This is vanity and many times iniustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past which dying exhorted their wiues to marie speedily for the better increase of the Commonwealth. Others ordaine, that for the loue of them and for their sakes a friend keepe such and such a thing, or that hee doe this or that vnto their dead bodies, which rather sheweth their vanity than doth any good to soule or body.

4

See heere another vanity, wee liue not but by relation vnto another;

another; wee take not so much care what we are in our selues in effect and truth, as what wee are in the publike knowledge of men; in such sort, that we doe many times deceiue and deprive our selues of our owne goods and commodities, and torment our selues, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not onely in outward things and such as belong to the body, and the expence and charge of our meanes, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seeme vnto vs to bee without fruit, if others enioy them not, and they bee not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

Our vanity is not only in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh and tormenteth both soule and body. Many times men trouble and torment themselves more for light occasions and matters of no moment, than for the greatest and most important affaires that are. Our soule is many times troubled with small fantasies, dreames, shadowes, fooleries, without body, without subiect, it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorrow, ioy, building castles in *Spaine*. The remembrance of a farewell of some particular grace or action afflicteth vs more than a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certaine words pronounced with a pitifull voice, yea with sighs and exclamations pierceth euen to the quicke, as Oratours and Players, and others that sell winde and smoake, doe well know and practise. And this winde catcheth and carrieth away many times men that are most constant and settled, if they stand not vpon their guard: so puissant is vanity ouer men. And not onely light and little things doe shake and trouble vs, but also lies and impostures, euen those we know to bee such (a strange thing) in such sort, that wee take pleasure to deceiue our selues in good earnest, to feede our fantasies with tales, with nothing. *Ad fallendum nosmetipfos ingeniosissimi sumus: Wee are wise to deceiue our selues*; witnesse they that weepe and afflict themselves hearing a relation or seeing a tragedy, which they know to be an inuention made for delight, euen of those things that neuer were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that hee died for one whom he knew to bee foule, old, deformed, not because he.

5

Agitations of the spirit.

6
*Visitations and
 offices of con-
 verses.*

he loued her, but because shee was well painted, and plastered or coloured with other impostures, though hee alwaies knew them to be such.

Let vs come from the particular vanity of euery particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanity is tied to the nature of man, not onely as a priuate and personall vice. What vanity and losse of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congies and mutuall entertainments, those offices of courtesie, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises ! How many hyperbolicall speeches, hypocrisies and impostures are there in the sight and knowledge of all, both of those that giue them, that receiue them, that heare of them ! insomuch that it seemeth to be a match and market made together, to mocke, lie, and deceiue one another. And that which is worth all the rest, hee that knowes that a man doth impudently lie vnto him, must yet giue him thanks ; and he that knowes that when he lies he is not beleeued, sets a bold face vpon the matter, attending and obseruing one the other, who shall first beginne or end ; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What inconueniences doth man endure ? He faineth, counterfeiteth, disguiseth himselfe ; he endureth heat, cold, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaueth his weighty affaires for the winde. Wee are vaine at the charge of our owne ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample vnder foot the substance, and the winde carrieth the body, so much is man a slaue to vanity : and hee that will doe otherwise shall be held for a foole and a man that vnderstands not the world. It is dexterity well to play this Comedy, and folly not to be vaine. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vaine and vnprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and pernicious, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vaine boastings ! Man desireth and delighteth to speake of himselfe and that which is his, and if he thinke he haue either done or said, or possesse any thing that is worthy estimation, he is not at ease vntill he hath vttered it, and made it knowne to others : when a commodity first commeth he entred into an account thereof, hee valueth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will

will not seeme to attend his commodity, though he seeke it with industrie; and then to heare what the speech of the people is abroad, hee thrusts himselfe into company, and it tickleth him at the heart to heare his happy successe spoken of, and that men esteeme of him the more, and of what hee esteemes.

But better to make knowne what credit and command this vanity hath ouer the nature of man, let vs call to minde that the greatest alterations of the world, the most generall and fearefull agitations of States and Empires, armies, battels, murders, haue risen from light, ridiculous and vaine causes: witnesse the warres of *Troy* and *Greece*, of *Sylla* and *Marius*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Augustus* and *Antony*. The Poets signifie as much, when they set all *Greece* and *Asia* on fire for an Apple. The first occasions and motiues arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase: a testimony of the vanity and folly of man. Many times the accident doth more than the principal, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quick than the greatest, nay the causes and subiects themselves. The robe of *Cesar* troubled *Rome* more than his death did, or those two and twenty stabs with a poignard that were giuen him.

Lastly, the crowne and perfection of the vanity of man is shewed in that which hee most affecteth and seekes after; hee pleaseth himselfe and placeth his whole felicity in those vaine and friuolous goods, without which hee may well and commodiously liue, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essentiall: his chance is winde, his whole good nothing but opinion and dreames, wherein he is matchlesse. *God* hath all good things in essence, all euill in vnderstanding; man quite contrary possesseth his good things by fantasie, his euill in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and fantasies, but with that which is present, palpable and in verity. Vanity hath beene giuen vnto man as his proper part or condition; he runnes, he stirs, he hunts vp and downe, he catcheth a shadow, he adoreth the winde, hee flies, hee dies, and a moat at the last is the hire of his dayes worke; *Vanitati creatura subiecta est etiam nolens, universa vanitas omnis homo vivens: Every creature is subiect to vanity, even against his will, and all men liuing are but vanity.*

7
Publike and
vniuersall agi-
tations.

8
Felicity and
contentment.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Debilitie or Infirmitie.

BEhold heere the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledge : for how should vanity be other than fraile and feeble ? This weaknesse is confessed, and proued by all that account many things easie to be vnderstood of all, but is not taken to be such in those things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth to be most strong, and least weake; in desiring, possessing, and vsing those things that he hath and holdeth, and in euery good and euill ; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excell others, and to be some thing. These are the true testimonies of his weaknesse : but we shall see this better apart.

2
*In desiring and
chusing.*

First, touching desire, a man cannot settle his contentment in any thing, no nor his owne desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse that we should : and whatsoeuer we haue desired or obtained, it satisfies vs not : but we goe bleating after things vnknowne and to come, because things present content vs not, and wee more esteeme of things absent. If one should put a man to his owne choice, make him his owne caruer, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he repent not his choice, or which he will not adde vnto, or take from, or alter some way or other ; for he desires that which he knowes not how to expresse : and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angry and falleth out with himselfe.

3
*In possessing
and vsing.*

The weaknesse of man doth more appeare, and is greater in the possession and vse of things, and that diuers wayes : first, in that hee cannot make vse of any thing in it owne purity and simple nature ; but he must disguise, alter and corrupt them before hee can accommodate them to his vse : the elements, metalls, and all things else in their owne nature are not fit for vse. Good things, delights and pleasures cannot be enjoyed without some mixture of euil and discommodity; *Medio de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat: Euen from amidst the fountaines of delights doe arise alwaies some bitternesse, which euen in the height of pleasure doe annoy.*

The

The highest pleasure that is, hath a sigh and a complaint to accompany it; and being come to perfection is but debility, a deiection of the minde, languishment. An extreme and full contentment hath more moderate seuerity than wanton delight; *Ipsa felicitas, se nisi temperat, premit: Felicity it selfe, unlesse it temper it selfe, vexeth.* And therefore it was well said of him, That God sells vnto vs whatsoeuer good thing hee sends vs: that is to say, That he giueth nothing vnto vs purely good, but that wee buy it at the scales with an addition of some euill to make vp weight. So likewise, sorrow is neuer pure without the alliance of some pleasure; *Labor voluptasq; dissimilima natura, societate quadam naturali inter se sunt iuncta; est quadam flere voluptas: Labour and pleasure, though in nature most unlike, yet by a certaine naturall society they are linked together, so that euen to weepe is a certaine delight.* So all things in this world are mingled & compounded with their contraries: those motions and wrinkles in the visage that serue to laugh, serue to weepe, as Paintersteach vs: and wee see that the extremity of laughter is mingled with teares. There is no good thing in vs that hath not some vicious tincture with it; *Omnes iustitie nostra sunt tanquam pannus menstruata: All our righteousnesses is as a menstruous cloth, as anon shal be shewed in his due place; nor no euill without some good: Nullum sine authoramento malum est: There is no sinne without punishment.* Misery it selfe alwayes serues to some end: for there is no euill without good, no good in man without euill: all is mingled, and there is nothing pure in our hands. Secondly, whatsoeuer happeneth vnto vs, wee take and enioy with an ill hand; our taste is vnresolued and vncertaine, it knowes not how to hold and possesse any thing after a good manner: and from thence sprang that vndetermined question of the soueraigne good. The better things many times in our hands, by our infirmities, vice, insufficiency, are made worse, are corrupted, become nothing, are vnprofitable vnto vs, yea sometimes hurtfull and contrary.

But humane imbecillity is more richly displayed in good and euill, in vertue and vice: hence it is, that man cannot be,

4
In good and
euill.

when it seemes good vnto himselfe, either wholly good or wholly wicked, but he hath his weaknesse, his impotencies

Tertull.

in them both. Touching vertue, three points are to be considered : the first is, That it is not in the power of man to doe all good, to put in practise all vertues ; insomuch that many vertues are incompatible, and cannot be together, at least in one and the same subiect, as filiall or maidenly continencie and viduall, which are wholly different ; the married and vnmarried state ; the two second of widowhood and marriage, being more painfull and busie, and hauing more difficulty and vertue than the two first of virginity and the vnmarried estate, which haue more purity, grace and ease: *Virgo felicior, vidua laboriosior ; in illa gratia, in ista virtus coronatur: The virgine is the happier, the widow the more painfull ; in the former grace, in the latter vertue is crowned.* That constancie which is in pouerty, want, aduersity, & that which is in abundance and prosperity : patience in beggery and liberality. And this is more true in vices, which are opposite one against the other.

5

The second point is, That many times a man cannot performe that which belongs to one vertue, without the scandall and offence either of another vertue, or of it selfe ; insomuch that they hinder one the other : whereby it comes to passe that a man cannot satisfie the one but at the charge of the other ; which wee must not attribute vnto vertue, or thinke that the vertues crosse and contrary one another, for they agree well enough ; but vnto the weaknesse of our humane condition, all the sufficiency and industry thereof being so short and so feeble, that it cannot finde any certaine, vniuersall and constant rule, whereby to make an honest man : and such order cannot be taken, but that the meanes to doe well doe many times hinder one the other. Let vs take for example, Charitie and Iustice : If I encounter my father or my friend in the warres, on the enemies part, in iustice I ought to kill him, but in charity I should spare and saue him. If a man be wounded to the death and past all remedy, and that there remaineth nothing but a grievous languishment, it were a deed of charity to make an end of him, as hee did that killed *Saul* at his earnest intreaty ; but this charity is punished by iustice, as he was by *Danid*, and that iustly, *Danid* being the minister of publique iustice, not priuate charity : yea, to be found

found neere vnto a man in such a case, in a suspicious place, and where there is doubt of the murderer, although hee be there to performe some office of humanity, is very dangerous; and the best thing that can happen vnto him, is to be called into question, and put to answer to that accident whereof he is innocent. So that we see that iustice doth not onely offend charity, but it hampereth and hindereth it selfe: and therefore it was very well said and truly, *Summum ius, summa iniuria: Extreme right, extreme wrong.*

The third point and the most notable is, that a man is constrained many times to vse bad meanes for the better auoydance of some great euill, or the execution of what is good, in such sort that he must sometimes approue as lawfull, not onely those things that are not good, but that are starke naught; as if to be good, it were necessary to be somewhat wicked. And this is seene in euery thing, in *Policie, Iustice, Veritie, Religion.*

6

In *Policy*, how many euils are there permitted and publickly acted, not only by conniueance or permission, but also by the approbation of the lawes themselves? as shall heereafter be said in his due place; *Ex senatusconsultis & plebescitis scelera exercentur: Crimes are committed by the decrees of the Senate, and approbations of the people.* To disburthen a State or Common-weale, either of too great a number of people, or of such as are inflamed with a desire of warres, which the state, like a body repleat with bad or abundant humours, cannot beare, it is the manner to send them else-where, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the *French, Lombards, Gothes, Vandales, Tartarians, Turkes* haue beene accustomed to doe. To auoid a ciuill warre, it is the manner to entertaine a strange war. To intrust others in the vertue of Temperance *Lycurgus* caused the *Ilotes* their seruants to be made drunke, that by the vgly deformity of their superfluous inundation, others might grow into a horror and detestation of that sinne. The *Romans*, to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordained of purpose those furious spectacles of the Fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders, afterwards for slaues or seruants, but innocents, and lastly for free-men that gaue themselves thereunto.

7
Poli.y.

thell houses in great Cities; *usuries*, *diuorces*, vnder the law of *Moses*, and in diuers other nations, and religions, haue been permitted for the better auoyding of greater mischiefes, *ad duritiem cordis eorum*: For the hardnesse of mens hearts.

8

Iustice.

In iustice, which cannot subliste, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely Iustice commutative, for that is not strange: it is after a sort necessary, and men could not liue and traffike together, without mutuall dammage, without offence, and the lawes allow of the losse which is vnder the moiety of the iust price. But also iustice distributive, as it selfe confesseth; *Summum ius, summa iniuria*: & *omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos, utilitate publica rependitur*: Extreme right is extreme wrong, and all great examples haue some iniustice, which for the common good is practised against all. Plato alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of fauour and pardon, to draw the offender to confesse his fault. This is by iniustice, deceit and impudency to doe iustice. And what should we say of the inuention of tortures, which is rather a prooffe of patience, than verity? For, both hee that can suffer them, and cannot, will conceale the truth. For, why should griefe cause a man rather to speake that which is, than that which is not? If a man thinke that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being a meanes to saue his life? *Illa tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cuiusque tum animi, tum corporis regit quasi-tor, flectit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustiis nil veritati loci relinquatur*: Griefe gouerneth those torments, nature doth moderate, the searcher both of the body and minde doth rule, lust boweth, hope corrupteth, feare weakeneth, so that in so many extremities, there is no place for truth. In defence hereof it is said, that tortures doe astonish and quell the guilty, and extort from him a truth; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent: but wee doe so often see the contrary, that this may be doubted; and to say the truth, it is a poore meanes full of vncertainty, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not doe, to auoid such torment? *Etenim innocentes mentiri cogit dolor*: For griefe enforceth innocents to lie; in such sort that it falleth out that the Iudge which giueth the torture, to
the

Of tortures.

the end an innocent should not die, causeth him to die an innocent and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand haue falsely accused their owne heads, either to shorten their torments or their liues. But in the foot of this account is it not a great iniustice & cruelty to torment and to rack a man in peeces for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end they may not kill a man without iust cause, they doe worse than kill him if he be innocent & beare the punishment, what amends is made him for his vniust torture? He shall be quit, a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thanke you. But it is the lesse euill that the weaknesse of man could inuent.

If man be weake in vertue, much more is hee in verity, whether it be eternall and diuine, or temporall and humane. That astonisheth him with the lightning, & beats him downe with the thunder thereof, as the bright beames of the Sunne, the weake eye of the owle: if he presume to behold it, being oppressed, he presently fainteth; *Qui scrutator est maiestatis, opprimetur à gloria: The curious searcher of Gods maiestie, shall be oppressed by his glory:* in such sort that to giue himselfe some breath, some taste, he must disguise, temper, and couer it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane verity, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speakes it, is many times holden for an enemy, *Veritas odium parit: Truth breedeth hatred.* It is a strange thing, man desireth naturally to know the truth, and to attaine thereunto he remoueth all lets whatsoever, and yet he cannot attaine it: if it be present, hee cannot apprehend it; if he apprehend it, he is offended with it. The fault is not in the truth, for that is alwayes amiable, beautiful, worthy the knowledge; but it is humane imbecillity that cannot endure the splendor thereof. Man is strong enough to desire, but too weake to receiue and hold what he desireth. The two principall meanes which he vseth to attaine to the knowledge of truth, are Reason and Experience. Now both of them are so feeble and vncertaine (though Experience the more weake) that nothing certaine can be drawne from them. Reason hath so many formes, is so pliable, so wauering, as hath beene said, and Experience much more, the occurrents are alwayes vnlike; there is nothing so vniuersall in Nature as diuersity, nothing so rare and difficult, and almost impossible, as

9
Veritie.

Cap. 14.

the likenesse and similitude of things : and if a man cannot note this dissimilitude, it is ignorance and weaknesse; I meane this perfect, pure, and entire similitude and dissimilitude : for to say the truth, they are both whole and entire, there is no one thing that is wholly like or dislike to another. This is an ingenious and marvellous mixture of Nature.

10
Religion.

But after all this, what doth better discover this humane imbecillity than Religion? yea the very intention thereof is to make man feeble his owne euill, his infirmity; his nothing, and to make him to receiue from God his good, his strength, his all things. First, it preacheth it vnto him, it beats it into our memory, it reprocheth man, calling him dust, ashes, earth, flesh, blood, grasse. Afterwards it insinuateth it into him, and makes him feeble it after an excellent and goodly fashion, bringing in God himselfe, humbled, weakned, debased for the loue of him, speaking, promising, swearing, chiding, threatening; and to be briefe, conuersing and working with man after a base, feeble, humane manner, like a father that counterfeits his speech, and playes the childe with his children. The weaknesse of man being such, so great, so inuincible, that to giue it some accessse and commerce with the Diuinity, and to vnite it vnto God, it was necessary that God should debase himselfe to the basest : *Deus quia in altitudine sua à nobis parvulis apprehendi non poterat, ideo se stravit hominibus* : God, because in his height he could not be apprehended by vs little ones, did humble himselfe to men. Againe, it makes him see his owne weaknesse by ordinary effects; for all the principall and holiest exercises, the most solemne actions of religion, are they not the true symptomes and arguments of humane imbecillity and sicknesse? Those sacrifices that in former times haue beene vsed thorowout the world, and yet in some countries continue, not onely of beasts but also of liuing men, yea of innocents, were they not shamefull markes of humane infirmity and misery? First, because they were signes and symboles of his condemnation and malediction (for they were as publique protestations, that hee had deserued death, and to be sacrificed as those beasts were) without which there had neuer beene any bloody offerings or propitiatory and expiatorie sacrifices. Secondly, because of the basenesse of the purpose

Sacrifices.

purpose and intent, which was to thinke to appease, flatter, and gratifie God by the massacre and bloud of beasts and of men: *Sanguine non colendus Deus, quæ enim extrucidatione immerentiū voluptas est?* God is not worshipped with blond, for what can there bee in shedding innocent bloud? It is true, that God in those first ages, yet the feeble infancy of the world and nature remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands of religious men, euen for their deuotion, or rather Christ his sake: *Respexit Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera eius*: God had respect to Abel, and to his gifts, taking in good part that which was done with an intent to honour and serue him; and also afterwards, the world being as yet in it apprentiship, *sub pedagogo*, was wholly seasoned in this opinion so vniuersall, that it was almost thought naturall. I touch not here that particular mystery of the religion of the Iewes, who vsed them for figure (that is a point that belongs to religion) and with whom it was common to conuert that which was humane or naturall and corporall, to a holy and sacred vse, and to gather from thence a spirituall fruit. But this was not because God tooke pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it selfe good: witnesse the Prophets, and the cleereſt sighted amongst them, who haue alwaies freely said; *Si voluisses sacrificium dedissem, utiq; holocaustis non delectaberis, sacrificium & oblationem noluiſti, holocaustum pro peccato non postulaſti, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c.* If thou wouldest haue sacrifice, I had giuen it thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offerings, neither wilt thou haue any sacrifice or oblation, nor requireſt any burnt offering for sinne, I will not receiue the calves from thy house, &c. And haue called backe and inuited the world to another sacrifice more high, spirituall and worthy the Diuinity; *Sacrificium Deo spiritus: aures autem perforaſti mihi, vt facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in medio cordis mei: Immola Deo sacrificium laudis: misericordiam volo, non sacrificium*: The spirit is a sacrifice to God, thou haſt boar'd mine eares, to the end I might doe thy will, and keepe thy law in the middest of my heart, offer vnto God the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiuing: I will haue mercy, and not sacrifice. At the last, the sonne of God, the Doctour of Truth, being come to secure and free-denize the world, did abolish them wholly: which hee had not done, if it had beene
a thing

a thing in it selfe and essentially good, and that it had pleased his father : for contrarily, *Pater non tales quarit, sed tales qui adorent in spiritu & veritate : My Father doth not seeke such, but those that worship him in spirit and Truth.* And to say the truth, it is one of the goodliest effects and fruits of Christianity after the abolition of Idols. And therefore *Julian* the Emperour, his capitall enemy, as in despite of him, offered more sacrifices than euer any other did in the world, attempting to set them vp againe with Idolatry. Wherefore let vs here leaue them, and let vs see those other principall parts of religion.

Sacraments.

Repentance.

An oath.

The Sacraments in a matter base and common, bread and wine, and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our pouerty and basenesse? Repentance, the vniuersall remedy of our maladies, is a thing in it selfe shamefull, feeble, yea euill: for to repent, to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is euill, though by consequent it bee good. An oath, what is it, but a symptome and shamefull marke of distrust, infidelity, ignorance, humane infirmity, both in him that requires it, that giues it, that ordaines it? *Quod amplius est à malo est: That which is more is from the deuill.* See then how religion healeth our euils by meanes not onely small and feeble, our weaknesse so requiring: *Stulta & infirma mundi elegit Deus: God hath chosen the foolish and simple of the world;* but such as by no meanes are of any value, nor are good in themselues, but good in that they serue and are imployed against euill, as medicines are: they sprang from an ill cause, yet they driue away ill: they are good, as gibbets and wheelles are in a Commonwealth, as vomits and other discharges proceeding from ill causes are to the body: to be briefe, they are such good things, as that it had beene farre better wee had neuer had them; and neuer had we had them, if man had beene wise, and preferred himselfe in that estate wherein God had placed him; neither shall he haue them any more, so soone as hee is deliuered from this captiuitie, and arriued to his perfection.

11
In euill.

All this sheweth how great this humane weaknesse is to any thing that is good, in Policie, Iustice, Verity, Religion towards God, but that which is more strange is, that this weaknesse is as great in what is euill: for man though hee bee willing

ling to be wicked, yet hee cannot bee wholly such, but when hee hath done his worst there will bee more to doe. There is alwaies some remorse and fearefull consideration, that mollifieth the will and maketh it relent, and still reserueth something to be done; which hath beene the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a proiect for their safetie. This is imbecillity and sottishnesse, and from hence did arise that Prouerbe at their cost; That a man must not play the foole by halves. A speech vttered with iudgement; but that may haue both a good and ill sense. To say that a man, when hee is once in, must still proceed to worse and worse, without any reseruatiō or respect, it is a very pernitiōus doctrine, and the Prouerbe saith well against it, The shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certaine cases the middle way is very dangerous; as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a Wolfe by the eares, hee must either winne him altogether by courtesie; or vtterly vndo him and extinguish him; which was alwaies the practise of the *Romanes*, and that very wisely: among others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*, at the exhortation of *Camillus*; *Pacem in perpetuum parere vel seruiendo vel ignoscendo*: To get perpetuall peace either seruing, or in pardoning. For in such a case to doethings by halves, is to lose all, as the *Samnites* did who for want of putting in practise that counsell giuen them by an old weather-beaten souldier, concerning the *Romanes*, whom they had then enclosed and shut vp, paid deerely for it; *Aut conciliandus aut tollendus hostis*: An enemy is either to bee reconciled, or made out of the way. The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable, and rather to be chosen; and we ought not come to the second but in extremities, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath beene said, is shewed the extreme imbecillitie of man in good and euill, and that good or euill which hee either doth or fieth, is not purely and entirely good or euill: so that it is not in his power to be wholly depriued of all good, nor altogether wicked.

Let vs likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weaknesse. It is imbecillity and pusillanimity not to dare or not to bee able to reprehend another, or to be reprehended

12
Reprehensions
and repulses.

hended : hee that is feeble or couragious in the one , is so in the other. Now it is a strange kinde of delicatenesse, to deprive either himselfe or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verball a wound, that doth onely touch and pierce the eare. Neere neighbour vnto this it is, not to be able to giue a deniall with reason, nor to receiue and suffer a repulse with patience.

13
False suspicions
and accusations.

In false accusations and wicked suspicions, which are done in place of iustice and iudgement, there is double imbecillitie ; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that is in iustifying and excusing themselues too carefully, and as it were ambitiously. *Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem ? Whom doth an infamous lie feare but a liar ?* This is to betray their owne innocency, to put their conscience and their right to comprmise and arbitrement ; for by such plea *Perspicuitas argumentatione. elevatur : Perspicuity by argument is made more apparent.* Socrates in iudgement it selfe would not doe it, neither by himselfe nor by another, refusing to vse the learned plea of great *Lyfias*, and chose rather to die. The other is in a contrary case, that is, when the accused is so couragious that he takes no care to excuse or iustifie himselfe, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as vnworthy his answer and iustification ; and hee will not doe himselfe that wrong to enter the lists. This course hath beene practised by generous men, by *Scipio* aboue all others, many times out of the maruellous constancy of his minde. Now others are offended herewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that he hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yeeld himselfe ; or imputing this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law, and inability to iustifie himselfe. O feeble humanity ! the accused or suspected, whether hee defend or defend not himselfe, it is imbecillity and cowardnesse. We wish a man courage to defend himselfe, and when he hath done it, wee shew our owne weaknesse by being offended with it.

14
Tendernesse and
delicacie.

Another argument of imbecillity is, when a man shall subiect and addiect himselfe to a certaine particular forme of life, this is a base kinde of tendernesse, and effeminate delicacie, vnworthy an honest man, and makes vs vnprofitable, diffe-

rent in conuerſation, and may bee hurtfull too in a caſe where change of manners and carriage is neceſſary. It is likewiſe a ſhame, either not to dare or not to be able to do that which he ſeeth euery man to do beſides himſelfe. It were fitteſt that ſuch people ſhould liue and hide themſelues in the chimney corner in their priuate houſes. The faireſt forme of liuing is to be pliable to all, euen to exceſſe it ſelfe, if need be; to bee able, to dare, to know how to doe all things, and yet to doe nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to uſe all.

It is likewiſe imbecillity, and a great and vulgar ſottiſhneſſe, to run after ſtrange and ſcholaſticall examples, after allegations, neuer to ſettle an opinion without teſtimonies in print, nor to beleue men but ſuch as are in bookes, nor truth it ſelfe but ſuch as is ancient. By this reaſon fooleries and royes if they once paſſe the Preſſe, they haue credit and dignity enough. Now there are euery day many things done before our eies, which if we had but the ſpirit and ſufficiencie well to collect, to ſearch with dexterity, to iudge of, and to apply to their times, we ſhould frame and finde miracles and maruellous examples, which yeeld not in any thing to thoſe of times paſt, which we ſo much admire, and therefore wee admire becauſe they are ancient and in Print.

Againe another teſtimony of weakneſſe is, that man is not capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extremities; for if they be ſmall and in outward ſhew baſe, he contemneth and diſdaineth them as vnworthy, and it is offenſiue vnto him to conſider of them: if they bee very great and ouerſplendent, he feares them, hee admires them, and is offended with them. The firſt doth principally concerne great and high mindes; the ſecond as common with thoſe that are weak.

This weakneſſe doth likewiſe appeare in our hearing, ſight, and in the ſudden ſtroke of a new vnexpected occurrent, which ſurpriſeth and ſeizeth vpon vs vnawares. For they doe in ſuch ſort aſtoniſh vs, that they take from vs both our ſenſe and ſpeech,

*Dirigit viſu in medio, calor oſſa reliquit,
Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore ſatur:
Stiffe in our ſight he grew, heat left his bones,
He ſals, and ſcarce at length breathes out theſe mones.*

yea

15

Search of bookes.

16

17

Sudden occurrents.

yea, sometimes life it selfe : whether they bee good, witnesse that Romane Dame, who died for ioy seeing her sonne returne safe from the warres ; *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the tyrant : or whether they be euill, witnesse *Diodorus*, who died in the field for shame, because hee was not able to resolute a doubt, nor answer an argument.

18

Braveries and
submissions.

Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is twofold, and after two contrary manners. Some yeeld and are ouercome by the teares, and humble supplications of another, and their courage and gallantry is wounded with their words: others quite contrary are not moued by all the submissions and complaints that may bee, but are rather more obdurate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weaknesse, and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar mindes, but the second is not without difficulty, and is found in all sorts of people. It should seeme that to yeeld vnto vertue, and to manly and generous strength and vigour, is the part of a valorous and generous minde. It is true if it be done in a reuerent esteeme of vertue, as *Scanderbeg* did, receiuing into grace a souldiour whom hee had seene to carry himselfe valourously in fight euen against himselfe; or as *Pompey* did, pardoning the City of the *Mamertines*, for the vertue of *Zenon* a citizen thereof; or as the Emperour *Conradus* did, forgiuing the Duke of *Bauiers*, and others besieged with him, for the magnanimity of their women, who priuily conuaied them away, and tooke the danger vpon their owne heads. But if it be done with a kinde of astonishment and affright of the power of vertue, as the people of *Thebes*, who lost their hearts hearing *Epaminondas* then accused, recount vnto them his honourable acts, and seuerely reproaching them with their ingratitude, it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander* containing the braue resolution of *Betis* taken with the citie of *Gaza* where hee commanded, was neither weaknesse nor courage, but choler, which in him had neither bridle, nor moderation.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

3. Inconstancy.

MAN is a subiect wonderfully diuers, and wauering, vpon whom it is very difficult to settle an assured iudgement, I say a iudgement vniuersall and entire; by reason of the great contrariety and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions, are nothing else but eruptions and impulsions enforced by occasions, and that haue reference to others. Irresolution on the one part, and afterwards inconstancy and instability, are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtlesse our actions doe many times so cōradict one the other in so strange a manner, that it seemes impossible they should all come forth of one & the same shop; we alter and we feele it not, we escape as it were, from our selues, and we rob our selues; *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*: Being stollen as it were from our selues. We goe after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the winde of occasions carrieth vs, not according to reason; *At nil potest esse equabile, quod non à certa ratione profiscatur*: Nothing can be iust which proceedeth not from reason. Our spirits also and our humors are changed with the change of time. Life is an vnequall motion, irregular, of many fashions. In the end wee stirre and trouble our selues by the instability of our behauiour. *Nemo non quotidie consilium mutat & votum*: modò uxorem vult, modò amicam; modò regnare vult, modò non est eo officiosior seruus; nunc pecuniā spargit, nunc rapit; modò frugi videtur & gravis, modò prodigus & vanus; mutamus subinde personam. No man there is who daily changeth not his minde, purpose and desires; sometimes he will haue his wife, sometimes a concubine, sometimes he will dominere, againe no seruant more humble and officious than he; Now he prodigally spends his owne, at another time hee violently raketh after other mens goods; sometime he would seeme graue and thrifty, another time a spendthrift, and vaine; so euery moment are we changed.

Quod petijt, spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,

Æstuat, & vir a disconuenit ordine toto.

Scornes what he honor'd; seekes what he lost, to finde;

Swels and abates, inconstant as the winde.

Man

Man is a creature of all others the most hard to be sounded and knowen, for hee is the most double and artificiall couert and counterfeit, and there are in him so many cabinets and blinde corners, from whence he comes forth sometimes a man, sometimes a satyre ; so many breathing holes, from whence he breathes sometimes heat, sometimes cold, and from whence comes forth so much smoake : all his carriage and morion is a perpetuall race of errours ; in the morning to bee borne, in the euening to die ; sometimes in the racke, sometimes at liberty ; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie ; hee laughs and weepes for one and the same thing ; he is content, and discontent ; he will, and he will not ; and in the end he knowes not what he will : now hee is filled with ioy and gladnesse, that hee cannot stay within his owne skinne, and presently hee falleth out with himselfe, nay dares not trust himselfe ; *Modò amore nostri, modò radio laboramus* : Sometimes wee loue, sometimes we loath our selues.

CHAP. XXXIX.

4. Misery.

Misery proper
vnto man.

BEhold here the maine and principall line and lineament of the picture of Man, he is (as hath beene said) vaine, feeble, fraile, inconstant in good, in felicity, in pleasure, but strong, constant, and hardned in misery : he is misery it selfe quicke and incarnate ; and this is in a word to expresse humanity, for in man is all misery, and without him there is not any in the world. It is the property of man to be miserable ; only man and all man is alwaies miserable ; *Homo natus de muliere, breui vivens tempore, repletur multis miserijs* : Man borne of a woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of miseries. Hee that will take vpon him to represent vnto vs all the parts of humane misery, had need to discouer his whole life, his substance, his entrance, his continuance, his end. I doe not therefore yndertake this businesse, it were a worke without end ; and besides, it is a common subiect handled by all : but I will here only quote certaine points which are not common nor taken for miseries, either because they are not felt, or sufficiently

tiently considered of, although they be such as presse man most, if he knew how to iudge of them.

The first point and prooffe of the misery of man, is his birth; his entrance into the world is shamefull, vile, base, contemptible; his departure, his death, ruine, glorious and honorable: whereby it seemeth that he is a monster, and against nature, since there is shame in making him, honor in destroying him: *Nostri nosmet pœnitet & pudet: We are ashamed and repent our selues of our selues.* Hereof a word or two. The action of planting and making man is shamefull, and all the parts thereof, the congregedients, the preparations, the instruments, and whatsoeuer serues thereunto is called and accounted shamefull, and there is nothing more vncleane in the whole nature of man. The action of destroying and killing him honorable, and that which serues thereunto glorious: wee gild it, wee enrich it, we adorne our selues with it, we carry it by our sides, in our hands, vpon our shoulders. Wee disdain to goe to the birth of man: euery man runnes to see him die, whether it be in his bed, or in some publike place, or in the field. When we goe about to make a man, wee hide our selues, we put out the candle, we doe it by stealth. It is a glory and a pompe to vnmake a man, to kill him; wee light the candles to see him die, wee execute him at high noone, wee sound a trumpet, we enter the combat, and we slay him when the sunne is at highest. There is but one way to beget, to make a man; a thousand and a thousand meanes, inuentions, arts to destroy him. There is no reward, honour or recompence assigned to those that know how to increase, to preserve humane nature; all honour, greatnesse, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophes are appointed for those that know how to afflict, trouble, destroy it. The two principall men of the world, *Alexander* and *Cesar*, haue vnmade, haue slaine, each of them (as *Pliny* reporteth) more than a million of men, but they made none, left none behinde them. And in ancient times, for pleasure onely and pastime, to delight the eyes of the people, there were publike slaughters and massacres of men made. *Homosacræres per jocum & ludum occiditur: satis spectaculi in homine mors est: innocentes in ludum veniant, ut publicæ voluptatis hostiæ fiant: Man though a*

2
In his beginning
and his end.

1

2

3

4

5

Seneca.
Tertull. de Spectac.

sacred thing is slaine euen for sport and delight, death in man is spectacle enough, Innocents come to the game that they may be made the sacrifices of the publike pleasure. There are some nations that curse their birth, blesse their death. How monstrous a creature is this, that is made a horror vnto himselfe! None of all this is in any other creature, no not in the whole world besides.

3

The second point and testimony of the misery of man is the diminishing of his pleasures, euen those small and slight ones that appertaine vnto him, (for of such as are great and sound hee is not capable, as hath beene shewed in his weaknesse) and the impairing of the number and sweetnes of them. If it be so, that he doe it not for Gods cause, what a monster is this? that is an enemy vnto himselfe, robbes, and betrayes himselfe, to whom his pleasures are a burden and a crosse. There be some that flie from health, ioy, comfort, as from an euil thing.

O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent!

O wretched man, whose very goods are naught,

And whose indifferents worse; whose ioyes haue fault.

We are not ingenious but to our owne hurt, it is the true diet of the force of the spirit.

4
Forging of euils.

But there is yet that which is worse, the spirit of man is not onely a diminisher of his ioy, a trouble-feast, an enemy to his small, naturall and iust pleasures, as I meane to proue, but also a forger of those that are euill; it faineth, feareth, flieth, abhorreth as great mischiefes, things that are not any way euill in themselues, and in truth, which beasts themselues feare not, but that by his owne proper discourse and imagination they are fained to be such, as not to be aduanced in honour, greatnesse, riches, as cuckoldship, sterility, death: for to say the truth, there is nothing but griefe it selfe that is euill and which is felt. And though some wise men seeme to feare these things, yet it is not for their owne sakes, but because of that griefe which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards: for many times it is a fore-runner of death, and sometimes followeth the losse of goods, of credit, of honour. But take from these things griefe, the rest is nothing but fantasie, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits it selfe of other businesse to be miserable; and

and imagineth within it owne bounds, false euils besides the true, employing and extending his misery in stead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feele not these euils, but are exempted from them; because Nature iudgeth them not to be such.

As for sorrow, which is the onely true euill, man is wholly borne thereunto, and it is his naturall property. The *Mexi-* 5
He is borne
to sorrow.
comes thus salute their infants comming forth of the wombe of their mother: *Infant, thou art come into the world to suffer: endure, suffer, and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is naturall vnto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasons. All the parts of man are capable of sorrow; very few of delight. The parts capable of pleasure cannot receiue more than one or two sorts, but all can receiue the greatest number of griefes all different, heat, cold, pricking, rubbing, trampling, fleaing, beating, boyling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which haue no proper name, (to omit those of the soule) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, than to expresse them. Man hath no long continuance in pleasure: for that of the body is like a fire of straw: and if it should continue, it would bring with it much enuy and displeasure: but sorrowes are more permanent, and haue not their certaine seasons as pleasures haue. Againe, the empire and command of sorrow is farre more great, more vniuersall, more powerfull, more durable, and (in a word) more naturall, than that of pleasure. 1
2
3

To these three a man may adde other three: Sorrow and griefe is more frequent, and falls out often; Pleasure is rare. Euill comes easily of it selfe, without seeking; Pleasure neuer comes willingly, it must be sought after, and many times wee pay more for it than it is worth. Pleasure is neuer pure, but alwayes distempered, and mingled with some bitterness, and there is alwayes something wanting; but sorrow and griefe is many times entire and pure. After all this, the worst of our marker, and that which doth euidently shew the misery of our condition, is, that the greatest pleasures touch vs not so neere, as the lightest griefes. *Segnius homines bona, quam mala sentiunt: Men more slowly feele that which is good, than that*

which is euill. Wee feele not so much our soundest health, as the least maladie that is: Pungit incute vix summa violatum, plagula corpus, quando valere, nil quenuquam mouet.

6
By memory and
anticipation.

It is not enough that man be indeed and by nature miserable, and besides true and substantiall euils he faine and forge false and fantastickall, as hath beene said; but hee must likewise extend and lengthen them; and cause both the true and false to endure and to liue longer than they can, so auarous is he of miserie; which hee doth diuers wayes. First, by the remembrance of what is past, and the anticipation of what is to come, so that we cannot faile to be miserable, since that those things which are principally good in vs, and whereof wee glory most, are instruments of misery. *Futuro torquemur & praterito, multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat, nemo presentibus tantum miser est: Wee are tormented with that which is past, and with that which is to come, euen our owne goods doe harme vs, memory reduceth the torment of feare, providence anticipateth, no man is miserable onely by things present.* It is not enough to be miserable, but wee must increase it by a continuall expectation before it come, nay seeke it, and prouoke it to come, like those that kill themselues with the feare of death, that is to say, either by curiosity or imbecillity, and vaine apprehension, to preoccupate euils and inconueniences, and to attend them with so much paine and adoe, euen those which peraduenture will neuer come neere vs. These kinde of people will be miserable before their time, and double miserable, both by a reall sense or feeling of their misery, and by a long premeditation thereof, which many times is a hundred times worse than the euils themselues. *Minus afficit sensus fatigatio, quam agitatio: The conceit of affliction doth hurt more than affliction selfe.* The essence or being of misery endureth not long, but the minde of man must lengthen and extend it, and entertaine before hand. *Plus dolet quam necesse est, qui ante dolet quam necesse est. Quadam magis, quadam antequam debeant, quadam um omnino non debeant, nos torquent. Aut augemus dolorem, aut fugimus, aut precipimus: He sorroweth more than he needs, that lamenteth before he hath need, some things afflict vs more than they should, some before they should, some when they should not at all.*

all; either we increase our griefe, or we flie it, or we command it. Beasts doe well defend themselves from this folly and miserie, and are much bound to thanke Nature that they want that spirit, that memory, that providence that man hath. *Cesar* said well, that the best death was that which was least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before death hath beene to many a greater torment, than the execution it selfe. My meaning is not here to speake of that vertuous and philosophicall premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the soule is made invincible, and is fortified to the prooffe against all assaults and accidents, whereof we shall speake hereafter: Lib. 2. cap. 7. but of that fearefull and sometimes false and vaine apprehension of euils that may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke, all the beautie and serenitie of the soule, troubleth all the rest and ioy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it selfe to be wholly surprisid. It is more easie and more naturall not to thinke thereof at all. But let vs leaue this anticipation of euill, for simply euery care and painfull thought bleating after things to come by hope, desire, feare, is a very great misery. For, besides that wee haue not any power ouer that which is to come, much lesse ouer what is past; (and so it is vanity, as it hath beene said) there dorth still remaine vnto vs that euill and dammage, *Calamitosus est animus, futuri anxius*: That minde is in a lamentable case, which is troubled for future things: which robbeth our vnderstanding, and taketh from vs the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will not suffer vs to settle and content our selues therein.

But this is not yet enough. For, to the end man may neuer want matter of misery, yea that he may alwayes haue his full, he neuer ceaseth searching and seeking with great study, the causes and aliments of misery. He thrusteth himselfe into businesse euen with ioy of heart, euen such as when they are offered vnto him, hee should turne his backe towards them; and either out of a miserable disquiet of minde, or to the end hee may shew himselfe to be industrious, a man of employment and vnderstanding, that is a foole and miserable too, he enterpriseth, mooueth and remooueth new businesse, or else he putteth himselfe into that of other mens. To be short, he is

so strongly and vncessantly molested with care, and thoughts not onely vnprofitable and superfluous, but painfull and hurtfull, tormented with what is present, annoyed with what is past, vexed with that which is to come, that hee seemeth to feare nothing more, than that he shall not be sufficiently miserable. So that a man may iustly cry out, O poore and wretched creatures that you are, how many euils doe you willingly endure, besides those necessary euils that Nature hath bestowed vpon you? But what? Man contenteth himselfe in *miserie*, he is obstinate to ruminare and continually to recall to minde his passed euils. Complaints are common with him, and his owne euils and sorrowes seeme many times deare vnto him, yea it is a happy thing for small and light occasions to be termed the most miserable of all others: *Est quedam dolendi voluptas: There is a certaine delight in grieffe.* Now this is a farre greater misery to be ambitiously miserable, than not to know it, not to feele it at all. *Homo animal querulum, cupide suis incumbens miserijs: Man is a complaining creature, willingly yeelding to his owne miseries.*

8

By incompati-
bilitie,

We will not account it a humane misery, since it is an euill common to all men, and not to beasts, that men cannot accommodate themselves, and make profit of one another, without the losse and hurt, the sicknesse, follie, sinne, death of one another. We hinder, wound, oppresse one the other in such manner, that the better sort euen without thought or will thereunto, out of an insensible desire, and innocently thirst after the death, the euill, the paine and punishment of another.

9

In the remedies
of *miserie.*

So that we see man miserable both naturally and voluntarily, in truth and by imagination, by obligation and willingness of heart. He is too miserable, and yet he feares he is not miserable enough; and laboureth to make himselfe more miserable. Let vs now see how. When hee feeles any euill, and is annoyed with some certaine misery (for he is neuer without many miseries that he feeles not) he endeouoreth to quit himselfe thereof; but what are his remedies? Truly such as importune him more than the euill it selfe which hee would cure; in such sort, that being willing to get forth of one misery, he doth but change it into another, and perhaps into a worse.

worse. But what of that? the change it selfe perhaps delighteth him, or at least yeelds him some solace: hee thinketh to heale one euill with another euill, which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth; that is, That there is nothing profitable, if it be not painfull. That is worth nought that costs nothing, yea ease it selfe is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing, but true, and which conuicteth man to be miserable, That no euill can be taken away, but by another euill, whether it be in body or in soule. Spirituall maladies and corporall are not cured and chased away, but by torment, sorrow, paine. The spirituall by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonment, which are truly afflictions, and such as gaule vs too, notwithstanding the resolution and deuotion willingly to endure them: for if we vse them either for pleasure or profit, they can worke no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of couetousnesse, of household gouernment, than of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporall in like sort be medicines, incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feele that are bound to medicinall rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoies them. So likewise other euils, as ignorance is cured by great, long, and painfull study: *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem*: He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth labour. Want and pouertie, by great care, watchings, trauell, sweatings: *In sudore vultus tui*: In the sweat of thy browes: So that both for the soule and for the body, labour and trauell is as proper vnto man, as it is for a bird to flie.

*It was erroneous,
but corrected.*

All these miseries aboue mentioned are corporall, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher than the imagination and fantasie. Let vs consider of the more subtile and spirituall, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more actiue and more our owne, but lesse felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because hee onely feelerh those euils, that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speake of them, so much is hee confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries.

10
Spirituall miseries.

We must therefore by the way as it were, and gently say something, at least with the finger point a farre off, to giue him occalion to consider and thinke thereof, since of himselfe he hides it not. First, in regard of the vnderstanding, is it not a strange and a lamentable miserie of humane nature, that it should wholly be composed of errour and blindness? The greater part of common and vulgar opinions, yea the more plausible, and such as are receiued with reuerence, are false and erroneous; and which is worse, the greater part vnprofitable for humane societie. And although some of the wisest, which are but few in number, vnderstand better than the common sort, and iudge of these opinions as they should, neuerthelesse sometimes they suffer themselues to be carried, if not in all and alwayes, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firme and constant that hee suffer not himselfe to be carried with the streame, yea sound and prepared to keepe himselfe cleere from so vniuersall a contagion. The generall opinions receiued with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift riuer which carrieth all with it: *Prób superi quantum mortalia pectora ceca noctis habent! O miseras hominum mentes & pectora caca, qualibus intenebris vita, quantisque periculis degitur hoc ævi quodcumque est! O God, how much sottish blindness rests in the breasts of men? O the senselesse and miserable blindness of mens mindes; in what darknesse is our life, and how many dangers doth this age whatsoever it is, passe through!* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing to runne ouer all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken: yet let vs take a view of some few of them, which in their due place shall be handled more at large.

See lib. 3. cap. 1.

1 To iudge of aduice and counsell by the euents, which are no way in our owne hands, and which depend vpon the heauens.

Lib. 2. cap. 8.

2 To condemne and reiect all things, manners, opinions, lawes, customes, obseruations as barbarous and euill, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconuenience in them, but onely because they are vnusuall, and different from such as are ordinary and common.

Lib. 2. cap. 3.

3 To esteeme and commend things, because of their novelty,

ueltie, or raritie, or strangenesse, or difficulty, foure messengers which haue great credit in vulgar spirits : and many times such things are vaine, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodnesse and commodity. And therefore that Prince did iustly contemne him that glorified himselfe because he could from farre cast a graine of miller thorow the eye of a needle.

4 Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weake mindes are infected.

5 To esteeme of men for their riches, dignities, honors, and to contemne those that want them, as if a man should iudge of a horse by his saddle and bridle.

6 To account of things not according to their true, naturall and essentiall worth, which is many times inward and hidden, but according to the outward shew or common report.

7 To thinke to be reuenged of an enemy by killing him; for that is to put him in safety, and to quit him from all ill, and to bring a vengeance vpon himselfe: it is to take from his enemy all sense of reuenge, which is the principall effect thereof. This doth likewise belong vnto weaknesse.

8 To account it a great injury, or to thinke a man miserable because he is a cuckold : for what greater folly in iudgement can there be, than to esteeme of a man the lesse for the vice of another, which he neuer allowed ? As much may be said of a bastard.

9 To account lesse of things present, and that are our owne, and which we peaceably enioy; and to esteeme of them most, when a man hath them not, or because they are another mans, as if the presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want of them increase it.

Virtutem incolumem odimus,

Sublatam ex oculis quarimus inuidi :

Absence endeares ; we weigh not what we haue,

And yet in others would ennie, and craue.

And this is the cause why a Prophet is not esteemed in his owne countrey. So likewise, mastership and authority ingendreth contempt of those that are subiect to that authority : husbands haue a carelesse respect of their wiues, and many fathers

fathers of their children. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) loue her no more? then marry her. We esteeme more the horse, the house, the seruant of another, because he is another and not ours. It is a thing very strange to account more of things in imagination, than in substance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whether it be before hee haue them, or after he hath had them. The cause hereof in both cases may be, because before a man possesse them, he esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according to that which he imagineth them to be, or they haue by another bene reported to be; and possessing them, he esteemes them according to that good and benefit he getteth by them; and after they are taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly in their perfection and declination, whereas before he enioyed them and vsed them, but by peecemeale successiuely: for a man thinketh he shall alwaies haue time enough to enioy them, and by that meanes they are gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the reason why the griefe is greater in hauing them not, than the pleasure in possessing them. But herein there is as much imbecillity as misery. We haue not the sufficiency to enioy, but onely to desire. There is another vice cleane contrary to this, and that is, when a man setleth himselfe in himselfe, and in such sort conceits himselfe and whatsoeuer he hath, that he preferres it before all, and thinks nothing comparable to his owne. Though these kinde of people be no wiser than the other, yet they are at least more happy.

10 To be ouer-zealous in euery question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himselfe importunate and opinatiue in euery thing, so he haue some faire pretext of iustice, religion, the weale-publike, the loue of the people.

11 To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weepe for the death, or vnhappy accident of another, to thinke that not to be moued at all, or very little, is for want of loue and affection. There is also vanity in this.

12 To esteeme, to make account of actions that are done with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemne those that are done otherwise, and to thinke that they that proceed after

ter

See cap. 27.

Lib. 2. cap. 10.

ter so sweet and calme a maner, doe nothing, are as in a dreame without action ; and to be brieft, to esteeme Art more than Nature. That which is puffed vp, swollen and eleuated by study, fame, report, and striketh the sense, (that is to say, artificiall) is more regarded and esteemed, than that which is sweet, simple, plaine, ordinary, that is to say, Naturall : that awaketh, this brings vs asleepe.

13 To giue an ill and wrong interpretation of the honourable actions of another man, and to attribute them to base and vaine, or vicious causes or occasions ; as they that attributed the death of young *Cato* to the feare he had of *Cesar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seemes to be offended ; and others more foolishly, to ambition. This is a great malady of the iudgement, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and manners, or enuie against those that are more worthy than themselves, or from that vice of bringing their owne credit to their owne doore, and measuring another by their owne foot ; or rather than all this, from imbecillity and weaknesse, as not hauing their sight so strong and so certaine, to conceiue the brightnesse of vertue in it owne native purity. There are some that thinke they shew great wit and subtilty in deprauing and obscuring the glory of beautifull and honourable actions, wherein they shew much more malice than sufficiency. It is a thing easie enough to doe, but base and villanous.

14 To defame and to chastise ouer-rigorously, and shamefully, certaine vices as crimes in the highest degree villanous and contagious, which are neuertheless but indifferent, and haue their root and excuse in nature : and not so much to detest, and to chastise with so greedy adoo those vices that are truly great, and against nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15 Behold also after all this a true testimony of spirituall misery, but which is wily and subtile, and that is, that the spirit of man in it best temper, and peaceable, settled, and foundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, naturall, and indifferent things. To be capable of diuine and supernaturall, as of diuination, prophesie, reuelation, inuention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the gods, he must be sicke,

sicke, displaced from his naturall seat, and as it were corrupted, *corruptus*, either by extrauagancie, extasie, inspiration, or by dreaming; insomuch that the two naturall waies to attaine thereunto, are either fury, or dead sleepe. So that the spirit is neuer so wise, as when it is a foole, nor more awaked, than when it sleepeth: it neuer meeteth better, than when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it neuer mounts or flies so high, as when it is most dejected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be, as it were lost, and without it selfe. This toucheth not in any sort the Diuine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reueale himselfe, man in the meane time continuing settled in his sense and vnderstanding, as the scripture makes mention of *Moyse* and diuers others.

16 To conclude, can there be a greater fault in iudgement, than not to esteeme of iudgement, not to exercise it, and to preferre the memory, and imagination, or fantasie before it? We see those great, goodly, and learned orations, discourses, lectures, sermons, bookes, which are so much esteemed and admired, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heape and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a worke of memory and reading, and a thing very easie, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and hereof are so many books composed) with some few points handled, with a good instruction or two (a worke of imagination) and here is all. This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any sparke of iudgement, or excellent vertue: so likewise the authors themselues are many times weake and common in iudgement, and in will corrupted: how much better is it, to heare a countrey swaine, or a merchant talking in his counting-house, discoursing of many goodly propositions and verities, plainly and truly without art or forme, and giuing good and wholesome counsell, out of a sound, strong, and solide iudgement?

11
Of the will.

In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable; they are without number, among which these following are some few of them.

1 To be willing rather to seeme an honest man, than to be,

bee, and rather to bee such to another, than to himselfe.

2 To bee farre more ready and willing to reuenge an offence, than to acknowledge a good turne, in such sort, that it is a course to his heart to acknowledge, pleasure and gaine to reuenge, a prooffe of a malignant nature, *gratia oneri est, ultio in questu habetur.*

3 To bee more apt to hate, than to loue, to slander, than to commend; to feed more willingly and with greater pleasure vpon the euill, than the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse, and the exercise of his stile, witnesse Lawyers, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man, are idle, eloquent in euill. The words, inuentions, figures, to speake ill, to scoffe, are farre otherwise, more rich, more emphaticall and significant, than to praise, or speake well.

4 To flie from euill, to doe what is good, not properly for the good effect by naturall reason, and for the loue of vertue, but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base and idle, of gaine and profit, vaine-glory, hope, feare, of custome, company; and to be brieft, not simply for himselfe and his duty, but for some other outward occasion, and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such vnequally, diuersly, not perpetually, constantly, vniiformely.

5 To loue him the lesse whom wee haue offended, and that because wee haue offended him, a strange thing, and which proceedeth not alwayes from feare that hee will take occasion to bee reuenged, for it may bee hee wisheth vs neuer the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse vs, and brings to memory our fault and indiscretion. And if the offender loue not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will; for commonly hee that hath a will to offend, loues him the lesse whom hee hath offended; *Chi offende, mai non perdona*: He that offends, neuer forgiues.

6 As much may bee said of him to whom wee are much bound for courtesies receiued, his presence is a burthen vnto vs, hee putteth vs in minde of our band and duty, hee reprocheth vnto vs our ingratitude and inabilities, and wee wish
he

he were not, so wee were discharged of that duty. Villaines by nature; *Quidam quo plus debent, magis oderunt: love as alienum debitorem facit, grave inimicum: Some the more they ought to love, the more they hate: a little debt alienateth a little, a great maketh him an enemy.*

7 To take pleasure in the euill, hurt, and danger of another, to grieve and repine at his good, advancement, prosperity (I meane when it is without cause of hatred, or private quarrell, for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill desert of a man) I speake here of that common and naturall condition, whereby without any particular malice, men of indifferent honesty, take pleasure to see others adventure their fortunes at sea, and are vexed to see them thrive better than themselves, or that fortune should smile more vpon others than them, and make themselves merry with the sorrow of another: this is a token of a malicious seed in vs.

12
The conclusion of
these spirituall
miseries.

To conclude, that I may yet shew you how great our misery is, let me tell you that the world is replenished with three sorts of people, who take vp much roome therein, and carry a great sway both in number and reputation: the superstitious, formalists, Pedants, who notwithstanding they are in diuers subiects, iurisdictions, and theaters, (the three principall, religion, life or conuersation, and doctrine) yet they are all of one stampe, weake spirits, ill borne, or very ill instructed, a very dangerous kinde of people in iudgement, and touched with a disease incurable. It is lost labor to speake to these kinde of people, or to perswade them to change their mindes, for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world, opiniatiue obstinacy is there in his proper seat; he that is once stricken and touched to the quicke with any of these euils, there is little hope of his recovery: Who is there more sottish, and withall more braine-sicke and heady than these kinde of people? Two things there are that doe much hinder them (as hath beene spoken) naturall imbecillity, and incapacity, and afterwards an anticipated opinion to doe as well and better than others. I doe here but name them, and point them with the finger, for afterwards in their places here quoted, their faults shall be shewed more at large.

1
Superstitious.
See lib. 2. cap. 5.

The *Superstitious*, iniurious to God, and enemies to true religion,

religion, couer themselves with the cloke of piety, zeale, and loue towards God, euen to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more than is needfull, thinking thereby to merit much; and that God is not onely pleased therewith, but indebted vnto them for the rest. What would you doe to these kinde of people? If you tell them that they doe more than they need, and that they receiue things with the left hand, in not vnderstanding them aright, they will not beleeue you, but tell you, that their intent is good (whereby they thinke to saue themselves) and that they doe it for deuotion. Howsoeuer, they will not quit themselves of their gaine, nor the satisfaction which they receiue, which is to binde God vnto them.

The *Formalists* doe wholly tie themselves to an outward forme and fashio[n] of life, thinking to be quit of blame in the pursuit of their passions and desires, so they doe nothing against the tenor of the Lawes, and omit none of their formalities. See here a miserable churle which hath ouerthrowne and brought to a desperate state many poore families; but this hath fallen out by demanding that which he thought to be his owne, and that by way of iustice. Who then can affirme that he hath done ill? O how many good works haue beene omitted, how many euils committed, vnder this cloake of formes, which a man sees not! And therefore it is very truly said, That the extremity of law is the extremity of wrong: and as well said, God shield vs from *Formalists*. 2
Formalists.

The *Pedantic* or household schoole-master, hauing with great study and paines filched from other mens writings their learning, they set it out to the view and to sale, and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it, and let it flie with the winde. Are there any people in the world so sottish in their affaires, more vnapt to euery thing, and yet more presumptuous and obstinate? in euery tongue and nation, *Pedant*, *Clerke*, *Master*, are words of reproach. To doe any thing sottishly, is to doe it like a *Clerke*. These are a kinde of people that haue their memories stuffed with the wisdome of other men, and haue none of their owne: their iudgements, wills, consciences are neuer the better, they are vnapt, simple, vnwise, in such sort, that it seemes that learning serues them for no other vse than to make them more fooles, 3
*Pedants. Lib. 3.
cap. 13.*

fooles, yea more arrogant praters : they diminish or rather swallow vp their owne spirits ; and bastardize their vnderstanding, but puffed vp their memory. Here is that misery seated which wee now come to speake of, and is the last of those of the vnderstanding.

CHAP. XL.

5. *Presumption.*

BEhold here the last and leaudest line or lineament of this picture ; it is the other part of that description giuen by *Pliny* ; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erroneous opinions, both publike and particular ; and yet a vice both naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must bee considered diuersly, and in all senses, high, low, collaterall, inward and outward, in respect of God, things high and celestiall ; in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of himselfe, and all may be reduced to these two ; To esteeme too much of himselfe, and not to esteeme sufficiently of another : *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios* : *Trusted in themselves and despised others.* A word or two of either.

Luc. 18.

*Presumption in
regard of God.*

First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in religion, or false seruice of God, proceedeth from this ; That we esteeme not enough of God, we vnderstand him not, and our opinions, conceits, and beleeves of the Diuinity, are not high and pure enough. I meane not by this enough, proportion answerable to the greatnesse of God, which being infinite, receiueth not any proportion ; for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or beleeue enough : but I meane enough in respect of what wee can and ought to doe. Wee soare not high enough, wee doe not eleuate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit, when we enter into an imagination of the Diuinity : wee ouer-basely conceit him, our seruices are vnworthy his maiesty : wee deale with him after a baser manner than with other creatures : we speake not only of his works, but of his maiesty, will, iudgements, with more confidence and boldnesse than wee dare to doe of an earthly Prince

Prince or man of honour. Many men there are that would scorne such kinde of seruice and acknowledgement, and would hold themselues to be abused, and their honors in some sort violated, if a man should speake of them, or abuse their names in so base and abiect a manner. We enterprise to leade God, to flatter him, to bend him, to compound or condition with him; that I may not say, to braue, threaten, despight, murmure against him. *Cesar* willed his Pilot not to feare to hoise vp sailes, and commit himselfe to the fury of the seas, euen against destiny and the will of the heauen, with this only confidence, That it was *Cesar* whom he carried. *Augustus* See lib. 1. cap. 10. hauing beene beaten with a tempest at sea, defied god *Nep-tune*, and in the chiefest pompe of the *Circean* sports, caused his image to be taken downe, from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods, to be reuenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundreth and lighteneth, shoot against heauen, to bring God himselfe into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea, and writ a bill of defiance against the hill *Athos*. And one telleth of a Christian King a neere neighbour of ours, who See lib. 2. cap. 18. See lib. 3. cap. 1. hauing receiued a blow from God, swore he would be reuenged; and gaue commandement, that for ten yeeres no man should pray vnto him, or speake of him.

Andax Iapeti genus.

Nil mortalibus arduum.

Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque

Per nostrum patimur scelus

Iracunda Iouem ponere fulmina.

Audacious Christians, Iaphets backward seede,

Goe the contrary way (to heauen) with speede;

Whose sinnes incessant, minute, houre, and day,

Prouoke Gods rod to walke, his staffe to stay.

But to leaue these strange extrauagancies, all the common sort of people doe they not plainly verifie that saying of *Pliny*, That there is nothing more miserable, and therewithall more glorious than man? For on the one side he saineth lofty and rich opinions of the loue, care, and affection of God towards him, as his minion and only beloued, and in the meane time he returneth him no duty or seruice worthy so great and lo-

uing a God. How can a life so miserable, and a seruice so negligent on the one side, agree with an opinion and beleefe so glorious and so haughtie on the other? This is at one and the same time, to be an angell and a swine: and this is that where with a great Philosopher reproached the Christians, that there were no people more fierce and glorious in their speech, and in effect more dissolute, effeminate and villanous. It was an enemy that spake it perhaps to wrong and abuse vs, but yet he spake but that which doth iustly touch all hypocrites.

2
In respect
Nature.

It likewise seemeth vnto vs, that we burthen and importune God, the world, and nature, that they labour and trauell in our affaires, they watch not but for vs, and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen vnto vs, and especially at our deaths. Few there are that resolute and beleue, that it is their last houre, and almost all doe euen then suffer themselves to be mocked with vaine hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of our selues, and we thinke that the whole world hath great interest in our death, that things faile vs according to that measure that we faile them, or that they faile themselves, according to that measure that they faile vs; that they goe the selfe-same dance with vs, not vnlike those that rowe vpon the water, thinke the heauens, the earth, yea Cities themselves to moue, when they moue; we thinke to draw all with vs, and there is no man amongst vs that sufficiently thinkes he is but one.

3
Of Heauen.

Besides all this; man beleeueth that the heauen, the starres, all this great celestiall motion of the world, is onely made for him. *Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos*: And that all the Gods are in contention for him alone. And the poore miserable wretch is in the meane time ridiculous: he is here beneath lodged in the last and worst stage of the world, most distant from the celestiall vau, in the sinke of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof, with creatures of baser condition, made to receiue all these excrements and ordures, which raine downe and fall from aboue vpon his head; nay he liues not but by them, and to endure all those accidents that on all sides happen vnto him; and yet he makes himselfe beleue that he

is the master and commander of all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies, wherof he knowes not the least vertue, and which he is constrained with astonishment to admire, moue not but for him, and to doe him seruice. And because he beggeth (wretch that he is) his liuing, his maintenance, his commodities, from the beames, light and heat of the Sunne, from the raine and other distillations of heauen, and the aire, he stickes not to say, that he enioyeth the heauens and the elements, as if all had beene made, and still moue onely for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much, and perhaps more iustly and peremptorily. For man who many times receiueth many discommodities from aboue, and of all that he receiueth hath nothing in his owne power or vnderstanding, nor can diuine of them, is in continuall doubt and feare, lest those superiour bodies should not moue aright, and to that end and purpose which hee hath proposed, and that they procure vnto him sterilitie, sicknesse, and whatsoeuer is contrary to his designement, and so hee trembleth vnder his burden; whereas beasts receiue whatsoeuer commeth from aboue, without stirre or apprehension of what shall happen vnto them, and without complaint of that which is hapned, which man cannot doe. *Non nos causa mun-*

Senec.

do sumus hyemem astatemq; referendi: suas ista leges habent, quibus diuina exercetur: minus nos suspicimus si digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moneatur: non tanta cælo nobiscum societas est, ut nostro fato sit ille quoque siderum fulgor. We are not the cause why the world hath course & recourse of winter and summer, these things haue their rules & lawes, by which the will of God is executed: we honour our selues the lesse, if we thinke our selues worthie, that for our sakes so many things should be moued: we haue not that society with the beaueus, that the stars should onely shine for vs.

In respect of things base and earthly, that is to say, all other creatures, he disdaineth and contemneth them, as if they did not appertaine to the same master-workman, and came not of the same mother, did not belong to the same familie with him, as if they did not any way concerne him, or had any part or relation vnto him. And from hence proceedeth that common abuse and cruelty that is practised against them, a thing that reboundeth against that common and vniuersall master

4
Of creatures.

which hath made them, which hath care of them, and hath ordained lawes for their good and preferuation, hath giuen them preheminence in certaine things, and sent man vnto them as to a schoole. But this belongs to the subiect of the chapter following.

5

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine, that the world is made for man, and man for God: for besides the instruction that man draweth in generall from euery high and low thing, whereby to know God, himselfe, his dutie, he also draweth in particular from euery thing either profit, pleasure, or seruice. That which is aboue him, which he hath least in vnderstanding, and nothing at all in his power, the azured heauen so richly decked, and counterpointed with starres, and rowling torches neuer ceasing ouer our heads, he only enioyeth by contemplation, he moun- teth and is carried with admiration, feare, reuerence of the author and soueraigne Lord of all: and therefore in this sense it was truly said by *Anaxagoras*, that man was created to contemplate the heauen and the sunne, and as truly by other Philosophers was he called *εγγύς νομῶν*, from base and inferiour things, he draweth helpe, seruice, commoditie; but for a man to perswade himselfe that in the framing of all these things no other thing was thought vpon but man, and that he is the only end and Butt of all these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great follie and an ouer-bold presumption.

6

Of man him-
selfe.

Three degrees of
humane pre-
sumption.

1. To beleene,
misbeleene.

Finally, but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himselfe, that is to say, in regard of himselfe, and of man his companion, both within, in the progresse of his iudgment and opinions; and without in his communication and conuersation with another. Concerning which, we are to consider three things, as three heads which follow one the other, where humanitie bewraeth in a sortish imbecillitie the foolish presumption thereof. The first in beleeuing or misbeleeuing (here is no question of religion, nor of faith and beleefe Theologicall, and therefore we must still call to mind the aduertisement giuen in the preface) where we are to note two contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; the one and the other more ordinary, is a kinde of lightnesse, *qui cito credit, levis est corde*; he that lightly beleeueth, is light in heart:

heart : and too great a facility to belecue and to entertaine whatsoeuer is proposed, with any kinde of appearance of truth or authority. This belongeth to the folly, limpticity, tenderneſſe and imbecillity of the weaker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, ſicke, ſuperſtitious, aſtoniſhed, indiſcreetly zealous, who like wax doe eaſily receiue all impreſſions, ſuffer themſelues to be taken and led by the eares. And this is rather an error and weakneſſe, than malice, and doth willingly lodge in mindes gentle and debonaire. *Credulitas error eſt magis quàm culpa, & quidem in optimi cuſuſq; mentem facile irrepit: Credulity is rather an error than a fault, which eaſily creepeth into the beſt mans heart.* Wee ſee almoſt the whole world led and carried with opinions and beleefes, not out of choice and iudgement, yea many times before they haue either yeares or diſcretion to iudge, but out of the cuſtome of the countrey, or inſtruction in youth receiued, or by ſome ſudden encounter as with a tempeſt, whereby they are in ſuch ſort faſtned, ſubiected and enthralled, that it is a matter of great difficultie euer to vnlearn them againe. *Veluti tempeſtate delati ad quamcunq; diſciplinam tanquam ad ſaxum adherescunt: They cleaue to any diſcipline as to a ſtone, being carried thither as with a tempeſt.* Thus is the world led, wee truſt our ſelues too much, and then perſwade others to belecue vs. *Vnuſquiſque mavult credere quàm iudicare; verſat nos & precipitat traditus per manus error, ipſa conſuetudo aſſentiendi periculosa & lubrica: Euery one had rather belecue than iudge; error comming by tradition, doth precipitate and toſſe vs, the very cuſtome of aſſenting is dangerous and ſlippery.* Now this popular facilitie, though it be in truth weakneſſe and imbecillitie, yet it is not without presumption. For, ſo lightly to belecue and hold for truth and certainty that which wee know not, or to enquire of the cauſes, reaſons, conſequents, and not of the truth it ſelfe, is to enterpriſe to preſume too much. For from what other cauſe proceeds this? If you ſhall anſwer, from a ſuppoſition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man hand- leth and ſtirreth the foundations and effects of a thouſand things which neuer were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are falſe. How many fables, falſe and ſuppoſed miracles, viſions, reuelations, are there receiued in the world that neuer were?

And why should a man beleue a miracle, a thing neither humane nor naturall, when hee is able by naturall and humane meanes to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying haue like visages, like cariage, relish, gate, and wee behold them with one and the same eie. *Ita sunt finitima falsa veris, ut in precipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere: Falshood is so neere vnto truth, that a wise man ought not to suffer himselfe to be unadvisedly carried away.* A man ought not to beleue that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernaturall & superhumane approbation, which is onely God, who is onely to be beleued in that he saith, onely because he saith it.

7

The other contrary vice is an audacious temeritie to condemne and reiect as false all things that are not easily vnderstood, and that please not the palat. It is the propertie of those that haue a good opinion of themselues, which play the parts of men of dexteritie and vnderstanding, especially Heretikes, *Sophists, Pedanties*: for they finding in themselves some speciall point of the spirit, and that they see a little more cleerely than the common sort, they assume vnto themselves law and authoritie to decide and determine all things. This vice is farre greater and more base than the former: for it is an enraged follie to thinke to know as much as possibly is to be knowen, the iurisdiction and limits of nature, the capacitie of the power and will of God, to frame vnto himselfe and his sufficiencie the truth and falshood of things, which must needs be in so certaine and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinarie language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there which at one time we haue reiected with laughter as impossible, which wee haue beene constrained afterwards to confesse and approue, yea and others too, more strange than they? And on the other side, how many things haue wee receiued as articles of our faith, that haue afterwards proued vanities and lies?

2. *To affirme
and condemne.*

The second degree of presumption, which followeth and commonly proceedeth from the former, is certainly and obstinately to affirme or disproue that which hee hath lightly beleued or misbeleued. So that it addeth vnto the first obstinacie

stinacie in opinion, and so the presumption increaseth. This facility to belecue with time is confirmed, and degenerateth into an obstinacie inuincible and vncapable of amendment, yea a man proceeds so farre in this obstinacie, that he defends those things that he knowes and vnderstands least. *Maiores fidem homines adhibent ijs qua non intelligunt: cupiditate humani ingenij lubentius obscura creduntur: Men easily beleene those things they vnderstand not; by a naturall desire of humane wit obscure things are easily beleued.* He speaks of all things with resolution. Now affirmation and opinatiue obstinacy are signes of negligence and ignorance accompanied with follie and arrogancie.

The third degree, which followeth these two, and which is the height of presumption, is to perswade others to receiue as canonically whatsoeuer he beleeueth, yea imperiously to impose a beleefe as it were by obligation, and inhibition to doubt. What tyrannie is this? Whosoever beleueth a thing, thinkes it a worke of charity to perswade another to beleue the same; and that hee may the better doe it, hee feareth not to adde of his owne inuention so much as hee seeth necessary for his purpose to supply that want, and willingnesse which hee thinkes to be in the conceit of another of that hee tels. There is nothing vnto which men are commonly more prone, than to giue way to their owne opinions. *Nemo sibi tantum errat, sed alijs erroris causa & author est: No man erres onely to himselfe, but is the author and cause of error to others.* Where the ordinarie meane wanteth, there a man addeth commandement, force, fire, sword. This vice is proper vnto dogmatists, and such as will gouerne, and giue lawes vnto the world. Now to attaine to the end hereof, and to captivate the beleefes of men vnto themselves, they vse two meanes: First they bring in certaine generall and fundamentall propositions, which they call principles and presuppositions, whereof they say we must neither doubt nor dispute; vpon which they afterwards build whatsoeuer they please; and deade the world at their pleasure: which is a mockerie whereby the world is replenished with errors and lies. And to say the truth, if a man should examine these principles, he should finde as great or greater vntruths

8

3 To perswade.

Copernicus.
Paracelsus.

truths and weakneses in them, than in all that which they would haue to depend vpon them, and as great an appearance of truth in propositions quite contrary. There haue beene some in our time that haue changed and quite altered the principles and rules of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomie, Physicke, Geometrie*, in nature, and the motion of the windes. Every humane proposition hath as much authoritie as another, if reason make not the difference. Truth dependeth not vpon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Diuinitie haue not reuealed them; all the rest is but a dreame and smoake. Now these great masters will, that whatsoever they say should be beleeued and receiued, and that euery man should trust them, without iudging or examining what they teach: which is a tyrannicall iustice. God onely (as hath beene said) is to be beleetued in all that hee saith, because hee saith it: *Qui a se metipso loquitur mendax est: Hee that speaketh of himselfe is a liar.*

The other meane is by supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestially reuelation and apparition, which hath beene cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or priuate Captaines. The perswasion taken from the subiect it selfe possesseth the simpler sort, but at the first it is so tender and fraile, that the least offence, mistaking or imprudencie that shall happen, vndoeth all: for it is a great maruell how from so vaine beginnings and friuolous causes there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth wonderfully grow and increase, in such sort that it fastneth euen vpon the most expert and skilfull, by reason of the multitude of beleeuers, witnesses, yeeres, wherewith a man suffereth himselfe to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurne against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to beleetue it. The greatest and most powerfull meane to perswade, and the best touchstone of truth, is multitude of yeeres and beleeuers: now fooles doe win the game, *sanitatis patrocinium est insipientium turba: The madde multitude is a patronage for sobrietie.* It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolute and settle his iudge-

iudgement against the common opinion. All this may easily appear by those many impostures and fooleries which wee haue scene to goe for miracles, and rauish the whole world with admiration, but instantly extinguished by some accident, or by the exact inquiry of such as are quicke sighted, who haue cleered and discovered the couzenage; which if they had but time to ripen, and to haue fortified in nature, they had continued for euer, beene generally receiued and adored. And euen such are diuers others, which by the fauour of Fortune haue passed for currant, and gained publike beleefe, whereunto men afterwards accommodate themselues, without any farther desire to know the thing in it first forme and originall, *nusquam ad liquidū fama perducitur*: Report is neuer brought to full triall. And this is the reason why there are so many kindes of religions in the world, so many superstitious customes of the Pagans, which are yet remaining euen in Christendome, and concerning which we cannot wholly assure the people. By this whole discourse we see what we are, and to what we tend, since we are lead by such guides.

The fift and last Consideration of Man, by those varieties and great differences that are in him, and their comparisons.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the difference and inequality of men in generall.

THere is nothing in this lower world wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men, and where the differences are so distant and diuers in one and the same subject and kinde. If a man should beleue *Plinie*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, there are shapes of men in some countries that haue very little resemblance with ours, and some that are
of

170 *Of the difference and inequality of men in generall.*

of a mixt and doubtfull kinde betwixt men and beasts. There are some countries where men are without heads, carrying their eies and mouthes in their breasts; where they are *Hermaphrodites*; where they goe with foure feet; where they haue one eie in the forehead, and a head liketo a dogs head than a mans; where they are as fish from the nauell downwards, and liue in the water; where their women beare children at fūeyeeeres of age, and liue but eight; where they haue their head and forehead so hard that iron cannot pierce them; where they doe naturally change into wolues and other beasts, and afterwards into men againe; where they are without a mouth, nourishing themselues with the smell of certaine odors; where they yeeld a seed that is blacke; where they are very little and dwarfs; where they are very great and giants; where they goe alwaies naked; where they are all hairy; where they speake not, but liue in woods like beasts, hidden in caues and hollow trees. And in our times wee haue discouered, seene with the eye, and touched with our fingers, where the men are without beards, without vse of fire, corne, wine; where that is held to be the greatest beauty, which wee account the greatest deformity, as hath beene said before. Touching the diuersity of manners, we shall speake elsewhere. And to omit many of these strange wonderments, wee know that as touching the visage, it is impossible to finde two in all things alike; it may fall out that we may mistake, and take the one for the other, because of the great resemblance that may be betweene two; but this must be in the absence of the one, for in the presence of them both it is easie to note a difference, though a man know not how to expresse it. In the soules of men there is a farre greater difference, for it is not onely greater without comparison betwixt a man and a man, than betwixt a beast and a beast: but there is greater difference betwixt a man and a man, than a man and a beast; for an excellent beast comes neerer to a man of the basest sort and degree, than that man to another great and excellent personage. This great difference of men proceedeth from the inward qualities, and from the spirit, where there are so many parts, so many iurisdictions, so many degrees beyond number, that it is an infinite thing to consider. We must now at the last learne to know

know man by those distinctions and differences that are in him, which are diuers, according to the many parts in man, many reasons, and meanes to compare and consider of him. We will here set downe five principall, vnto which all the rest may be referred, and generally all that is in man, *Spirit, body naturall*, acquired, publike, priuate, apparent, secret : and so this fift and last consideration of man shall haue five parts, which are five great and capitall distinctions of men, that is to say :

The first naturall, essentiall, and vniuersall of all men, soule and body.

The second naturall and essentiall principally, and in some sort acquired, of the force and sufficiencie of the spirit.

The third accidentall of the estate, condition and dutie of man, drawne from superioritie and inferiority.

The fourth accidentall of the condition and profession of life.

The fift and last of the fauours and disfauours of Nature and of Fortune.

CHAP. XLII.

The first distinction and difference of men naturall and essentiall, drawne from the diuers situation of the world.

THe first most notable and vniuersall distinction of men, which concerneth the soule and body, and whole essence of man, is taken and drawne from the diuers site of the world, according to which the aspect and influence of heauen, and the Sunne, the aire, the climate, the countrie, are diuers. So likewise not only the colour, the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners, are diuers, but also the faculties of the soule : *plaga cœli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animorum facit. Athenis tenue cœlum, ex quo etiam acutiores Attici, crassum Thebis, ideo pingues Thebani & valentes.* The temperature of the celestiall Climat is of great operation, both for the strength of the bodie, and the vigour of the minde : the Athenian aire is delicate, and therefore they of a more sharpe and ready wit ; The Theban grosse, and they fat and strong. And therefore Plato

The diuersity of men proceedeth from the diuers situation of the world.

thanked

thanked God that he was an *Athenian*, and not a *Theban*. As fruits and beasts are diuers, according to the diuers countries wherein they are: so men are borne more and lesse warlike, iust, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ingenious, good, obedient, beautifull, sound, strong. And this is the reason why *Cyrus* would not agree to the Persians to abandon their sharpe and hilly countrey, to goe to another more plaine and pleasant, saying, that fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

2

The diuision of
the world into
three parts.

Following this foundation, we may in grosse diuide the world into three parts, and all men into three kindes of nature: we will make three generall situations of the world, which are, the two extremities, South and North, and the middle betwixt them both; euery part and situation shall haue sixty degrees. The Southerne part which is vnder the *Æquator*, hath thirty degrees on this side the line, thirty on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two Tropicks or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southerne countries, *Africke*, and *Æthiophe*, in the middle betwixt the East and the West; *Arabia*, *Calicut*, the *Moluques*, *Ianes*, *Taprobana* towards the Orient; *Pern* and the great Seas towards the Occident. The other middle part hath thirty degrees beyond the Tropicks both on this side the line, and on that towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all *Europe* with the *Mediterrane* Sea in the middle betwixt the East and West; all *Asia* both the lesse and the greater which is towards the East, with *China*, *Iapan*, and *America*, towards the West. The third, which is the thirty degrees which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and Icie countries, the *Septentrionall* people, *Tartary*, *Muscovy*, *Estotilan*, *Magelan*, which is not yet throughly discovered.

3

Their natures.

Following this generall partition of the world, the natures of men are likewise different in euery thing, body, soule, religion, manners, as we may see in this little Table: For the

Northerne

Northerne people are

Middle are

Southerne are

High, and great, phlegmaticke, sanguine, white, and yellow, sociable, the voice strong, the skin soft and hairie, great eaters and drinkers, puiſſant.

Heauie, obtuſe, ſtupid, ſottiſh, ſacill, light, in-constant.

Little religious and deuout.

Warriers, valiant, painfull, chaſte, free from iealouſie, cruell and inhumane.

Indifferent and temperate in all thoſe things, as neuters, or partakers a little

of thoſe two extremities, and participating moſt of that regi-

on to which they are neereſt neighbours.

Little, melancholicke, cold, and drie, blacke, Solitarie, the voice ſhrill, the ſkinne hard, with little haire, and curled, abſtinent, fee-

ble. Ingenious, wiſe, ſubtile, opinatiue.

Superſtitious, contemptiue.

No warriours, idle, vnchaſte, iealous, cruell, and inhumane.

1 In their Bodies.

2 Spirit.

3 Religion.

4 Manners.

4 The prooſes of theſe differences of the body.

2 The Spirit.

All theſe differences are eaſily proued. As for thoſe of the body, they are knowne by the eye, and if there be any exceptions, they are rare, and proceet from the mixture of the people, or from the windes, the waters, and particular ſituation of the place, whereby a mountaine is a notable difference in the ſelfe ſame degree, yea the ſelfe ſame country and citie. They of the higher part of the city of Athens, were of a quite contrary humour, as Plutarke affirmeth, to thoſe that dwell about the gate of Pyrrus: and they that dwell on the North ſide of a mountaine differ as much from thoſe that dwell on the South ſide, as they doe both differ from thoſe in the valley.

As for the differences of the ſpirit, we know that mechanickall and manuall Arts belong to the North, where men are made for labour; Speculative ſciences came from the South. Caſar and other ancienes of thoſe times, called the Egyptians ingetious, and ſubtile: Moyses is ſaid to be inſtructed in their wiſdome; and Philoſophie came from thence into Greece. Greatneſſe began rather with them, becauſe of their ſpirit and ſubtiltie. The gards of Princes (yea in the Southerne parts) are Northerne men, as hauing more ſtrength, and leſſe ſubtilty

subtilty and malice. So likewise the Southerne people are indued with great vertues, and subiect to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northerne haue goodnesse and simplicity. The lesser and middle sciences, as policies, lawes, and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and policies haue flourished.

3
Religion.

As touching the third point, religions haue come from the South, *Egypt, Arabia, Chaldaea*; more superstition in *Africke* than the whole world besides, witnesse their vowes so frequent, their temples so magnificent. The Northerne people, saith *Cesar*, haue little care of religion, being wholly giuen to the warres and to hunting.

4
Manners.

As for manners, and first touching warres, it is certaine that the greatest armies, Arts, military instruments and inuentions haue come from the North. The *Scythians, Gothes, Vandals, Huns, Tartarians, Turkes, Germanes*, haue beaten and conquered all other nations, and ransacked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, That all euill comes from the North. Single combats came from them. The Northerne people adore a sword fastned in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are inuincible, yea to the *Romans*, who hauing conquered the rest of the world, were vtterly destroyed by them. They grow weake and languish with the Southerne winds, and going towards the South; as the Southerne men comming into the North redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fiercenesse, they will not endure to be commanded by authority, they loue their liberty, at leastwise electiue commanders. Touching chastity and ieaousie in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to a man: yea one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cesar*. There is no ieaousie, saith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselues together with strangers. In the South *Polygamie* is altogether receiued. All *Africke* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*. The Southerns die with ieaousie, and therefore they keepe Eunuches as gardians to their wiues, which their great Lords haue in great number, as they haue stables of horses. Touching cruelty, the two extremes are alike cruell, but the causes are diuers, as wee shall see anon, when wee come to speake of the causes. Those torures of the wheele, and staking of men alieue, came from the North:

North : The inhumanities of the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, are too well knowne. The *Almanes*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offenders by law, but cruelly murder them as enemies. The *Southernes* flea their offenders aliue, and their desire of reuenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not glutted therewith. In the middle regions they are mercifull and humane : The *Romans* punished their greatest offenders with banishment. The *Greeks* vsed to put their offenders to death with a sweet drugge made of a kinde of Hemlocke which they gaue them to drinke : And *Cicero* saith, that humanitie and courtesie were the conditions of *Asia minor*, and from thence deriued to the rest of the world.

The cause of all these corporall and spirituall differences, is the inequalitye and difference of the inward naturall heat, which is in those countries and peoples, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Northerns, by reason of the great outward cold which incloseth and driueth the heat into the inward parts, as caues and deepe places are hot in winter, so mens stomachs, *Ventres hyeme calidiores*. Our stomachs are hot in winter. Weake and feeble in the Southerns, the inward heat being dispersed and drawne into the outward parts, by the vehemencie of the outward heat, as in Summer vaults, and places vnder the earth are cold. Meane and temperate in the middle regions. From this diuersitie, I say, and inequalitye of naturall heat, proceed these differences not only corporall, which are easie to note, but also spirituall ; for the Southerns by reason of their cold temperature, are melancholike, and therefore staid, constant, contemplatiue, ingenious, religious, wise ; for wisdom is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholike, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold blood. From this melancholic temperature it likewise commeth, that the Southerns are vnchaste, by reason of that frothie, fretting, tickling melancholie, as we commonly see in Hares ; and cruell, because this fretting sharpe melancholie doth violently presse the passions and reuenge. The Northernes are of a phlegmaticke and sanguine temperature, quite contrarie to the Southerne, and therefore haue contrarie qualities, saue that they agree in this one, that they are likewise

5
The cause of the
aforesaid differences.

likewise cruell and inhumane, but by another reason, that is, for want of iudgement, whereby like beasts, they know not how to containe and gouerne themselues. They of the middle regions are sanguine and cholericke, tempered with a sweet, pleasant, kindly disposed humor; they are actiue. We could likewise more exquisitely represent the diuers natures of these three sorts of people, by the application and comparison of all things, as you may see in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

	Northerne,	Midlers,	Southerne.
<i>Qualities of the Soule.</i>	<i>The common sense,</i>	<i>discourse & reasoning,</i>	<i>Vnderstanding.</i>
	<i>Force as of Beares and other beasts.</i>	<i>Reason and iustice of men.</i>	<i>Subtilty of foxes, & religion of diuines.</i>
<i>Planets.</i>	<i>Mars } Warre The moon } hunting.</i>	<i>Mercury } Emperors, Iupiter. } Oratours.</i>	<i>Saturn } cōtemplati- Venus } lous. (on,</i>
<i>Actions and parts of the common-weale.</i>	<i>Art and handi- crafts.</i>	<i>Prudence, knowledge of good and euill.</i>	<i>Knowledge of truth and falshood.</i>
	<i>Labourers, Artifi- cers, Souldiers, to execute & obey.</i>	<i>Magistrats, prouider, to iudge, command.</i>	<i>Prelates, Philoso- phers, to contem- plate.</i>
	<i>Yong men vnapt.</i>	<i>Perfekt men, māna- gers of affaires.</i>	<i>Grave old men, wise, pensiue.</i>

The other distinction more particular may be referred to this generall of North, and South: for we may referre to the conditions of the Northerne those of the West, and that liue in mountaines, warriours, fierce people, desirous of libertie, by reason of the cold which is in mountaines. So likewise, they that are farre distant from the Sea are more simple and innocent. And contrarily to the conditions of the Southernes, we may referre the Easterlings, such as liue in valleys; effeminate and delicate persons, by reason of the fertilitie of the place, which naturally yeeldeth pleasure. So likewise they that liue vpon the Sea coasts are subtile, deceiuers by reason of their commerce & traffike with diuers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may see that generally those of the North

North doe excell in body, haue strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and haue for their part subtiltie; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. So likewise we may see that their manners, to say the truth, are neither vices nor vertues, but workes of nature, which to amend or renounce altogether is more than difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremitie to a mediocritie, is a worke of vertue.

CHAP. XLIII.

The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the spirits and sufficiences of men.

THIS second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiencie, is not so plaine, and perceptible as the other, and come as well from nature as archieurement; according vnto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the first and the lowest are the weake and plaine spirits, of base and slender capacity, borne to obey, serue, and to be led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent iudgement, make profession of sufficiencie, knowledge, dexteritie; but doe not sufficiently vnderstand and iudge themselves, resting themselves vpon that which is commonly held, and giuen them at the first hand, without further enquire of the truth and source of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawfull; and neuer looking farther than where they be, but thinking that it is euery where so, or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceiued, yea they are barbarous. They subiect themselves to opinions, and the municipall lawes of the place where they liue, euen from the time they were first hatched, not onely by obseruance and custome, which all ought to doe, but euen from the very heart and soule, with a perswasion that that which is beleueed in their village is the true touchstone of truth, (here is nothing spoken of diuine reuealed truth, or religion) the only, or at least the best rule to liue well. These sorts of people are of the schoole and iurisdiction of *Aristotle*, affirmers, positiue men, dogmatists, who respect more vilitie than veritie, according to the vse and custome of the world, than that

I
Three sorts and
degrees of people
in the world.

1

2

which is good and true in it selfe. Of this condition there are a very great number and diuers degrees, the principall and most actiue amongst them gouerne the world, and haue the command in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quicke and cleare spirit, a strong, firme, and solid iudgement, who are not content with a bare affirmation, nor settle themselues in common receiued opinions, nor suffer themselues to be won and preoccupied by a publike and common beleefe, whereof they wonder not at all, knowing that there are many couenages, deceits and impostures receiued in the world with approbation and applause, yea publike adoration and reuerence: but they examine all things that are proposed, sound maturely, and seeke without passion the causes, motiues, and iurisdictions euen to the root, louing better to doubt, and to hold in suspence their beleefe, than by a loose and idle facilitie or lightnesse, or precipitation of iudgement to feed themselues with lies, and affirme or secure themselues of that thing whereof they can haue no certaine reason. These are burfew in number, of the Schoole of *Socrates* and *Plato*, modest, sober, stayed, considering more the verity and reality of things than the vtilitie; who if they be well borne, hauing with that aboue mentioned probitie and gouernment in manners, they are truly wise, and such as here we seeke after. But because they agree not with the common sort, as touching opinions, see more clearly, pierce more deeply, are not so facill and easily drawne to beleefe, they are suspected and little esteemed of others, who are farre more in number, and held for fantasticks and Philosophers; a word which they vse in a wrong sense, to wrong others. In the first of these three degrees or orders there is a farre greater number than in the second, and in the second than in the third. They of the first and last, the lowest and highest, trouble not the world, make no stirre, the one for insufficiencie and weaknes, the other by reason of too great sufficiencie, stabilitie, and wisdom. They of the middle make all the stirre, the disputations that are in the world, a presumptuous kinde of people, alwaies stirred, and alwaies stirring. They of the lower range, as the bottome, the lees, the sinke, resemble the earth, which doth nothing but receiue and suffer that which comes from aboue. They of the middle

middle resemble the region of the aire, wherein are formed all the meteors, thunders, and alterations are made, which afterwards fall vpon the earth. They of the higher stage resemble the firmament it selfe, or at least the highest region next vnto heauen, pure, cleare, neat and peaceable. This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the braine, which is different, moist, hot, drie, and that in many degrees, whereby the spirits and iudgements are either very solid, couragious, or feeble, fearefull, plaine: and partly from instruction and discipline; as also from the experience and practise of the world, which serueth to put off simplicitie, and to become more aduised. Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found vnder euery robe, forme and condition both of good and euill men, but diuersly.

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies, for some there are that make way themselves, and are their owne guides and gouernours. These are happie, of the higher sort, and very rare; others haue need of helpe, and these are of two sorts. For some need onely a little light, it is enough if they haue a guide and a torch to goe before them, they will willingly and easily follow. Others there are that must be drawen, they need a spurre, and must be led by the hand. I speake not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot, as they of the lower range, or the malignitie of their nature will not, as they of the middle, who are neither good to follow, nor will suffer themselves to be drawen and directed, for these are a people past all hope.

2
Another distinction.

CHAP. XLIIII.

The third distinction and difference of men accidentall, of their degrees, estates and charges.

THis accidentall distinction, which respecteth the estates and charges, is grounded vpon two principles and foundations of humane societie, which are, to command and obey, power and subiection, superioritie and inferioritie. *Imperio & obsequio omnia constant: All things doe consist of command and subiection.* This distinction we shall better see, first in grosse in this Table.

The first general division.

			<p>Mariage, of the husband and the wife. This is the source of humane societie.</p> <p>Paternall of parents over their children. This is truly naturall.</p> <p>Herile, which is twofold, of { Lords, over their slaues. Masters, over their seruants.</p> <p>Patronall, of patrons over their pupils: the use whereof is lesse frequent.</p>
<p>All power and subiection is either</p>	<p>Private, which is either in</p>	<p>Families and household government; and it is fourfold:</p>	<p>Corporations and Colledges, Ciuill communities over the particular members of that communitie.</p>
	<p>Publike, which is either</p>	<p>Souereigne, which is threefold, and they are three sorts of estates, cunctas nationes & urbes, populus aut primores, aut singuli regunt, i.</p> <p>Subaltern, which is in those who are superiors and inferiors, for diuers reasons, places, persons, as</p>	<p>Monarchie, of one.</p> <p>Aristocratie, of a few.</p> <p>Democritie, of all.</p> <p>Particular lords in many degrees.</p> <p>Officers of the soueraignie, whereof there are diuers sorts.</p>

The subdiuision of the soueraigne power.

This publike power, whether it be soueraigne, or subalterne, hath other subdiuisions necessary to be knowne. The soueraigne, which (as hath beene said) is threefold in regard of the maner of government is likewise threefold; that is to say, euery one of these three is gouerned after a threefold manner, and is therefore called Royall, or Signoriall, or Tyrannicall. Royall, wherein the soueraigne (be it one, or many, or all) obeying the lawes of Nature, preferueth the naturall libertie and proprietie of the goods of his subiects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, ad singulos proprietates: omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli*

singuli dominio. All power belongeth to Kings, to euery particular man the proprietie, the King possesseth all by command, priuate men by possession. Seignoriall or lordly, where the soueraigne is Lord both of men and goods, by the right of armies, gouerning his subiects as slaues. Tyrannicall, where the soueraigne contemning all lawes of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subiects, differing from a Lord, as a theefe from an enemie in warre. Of the three soueraigne states, the *Monarchie*, and of the three gouernments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable and maiestticall, as in former times *Assyria, Persia, Egypt*, and now *Ethiopia* the most ancient that is, *Mosconie, Tartary, Turkie, Peru*. But the better and more naturall state and gouernment is the *Monarchie Royall*. The most famous *Aristocracies*, hath sometimes beene that of the *Lacedemonians*, and now the *Venetians*. The *Democrities*, *Rome, Athens, Carthage*, Royall in their gouernment.

The publike subaltern power, which is in particular Lords, is of many kindes and degrees, principally fiue, that is to say, Lords ³ *Tributarie*, who pay only tribute. *Of particular Lords,*

Fendetaries, simple *Vassals*, who owe faith and homage for the tenure of their land. These three may be soueraignes.

Vassals bound to doe seruice, who besides faith and homage, owe likewise personall seruice, whereby they cannot truly be soueraignes.

Naturall subiects, whether they be *Vassals* or *Censors*, or otherwise, who owe subiection and obedience, and cannot be exempted from the power of their soueraigne: and these are Lords.

The publike subalterne power which is in the officers of the soueraignie, is of diuers kindes, and both in regard of the honour and the power may be reduced to fiue degrees. *Of officers.*

The first and basest are those ignominious persons, which should remaine without the citie, the last executioners of iustice.

The second, they that haue neither honour nor infamie, *Sergeants, Trumpeters.*

The third, such as haue honour without knowledge and power, *Notaries, Receiuers, Secretaries.*

4

The fourth, they that haue with honour, power and knowledge, but without iurisdiction, the Kings seruants.

5

The fifth, they that haue with the rest iurisdiction; and these are properly called Magistrates: of whom there are many distinctions, & especially these five, which are all double:

- | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|---|----|---|--|
| 1. | { | Maiores, Senators. | { | 2. | { | Politiques. |
| | | Minors, Iudges. | | | | Militaries. |
| 3. | { | Ciuill. | { | 4. | { | Titularies in offices of forme, who haue |
| | | Criminall. | | | | Commisſaries. |
| 5. | { | Perpetuall, as the lesser both in number and otherwise should be. | | | | |
| | | Temporall and moucable, as the greater should be. | | | | |

OF THE ESTATES AND DEGREES OF MEN
in particular following this precedent Table.

An Advertisement.

Here we are to speake in particular of the parts of this Table, and the distinctions of powers and subiections, (beginning with the priuate and domestickall) that is to say, of euery estate and profession of men, to the end we may know them; and therefore this may be called The Booke of the knowledge of man: for the duties of euery one shall be set downe in the Third Booke, in the vertue of iustice; where in like manner and order, all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before we beginne, it shall be necessarie summarily to speake of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principall causes of these diuersities of estates and charges.

CHAP. XLV.

Of commanding and obeying.

These, as hath beene said, are the two foundations of all humane societie, and the diuersitie of estates and professions. They are Relatiues, they doe mutually respect, ingender

der and conferue one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subiect to a naturall kinde of enuie, and an euerlasting contestation, complaint and obrectation. The popular estate make the Soueraigne of worse condition than a Carter. The Monarchie placeth him aboute God himselfe. In commanding is the honour, the difficultie (thesetwo commonly goe together) the goodnesse, the sufficiencie, all qualities of greatnesse. Command, that is to say, sufficiencie, courage, authoritie, is from heauen and of God. *Imperium non nisi diuino fato datur: omnis potestas a Deo est: Empire and dominion is not giuen but by diuine destinie, all power is from God aboue.* And therefore Plato was wont to say, That God did not appoint and establish men, that is to say, men of a common sort and sufficiencie, and purely humane, to rule others, but such as by some diuine touch, singular vertue, and gift of heauen, doe excell others: and therefore they are called *Heroes*. In obeying is vilitie, procliuitie, necessitie, in such sort, that for the preseruatiō of the weale publike it is more necessarie than well to command; and the deniall of obedience, or not to obey as men should, is farre more dangerous than for a Prince not to command as he should. Euen as in mariage, though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loyaltie and fidelitie, and haue both bound themselves by promise in the same words, the same ceremonies and solemnities, yet notwithstanding the inconueniences are incomparably farre greater, in the fact of adulterie, to the wife than the husband: euen so, though command and obedience are equally required in euery state and companie, yet the inconueniences of disobedience in subiects are farre more dangerous than of ill gouernment in a Commander. Many States haue a long time continued and prospered too vnder the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates, the Subiects obeying and accommodating themselves to their gouernment: and therefore a wise man being once asked why the Common-wealth of *Sparta* was so flourishing, and whether it were because their Kings commanded well? Nay rather, saith he, because the Citizens obey well. For if the subiects once refuse to obey, and shake off their yoke, the state must necessarily fall to the ground.

CHAP. XLVI.

Of Mariage.

Notwithstanding the state of mariage be the first, more ancient and most important, and as it were the foundation and fountaine of humane society, whence arise families, and from them common weales, *Prima societas in conjugio est, quod principium urbis, seminarium Reipublicæ*; The first society is in wedlocke, which was the beginning of cities, and the seminarie of the common-wealth: Yet it hath beene contemned and defamed by many great personages, who haue iudged it vnworthy men of heart and spirit, and haue framed many objections against it.

2
Objections against mariage.

First they account the band and obligation thereof vniust, a hard and ouerstraight captiuitie, insomuch, that by mariage a man is bound and inthralled to the cares and humours of another. And if it fall out, that he haue mistaken in his choice, and haue met with a hard bargaine, more bone than flesh, his life is euer afterwards most miserable. What iniquitie and iniustice can there be greater than for one houres folly, a fault committed without malice, and by meere ouersight, yea many times to obey the aduice of another, a man should be bound to an euerlasting torment? It were better for him to put the halter about his necke, and to cast himselfe into the sea, his head downward, to end his miserable life, than to liue alwaies in the paines of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of ieaousie, of malice, of rage, of madnesse, of brutish obstinacie, and other miserable conditions: and therefore one stickes not to say, That he that inuented this knot and tie of mariage, had found a goodly and beautifull meanes to bee reuenged of man, a trap or gin to intangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another saith, That to marry a wife man to a foole or a foole to a wise man, is to binde the liuing to the dead, which was the cruellest death inuented by Tyrants, to make the liuing to languish and die by the company of the dead. Secondly, they say that mariage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits, insomuch that the flatteries and

and smooth speeches of the partie beloued, the affection towards children, the care of houlhold affaires, and advancement of their families, doe lessen, dissolue, and mollifie the vigour and strength of the most liuely and generous spirit that is, witnesse *Sampson, Salomon, Marc. Antony*. And therefore howsoeuer the matter goe, we had not need to mary. But those that haue more flesh than spirit, strong in bodie, and weake in minds, tie them to the flesh, and giue them the charge of small and base matters, such as they are capable of. But such as are weake of bodie, haue their spirits great, strong, and puissant, is it not then a pittie to binde them to the flesh, and to mariage, as men doe beasts in a stable? We see that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for seruice, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept asunder from the company and acquaintance of the other sex, and it is the manner to put beasts of least esteeme at randon together. So likewise such men and women as are ordained to the most venerable and holiest vocation, and which ought to be as the creame and marrow of Christianitie, Church-men and religious, are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from mariage. And the reason is, because mariage hindreth and auerteth those beautifull and great eleuations of the soule, the contemplation of things, high, celestiall and diuine, which is incomparable with the troubles and molestations of domestically affaires; for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitarie continent life before mariage. Vtility may well hold with mariage, but honestie is on the other side.

Againe, it troubleth beautifull and holy enterprises: as Saint *Austin* reporteth, that hauing determined with some other his friends, among whom there were some married, to retire themselves from the citie, and the company of men, the better to attend to the studie of wisdom and vertue, their purpose was quickly broken and altered by the wiues of those that were married. And another wise man did not doubt to say, that if men could liue without women, they should be visited and accompanied by Angels. Moreouer, mariage is an hindrance to such as delight in trauell, and to see strange countries, whether to learne to make themselves wise, or to teach others to be wise, and to publish that to others which they know.

know. To conclude, mariage doth not only corrupt and deiect good and great spirits, but it robbeth the weale-publike of many beautifull and great things, which cannot manifest themselues remaining in the bosome and lap of a woman, or being spent about young children. But is it not a goodly sight, nay a great losse, that he that is able for his wisdome and policie to gouerne the whole world, should spend his time in the gouernment of a woman and a few children? And therefore it was well answered by a great personage being sollicitied to marie, That he was borne to command men, not a woman, to counsell Kings and Princes, not little children.

3
The answer to
the aforesaid ob-
jections, Cap. 4.

To all this a man may answer, that the nature of man is not capable of perfection, or of any thing against which nothing may be objected, as hath elsewhere beene spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath, are in some degree or other but sickly, mingled with discommodities: They are all but necessarie euils. And this is the best that man could deuise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtilly haue inuented meanes to haue auoided these thornie inconueniences; but besides that they built castles in the aire, that could not long continue in vse, their inuentions likewise if they could haue beene put in practise, would not haue beene without many discommodities and difficulties. Man hath beene the cause of them, and hath himselfe brought them forth by his vice, intemperancy, and contrarie passion; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knowes not wel how to vse any thing. Moreouer a man may say, that by reason of these thornes and difficulties, it is a schoole of vertue, an apprenticeship, and a familiar and domesticall exercise: and *Socrates* a doctour of wisdome did once say to such as hit him in the teeth with his wiues pertish frowardnesse, That he did thereby learne euen within his owne dores, to be constant and patient euery where else, and to thinke the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant vnto him. It is not to be denied but that he that can liue vnmarried doth best: but yet for the honour of mariage, a man may say, that it was first instituted by God himselfe in Paradise before any other thing, and that in the state of innocencie and perfection. See here foure commendations of
mariage,

mariage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without reply. Afterwards the Sonne of God approued it, and honoured it with his presence at the first miracle that he wrought, and that miracle done in the fauour of that state of mariage and married men; yea he hath honored it with this priuiledge, that it serueth for a figure of that great vnion of his with the Church, and for that cause it is called a mystery and great.

Without all doubt, mariage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great euill, a great content, or a great trouble, a paradise or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good, or a rough and dangerous march, and a gauling burthensometie, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini Deus, aut lupus: Man is to man either a God or a wolfe.*

4

*Wholly good or
wholly ill.*

Mariage is a worke that consisteth of many parts; there must be a meeting of many qualities; many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoeuer a man say, he marieth not onely for himselfe; his posteritie, familie, alliance, and other meanes, are of great importance, and a grieuous burthen. See here the cause why so few good are found; and because there are so few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof: it is the condition of all great charges: Royaltie is full of difficultrie, and few there are that exercise it well and happily. And whereas we see many times that it falleth not out so luckily, the reason thereof is the licentious liberty, & vnbridled desire of the persons themselves, and not in the state & institution of mariage: and therefore it is commonly more commodious, and better fitted in good, simple, and vulgar spirits, where delicacy, curiosity, and idlenesse are lesse troublesome: vnbridled humors and turbulent wauering mindes are not fit for this state or degree.

5

*A good mariage,
a rare good.*

Mariage is a step to wisdom, a holy and inuiolable band, an honourable march. If the choyce be good and well ordered, there is nothing in the world more beautifull: It is a sweet society of life, full of constancy, trust, and an infinite number of profitable offices and mutuall obligations: It is a fellowship not of loue, but amitie. For loue and amitie are as different, as the burning sicke heat of a feuer, from the naturall heat of a sound bodie. Mariage hath in it selfe amitie, vtilitie,

6

*A simple description
and summary
of mariage.*

uicilitie, iustice, honor, constancy, a plaine pleasure, but sound, firme, and more vniuersall. Loue is grounded vpon pleasure only, and it is more quicke, piercing, ardent. Few mariages succeed well that haue their beginnings and progresse from beautie and amorous desires. Mariage hath need of foundations more solid and constant; and we must walke more warily; this boyling affection is worth nothing, yea mariage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

7
A description
more exact.

Thus much is said summarily and simply; but more exactly to describe it, we know that in mariage there are two things essentiall vnto it, and seeme contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to say, an equalitie sociable, and such as is betwene Peeres: and an inequalitye, that is to say, superioritie and inferioritie. The equalitie consisteth in an entire and perfect communication and communitie of all things, soules, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamentall law of Mariage, which in some places is extended euen to life and death, in such sort, that the husband being dead, the wife must incontinently follow. This is practised in some places by the publike lawes of the countries, and many times with so ardent affection, that many wiues belonging to one husband, they contend, and publicly plead for the honour to goe first to sleepe with their spouse (that is their word) alleaging for themselues the better to obtaine their suit, and preferment herein, their good seruice, that they were best beloued, had the last kisse of their deceased husband, and haue had children by him.

Et certamen habent lethi, quæ uirua sequatur

Conjugium; pudor est non licuisse mori.

Ardent uictrices, & flamma pectora præbent.

Imponuntque suis ora perusta uiris.

Strive (and giue reasons) each one earnestly

To haue the honour, with their husband die,

To line is shame and losse: who doth obtaine,

Imputes to pleasure, that which we count paine,

And is so ardent hot in her desire,

Fearing reuerfed iudgement, more then fire,

That she makes haste, &c.

In other places it was obserued, not by publike lawes, but priuate compacts and agreements of mariage, as berwixt

Marc.

Marc. Antony, and Cleopatra. This equalitie doth likewise consist in that power which they haue in commune ouer their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of her husband, the mistrisse of the house and family, as the husband the master and lord : and their ioynt authoritie ouer their family is compared to an *Aristocracie*.

The distinction of superioritie and inferioritie consisteth in this, that the husband hath power ouer the wife, and the wife is subiect to the husband. This agreeth with all lawes and policies ; but yet more or lesse according to the diuersity of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is subiect to the husband. This superioritie and inferioritie is naturall, founded vpon the strength and sufficiencie of the one, the weaknesse and insufficiencie of the other. The Diuines ground it vpon other reasons drawne from the Bible : Man was first made by God alone and immediatly, expressly for God his head, and according to his Image, and perfect, for nature doth alwaies begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the second place, after man, of the substance of man, by occasion and for another thing, *mulier est vir occasionatus, A woman is a man occasionate, a mans occasion, and the occasion of a man,* to serue as an aid and as a second to man, who is her head, and therefore imperfect. And this is the difference by order of generation. That of corruption and sinne proueth the same, for the woman was the first in preuarication, and by her owne weaknesse and will did sinne, man the second, and by occasion of the woman ; the woman then the last in good and in generation, and by occasion, the first in euill and the occasion thereof, is iustly subiect vnto man, the first in good, and last in euill.

This superioritie and power of the husband hath beene in some places such as that of the father, ouer life and death, as with the *Romans* by the law of *Romulus* : and the husband had power to kill his wife in foure cases, *Adulterie, Suborning of children, counterfeiting of false keyes, and drinking of wine.* So likewise with the *Greekes*, as *Polybius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband was ouer the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated ; but almost in all places the power of

8

Inequalitie.

9

*The power of the husband.**Dion. Halicar.**l. 2.**Lib. 2.**Lib. 6. bel. Gal.*

of the husband and the subiection of the wife doth inferre thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vowes of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks (as for blowes, they are vnworthy a woman of honour or honestie, saith the Law) and the wife is bound to hold the condition, follow the qualitie, countrey, familie, habitation and rancke of her husband, she must accompanie and follow him in all things, in his iourneys if need be, his banishment, his imprisonment, yea a wandring person, a vagabond, a fugitiue. The examples hereof are many and excellent, of *Sulpitia*, who followed her husband *Lentulus* being banished into *Cicilie*; *Erithrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mithridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandred thorow the world. Some adde vnto this, That wiues are to follow their husbands euen in the warres, and into those prouinces whither the husband is sent with publike charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiffe or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Iudge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into iudgement, without the permission of the Magistrate.

Corn. Tacit.

10
The diuers rules
of mariage.

Mariage is not carried after one and the same fashion, neither hath it in euery place the same lawes and rules, but according to the diuersitie of religions and countreys, it hath rules either more easie or more streight: according to the rules of Christianity of all other the streightest, mariage is more subiect, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free, the continuance is by constraint, depending of some thing else than our owne willes. Other nations and religions, to make mariage more easie, free, and fertile, haue receiued and practised *Polygamie* and repudiation, libertie to take and leaue wiues: they accuse Christianitie for taking away these two, by which meanes amity and multiplication, the principall ends of mariage, are much preiudiced, inasmuch as amity is an enemy to all constraint, and they doe better maintaine themselves in an honest libertie; and multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make knowne vnto vs in wolues, of whom the race is so fertile in the production of their young, euen to the number of
twelue

twelue or thirteene, that they farre excell all other profitable creatures : of these there are great numbers killed euery day, by which meanes there are but few, and they though of all others the most fertile, yet by accident the most barren : the reason is because of so great a number as they bring, there is one onely female, which for the most part beareth not by reason of the multitude of males that concur in the generation, of which the greatest part die without fruit, by the want of females. So likewise we may see how much *Polygamie* helpeth to multiplication in those nations that receiue it, *Iewes*, *Turks*, and other *Barbarians*, who are able to raise forces of three or foure thousand fighting men fit for warres. Contrariwise, in Christendome there are many linked together in matrimony, the one of which, if not both, are barren, which being placed with others, both the one and the other may happily leaue great posterity behinde them. But to speake more truly, all his fertilitie consisteth in the fertilitie of one onely woman. Finally, they obiekt, That this Christianlike restraint is the cause of many lasciuious pranks and adulteries. To all which we may answer, That Christianitie considereth not of mariage by reasons purely humane, naturall, temporall; but it beholds it with another visage, and weigheth it with reasons more high and noble, as hath beene said. Adde vnto this, That experience sheweth in the greatest part of mariages, that constraint increaseth amity, especially in simple and debonaire mindes, who doe easily accommodate themselves where they finde themselves in such sort linked. And as for lasciuious and wicked persons, it is the immodestie of their manners that makes them such, which no libertie can amend. And to say the truth, Adulteries are as common where *Polygamie* and repudiation are in force; witnesse the *Iewes*, and *Dauid*, who for all the wiues that he had could not defend himselfe from it: and contrariwise, they haue beene a long time vnknowne in policies well gouerned, where there was neither *Polygamie* nor repudiation; witnesse *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation. And therefore it is absurd to attribute it vnto religion, which teacheth nothing but puritie and continencie.

The libertie of *Polygamie* which seemeth in some sort naturall,

*Polygamie di-
uers.*

12
*Repudiation
diuers.*

turall, is carried diuersly according to the diuersity of nations and policies. In some, all the wiues that belong to one husband liue in common, and are equall in degree; and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principall and as the mistris, whose children inherit the goods, honours, and titles of the husband: the rest of the wiues are kept apart, and carrie in some places the titles of lawfull wiues, in others of concubines, and their children are onely pensioners.

The vse of repudiation in like sort is different: for with some, as the *Hebrewes, Greeks, Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not exprest, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawfull to marry another. But by the law of *Mahumet*, the separation is made by the Iudge, with knowledge taken of the cause (except it be by mutuall consent) which must be adulterie, sterilitie, incompatibility of humors, an enterprise on his, or her part against the life of each other, things directly and especially contrarie to the state and institution of mariage: and it is lawfull to retake one another as often as they shall thinke good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and ouer-sharpe and bitter husbands: The second, which is to expresse the cause, dishonoureth the parties, and discouereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficientlie verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murthers doe commonly ensue; many times vnknowne vnto men: as it was discouered at *Rome* before the vse of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others, and they others too, to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath beene, that the adulterer escapeth almost euery where without punishment of death, and all that is laid vpon him is diuorce and separation of companie, brought in by *Iustinian*, a man wholly possessed by his wife, who caused whatsoeuer lawes to passe that might make for the aduantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetuall adulterie, desire of the death of the one partie, the offender is not punished, the innocent iuiured remaineth without amends.

The dutie of married folke, See Lib. 3. Chap. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVII.

Of Parents and Children.

THere are many sorts & degrees of authority and humane power, Publike and Priuate; but there is none more naturall, nor greater, than that of the father ouer his children, (I say father, because the mother who is subiect vnto her husband cannot properly haue her children in her power and subiection) but it hath not beene alwayes, and in all places alike. In former times almost euery where it was absolute and vniuersall ouer the life and death, the libertie, the goods, the honour, the actions and carriages of their children, as to pleade, to marry, to get goods: as namely with the *Romans* by the expresse law of *Romulus*; *Parentum in liberos omne jus esto, relegandi, vendendi, occidendi*: Let the parents haue full liberty to dispose of their children, yea of banishing, selling, or killing them; Except only children vnder the age of three yeeres, who as yet could not offend either in word or deed, which law was afterwards renued by the law of the twelue Tables, by which the father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians* according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French* as *Cæsar* and *Prosper* affirme; with the *Muscovites* & *Tartars*, who might sell their children to the fourth time. And it should seeme by that fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his sonne, that this power was likewise vnder the law of nature: for if it had beene against his duty, and without the power of the father, he had neuer consented thereunto, neither had he euer thought that it was God that commanded him to doe it, if it had been against nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocencie, knowing that it was in the power of his father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatnesse of the faith of *Abraham*, because he would not sacrifice his sonne by vertue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but onely to obey the commandement of God. So likewise it was in force by the law of *Moses*, though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath beene in ancient times in the greatest part of the world, and

¹ Fatherly power.

Dion Halic.
 libr. 2. antiq.
 Rom. l. in suis
 ff. de lib. &
 post. Aul.
 Gell. lib. 20.
 Lib. 8. Eth.
 cap. 20.
 Lib. 6. Bel.
 Gal.
 Prosper.
 Aquitan. in
 Epist. Segism.

Deuter. 32.

which endured vnto the time of the Roman Emperors. With the Greeks it was not so great & absolute, nor with the Egyptians: Neuerthelesse if it fell out, that the father had killed his sonnes wrongfully, and without cause, hee had no other punishment, but to be shut vp three dayes together with the dead body.

2 *The reasons and fruits thereof.* Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of fathers ouer their children, necessary for the culture of good manners, the chasing away of vice, and the publique good, were first to hold the children in awe and duty: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape vnpunished, to the great preiudice of the weale publique, if the knowledge and punishment of them were but in the hand of publike authority, whether it be because they are domesticall and secret, or because there is no man that will prosecute against them: for the parents who know them and are interessed in them, will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolencies that are neuer punished by iustice. Adde hereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt parents and children, brothers and sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authority. And the Law did alwayes suppose, that the father would neuer abuse this authoritie, because of that great loue which hee naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with crueltie: which is the cause that in stead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the Law: and there can be no greater torment to them, than to see their children in paine. And it falleth out very seldome or neuer, that this power is put in practise without very great occasion, so that it was rather a scar-crow to children, and very profitable, than a rigour in good earnest.

3 *The declination.* Now this fatherly power (as ouer-sharpe and dangerous) is almost of it selfe lost and abolished, (for it hath rather happened by a kinde of discontinuance than any expresse law) and it beganne to decline at the coming of the Roman Emperours: for from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent

insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, said, That he had seene more parricides punished in five yeeres past, than had beene in seven hundred yeeres before; that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times, if it fell out that the father killed his children, he was not punished, as we may see by the example of *Fulvius* the Senatour, who killed his Sonne because he was a partner in the conspiracie of *Catiline*: and of diuers other Senatours, who haue made criminall procelle against their children in their owne houses, and haue condemned them to death, as *Cassius Trazianus*; or to perpetuall exile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his sonne *Sillanus*. There were afterwards lawes ordained, that inioyned the father to present vnto the Iudge his children offending, that they might be punished, and that the Iudge should pronounce such a sentence as the father thought fit; which is still a kinde of footstep of antiquitie: and going about to take away the power of the father, they durst not doe it but by halles, and not all together and openly. These latter Lawes come somewhat neere the law of *Moyse*, which would, That at the onely complaint of the father made before the Iudge, without any other knowledge taken of the cause, the rebellious and contumacious childe should be stoned to death; requiring the presence of the Iudge, to the end the punishment should not be done in secret or in choller, but exemplarily. So that according to *Moyse*, this fatherly power was more free and greater, than it hath beene after the time of the Emperours; but afterwards vnder *Constantine* the Great, and *Theodosius*, and finally vnder *Iustinian*, it was almost altogether extinct. From whence it is, that children haue learned to denie their obedience to their parents, their goods, their aide, yea to wage law against them; a shamefull thing to see our Courts full of these cases. Yea, they haue beene dispensed heerewith vnder pretext of deuotion and offerings, as with the Iewes before Christ, wherewith hereprocheth them; and afterwards in Christianitie, according to the opinion of some: yea, it hath beene lawfull to kill them either in their owne defence, or if they were enemies to the Common-weale: although, to say the truth, there should neuer be cause iust enough for a son to kill his father. *Nullum tantum scelus admitti*

Lib. 1. de Clem.

Salust. in bel. Catil.

Valer. Maxi.

Mat. 15.

poteſt à patre, quod ſit parricidio vindicandum, & nullum ſcelus rationem habet. A father cannot commit ſuch a crime, as may be reuenged with parricide, and no wickedneſſe hath any reaſon.

Now we ſeele not what miſchiefe and preiudice hath hapned to the world, by the abolishing and extinction of this fatherly power. The Common-weales wherein it hath beene in force haue alwaies flouriſhed. If there were any danger or euill in it, it might in ſome ſort be ruled and moderated; but vtterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honeſt nor expedient, but hurtfull and inconuenient, as hath beene ſaid.

Of the reciprocall duty of Parents and children, See *Lib. 3. Cap. 14.*

CHAP. XLVIII.

Lords and ſlaues, Maſters and ſeruaunts.

¹
The uſe of
ſlaues vniuerſall
and againſt na-
ture.

THe uſe of ſlaues, and the full and abſolute power of Lords and Maſters ouer them, although it be a thing common thorowout the world and at all times (except within theſe foure hundred yeeres, in which time it hath ſomewhat decayed, though of late it reuiue againe) yet it is a thing both monſtrous and ignominious in the nature of man, and ſuch as is not found in beaſts themſelues, who conſent not to the captiuitie of their like neither actiuelly nor paſſiuelly. The law of *Moyſes* hath permitted this as other things, *ad duritiā cordiū eorū*, for their hardneſſe of heart, but not ſuch as hath beene elſewhere: for it was neither ſo great, nor ſo abſolute, nor perpetuall, but moderated within the compaſſe of ſeuē yeeres at the moſt. Chriſtianitie hath left it, finding it vniuerſall in all places, as likewiſe to obey idolatrous Princes and Maſters, and ſuch like matters as could not at the firſt attempt and altogether be extinguiſhed, they haue abolithed.

²
Diſtinction.

Tacit. de mort.
German.

There are foure ſorts, Naturall, that is, ſlaues borne; Enforced, and made by right of warre; Juſt, termed ſlaues by puniſhment by reaſon of ſome offence, or debt, whereby they are ſlaues to their Creditors, at the moſt for ſeuē yeeres, according to the law of the Iewes, but alwaies vntill payment and reſtitution be made, in other places; Voluntaries, whereof there are many ſorts, as they that caſt the dice for it, or ſell their

their libertie for money, as long sithence it was the custome in *Almaigne*, and now likewise in some parts of Christendome, where they doe giue and vow themselues to another for euer, as the Iewes were wont to practise, who at the gate bored a hole in their eare, in token of perpetuall seruitude. And this kinde of voluntarie captiuitie is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

It is couetousnesse that is the cause of slaues enforced ; and leaudnesse the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and Masters haue hoped for more gaine and profit by keeping, than by killing them : and indeed the fairest possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaues. By this meanes *Crassus* became the richest among the *Romanes*, who had besides those that serued him five hundred slaues, who euery day brought gaine and commoditie by their gainefull Arts and mysteries, and afterwards when he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

3
The cause of
Slaues.

It is a strange thing to reade of those cruelties practised by Lords vpon their slaues, euen by the approbation and permission of the lawes themselues : They haue made them to till the earth being chained together, as the manner is in *Barbarie* at this day ; they lodge them in holes and ditches ; and being old, or impotent, and so vnprofitable, they sell them, or drowne them, and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withall : They kill them not onely for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a glasse, but for the least suspicion, yea, for their owne pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time. And to giue delight vnto the people, they were constrained in their publike Theaters to kill one another. If a Master hapned to be killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaues were all put to death, inso-much that *Pedonius* the *Romane* being slaine, although the murderer were knowen, yet by the order of the Senate, foure hundred of his slaues were put to death.

4
The cruelties of
Lords against
their slaues.

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to heare of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaues against their Lords, when they haue beene able to worke their reuenge, not only in particular by surprise and treason, as it fell out one night in the Citie of *Tyre*, but in set battell both by sea and land;

5
The cruelties of
slaues against
their Lords.

land; from whence the prouerbe is, So many slaues, so many enemies.

6
*Diminution of
Slaves.*

Now as Christian religion, and afterwards *Mahumetisme* did increase, the number of slaues did decrease, and seruitude did cease, insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the Turkes, like apes imitating them, gaue freedom and libertie to all those that were of their religion; in such sort, that about the twelue hundred yeere, there were almost no slaues in the world, but where these two religions had no authoritie.

7
*The increase of
poore people
and vagabonds.*

But as the number of slaues diminished, the number of beggers and vagabonds increased: for so many slaues being set at libertie, come from the houses and subiection of their Lords, not hauing wherewithall to liue, and perhaps hauing Children too, filled the world with poore people.

8
*Returne to
seruitude.*

This pouertie made them returne to seruitude, and to become voluntarie slaues, paying, changing, selling their libertie, to the end they might haue their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause and this voluntary seruitude, the world is returned to the vse of slaues, because the Christians and Turks alwaies maintaining warres one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both orientall and occidentall, although by the example of the Iewes they haue no slaues of their owne nation, yet they haue of others, whom, though they turne to their religion, they hold slaues by force.

The power and authoritie of masters ouer their seruants, is not very great, nor imperious, and in no sort can be preiudiciall to the libertie of seruants; onely they may chastise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much lesse ouer those that are mercenarie, ouer whom they haue neither power nor correction.

The dutie of Masters and Seruants, See *lib. 3. chap. 15.*

CHAP. XLIX.

Of the State, Soueraigntie, Soueraignes.

1
*The description
and necessitie of
the state.*

HAuing spoken of priuate power, we come to the publicke, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certaine order in commanding and obeying, is the

the prop, the cement, and the soule of humane things: It is the bond of societie, which cannot otherwise subsist; It is the vitall spirit, whereby so many millions of men doe breathe, and the whole nature of things.

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure, very difficult, subiect to changes, *Arduum & subiectum fortuna cuncta regendionus*: The burden of government is a hard matter, and subiect to fortune: which declineth and sometimes falleth by hidden and vnknowne causes, and that altogether at an instant, from the highest steppe to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it vseth to be long a rising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subiect to ambushments, underminings, and dangers, which hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the soueraignes, and the nature of the soueraigntie, which wee are about to describe.

2
The nature of the
State.
Tacit.

Soueraignty is a perpetuall and absolute power, without constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a power to giue lawes to all in generall, and to euery one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another saith (to derogate from the common law) Soueraigntie is so called, and absolute, because it is not subiect to any humane lawes, no nor his own. For it is against nature to giue lawes vnto all, and to command himselfe in a thing that dependeth vpon his will. *Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quæ à voluntate promittentis statum capit*: No obligation can stand good, which hath his strength from the will of the promiser: nor of another, whether liuing, or of his predecessors, or the countrey. Soueraigne power is compared to fire, to the Sea, to a wilde beast; it is a hard matter to tame it, to handle it, it will not be crost, nor offended, but being, is very dangerous. *Potestas res est quæ moveri, doceri quæ non vult, & castigationem agrè ferat*: Power is a thing which will neither be admonished nor taught, and with great difficulty suffereth any correction.

3
The description
of Soueraigntie.

The markes and properties therof, are, to iudge the last appeales, to ordaine lawes in time of peace and warre, to create and appoint magistrates and officers, to giue graces and dis-

4
The properties.

penfations againſt the law, to impoſe tributes, to appoint money, to receiue homages, ambaffages, oathes. But all this is comprehended vnder the abſolute power to giue and make lawes according to their pleaſure. Other markes there are of leſſe weight, as the law of the ſea and ſhipwracke, confiscation for Treason, power to change the tongue, title of Maieſtie.

5

Greatnes and Soueraignty is ſo much deſired of all, becauſe all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly, and all the ill is altogether inward: As alſo becauſe to command others, is a thing as beautifull and diuine, as great and difficult; and for this cauſe they are eſteemed and reuerenced for more than men. Which beleeſe in the people, and credit of theirs is very neceſſarie and commodious to extort from the people due reſpect and obedience, the nurce of peace and quieneſſe. But in the end they proue to be men caſt in the ſame mould that other men are, and many times worſe borne, and worſe qualified in nature than many of the common ſort of people. It ſeemeth that their actions becauſe they are weightie and important, doe proceed from weightie and important cauſes: but they are nothing, and of the ſame condition that other mens are. The ſame occaſion that breeds a brawle betwixt vs and our neighbour, is ground enough of a warre betwixt Princes: and that offence for which a Lackey deſerues a whipping, lighting vpon a King, is the ruine of a whole prouince. They will as lightly as we, and we as they, but they can doe more than we: the ſelfe ſame appetites moue a ſlie and an elephant. Finally, beſides theſe paſſions, defects, and naturall conditions which they haue common with the meanest of thoſe that doe adore them, they haue likewiſe vices and diſcommodities which their greatneſſe and ſoueraigntie beares them out in, peculiar vnto themſelues.

6

The maners of
Soueraignes.

The ordinarie maners of great perſonages are, vntamed pride, *Durus eſt veri inſolens, ad recta ſlecti regius non vult tumor*; He that is inſolent is vncapable of the truth, kingly pride will not yeeld to thoſe things that are true. Violence too licentious, *Id eſſe regni maximum pignus putant, ſi quicquid alijs non licet, ſolis licet: quod non poteſt, vult poſſe, qui nimium poteſt*: They thinke it the greateſt teſtimonie of their royalty, that that which is

is not permitted others, is only lawfull for them; he that hath power to doe too much, will haue power to doe that he cannot: Their mott that best pleaseth them is, *Quod libet, licet*: What they list is lawfull: Suspicion, ieaousie, *Suapte natura, potentia anxii*, They are naturally carefull of their power, yea euen of their owne infants, *Suspectus semper, in visusq; dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur, adeo ut displiceant etiam civilia filiorum ingenia*: The next whosoener destinated to succeed them, is alwaies mistrusted, and enuied, insomuch that the ciuill demeanor of their owne children doth also displease them. Whereby it falleth out that they are many times in alarum and feare, *Ingenia regum prona ad formidinem*, Kings are naturally apt to feare.

Seneca.
Tacitus.

The aduantages of Kings and soueraigne Princes aboue their people, which seeme to great and glittering, are indeed but light, and almost imaginarie; but they are repayed with great, true, and solid disadvantages and inconueniences. The name and title of a soueraigne, the shew and outside is beautifull, pleasant, and ambitious; but the burden and the inside is hard, difficult, and irkesome. There is honor enough, but little rest and ioy, or rather none at all: It is a publike and honorable seruitude, a noble miserie, a rich captiuitie, *Aurca & fulgida compedes, clara miseria*; witnesse that which *Augustus, Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, Diocletian*, haue said and done, and the end that almost all the first twelue *Cesars* made, and many others after them. But because few there are that beleeue this, but suffer themselues to be deceiued by the beautifull shew, I will more particularly quote the inconueniences and miseries that accompany great Princes.

7
The miseries,
and discommodities.

First, the great difficultie to play their part, and to quit themselues of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to gouerne so many people, since in the ruling of himselfe there are so many difficulties? It is an easier matter and more pleasant to follow, than to guide; to trauell in a way that is already traced, than to finde the way; to obey, than to command; to answer for himselfe only, than for others too; *ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum, quam regere imperiores velle*: It is far better to procure peace & quiet, than to gouerne a kingdom. Adde hereunto, that it is required that he that commandeth must be a better man than he that is commanded:

8
1. In their charge.

so said *Cyrus* a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucitie of those that are such as they ought to be. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the only Prince that in goodnesse excelled his predecessors: and another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be grauen in a ring.

9
2. In the pleasures
and actions of
their life.

Secondly, in their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they haue a greater part than other men. But they are doubtlesse of a worse condition than the pleasures of private men: for besides that the lustre of their greatnesse makes them vnfit to take ioy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too cleare and apparent, and made as a butt and subiect to censure, they are likewise crost and peered into euen to their very thoughts, which men take vpon them to diuine and iudge of. Againe, the great ease and facilitie that they haue to doe what pleaseth them, because all men applie themselves vnto them, takes away the taste, and sowreth that sweet which should be in their pleasures; which delight no man but those that taste them, with some scarcitie and difficultie. He that giues no time to be thirstie, knowes not what a pleasure it is to haue drinke: Satiety is noysome, and goes against the stomacke.

*Pinguis amor nimiumq; potens in tedia nobis
Vertitur: & stomacho dulcis ut esca nocet.*

*Extremities of Pleasure turnes to paine,
So Venus satiates, and honey's bane.*

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome than abundance, yea they are deprived of all true and liuely action, which cannot be without some difficultie and resistance. It is not going, liuing, acting in them, but sleeping and an insensible sliding away.

10
3. In their marriages.

The third inconuenience that followeth Princes, is in their mariages. The mariages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntarie, made with more affection, libertie and contentment. One reason heereof may bee that the common sort of men finde more of their degree to chuse, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, haue no plentifull choice. But the other reason is better, which is, that the common sort in their mariages looke but into their owne affaires, and how they may accommodate it best vnto themselves;

themselves ; but the mariages of Princes are many times enforced for publike necessitie: they are great parts of the State, and instruments seruing for the generall good and quiet of the world. Great personages and Soueraignes marie not for themselves, but for the good of the State, whereof they must be more amorous and iealous, than of their wiues and children : for which cause they many times hearken vnto mariages where there is neither loue nor delight ; and matches are made betweene persons, who neither know nor haue seene one another, much lesse affect : yea such a great man takes such a great Ladie, whom if he were not so great, he would not take : but this is to serue the weale-publike, to assure the States, and to settle peace amongst their people.

The fourth is, That they haue no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour, in the exercises of the minde and of the body, which is one of the most delightfull things in the commerce and conuersation of men. The reason hereof is, because all the world giues place vnto them, all men spare them, and loue rather to hide their owne valour, to betray their owne glorie, than to hurt or hinder that of their Soueraigne, especially where they know he affects the victorie. This, to say the truth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully and iniuriously, and therefore one said, that the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, but to manage a horse, because in all other exercises euery one bowes vnto them, and giues them the prise : but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great personages haue refused the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteeme of them, and reioyce in them, if they came from free men, that durst say the contrary, and tax mee if there were cause.

The fift is, That they are deprived of the libertie to trauell in the world, being as it were imprisoned within their owne countries, yea within their owne palaces, being alwayes inclosed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that wherefoeuer they be, and in all actions whatsoeuer, prying euen thorow the holes of their chaire : whereupon *Alphonse* the

11
4. Attempt of
honour.

12
5. Libertie of
travell.

the King said, that in this respect the estate of an asse was better than the condition of a King.

13

6. Mutuall and
barty amitie.

The sixt miserie, that they are depriued of all amitie and mutuall societic, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equals or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparitie puts them without the commerce and society of men; all humble seruices, and base offices, are done vnto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from loue, but from subiection, or to increase their owne greatnes, or of custome and countenance; which is plaine, because wicked Kings are as well serued and reuerenced as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloued, there is no difference, the selfe-same apparell, the selfe-same ceremonie: Whereupon *Iulian* the Emperor answered his Courtiers, that commended him for his iustice, Perhaps I should be proud of these praises, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserue it.

14

7. Ignorance of
things.

The seuenth miserie, worse perhaps than all the rest, and more dangerous to the weale-publike, is, that they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affaires, and consequently not to call & employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessary. They are shut vp, and beset with a certaine kind of people, that are either of their owne blood, or by the greatnes of their houses and offices, or by prescription, are so farre in authoritie, power, and managing of affaires before others, that it is not lawfull, without putting all to hazard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kinde of people that couer, and hold as it were hidden the Prince, doe prouide that all the truth of things shall not appeare vnto him, and that better men, and more profitable to the state come not neere him, lest they be knowen what they are. It is a pittifull thing not to see but by the eyes, not to vnderstand, but by the eares of another, as Princes doe. And that which perfecteth in all points this miserie, is, that commonly, and as it were by destinie, Princes and great personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humane kinde, Flatterers, Inuencers of imposts or tributes, Informers, who

who vnder a faire and false pretext of zeale and amitie towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyaltie and reformation as the latter, spoile and ruinate both Prince and State.

The eighth miserie is, That they are lesse free, and masters of their ownewils than all other, for they are inforced in their proceedings by a thousand considerations and respects, whereby many times they must captiuat their designments, desires, and wils: *In maxima fortuna, minima licentia*; In the greatest honour the least libertie. And in the meane time in stead of being plaintiffes, they are more rudely handled and iudged than any other: For men will not sticke to diuine of their designes, penetrate into their hearts and inuentions, which they cannot doe; *Abditos Principis sensus, & quid occultius parat exquirere; illicitum anceps nec ideo assequare*: To prie into the hidden secrets of the Prince, and to search if they can finde any thing more secret; neither will they herein forbear although they know it unfitting: and looking into things with another visage, where they vnderstand not sufficiently the affaires of the state, they require of their Princes what they thinke should be done, blame their actions, and refusing to submit themselues to what is necessarie, they commonly proceed in their businesse rudely enough.

Finally, it falleth out many times, that they make a miserable end, not only tyrants and vsurpers, for it belongs to them, but such as haue a true title to their Crowne; witnesse so many Romane Emperours after Pompey the Great, and Cesar, and in our time Mary Queene of Scotland, who lost her life by the hand of an executioner, and Henry the third, wilfully murdered in the middle of forty thousand armed men, by a little Monke; and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempests oppose themselues against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that enuie & emulate greatnes below vpon earth.

*Vsq̃ adeo res humanas vis abdita quadam
Obterit & pulchros fasces, sauasq; secures
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.*

So farre seme hidd'n Highnesse seemes to frowne
On humane pride in Diademe or Crowne,
As it both laughs at it, and beats it downe.

15
8. Not masters
of their wils.

16
9. A miserable
end.

17
The conclusion of
their miseries.

To conclude, the condition of Soueraignes is hard and dangerous: Their life if it be innocent, is infinitely painfull; if it be wicked, it is subiect to the hate and slander of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers: for the greater a Prince is, the lesse may he trust others, and the more must he trust himselfe. So that we see, that it is a thing as it were annexed to soueraignie, to be betrayed.

Of their dutie, See the third booke, Cap. 16.

CHAP. L.

Magistrates.

1
The distinction.

There are diuers degrees of Magistrates as well in honour as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which haue nothing common the one with the other: and many times they that are more honourable haue lesse power, as Counsellors of the Priuie Counsell, the Secretarie of the State. Some haue but one of the two; others haue both, and that of diuers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that haue both.

2 The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Soueraigne and the particulars, in the presence of their Soueraignes haue no power to command. As riuers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the sea, and the stars their light in the presence of the Sunne; so all power of Magistrates is but vpon sufferance in the presence of their Soueraigne: as also the power of inferiours and subalternate Magistrates in the presence of their superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superioritie, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and preuention.

3 All Magistrates iudge, condemne and command either according to the law, and then their sentence is but the execution of the law; or according to equitie, and such iudgement is called the office or dutie of the Magistrate.

4 Magistrates cannot change nor correct their iudgements, except the Soueraigne permit it, vnder paine of iniustice: they may reuoke their commands or make stay of them, but not

not that which they haue iudged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause.

Of the dutie of Magistrates, See *Lib. 3.*

CHAP. LI.

Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers.

IT is one of the vanities & follies of man, to prescribe lawes and rules that exceed the vse and capacitie of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors haue done. They propose strange and eleuated formes or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practise of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea the attempt is dangerous to many. These are Castles in the aire, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*, and *More*, the Oratour of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautifull and excellent imaginations; but he was yet neuer found that put them in vse. The soueraigne and perfect Law-giuer and Doctor tooke heed of this, who both in himselfe, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extrauagancies and formes diuided from the common capacitie of men; and therefore he calleth his yoke easie, and his burthen light: *In- gulum meum suauis, & onus meum leue; My yoke sweet and my burden light.* And they that haue instituted and ordered their companie vnder his name, haue very wisely considered of the matter, that though they make speciall profession of verue, deuotion, and to serue the weale-publike aboue all others, neuerthelesse they differ very little from the common and ciuill life. Wherein there is first great iustice: for there must alwaies be kept a proportion betwixt the commandement and the obedience, the dutie and the power, the rule and the workmaster: and these bind themselues and others to be necessarily in want, cutting out more work than they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers, are the first Law-breakers: for they doe nothing, and many times do quite contrarie to that they enioyne others, like the Pharisees, *Imponunt onera grauius, & nolunt ea digito mouere: They impose great burdens, but will not themselves touch them with a finger.* So doe some Physicians and Diuines in so liues the world;

rules

rules and precepts are enioyned, and men not only by an irregularitie of life and manners, but also by contrary opinion and iudgement follow others.

There is likewise another fault full of iniustice, they are farre more scrupulous, exact, and rigorous in things free and accidentall than in necessarie and substantiall, in positive and humane, than in naturall and diuine; like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts: and all like the Pharisees, as the great and heauenly Doctor telleth them to their reproach. All this is but hypocrisie and deccit.

CHAP. LII.

People or vulgar sort.

THe people (we vnderstand heere the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kinde of people vnder what couert soeuer, of base, seruile, and mechanicall condition) are a strange beast with many heads, and which in few words cannot be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waues of the sea; they are moued and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant: there is nothing more easie than to driue them into what passion he will; they loue not warres for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietnesse, but for varieties sake, and the change that there is from the one to the other: confusion makes them desire order, and when they haue it, they like it not: they run alwaies one contrariety to another, and there is no time pleaseth but what is to come: *Hi vulgi mores, odisse presentia, ventura cupere, praterita celebrare*: It is the custome of the vulgar sort, to despise the present, desire the future, praise and extoll that which is past.

They are light to beleue, to gather together newes, especially such as are most hurtfull; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonnet of newes, a man may assemble them together like bees at the sound of a bason.

Without iudgement, reason, discretion. Their iudgement and wisdom is but by chance, like a cast at dice, vnadvised and headlong of all things, and alwaies ruled by opinion or custome,

custome, or the greater number, going all in a line, like sheepe that run after those that goe before them, and not by reason and truth. *Plebi non iudicium, non veritas: ex opinione multa,* Tacit. *ex veritate pauca iudicat.* The common people haue no iudgement, Cic. no verity; deeme many things by opinion, few by the truth it selfe.

Enuious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of vertue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, fauouring the more weake and the more wicked, and wishing all ill they can to men of honor they know not wherefore, except it be because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

4

Treacherous and vntrue, amplifying reports, smothering of truthes, and alwaies making things greater than they are, without faith, without hold. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a childe, are of like durance, which change not onely as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that euery houre of the day may bring forth.

5

Mutinous, desiring nothing but nouelties and changes, seditious, enemies to peace & quietnesse: *Ingenio mobili, seditiosum, discordiosum, cupidum rerum novarum, quieti & otio aduersum,* Salust. *Of a mutable disposition, seditious, a breeder of discord, desirous of nouelties, enemies to peace and quietnesse,* Especially when they meet with a leader: for then euen as the calme sea, of nature tumblerth, and foameth, and ragerth, being stirred with the furie of the windes; so doe the people swell, and grow proud, wilde, and outragious: butt take from them their leader, they become deiect, grow wilde, are confounded with astonishment, *Sine rectore praeceptis, pavidus, socors, nil ausuram plebs principibus amotis:* Headlong without a gouernor, fearefull, carelesse, daring nothing in absence of their princes.

6

Procurers and fauorers of broiles and alterations in household affaires, they account modestie simplicitie, wisdome rusticitie: and contrariwise, they giue to fierie and heady violence the name of valour and fortitude. They prefer those that haue hot heads and actiue hands, before those that haue a settled and temperate iudgement, and vpon whom the weight of the affaires must lie; boasters and praters before those that are simple and stayed.

7

P

They

They care neither for the publike good nor common honestie, but their priuate good only; and they refuse no base offices for their gaine and commodity. *Privata cuique stimulat, vile decus publicum: Every one hath his priuate spur, contemning the publike honor.*

Alwaies muttering and mumuring against the State, alwaies belching out slanders and insolent speeches against those that gouerne and command. The meaner and poorer sort haue no better pastime, than to speake ill of the great and rich, not vpon cause and reason, but of enuie, being neuer content with their gouernours, nor the present State.

They haue nothing but a mouth, they haue tongues that cease not, spirits that bowge not: they are a monster whose parts are all tongues, they speake all things, but know nothing; they looke vpon all, but see nothing; they laugh at all, and weepe at all; fit to mutine and rebell, not to fight. Their propertie is rather to assay to shake off their yoke, than to defend their libertie: *Procacia plebis ingenia, impigre lingue, ignavi animi: The wits of the vulgar sort are shamlesse, talkative, base minded.*

Tacitus.
Salust.

They neuer know how to hold a measure, nor to keepe an honest mediocritie. Either like slaues they serue ouerbasely, or like Lords they are beyond all measure insolent and tyrannicall. They cannot endure a soft and temperate bit, nor are pleased with a lawfull libertie; they run alwaies to extremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much distrusting out of feare. They will make you asfeard, if you feare not them: when they are frighted, you chocke them vnder the chin, and you leape with both feet vpon their bellies. They are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the cudgell; and therefore the prouerbe is, Tickle them, and they will prick thee; prick them, and they will tickle thee. *Nil in vulgo modicum terrere ni paueant, ubi pertinuerint impune contemni: audacia turbidum nisi ubi metuat aut seruit humiliter, aut superbè dominatur: libertatem, que media, nec spernere nec habere.*

Very vnthankfull towards their benefactors. The recompence of all those that haue deserued well of the commonwealth, haue alwayes beene banishment, reproach, conspircie,

cie, death. Histories are famous, of *Moyfes* and all the Prophets, *Socrates*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*, *Themistocles*. And the Truth it selfe hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people, escaped not : and contrariwise, they that oppresse them, are dearest vnto them. They feare all, they admire all.

To conclude, the people are a saurage beast, all that they thinke, is vanitie ; all they say, is false and erroneous ; that they reprove, is good ; that they approue, is naught ; that which they praise is infamous ; that which they doe and vnder-
 13
 dertake is follie. *Non tam bene cum rebus humanis geritur ut meliara pluribus placeant : argumentum pessimi turba est :* It goes not so well in humane affaires, as that the best things do please the most : multitude is an argument of the worst. The vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, iniustice, inconstancie, idolatrie, vanitie, which neuer yet could be pleased : their mor-
Seneca.
 is, *Vox populi, vox Dei* ; The voice of the people is the voice of God : but we may say, *Vox populi, vox stultorum* : The voice of the people is the voice of fooles. Now the beginning of wisdom, is for a man to keepe himselfe cleere and free, and not to suffer himselfe to be caried with popular opinions. This
Lib. 2. cap. 1.
 belongs to the second booke, which is now neere at hand.

*The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawne
 from their diuers professions and con-
 ditions of life.*

THE PREFACE.

BEhold here another difference of men, drawne from the diuersitie of their professions, conditions and kindes of life. Some follow the ciuill and sociable life, others flie it, thinking to saue themselues in the solitarie wilderness ; some loue armes, others hate them ; some liue in common, others in priuate ; it pleaseth some best to haue charge, and to leade a publike life, others to hide and keepe themselves priuate ; some are Courtiers, attending wholly vpon others, others court none but themselves ; some delight to liue in the Citie, others in the fields, affecting a countrey life, whose choice is
 P 2 the

the better, and which life is to be preferred, it is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They haue all their aduantages and disaduantages, their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered herein, as shall be said, is, That euery man know how to chuse that which best befits his owne nature, that he might liue the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all, by comparing them together: but this shall be after we haue spoken of that life which is common to all, which hath three degrees.

CHAP. LIII.

The distinction and comparison of the three sorts of degrees of life.

THere are three sorts of life, and as it were three degrees, one priuate of euery particular man within himselfe, and in the closet of his owne heart, where all is hid, all is lawfull: the second, in his house and family, in his priuate and ordinarie actions, where there is neither studie nor Art, and where of he is not bound to giue any reason: the third is publike in the eyes of the world. Now, to keepe order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare than in the other two; and in the second, than in the third, the reason is, because where there is neither Iudge nor Controller, nor regarder, and where we haue no imagination either of punishment or recompence, we carrie our selues more loosely and carelesly, as in priuate liues, where conscience and reason only is our guide, than in publike, where we are still in checke and as a marke to the eyes and iudgement of all, where glory, feare of reproach, base reputation, or some other passion doth leade vs (for passion commands with greater power than reason) whereby we keepe our selues readie, standing vpon our guard: for which cause it falleth out, that many are counted holy, great, and admirable in publike, who in their owne priuate haue nothing commendable. That which is done in publike is but a fable, a fiction, the truth is secret and in priuate; and he that will well iudge of a man,

man, must conuerse euery day with him, and pry into his ordinary and naturall cariage; the rest is all counterfet; *Uniuersus mundus exercet histrioniam*: *The whole world plays the Comedian*: and therefore said a wise man, That he is an excellent man, who is such within and in himselfe which he is outwardly, for feare of the lawes and speech of the world. Publike actions thunder in the eares of men, to which a man is attentiu when he doth them, as exploits in warre, sound judgement in counsell, to rule a people, to performe an Ambassage. Priuate and domesticall actions are quicke and sure, to chide, to laugh, to sell, to pay, to conuerse with his owne, a man considers not of them, he doth them, not thinking of them: secret and inward actions much more, to loue, to hate, to desire.

Againe, there is here another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the naturall hypocrisie of men, which we make most account of, and a man is more scrupulous in outward actions, that are in shew, but yet are free, of small importance, and almost all in countenances and ceremonies, and therefore are of little cost, and as little effect, than in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessarie, and therefore they are the more difficult. Of those depend the reformation of the soule, the moderation of the passions, the rule of the life; yea, by the attainment of these outward, a man becomes carelesse of the inward.

Now of these three liues, inward, domesticall, publike, he that is to leade but one of them, as Hermites, doth guide and order his life at a better rate, than he that hath two, and he that hath but two, his condition is more easie, than he that hath all three.

CHAP. LIIII.

*A comparison of the ciuill and sociable life
with the solitary.*

They that esteeme and commend so much the solitarie and retired life, as a great stay and sure retreat from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit meanes to preserue

and maintaine themselves pure and free from many vices, in as much as the worse part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good, the number of fooles is infinite, contagion in a prease is dangerous, they seeme to haue reason on their side: for the companie of the wicked is a dangerous thing, and therefore they that aduenture themselves vpon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemers, or dissolute and wicked person enter their ship; one only *Ionas* with whom God was angrie, had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him crying out in a great danger for helpe vnto their gods, pleasantly said, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceiue not that you are here with me. *Albuquerque* the Vice-roy of the *Indies* for *Emanuel* King of *Portingall*, in a great danger at sea, tooke vpon his shoulders a little childe, to the end that his innocencie might serue as a suretie to God for his sins. But to thinke that a solitarie life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of vertue, more difficult, sharpe, laborious and painfull, as some would make vs beleue, they grossely deceiue themselves: for contrarily it is a great discharge and ease of life, and it is but an indifferent profession, yea a simple apprenticeship and disposition to vertue. This is not to enter into busines, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to flie them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the *Epicures* (*Hide thy selfe*) it is to runne to death, to flie a good life. It is out of all doubt, that a King, a Prelat, a Pastor is a farre more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult, than that of a Monke, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but seminaries and apprenticeships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiasticall charge, and their preparatiues to a greater perfection. And he that liues ciuilly hauing a wife, children, seruants, neighbours, friends, goods, businesse, and so many diuers parts which he must satisfie, and truly and loyally answer for, hath without comparifon farre more businesse, than he that hath none of all these, hath to doe with none but himselfe: Multitude and abundance is farre more troublesome, than solitarinesse and want. In abstinencie there is but one thing, in the conduct and vse of many, diuers things, there are many considerations, diuers duties. It is an easier thing to
part

part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, than to governe them well, and well to discharge them. It is easier for a man to live altogether without a wife, than in all points duly to live, and to maintaine himselfe with his wife, children, and all the rest that depend vpon him: so is the single life more easie than the married state.

So likewise to thinke that solitarinesse is a sanctuarie and an assured haven against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceiue themselues; for it is not true in euery respect. Against the vices of the world, the stirre of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good; but solitarinesse hath it inward and spirituall affaires and difficulties: *Ivit in desertum ut tentaretur à diabolo: He went into the desert to be tempted of the deuill.* To imprudent and vnadvised young men, solitarinesse is a dangerous staffe, and it is to be feared, that whilest he walkes alone, he entertaines worse companie than himselfe, as *Crates* said to a young man who walked all alone farre from companie. It is there where fooles contriue their wicked designements, beginne their owne ouerthrowes, sharpen their passions and wicked desires. Many times to auoid the gulfes of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla*; to flie is not to escape, it is many times to increase the danger, and to lose himselfe: *Non vitat, sed fugit: magis autem periculis patemur averse.* He doth not eschew it, but flieth it: we lie more open to dangers being auerted from them. A man had need be wise and strong, and well assured of himselfe when he falles into his owne hands, for it falles out many times that there are none more dangerous than his owne. *Guarda me, dios de mi; God keepe me from my selfe,* saith the Spanish prouerbe very excellently; *Nemo est ex imprudentibus qui sibi relinqui debeat; solitudo omnia mala persuadet.* No vnwise man should be left alone to himselfe; solitarinesse persuadeth all euill. But for some priuate and particular consideration, though good in it selfe (for many times it is for idlenesse, weaknesse of spirit, hatred, or some other passion) to flie and to hide himselfe; hauing meanes to profit another, or to doe good to the weale-publike, is to be a fugitiue, to burie his talent, to hide his light, a fault subiect to the rigour of iudgement.

CHAP. LV.

*A comparison betwixt the life lead in common
and in private.*

SOME haue thought that the life lead in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may say, this is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth most to perfection, and hath most charity and concord. This may take place in the companie of a certaine number of people, lead and directed by some certaine rule, but not in a state and common-weale; and therefore *Plato* having once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all auarice and dissension, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwise aduised: for as the practise sheweth, there is not onely not any hartie affection towards that that is common to all, and as the prouerbe is, *The common asse is alwaies ill saddled*: but also the communitie draweth vnto it selfe contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is alwaies seene, yea euen in the primitive Church: *Crescente numero discipulorum, factum est murmur Gracorum aduersus Hebraeos*: The number of the disciples increasing, there grew a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrewes. The nature of loue is such, as that of great riuers, which being ouer-charged with abundance of waters, being diuided, are quit of that charge; so loue being diuided to all men, and all things, loseth it force and vigor. But there are degrees of communitie; to liue, that is to say, to eat and drinke together is very good, as the manner was in the better and most ancient common-weales, of *Lacedemon* and *Crete*; for besides that modestie and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication; but to thinke to haue all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise aduised, is to peruert all.

Luc.
Acts 6.

CHAP. LVI.

The comparison of the country-life with
the Citizens.

THis comparison to him that loueth wisdom is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and aduantages are on one side, both spirituall and corporall, libertie, wisdom, innocencie, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free and to it selfe : in Cities, the persons, the affaires, both their owne and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainments, how much time doe they steale from vs? *Amici fures temporis : Friends steale away time.* How many troubles bring they with them, auocations, allurements to wickednesses? Cities are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise than cages to birds and beasts. This celestiall fire that is in vs, will not be shut vp, it loueth the aire, the fields; and therefore *Columella* saith, that the country-life is the cousen of wisdom, *Consanguinea*, which cannot be without beautifull and free thoughts and meditations; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the citie. Againe, the country life is more neat, innocent and simple; In cities vices are hid in the rout, and are not perceiued, they passe and insinuate themselues pell-mell, the vse, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious, is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole heauens lie open to the view, the sun, the aire, the waters, and all the elements are free, exposed and open in all parts, alwayes sustaining vs, the earth discouereth it selfe, the fruits thereof are before our eyes; and none of all this is in cities in the throng of houses: so that to liue in cities is to be banished in the world, and shut from the world. Againe, the country life is wholly in exercise, in action, which sharpeneth the appetite, maintaineth health, hardeneth and fortifieth the bodie. That which is to be commended in cities, is commoditie either priuate, as of merchants and artificers, or publike, to the managing whereof few are called, and in ancient times heretofore they were chosen from the country life, who returned hauing performed their charge.

CHAP.

CHAP. LVII.

Of the militarie profession.

I
*The praise
 thereof.*

THe militarie profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is no commoditie more iust, nor more vniuersall than the protection of the peace and greatnesse of his country; noble in the execution, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroicall vertue of all others; honorable, for all humane actions, the greatest and most glorious is the warriors, and by which all other honours are iudged and discerned; pleasant, the company of so many noble men, young, actiue, the ordinary view of so many accidents and spectacles, libertie and conuersation without Art, a manly fashion of life without ceremonie, the varietie of diuers actions, a couragious harmony of warlike musicke, which entertaines vs and stirres our blood, our cares, our soule; those warlike commotions which rauish vs with their horror and feare, that confused tempest of sounds and cries, that fearefull ordering of so many thousands of men, with so much fury, ardour and courage.

2
The dispraise.

But on the other side, a man may say, that the Art and experience of vndoing one another, of killing, ruinating, destroying our owne proper kinde, seemes to be vnnaturall, and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and vnderstanding; it is a great testimonie of our weaknesse and imperfection, and it is not found in beasts themselues, in whom the image of Nature continueth farre more entire. What follie, what rage is it, to make such commotions, to torment so many people, to runne thorow so many dangers and hazards both by sea and land, for a thing so vncertaine and doubtful as the issue of warre, to runne with such greedinesse and fiercenesse after death, which is easily found euery where, and without hope of sepulture, to kill those he hates not, nor euer saw? But whence proceedeth this great furie and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What frensie and madnesse is this for a man to abandon his owne bodie, his time, his rest, his life, his libertie, and to leaue it to the mercy of another? to expose himselfe to the losse of his owne members,

bers, and to that which is a thousand times worse than death, fire and sword, to be trodden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cut, to be torne in peeces, broken, and put to the gallies for euer? And all this, to serue the passion of another, for a cause which a man knowes not to be iust, and which is commonly vniust: for warres are commonly vniust, and for him whom a man knowes not, who takes so little care for him that fights for him, that he will bee content to mount vpon his dead bodie to helpe his owne stature, that he may see the farther. I speake not here of the duty of subiects towards their Prince and countrey, but of voluntaries and mercenarie soldiers.

The first and last distinction and difference of men, drawn from the fauours and disfauours of Nature and Fortune.

THE PREFACE.

THIS last distinction and difference is apparent enough and sufficiently known, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicity or good fortune, and Infelicity or ill fortune, Greatnesse or littlenesse. To Felicity and greatnesse belong health, beautie, and the other goods of the body, liberty, nobility, honor, dignity, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicity or littlenesse belong all the contraries, which are priuations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great difference, because a man is happy in one of these, or in two, or in three, and not in the rest, and that more or lesse by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happie or unhappie in them all. He that hath the greatest part of these goods, and especially three, Nobilitie, Dignitie, or Authoritie and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many haue but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little. We must speake a little of them all.

Of Health, beautie, and other naturall goods of the body *chap. II.*
hath been spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, *chap. 6.*
Sicknesse, Griefe.

CHAP. LVIII.

Of Libertie and Seruitude.

Libertie is accounted by some a foueraigne good, and Seruitude an extreme euill, insomuch that many haue chosen rather to die a cruell death, than to be made slaues, or to see either the publike good or their owne priuate indangered. But of this there may be too much, and of these too many, as of all other things. There is a twofold libertie: the true, which is of the minde or spirit, and is in the power of euery one, and cannot be taken away, nor indammaged by another, nor by Fortune it selfe: contrariwise, the seruitude of the spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serue our owne affections, to suffer our selues to be deuoured by our owne passions, to be led by opinions. ô pitifull captiuitie! The corporall libertie is a good greatly to be esteemed, but subiect to Fortune: and it is neither iust nor reasonable (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance) that it should be preferred before life it selfe, as some of the ancients haue done, who haue rather made choice of death, than to lose it; and it was accounted a great vertue in them: so great an euill was seruitude thought to be: *Servitus obedientia est fracti animi & abjecti, arbitrio carentis suo: Seruitude is the obedience of a base and abiect minde, which wanteth his due iudgement.* Many great and wise men haue serued, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes*, euen those that were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their owne condition, but continued in effect and truth more free than their masters.

CHAP. LIX.

Nobilitie.

I
The description
of nobility.

Nobilitie is a qualitie euery where not common, but honourable, brought in and established with great reason and for publike vtilitie.

It is diuers, diuersly taken and vnderstood, and according to diuers nations and iudgements, it hath diuers kindes. According to the generall and common opinion and custome
it

it is a qualitie of a race or stocke. *Aristotle* saith; that it is the antiquitie of a race and of riches. *Plutarch* calleth it the vertue of a race, *ἀρετὴ γένους*, meaning thereby a certaine habit and qualitie continued in the linage. What this qualitie or vertue is, all are not wholly of one accord, sauing in this, that it is profitable to the weale-publike. For, to some and the greater part this qualitie is militarie, to other it is politike, literarie of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the militarie hath the aduantage about the rest: for, besides the seruice which it yeeldeth to the weale-publike as the rest doe, it is painfull, laborious, dangerous; whereby it is accounted more worthy and commendable. So hath it caried with vs by excellencie the honourable title of Valour. There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobilitie, profession of this vertue, and qualitie profitable to the common-weale, which is as the forme; and the race as the subiect and matter, that is to say, a long continuance of this qualitie by many degrees and races, and time out of minde, whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen, that is to say, of a race, house, familie, carying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publike vertue, seruing his Prince and Country, and being descended of parents and ancestors that haue done the same.

There are some that separate these two, and thinke that one of them sufficeth to true nobilitie, that is, either only vertue and qualitie, without any consideration of race or ancestors. This is a personall and acquired nobilitie, and considered with rigour it is rude, that one come from the houle of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble, whatsoeuer seruice he hath done for the Common-weale. Neuerthelesse, this opinion hath place in many nations, namely with the *Turkes*, contemners of ancient nobilitie, and esteeming of no other but personall, and actuall militarie valour; or only antiquitie of race without profession of the qualitie; this is in the blood and purely naturall.

If a man should compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together, that which is purely naturall (to iudge aright) it is the lesse, though many, out of their vanitie haue thought

3
The distinction.

4

Naturall Nobilitie.

thought otherwise. The naturall is another mans qualitie, and not his owne: *Genus & proavos & quæ non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra puto: nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit, nostrum est: I scarce account those things ours, which descend from our linnage or ancestors, or any thing which we our selves haue not done; no man hath liued for our glory and renowne; Neither are we to account that ours which hath beene before vs.* And what greater follie can there be, than to glory in that which is not his owne? This honor may light vpon a vitious man, a knaue, and one in himselfe a true villaine. It is also vnprofitable to another, for it communicateth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it, as science, iustice, goodnesse, beauty, riches doe. They that haue nothing else commendable in them but this nobility of flesh and blood, make much of it, they haue it alwayes in their mouthes, it makes their cheekes swell and their heart too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they haue) it is the marke by which they are knowne, and a token that they haue nothing else in them, because they rest themselves wholly vpon that. But this is vanitie, for all their glorie springeth from fraile instruments, *Ab utero, conceptu, partu; From the wombe, the conception, the birth,* and is buried vnder the tombe of their Ancestors. As offenders being pursued haue recourse to Altars and the Sepulchers of the dead, & in former times to the statutes of Emperours; so these men being destitute of all merit and subiect of true honour, haue recourse to the memorie and armouries of their Ancestors. What good is it to a blinde man, that his parents haue beene well sighted, or to him that stammereth, that his Grandfather was eloquent? and yet these kinde of people are commonly glorious, high minded, contempters of others; *Contemptor animus & superbia commune nobilitatis malum: A contemptible and proud minde, are common vices accompanying Nobilitie.*

Salust.

5
Acquired and
personall honour.

The personall and acquired honour hath conditions altogether contrary and very good. It is proper to the possessor therof, it is alwayes a worthy subiect, and profitable to others. Againe, a man may say, that it is more ancient and more rare, than the naturall, for by it the naturall began; and in a word, that is true honour which consisteth in good and profitable effects,

effects, not in dreames and imagination, vaine and vnprofitable, and proceedeth from the spirit, not the blood, which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis generosus? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem, cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere: Who is a gentleman? a minde well disposed to vertue maketh noble, who, upon what accident or condition soeuer is able to raise it selfe a-boue fortune.* Seneca.

But they are both oftentimes, and very willingly together, and so they make a perfect honor: The naturall is a way and occasion to the personall; for things doe easily returne to their first nature and beginning. As the naturall hath taken his beginning & essence from the personall, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it; *Fortes creantur fortibus: hoc unum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus imposita necessitudo videatur, ne à maiorum virtute degenerent: The valiant beget those that are valiant: this is the onely good of nobilitie, that necessitie seemeth to be imposed on those that are noble, not to degenerate from the vertue of their ancestors.* To know that a man is sprung from honorable ancestors, and such as haue deserved well of the Common-weale, is a strong obligation and spurre to the honorable exploits of vertue. It is a foule thing to degenerate, and to belie a mans owne race. The nobilitie that is giuen by the bountie & letters patent of the Prince, if it haue no other reason, it is shamefull, and rather dishonourable than honourable. It is a nobilitie in parchment, bought with siluer or fauour, and not by blood as it ought. If it be giuen for merit, and notable seruices, it is personall and acquired, as hath bene said.

6
Naturall and
acquired.

CHAP. LX.

Of Honour.

SOME say (but not so well) that honour is the prise and recompence of vertue, or not so ill, an acknowledgement of vertue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of an outward duty towards vertue; It is a priuiledge that draweth his principall essence from vertue. Others haue called it

1
The description
of honour.

it the shadow of vertue, which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the body. But to speake truly, it is the rumor of a beautifull & vertuous action, which reboundeth from our soules to the view of the world, and by reflexion into our selues, bringing vnto vs a testimonie of that which others beleue of vs, which turneth to a great contentment of minde.

2

Honour is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attaine thereunto a man enterpriseth, endureth, contemneth whatsoever besides, yea life it selfe; neuerthelesse, it is a matter of small and slender moment, vncertaine, a stranger, and as it were separated in the aire, from him that is honoured; for it doth not onely not enter into him, nor is inward and essentiall vnto him, but it doth not so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent, and who feeleth nothing) but setleth it selfe and stayeth without at the gate, sticks in the name, which receiueh and carrieth all the honors and dishonors, praises and dispraises, whereby a man is said to haue either a good name or a bad. All the good or euill that a man can say of *Cesar* is carried by his name. Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing, it is onely the image which presenteth it, the marke which distinguisheth it from others, a summarie which containeth it in a small volume, mounteth it, and carrieth it whole and entire, the meane to enioy it and to vse it (for without the names there would be nothing but confusion, the vse of things would be lost, the world would decay, as the historie of the tower of *Babel* doth richly teach vs) to be briefe, the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing, and the honour or dishonor thereof, for it is that that toucheth the thing it selfe, and receiueh all the good or ill that is spoken. Now honour before it ariue to the name of the thing, it goes a course almost circular, like the Sunne, performed and perfected in three principall sites or places, the action or worke, the heart, the tongue: for it begins and is conceiued, as in the matrix and root, in that beautie, goodnesse, profit of the thing honoured which comes to light and is produced, this is (as hath beene said) the rumor of a beautifull or honorable action. *Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei: pleni sunt cæli & terra gloria tua: The hea-*
mens

uents declare the glorie of God, the heauens and the earth are full of thy glorie (for whatsoeuer valour, worth and perfection the thing haue in it selfe and inwardly , if it producen nothing that is excellent, it is altogether vncapable of honour, and is as if it were not at all) from thence it entreth into the spirit and vnderstanding, where it takes life, and is formed into a good, haucie, and great opinion : finally fallying forth from thence, and being caried by the word verball or written, it returnes by reflexion, and as it were, dissolueth and endeth in the name of the authour of this beautifull worke, where it had the beginning, as the Sunne in the place from whence it departed, and then it beares the name of honour, praise, glory, and renowne.

But the question is, what those actions are to which honour is due. Some thinke that it is generally due to those that performe their duty in that which belongs to their profession, although it be neither famous nor profitable, as he that vpon a Stage playes the part of a seruant, well, is no lesse commended than he that presenteth the person of a King, and he that cannot worke in statues of gold, cannot want those of leather or earth wherein hee may as well shew the perfection of his Art. All cannot employ themselves, neither are they called to the managing of great affaires, but the commendation is to doe that well, that he hath to doe. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honour, which is not a common and ordinarie guest for all persons, and all iust and lawfull actions. Euery chaste woman, euery honest man is not honourable. The wisest men require also thereunto, two or three things, the one is difficultie, labour or danger, the other is publike vility, and this is the reason why it is properly due to those that administer, and well acquit themselves of great charges, that be the actions as priuately and generally good and profitable as they will, they shal haue approbation and sufficient renowne with those that know them, and the safetie and protection of the lawes; but not honour, which is publike, and hath more dignitie, fame, and splendor. Some adde vnto these a third, and that is, that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

The desire of honour and glorie, and the approbation of another, is a vicious, violent, powerfull passion, whereof wee haue

3

4

Desires of honor,
chap. 20.

Lib. 3 in the
vertue of Tem-
perancie.

5
Marks of honor.

haue spoken in the passion of ambition, but very profitable to the weale publike, to containe men in their dutie, to awaken and inflame them to honorable actions, a testimonie of weaknesse and humane insufficiencie, which for want of good money vseth light and false coine. Now in what, and how farforth it is excusable, and when not commendable, and that honour is not the recompence of vertue, shall bee said hereafter.

The markes of honour are very diuers, but the better and more beautifull are they that are without profit and gaine, and are such as a man may not straine, and applie to the vitious, and such as by some base office haue serued the weale-publike. These are the better and more esteemed: they are in themselves more vaine, that haue nothing of worth in them, but the simple marke of men of honour and vertue, as almost in all policies, crownes, lawrell garlands, oake, a certaine forme of accoutrements, the prerogatiue of some surname, precedencie in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And it falleth out sometimes, that it is a greater honour not to haue the markes of honour, hauing deserued them, than to make them. It is more honourable vnto me, saide *Cato*, that euery man should aske mee, why I haue not a statue erected in the Market place, than they should aske why I haue it.

CHAP. LXI.

Science.

Science, to say the truth, is a beautifull ornament, a very profitable instrument to him that knowes well how to vse it; but in what ranke to place it, or how to prise it, all are not of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults, some by esteeming it too much, some too little. Some make that account of it, that they preferre it before all other things, and thinke that it is a soueraigne good, some kinde and ray of Diuinitie, seeking it with greedinesse, charge and great labour; others contemne it, and despise those that professe it: the mediocritie betwixt both is the more iust and most assured. For my part, I place it farre beneath honestie, sanctitie, wisdom,

See lib. 3. cap. 14.

wisdome, vertue, yea beneath dexterity in affaires: and yet I dare to range it with dignity, naturall nobilitie, militarie valour, and I thinke they may very well dispute of the precdencie: and if I were called to speake my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subiects and matters, in the apprentiship and acquisition, so are they in their vtility, honestie, necessitie, as also in their gaine and glorie: some are Theoricks and in speculation only, others are practike and in action: againe, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without vs, whether they be naturall or supernaturall; other are particular, which teach the tongues to speake, and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that haue most honestie, vtilitie, necessitie, and least glory, vanitie, mercenarie gaine, are farre to be preferred before others. And therefore the practike are absolutely the better, which respect the good of man, teaching him to liue well, to die well, to command well, to obey well; and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that endeouureth to be wise: whereof this worke is a brieue and summatic, that is to say, Morall Science, Oeconomicall, Politicall. After these is Naturall, which serueth to the knowledge of whatsoeuer is in the world fit for our vse, as likewise to admire the greatnesse, goodnesse, wisdome, power of the chiefe workemaster. All other knowledges are vaine, and are to be studied cursorily, as appendents vnto these, because they are no wayes beneficiall to the life of man, and helpe not to make vs honest men. And therefore it is a losse and a follie to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we doe. It is true that they serue to heape vp crownes, and to win reputation with the people, but it is in pollicies that are not wholly sound goods.

CHAP. LXII.

Of riches and pouertie.

1
The causes of
troubles.

THESE are the two sources and elements of all discords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world: for the excessive riches of some doe stirre them vp to pride, to delicacies, pleasures, disdain of the poore; to enterprise and attempt: the extreme pouerty of others, prouokes them to enuie, extreme ieaousie, furie, despaire, and to attempt fortunes. *Plato* calleth them the plagues of a Common-wealth. But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thorowly resolved amongst all. According to *Aristotle* it is abundance, for a State needs not doubt of those that desire but to liue, but of such as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is pouertie, for desperate poore men are terrible and furious creatures; for wanting either bread or worke to exercise their Arts and occupations, or too excessively charged with imposts, they learne that of the mistresse of the schoole Necessitie, which of themselues they neuer durst to haue learned, and they dare, because their number is great. But yet there is a better remedie for them than for the rich, and it is an easie matter to hinder this euill; for so long as they haue bread and employment to exercise their mysteries, and liue, they will neuer stir. And therefore, the rich are to be feared for their owne sakes, their vice and condition: the poore, by reason of the imprudencie of gouernours.

2
Against the e-
quality & ine-
quality of riches.

Now, many Law-makers and great States-men haue gone about to take away these two extremities, and this great inequality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocritie and equalitie, which they called the nourishing-mother of peace and amitie; and others likewise haue attempted to make all things common, which could neuer be but by imagination. But besides that, it is impossible to establish an equality, by reason of the number of children which increase in one familie, and not in another, and that it can hardly be put in practise, although a man be enforced, and it cost much to attaine thereunto, it were also inexpedient, and to small purpose,

purpose, and by another way to fall into the same mischief: for there is no hatred more capitall than betwixt equals; the enuie and ieaiousie of equals is the seminarie of troubles, seditions, and cruell warres. Inequality is good, so it be moderate. Harmonie consisteth not of like sounds, but different and well according.

Nihil est equalitate inaequalius:

Nothing can lesse equall be

Than it selfe, Equalitie.

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth from many causes, especially two: the one is from vniust lones, as vsuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other, and grow fat with the substance of another: *Qui deuorant plebem sicut escam panis: Who deuoure the people as a morsell of bread.* The other from dispositions, whether amongst the liuing, as alienations, donations, endowments in mariages; or testamentaries by reason of death. By both which meanes some doe excessiue increase aboue others, who continue poore. The heires of rich men marie with those that are rich, whereby some houses are dismembred & brought to nothing; and others made rich and exalted. All which inconueniences must be ruled and moderated by auoiding excessiue extremities, and in some sort approching to some mediocritie and reasonable equalitie: for to haue either entire, is neither possible, nor good, nor expedient, as hath beene said.

And this shall be handled
in the vertue of
Iustice.

FINIS.



OF
WISDOME,
THE
SECOND BOOKE,

*Containing the generall instructions and
rules of Wisdome.*

THE PREFACE.

*Wherein is contained a generall portrait of Wisdome,
and the summe of this Booke.*



Having in the First Booke layd open vnto man many and diuers meanes to know himselfe and our humane condition, which is the first part, and a great introduction to Wisdome, we are now to enter into the doctrine, and to vnderstand in this Second Booke the generall rules and opinions thereof, reseruing the more particular to the Third and last Booke. It is wth v^{er}ie consideration, and as a Preamble to the rest, to call man vnto himselfe, to taste, sound, studie himselfe, to the end he may know and vnderstand his defects and miserable condition, and so make himselfe capable of wholsome and necessary remedies, which are the aduise-ments and instructions of wisdome.

But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care of it owne good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be vtterly carelesse that his businesse be well done? 2

Man would onely liue, but he cares not to know how to liue well. That which a man should especially, and onely know, is that which he knowes least, and cares least to know.

Our inclinations, designements, studies, are (as we see) from our youth diuers, according to the diuersity of natures, companies, instructions, occasions, but there is not any that casteth his eyes to the other side, that endeuoreth to make himselfe wise, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth so much as thinke thereon. And if perhaps sometimes he doe, it is but by chance, and as it were passing by, and he attendeth it, as newes that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleaseth some well, but that is all, the thing it selfe is neither accounted of, nor sought for in this world of so vniuersall corruption and contagion. To vnderstand the merit and worth of wisdom, some kinde of aire or tincture of nature is necessarie; for men are willing to vse studie and endeuour, rather for those things that haue their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and sensible, such as ambition, avarice, passion haue, than for wisdom whose effects are sweet, darke, inward, and lesse visible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loueth better the winde with noife, than the body it selfe, the essence without it, opinion and reputation, than verity! Man (as hath beene said in the first booke) is nothing but vanity and miserie, vncapable of wisdom. Euery man hath a taste of that aire which he breatheth, and where he liueth, followeth the traine and custome of liuing followed by all, how then should he aduise himselfe of any other? We follow the steps of another, yea we presse and inflame one another, we inuest our vices and passions one into other; no man stayes vs, or cries *hola* vnto it, so much doe we. We vile and mistake our selues. We haue need of some speciall fauour from heauen, and withall a great and generous force and constancy of nature to note that common error which no man findeth, in aduising and consulting of that which no man considereth, and resoluing our selues quite contrary to the course of other men.

There are some though rare, I see them, I vnderstand them, I smell them with pleasure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites* or *Heraclites*; the one sort doe nothing but
mock

mock and gibe, thinking they shew truth & wisdom enough in laughing at error and follie. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleasant, but not good and charitable. The other are weak and poore, they speake with a low voice, their mouthes halfe open, they disguise their language, they mingle & stuffe their propositions, to make them passe more currantly, with so many other things, and with such Art, that they are hardly discerned. They speake not distinctly, clearly, assuredly, but doubtfully like oracles. I come after them and vnder them, but I speake in good sooth that which I thinke and beleue clearly and perspicuously.

I giue heere a picture, with certaine lessons of wisdom, which perhaps may seeme to some new and strange, and such as no man in former time hath giuen in such a fashion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who haue neither patience, nor power to iudge truly and wisely of things, maliciously condemne whatsoeuer agrees not with their palat, and with that which they haue already receiued. But that is all one, for who is he that can assure himselfe of the good opinion of all? But my hope is, that the simple and debonaire, the Ætherian and sublime spirits will iudge indifferently. These are the two extremities and stages of peace and serenity; In the middle are the troubles, tempests, and meteors, as hath beene said. Lib. I.

To the end wee may haue some rude and generall knowledge of that which is handled in this booke, and the whole doctrine of wisdom, wee may diuide this matter into foure points or considerations. The first are preparatiues to wisdom, which are two, the one an exemption and freedom from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the externall errors and vices of the world, or inward, as passions: the other is a plaine, entire, and vniuersall liberty of the minde. These two first, and the more difficult make a man capable and apt for wisdom, because they empty and cleanse the place, to the end it may be more ample & capable to receiue a thing of so great importance as wisdom is, *Magna & spatiosa res est sapientia, vacuo illi loco opus est, supervacua ex animo tollenda sunt: Great and spacious is wisdom, and had need of large roome: the minde must be freed from things superfluous.*

The diuision of
this booke into
4. parts.

I
Preparatiues.

known. And this is the first. Afterwards they make him open, free, and alwayes ready to receiue it. This is the second.

2
Foundations.

The second are foundations of wisdom, which are likewise two, true and essentiall probitie, and to haue a certaine end and course of life. These two respect nature, they rule and accomodate vs thereunto, the first to the vniuersall nature, which is reason; for probitie or honestie, as shall be said, is no other thing: the second to the particular of euery one of vs; for it is the choice of the kinde of life proper and fit for the nature of euery one.

3
Offices.

The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to say, offices and functions of wisdom, which are six, whereof the three first are principally for euery one in himselfe, which are pietie, inward gouernment of our desires and thoughts, and a sweet carriage in all accidents of prosperitie and aduersitie: the other three respect another, which are such an obseruation as is necessarie of lawes, customes, and ceremonies, a sweet conuersation with another, and prudence in all affaires. These six doe correspond and comprehend the foure morall vertues, the first, fourth, and fift doe properly appertaine to *Iustice*, and to that which we owe to God and our neighbour; the second and third to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, the sixt to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the matter and subiect of the third booke, which handleth at large the foure morall vertues, and in particular the offices and duties of a wise man, but in this booke they are handled in generall.

4
Fruits.

The fourth, are the effects and fruits of wisdom, which are two, to be alwayes ready for death, and to maintaine a mans selfe in true tranquillity of spirit, the crowne of wisdom, and the soueraigne good.

These are in all twelue rules and lessons of wisdom, diuided into so many Chapters, which are the proper and peculiar foot-steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found else-where. I meane in that sense wherein we take them, and now describe them: For although some of them, as honesty, the obseruation of the lawes, seeme to be found in others of the common and prophane sort, yet not such as wee here require and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who maintaining

ning himselfe truly free and noble, is directed in all things according to nature, accomodating his owne proper and particular to the vniuersall, which is God, liuing and carying himselfe before God, with all, and in all affaires, vpright, constant, cheerefull, content, and assured, attending with one and the same foot, all things that may happen, and lastly, death it selfe.

CHAP. I.

*Exemption and freedome from errorrs and the vices
of the world, and from passions. The first
disposition to Wisdome.*

IT is here necessarie for the first lesson and instruction vnto wisdome, to put the knowledge of our selues and our humane condition, for the first in euery thing, is well to know the subiect, wherewith a man hath to doe, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be already done, for it is the subiect of our first booke: We can onely say here, as a summary repetition of all that hath beene spoken, that a man aspiring vnto wisdome, should aboue all things, and before all other workes, sufficiently know himselfe, and all men besides. This is the true science of man, very profitable, a matter of great study, fruit, and efficacie, for man is all in all: It is proper to a wiseman; for, only he that is wise knowes himselfe, and hee that knowes himselfe well is wise. It is very difficult, for a man is extremely counterfeited and disguised, not only man with man, but euery man with himselfe. Euery one takes a delight to deceiue himselfe, to hide, to rob, to betray himselfe, *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*, flattering and tickling himselfe to make himselfe laugh, extenuating his defects, setting a high price of whatsoeuer is good in himselfe, winking of purpose lest hee should too clearly see himselfe: It is very rare and sought for by a few, and therefore no maruell if wisdome be so rare, for they are very few that doe well know this first lesson, or that doe studie it; there is not a man that is master to himselfe, much lesse to another. In things not necessarie and strange, there are many masters,
many

many disciples. In this point, we are neuer with, nor within our selues, we alwaies muse of outward things, and man better knoweth all things than himselfe. O miserie, O madnesse! To the wise in this point, it is necessarie that we know all sorts of men, of all aires, climats, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serues the trauelier and the historie) their motions, inclinations, actions, not only publike, (they are least to be regarded, being all fained and artificiall) but priuate, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and naturall iurisdiction; as likewise all those that concerne them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwards that we conferre them all together to make an entire bodie and vniuersall iudgement; but especially that we enter into our selues, taste and attentiuely sound our selues, examine euery thought, word, action. Doubtlesse we shall in the end learne, that man is in truth on the one side a poore, weake, pitifull, and miserable thing, and we cannot but pitie him; and on the other, we shall finde him swollen and puffed vp with winde, presumption, pride, desires, and we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now hee hath beene sufficiently deciphered and presented vnto vs euen to the life, in the first booke, by diuers meanes, in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why wee speake no more of this knowledge of man, and of our selues in this place; but we set downe here for the first rule of wisdome the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first booke might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preserue men from the contagion of the world and of themselves, these are the two euils and formall hindrances of wisdome, the one outward, as popular opinions and vices, the generall corruption of the world; the other inward, that is, our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himselfe against these two. Wisdome is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the onely endeouour that we haue to attaine vnto it, is to set at libertie, and to free our selues from that miserable double captiuitie, publike and domesticall, of another and of our selues: this being attained, the rest will be easie. Let vs speake of these two euils distinctly and apart.

As concerning the outward, we haue before sufficiently displayed the vulgar nature, the strange humors of the world, and the common sort of people, whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them ; for since they are worshippers of vanitie, enuious, malicious, vniust, without iudgement, discretion, mediocrity, what can they deliberate, thinke, iudge, resolute, speake, doe well and iustly ? We haue likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the misery of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in iudgement and will , whereby it is easie to know, that it is wholly composed of error and vice, whereunto all the sayings of the wisest in the world do accord, affirming, that the worser part is the greater : of a thousand there is not one good; the number of fooles are infinite, and contagion is most dangerous in a prease.

2
Exemption of
vulgar errors.

And therefore they counsell vs, not onely to preferue our selues neat and cleare from popular opinions, delignements, and affections, as being all base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect : but also to flie aboue all things the multitude, the company and conuersation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach neere vnto it without some losse and impeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous euen to the wisest and best settled men that are : for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices comming with so great a troope ? One example of couetousnesse or incontinency doth much harne. The company of one delicate effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little thosethat liue with him. One rich neighbour giues light and life to our couetousnesse. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and applieth his vice, like rust into the nearest and purest mindes. What then can wee looke for from such manners, after which the world runneth, as it were with a loose bridle ?

But what? it is very rare and difficult so to doe. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearance of goodnesse and iustice, to follow the way approued by all; the great beaten way doth easily deceiue; *Lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in maligno positus; Broad is the way to death, and many.*

many walke therein; The world is giuen to wickednesse: we goe one after another like beasts for company; we neuer diue into the reason, the merit, the equitie of the cause; we follow examples and customes, and as it were of enuy & emulation, we stumble, and fall one vpon another; we throng one another, and draw euery one to a head-long down-fall. We borrow our owne ouerthrow, and perish vpon credit. *Alienis perimus exemplis; We perish by other mens example.* Now he that would be wise, must alwayes suspect whatsoeuer pleaseth, and is approved by the people, by the greater number, and must looke into that that is true & good in it selfe, and not into that which seemeth to them, and that is most vsed and frequented, and not suffer himselfe to be cunny-catcht and carried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one; *Vnus mihi pro populo, & populus pro uno: One is to me for the people, and the people for one.* And when to stop his mouth, and to beat him downe at a blow it shall be said, that the whole world saith it, beleeueth it, doth it; he must say in his heart, it is so much the worse, it is but a simple and a wicked caution; I esteeme it the lesse, because the world esteemes it so much; likewise Phocion, who seeing the people highly to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said vnto them, Hath any folly vnwitting to my selfe escaped my mouth, or any loose or wicked word, that all this people doe so approve me? *Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus queritur popularis favor: Who is he to whom vertue is pleasing, that can please the people? The fauour of the people is attained by ill meanes.* We must then as much as is possible flie the haunt and company of the sortish, illiterate, ill-composed people, but aboue all preferue our selues from their iudgements, opinions, vicious behauiour, and without any stirre keepe alwayes our owne thoughts apart by themselves: *Quod scie non probat populus, quod probat populus ego nescio: Sapiens non respicit quod homines iudicent; non ita quâ populus, sed ut sidera mundi contrarium iter intendunt, ita hic aduersus opiniones omnium vadit: What I know the people allow not: what the people allow, I know not: A wise man respecteth not what men indge of him; He goes not the same way with the people, but as the starres runne a contrary course to the world, so he to the opi-*
nions

nions of all men. Remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidneis couered with fat, but haue none themselves: *Non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus: odi prophanum vulgus & arceo*: You are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you; The profane multitude I both hate and abandon. This is that solitarinesse so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soule of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captiuitie, to draw it to it selfe, and to set it at libertie.

The other euill and hinderance to wisdom, which a man must carefully auoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captiuitie of his passions, and turbulent affections, whereof he must disfurnish and free himselfe, to the end hee may be emptie and neat, like a white paper, and be made a subiect more fit to receiue the tincture and impressions of wisdom, against which the passions doe formally oppose themselves: and therefore the wise were wont to say, that it was impossible euen for *Iupiter* himselfe to loue, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdom is a regular managing of our soule with measure and proportion: It is an equilibrium, and sweet harmony of our iudgements, wills, manners, a constant health of our minde; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of follie, violent and rash sallies and motions.

Wee haue sufficiently deciphered the passions in the first booke, and said enough to bring vs into horror and detestation of them: the generall means and remedies to ouercome them (for the particular in euery one are in the third booke, in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie) are many and different, good and euill. And not to speake of that goodnesse and felicitie of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh vs calme and cleare, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions, & keepeth vs in good case, equall, vnited, firme, and as strong as Steele against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare; for this is not a remedie against this euill, but an exemption of euill, and health it selfe: but of the remedies against them we may note foure.

The first, improper and by no meanes commendable, is a kinde Stupiditie.

5

The second part
exemption of
passions.

6

Generall remedies
against the
passions.

7

kinde of stupiditie and insensiblenesse in not perceiuing and apprehending of things, a brutish pampering foode of base mindes, or such as haue their apprehension wholly dilled, a spirituall leprosie, which seemeth to haue some shew of health, but it hath not; for it is not possible there should be wisdom and constancie, where there is not knowledge and vnderstanding, and emploiment in affaires: so that it is only a complexion, and not a vertue. This is not to feele the disease, and therefore not to cure it: neuerthelesse this estate is nothing so bad, as to know, and feele, and vnderstand, and yet to suffer himselfe to be gulled and ouercome:

— *Præulerim delirus inersq; videri,
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,
Quàm sapere & ringi.* —
*I rather choose to seeme a foole with ease,
Than to be wise in deed, and yet displease.*

8
Counterpassion.

The second remedie is little better than the euill it selfe, but yet more in vse, that is, when a man conquereth and extingui- sheth one passion by a stronger than it: for passions are neuer of equall force, but there is alwaies one or other (as in the humors of the bodie) which is the predominant, which ruleth and deuoureth the rest; and we attribute many times very vn- truly that vnto vertue and wisdom which ariseth from passi- on: but yet it is enough in these men, when those passions that beare sway in them, are not of the worst.

9
Precaution.

The third remedie and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificiall, whereby a man auoideth, flieth, and hi- deth himselfe from all such accidents whatsoever, as may stirre, awaken, or kindle his passions. This is a kinde of studie and Art, whereby a man prepareth himselfe before the occa- sions, in diuerting of euils, and prouiding that he feele them not; like that King who brake a beautifull and rich cup that one gaue him, to take away in a good houre all matter of brawle and anger that might happen about it. The praier of these kinde of people is, *Ne nos inducas in tentationem:* *Leade vs not into temptation.* By this remedie, he that sets himselfe forward to the sport, sports not himselfe; men of honour, prompt and cholericke, flie contentions, altercations, and stay themselues at the first onser and occasion of passion. For when

when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carry him-
 selfe wisely and discreetly: We guide our affaires in the begin-
 ning, and hold them at our mercie, but after they are once a-
 foot and thorowly heated, they guide and carrie vs. Passions
 are farre more easily auoided than moderated, *excinduntur a-*
nimo facilius quàm temperantur: because all things are in their
 first birth feeble and tender. In their weaknesse we discouer
 not the danger, and in their full growth and strength wee
 know not how to withstand them; as wee may see in diuers,
 who easily and lightly enter into quarrels, and law, and con-
 tentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can,
 with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it ne-
 uer so base and dishonourable, yea, to seeke false interpretati-
 ons, to belie themselues, to betray their owne hearts, to pla-
 ster and couer the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times
 worse than the euill they goe about to heale, *melius non inci-*
pient, quàm desinent: They shall not begin better, than they end:
 from the want of wisdome they fall into want of heart: This is
 contrary to that saying of Bias, Enterprise coldly, pursue ar-
dently. It is like fooles, who out of a vitious shame are easily
 perswaded to agree to whatsoeuer a man demands, and as ea-
 sily flie from their words, and reuoke that they haue spoken.
 We must therfore in all our affaires and commerce with men,
 from the beginning be prudent and aduised.

The fourth and best remedy of all, is a liuely vertue, reso-
 lution, and constancie of the minde, whereby a man seeth and
 confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and
 entreth into combat with them. It is a valiant, noble, and glo-
 rious impassibilitie, quite contrary to the first which we haue
 spoken of, base stupiditie. Now, to forme it, and to attaine vn-
 to it, there is nothing more necessarie than a precedent dis-
 course. Discourse is the master of our passions, premeditation
is that which giueth the temper to the soule, and makes it
hard and steely and impenetrable against whatsoeuer would
wound, or hurt it. The proper means to appease and sweeten
 these passions, is, to know them well, to examine, to iudge
 what power they haue ouer vs, and we ouer them. But aboue
 all, the soueraigne remedie is to belecue, and not to suffer him-
 selfe to be carried with opinion, which is that which cheri-
 sheth

10
Vertue.

sheth & kindleth our passions, and is (as hath beene said) false, foolish, inconstant, and vncertaine, the guide of fooles and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himselfe to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and sealed. But hereof, hereafter more at large.

II
Presumption.

But aboue all other passions, it is necessary that we doe carefully guard and defend our selues from that self-loue, presumption, and foolish dorage of our seluss, the plague of mankinde, the capitall enemy of wisdom, the true gangrene and corruption of the soule, whereby wee adore our selues, and rest contented with our selues, we hearken to none other, and beleeue none other but our selues. Now wee should know that we are not in greater danger in the hands of any, than of our selues. It is an excellent mott originally come from the Spanish tongue, *O God keepe my selfe from my selfe*. This presumption and foolish loue of our selues, proceeds from the ignorance we haue of our selues, of our weaknesse, and that little that is in vs, not onely in generall of the infirmity and misery of mankind, but also of our owne proper and personall imperfections: but whosoever hee be that hath the least graine or touch of this follie, shall neuer attaine vnto wisdom. Faith, modestie, a hearty and serious acknowledgement of that little that we haue, is a great testimonie of a good and sound iudgement, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition vnto wisdom.

CHAP. II.

A vniuersall and plaine libertie of spirit both in iudgement and will, the second disposition to wisdom.

THe other disposition vnto wisdom, which followeth the first (which doth quit vs from this outward and inward captiuitie and confusion, popular and passionate) is a plaine, entire, generous, and lord-like liberty of the minde, which is two-fold, that is to say, of iudgement, and will.

I The first part,
liberty of iudgement.

The first, of iudgement, consisteth in the consideration, iudgement, examination of all things, and in not tying himselfe

selfe to any one, but remaining free in himselfe, vniuersall, ready, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper law and true priuiledge of a wise and actiue man. But few they are that will vnderstand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should: and this is the reason why wee must heere establish it, against such as are incapable of wisdom. And first, to auoyd all miscountings, we explaine the words, and giue the sense. There are here three things which maintaine, cause, and conserue one the other, that is, to iudge of all things, not to be married or bound to any, to continue open and ready for all. When I say to iudge, my meaning is not to resoluē, affirme, determine: this were contrary to the second, which is, not to binde our selues to any thing: but it is to examine, and weigh the reasons and counter-reasons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby worke out the truth. So likewise not to binde our selues to any thing, is not to settle our selues, and to remaine short of that we should, bleating in the aire, and to cease our endeouours, & to proceed in our necessary actions and deliberations: For I will that in all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatsoever is ordinarily vsed, a man should agree and accommodate himselfe to the common sort; for our rule extendeth not it selfe to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and secret, and inward iudgement: yea and therein likewise I consent, that a man settle and apply himselfe to that which seemeth most agreeable to the truth, most honest and profitable; but yet that it be without determination, resolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrary or diuers iudgements, old, or new, but alwayes to hold himselfe ready to entertaine better if it appeare, yea not to be offended, if another shall contest with him against that which he thinketh better, but rather desire to heare what may be said; for this is the meane, to exercise the first, which is to iudge, and alwayes to enter into the search of the truth. These three I say, doe maintaine and conserue one the other, for he that iudgeth well, and without passion of all things, findeth in euery thing appearances of reason, which hinder his resolution, whereby hee seareth to settle his iudgement, and so remaineth vndermined, indifferent, and vniuersall: whereas

contrariwise, he that resolueth, iudgeth no more, but settleth and resteth himselfe vpon that which hee holdeth, and so makes himselfe a partaker and a particular. To the former fooles, simple and weake people are contrary: to the second, obstinate opinatiue affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practised by the wise, modest, discreet, and temperate searcher of the truth and true Philosophie. It remaineth for the explication of this our proposition, that I let you know, that by all things, and some thing (for it is said, to iudge of all things, not to be assured of any) wee vnderstand not those diuine verities which haue beene reuealed vnto vs, which we are to receiue simply with all humilitie and submission, and without all controuersie and discussion, submit our selues, and captiuate our mindes thereunto, *captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our vnderstanding to the obedience of faith*: but we vnderstand hereby all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perswade an indifferent spirit to receiue this rule of wisdom; but I see and perceiue a sort of people, glorious, affirmatiue, which would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod, and as others in former times haue sworne to certaine principles, and married themselues to certaine opinions, so they would that all others should doe the like, whereby they oppose themselues to this noble libertie of the spirit. It shall be necessary therefore to establish it more amply, and by order to confirme and handle these three points and members thereof.

2
The first to
iudge of all.

The first is to iudge of all. It is the property of a wise and spirituall man; faith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spiritualis omnia dyndicat, & à nemine iudicatur: The spirituall man iudgeth all, and is iudged of none*. The true office of man, his most proper and naturall exercise, his worthiest profession is to iudge. Why is he a man discoursing, reasoning, vnderstanding? Why hath he a spirit, to build (as they say) castles in the aire, and to feed himselfe with fooleries and vanities, as the greatest part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit? Who had euer eyes giuen him, to keepe them shut?* No doubtlesse, but to vnderstand, to iudge of all things, and therefore he is called the gouernour, the superintendent,

intendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the workes of God. To goe about to depriue him of this right, is to make him no more a man, but a beast; to doe it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man; if not to iudge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it doe in a wise man, who is as farre aboue the common sort of men, as a common man is aboue beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speake not of idiots, and the weaker sort, who haue not the facultie and meane to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of vnderstanding and sufficiencie, depriue themselues willingly of this right and authority so naturall, so iust, and excellent, who without the examining or iudging of any thing, receiue and approue whatsoeuer is presented, either because it hath a faire semblance and appearance, or because it is in authority, credit, and practise; yea, they thinke that it is not lawfull to examine or doubt of any thing, in such sort do they debase and degrade themselues: they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearefull and submisse, though it doe iustly appertaine vnto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth, a thousand opinions of one and the same thing, and but one that is true, why should not I examine with the instrument of reason, which is the better, the truer, the more reasonable, honest, and profitable? Is it possible that amongst so many lawes, customes, opinions, different manners, and contrary to ours, as there are in the world, there are none good but ours? Hath all the world besides beene mistaken? Who dares to say so, and who doubteth but others say as much of ours, and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had beene there borne and brought vp, would thinke them better, and preferre them before those he now accounteth the only good, and all because he hath beene accustomed vnto them? To conclude, to him that shall be so foolehardy to say it, I doe answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they iudging and examining all, may finde ours to be the better. Goe to then, the wiseman shall iudge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the barre, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of prophane men and beasts, to suffer themselues to be lead like oxen. I will that men liue, and speake, and

doe, as others, and the common sort doe; but not that they iudge like the common sort, but iudge them. What can a wise man, or a holie man haue aboue a prophane, if he must haue his spirit, his minde, his principall and heroicall part a slaue to the vulgar sort? The publike and common should content it selfe, if a man conforme himselfe thereunto in all apparent things; what hath it to doe with our inside, our thoughts, and iudgements? They shall gouerne as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit, for that, by their leaue, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the libertie of the spirit, and if a man would doe it, it is the greatest tyrannie that may be: a wise man will take heed thereof actiuelly and passiuelly, will maintaine himselfe in his liberty, and not trouble that of other men.

3
The effect of
this first treatise.
A wise man one
within, another
without.

Now a wiseman enioying this his right to iudge & examine all things, it many times comes to passe, that the iudgement and the hand, the minde and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carie himselfe outwardly after one maner, and iudge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his minde, which hee must doe to preferue equitie and iustice in all. That generall saying, *Vniuersus mundus exercet histrioniam*, All the world carieth two faces in one head, should properly and truly be vnderstood of a wise man, who is another man within, than hee outwardly shewes. If he were without such as he is within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the world: If he were within such as without, he should be no more a wise man, hee should iudge amisse, be corrupted in his minde. He must doe, and carie himselfe outwardly, for publike reuerence, and so as he offend no man, according to the law, custome, and ceremonie of the countrey; and inwardly iudge of the truth as it is, according to the vniuersall reason, whereby it many times comes to passe that he condemneth that which outwardly hee doth. *Sapiens faciet quæ non probabit, ut ad maiora transitum inueniat, nec relinquet bonos mores, sed tempori aptabit omnia: quæ imperiti faciunt, & luxuriosi, faciet, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito: multa sapientes faciunt quæ homines sunt, non quæ sapientes.* A wise man will doe that which himselfe will not allow, to make way vnto greater matters thereby: neither will he forsake good

good manners, but accommodate all things to the time; what unskilfull and dissolute persons doe, that will be doe, but not in the same manner, or to the same purpose. Many things wise men doe as they are men, but not as wise men. He will carie himselfe in things and actions as Cicero in words, who said, I leaue the vse or custome of speech to the people, and obserue the true science and knowledge of words: *Loquendum & extrà vivendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci*: We must speake and carie our selues outwardly as the greater number, and be wise with the smaller. Some few examples hereof, and first of things of lesse moment. In all humilitie I take off my hat, and keepe my head vncouered before my superior, for so doth the custome of my countrey require; but yet I will not leaue to iudge, that the custome of the East is farre better, to salute and doe reuerence, by laying the hand vpon the brest, without vncouering the head, to the prejudice of our health, & other inconueniences. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would take my repast, sitting vpon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or halfe lying looking vpon the table side-ways as they doe there, and as our Sauour with his Apostles did vse to doe, *recumbentibus, discumbentibus*: and yet I would not cease to iudge, that the manner of sitting vp-right at table, our faces towards it, as the custome is here, is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let vs take another of better importance. I will and I yeeld my consent that the dead bee interred and left to the mercie of the worme, of rottennesse and stench, because it is now the common custome almost euery where; but yet I will not cease to iudge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble and more neat, to commit and commend them to the fire, the excellentest element, enemy to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heauen it selfe, a signe of immortalitie, a shadow of the diuinity, and whereof the vse is proper and peculiar vnto man, rather than to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sinke of the world, the mother of corruption, and to the wormes which is the extremest ignominie and horror, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it selfe teacheth and commandeth to

dispose after this manner of all things, as of the Paschall lambe which might not be eaten, and (where popery beareth sway) the consecrated host, and diuers the like; why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies? What can a man doe that is more dishonorable to the bodie, than to cast it into the earth there to corrupt? It seemeth to me to be the vttermost punishment that can be inflicted vpon infamous persons and hainous offenders, and that the carcases of honest and honorable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtlesse of all the manners in disposing of dead bodies, which may be reduced to five, that is, to commit them to the foure elements, and the bowels of wilde beasts, the vilest, and basest, and most shamefull is to interre them, the most noble and honorable to burne them. Againe, I will and consent, that this my Wise man in things naturall be modest, that hee hide and couer those parts and actions that are called shamefull, dishonorable; and he that should doe otherwise, I would detest, and thinke hardly of him, because it is almost the custome of the whole world; but yet I will neuerthelesse that hee iudge that simply in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shamefull than the nose or the mouth, to drinke and to eat: Nature, that is, God, hauing made nothing shamefull, but it is for another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is sinne. Diuinitie also more chaste than Philosophietelleth vs, that in entire nature, not yet altered by the sinne of man, these parts and actions were not shamefull, for then shame was not, it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sinne. I consent to apparell my selfe like those of my countrey and profession, and if I had bene borne in those countries where they goe naked, I would haue gone so too: but yet I cease not to iudge, that neither of the two fashions is very good; and if I were to chuse, and ordaine, I would chuse a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those countries where they couer themselves with one onely and simple couering, light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost; for our manner of attiring is not good, yea worse than to goe naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and varietie of couerings of diuers stufes, euen to the number of foure, five, six, one vpon another, and whereof some are double,

double, that they hold vs prest and packt vp with so many ties, binding, butnings (not to speake of that dissolute and abominable excesse condemned by all good lawes) that wee can hardly stirre our selues in them. I will content my selfe with these examples. The selfesame a man may say of all lawes, customes, manners, and of that which is *de facto*, and much more of opinions, and that which is *de iure*.

If any man shall say that I haue iudged amisse in these examples, and that generally, if libertie be giuen to iudge of all things, the spirit will wander and lose it selfe, filling and furnishing it selfe with follies and false opinions ; I answere to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is overboldnesse to accuse any man ; for it is as much as if hee should say, that a man knowes where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectly know or iudge of ? Now not to finde the truth, is not to iudge amisse ; to iudge amisse, is to weigh, and ballance, and compare amisse, that is to say, not to examine the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and vniuersall nature, (both which though a man doe, yet it followeth not that he must needs finde out the truth.) Now I belecue nothing that is but simply affirmed, if it be not likewise proued ; but if any man by contrary reasons more strong and forcible shall make good what he saith, of all others he is the welcomest man vnto me, and the man I looke for ; for oppositions and contradictions well vrged, and with reason, are the true meanes to exercise this iudging office. I had neuer set downe these opinions, but that I looked that some one or other should abrogate them, and helpe me to better, and to answer more effectually, and to that generall obiection of the danger that there is in this libertie, besides that which hath beene spoken, and shall more expressly be said in the third lesson of Wisdome and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in iudging, and in all things, is nature, naturall and vniuersall reason, following which a man can neuer erre. See here the other member of this iudicious libertie which we are about to handle, which will furnish vs with a remedie against this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like libertie of spirit, is an indifferencie

4

An obiection.

5

2. Not to binde
our selues to any
thing.

difference of taste, and a deferring of a settled resolution, whereby a wise man considering coldly and without passion all things, as is said, is not obstinate, doth not sweare, tye, binde himselfe to any opinion, keeping himselfe alwaies readie to receiue the truth, or that which seemes to him to haue best semblance of truth, and saying in his inward and secret iudgement, that which our ancients were wont to say in their outward and publike, *Ita videtur*, it seemeth so, there is great appearance of truth on this side; and if any man doe contradict and oppose himselfe, with patience he is ready to vnderstand the contrarie reasons, and to receiue them finding them more strong and better; and when he hath heard what he can heare, he still thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans iudgement is founded first vpon those propositions so much celebrated among the wise, That there is nothing certaine, that we know nothing, that there is nothing in nature but doubt, nothing certaine but incertainty, *Solum certum, nihil esse certi, hoc unum scio, quod nihil scio*; The only thing certaine, is, that nothing is certaine, this one thing know I, that I know nothing; That of all things a man may dispute alike, that wee doe nothing but search, enquire, and grope after appearances, *Scimus nihil, opinamur verisimilia*; We know nothing, and imagine likelihoods; That verity is not a thing of our owne inuention and purchase, and when it yeelds it selfe into our hands, we haue nothing in our selues whereby we may challenge it, possesse it, or assure our selues of it; That truth and falshood enter into vs by one and the same gate, and there hold the same place and credit, and maintaine themselves by the same meanes; That there is no opinion held by all, or currant in all places, none that is not debated and disputed, that hath not another held and maintained quite contrarie vnto it; That all things haue two handles and two visages, and there is reason for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrarie, it is of lead, it turneth and accommodateth it selfe to whatsoeuer a man will haue it: To be short, it is the doctrine and practise of all the wisest, greatest, and most noble Philosophers, who haue made profession of ignorance, doubting, enquiring, searching. Others notwithstanding they haue beene dogmatists, and affirmers,

mers, yet it hath beene of gestures and words only, and that to shew how far they could wade in the purchase and search of the truth, *Quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt*, which the learned rather imagine, than know: giuing vnto all things no other nor stronger title, than probabilitie and true likelihood, and handling them diuersly, sometimes with one visage and in one sense, sometimes in another, by problematicall questions, rather enquiring than instructing, and many times shewing that they speake not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise, *Nontam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materia difficultate voluisse videntur*. They will seeme not so much to thinke what they say, as to exercise their wits with the difficultie of the matter. And who will belecue that it was the purpose of Plato to tie men to his Common-wealth and his Ideas, of Pythagoras to his numbers, of Epicurus to his Atomes, or to giue them for currant coine? They tooke pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtile inuentions, *Quae ex ingenio finguntur, non ex scientia vi*: which they rather faine wittily, than know skilfully. Sometimes likewise they haue studied after difficulty, to couer the vanity of their subiect, and to employ the curiosity of their spirits. And Aristotle the most resolute of all the rest, the Prince of dogmatists, and peremptorie affirmers, the god of pedanties, how often hath he beene crost in his opinions, not knowing what to resolue in that point of the soule, wherein he is almost alwaies vnlike to himselfe, and in many other things more base, which he knew not how to finde or vnderstand, ingeniously confessing sometimes the great weaknes of man in finding and knowing the truth.

They that haue come after, of a pedanticall and presumptuous spirit, who make Aristotle and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions than euer they were, disauowing those for disciples that faint in their opinions, hate & arrogantly condemne this rule of wisdom, this modestie, and academicall stayednesse, glorying in their obstinate opinions, whether they be right or wrong, louing better a heady froward affirmer against their owne opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, than a modest peaceable man, who doubteth and maketh stay of his iudgement, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say,

6.
Obiects.

say, a foole than a wise man ; like to women, who loue better to be contradicted, euen with iniurie, than that a man either out of the coldnesse of his nature, or contempt, should say nothing to them, whereby they imagine they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquitie. For why should it not be as lawfull to doubt, and consider of things as doubtfull, not determining of any thing, as it is to them to affirme ? Why should it not be lawfull ingenuously to confesse that which a man knoweth not, since in verity he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspence that which he is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions ? It is certaine according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more than we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing, in regard of that we know not : the causes of our ignorances are infinite, and both in respect of the things themselves either too farre from vs, or too neere, too great, or too little, too durable, or not durable enough, perpetually changing, and in respect of our selues, and the manner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficiently learned. And that which we thinke we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from vs, and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacie in opinion is strong, yet we are contended with, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or lesse, if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selues in certaine things, and in such manner, that we seeke no farther, nor examine any more that which we thinke to hold ? They thinke this suspension a shame and a weaknesse, because they know not what it is, and they perceiue not that the greatest men that are haue made profession thereof ; they blush, and haue not the heart freely to say, I know not, so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science ; and they know not that there is a kinde of ignorance and doubt, more learned, and more certain, more noble and generous, than all their science and certainty. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renowned and held for the wisest man : It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies : It is a modest, milde, innocent, and hearty acknowledgement of the mysticall height of truth, and of the pouertie of our humane condition

condition full of darknesse, weaknesse, vncertainty, cogitationes mortalium timide, incerta ad inuentiones nostra; Deus novit cogitationes hominum quoniam vane sunt. Mans thoughts are fearefull, and our inuentions vncertaine: God knowes the thought of man how vaine it is. Here I would tell you, that I caused to be grauen ouer the gate of my little house which I built at Condom in the yeare 1600 this word, *I know not*.

But they will needs that we submit our selues in all duty to certaine principles, which is an vniust tyrannie. I yeeld my consent, that a man employ them in all iudgement, and make vse of them, but yet not so as that a man may not spurne against them, for against that opinion I oppose my selfe. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and giue lawes to the world, to subiect the spirits of men, and to giue principles, which may be no more examined, that a man may no more denie or doubt of, but God himselfe the soueraigne spirit, and true principle of the world, who is onely to be beleueed because he saith it? All other things are subiect to triall and opposition, and it is weaknes to subiect our selues vnto it. If they will that I submit my selfe to principles, I will say to them as the Curat said to his parishioners in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of religion, Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my selfe vnto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions, in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*, whereby there are so many sects among them, that if I yeeld my selfe to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction not to be resolued, to remaine alwaies in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficultie for a man to continue long in that state. They haue reason to say it, for they finde it so in themselues, being the propertie of fooles, and weake minds, of presumptuous fooles, passionate and obstinate in certaine opinions, who condemne all others, and although they be ouercome, neuer yeeld themselues, vexing and putting themselues into choler, neuer acknowledging any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered, they are as resolute and obstinate in their new as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion,

Ioh. 9.

2. Cor. 8.

passion, and neuer disputing to learne and finde the truth, but to maintaine that which they haue sworne and bound themselves vnto. These kinde of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they thinke to know and to hold the truth in their sleeue: Because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man; *Si quis existimet se scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire*: He that thinks he knowes something, knowes not yet what he ought to know. It is fit that weake men that haue not strength to keepe themselves vpright vpon their feet, be kept vp with props, they cannot liue but in bonds, nor maintaine themselves free, a people borne to seruitude, they feare Bug-beares, or that the Wolfe will eat them if they be alone. But in wise, modest, and staied men it is quite contrary, the surest stay and most happie estate of the spirit, which by this meanes keepeth it selfe firme, vpright, constant, inflexible, alwaies free and to it selfe: *hoc liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis iudicandi potestas manet*: Herein we are free, because in our selves we haue full power to iudge. It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant soierne or delay, where a man feareth not to faile or miscount himselfe, where a man is in the calme, vnder couer, and out of danger of participating so many errours produced by the fantasie of man, and whereof the world is full of entangling himselfe in complaints, diuisions, disputes, of offending diuers parts, of belying and gainsaying his owne beleefe, of changing, repenting, and readuising himselfe. For how often hath time made vs see that wee haue beene deceiued in our thoughts, and hath enforced vs to change our opinions? To be brieft, it is to keepe the minde in peace and tranquillitie, farre from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we thinke to haue in things; for from thence doe spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires, obstinacie in opinion, presumption, loue of nouelties, rebellion, disobedience: from whence come troubles, sects, heresies, seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate, and resolute in opinion? not from Academiques, neuters, modest, indifferent staied, that is to say, wise men. Moreouer let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more seruice to pietie, religion, and diuine operation,

operation, than any thing whatsoever. I say seruice as well in the generation and propagation, as the conseruation thereof. Diuinity, yea the mysticall part thereof, teacheth vs, that well to prepare our soules for God and the receiuing of his holy spirit, we must emptie, cleanse, purifie them, and leaue them naked of all opinion, beleefe, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it selfe and to the world, that God might liue and worke in it, driue away the old master, to establish the new; *Expurgate vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem: Purge the old leuen, and put off the old man.* So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianitie among Infidels, or mis-beleeuing people, as in these daies in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and perswasions: That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and leasing, That the world is wholly composed, torne, and vilified with the forged phantasticall opinions of euery priuate mans braine: That God hath created man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himselfe, nor by any humane means: And, That it is necessarie that God himselfe, in whose bosome it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reueale it as he doth. But, That the better to prepare himselfe for this reuelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beleefes, wherewith the spirit is already anticipated and befotted, and present himselfe white, naked, and ready to receiue it. Having well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academics and Pyrronians, it is necessary that we propose the principles of Christianity as sent from heauen, brought by the Embassadour and perfect messenger of the diuinity, authorised and confirmed in his time by so many marvellous proofes and authenticall testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great meanes to true piety, not only to receiue it, as hath beene said, but to preserue it, for with it there neuer are heresies, and selected particular extrauagant opinions. An *Academicke* or *Pyrrhonian* was neuer hereticke, they are things opposit. It may be some man will say that he will neuer be either good Christian or Catholike, because he will as well be a neuter and irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to vnderstand amisse that
which

which hath beene spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to iudge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God, but we must suffer him to put and engraue that which pleaseth him, and none other. I haue made here a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let vs now returne to the matter.

7
3. The third
part, vniuersality
of spirit.

After these two, to iudge of all, to be slow in determining, there commeth in the third place, the vniuersality of spirit, whereby a wise man taketh a view and entreth into consideration of the whole Vniuerse, he is a citizen of the world like *Socrates*, he containeth in his affection all humane kinde, he walketh through all, as if they were neere vnto him, he seeth like the sunne, with an equall, settled, and indifferent regard, as from a high watch-tower all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himselfe, but alwaies continuing one and the same, which is a liuery of the diuinity, and a high priuiledge of a wise man, who is the image of God vpon earth. *Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos sibi poni nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem qui ceteros terminos includit, omnia illi secula ut Deo seruiunt. Nullum seculum magnis ingenys clausum, nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus. Quam naturale in immensum mentem suam extendere, in hoc a natura formatus homo ut paria dys velit, ac se in spatium suum extendat.* Great and generous is the minde of man; it endureth no bounds, but such as belong to God himselfe. The same holdeth not a wise man, which includeth all other things. All times obey him as God himselfe. No times are hid from great wits, nor any not subiect to their thoughts. It is naturall for mans minde to reach beyond the moone, where in nature hath framed in man a desire to be equall to the Gods, and to extend himselfe to his greatnes. The most beautifull and greatest spirits are the more vniuersall, as the more base and blunt are the more particular. It is a sottish weakenesse to thinke that a man must beleue, doe, liue in all respects as at home in his owne village and country, or that the accidents that fall out here, concerne and are common with the rest of the world. A foole, if a man tell him that there are diuers manners, customes, lawes, opinions, contrary to those which he seeth in vse, either he will not beleue them, and saith they are fables, or he presently

ly refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partiall is he, and so much enthralled with those his municipall manners; which he accounteth the only true, naturall, vniuersall. Euery man calleth that barbarous that agreeth not with his palat and custome, and it seemeth that wee haue no other touch of truth and reason, than the example and the *Idea* of the opinions and customes of that country where we liue. These kind of people iudge of nothing, neither can they, they are slaues to that they hold, a strong preuention and anticipation of opinions doth wholly possesse them, they are so besotted, that they can neither say, nor doe otherwise. Now partialitie is an enemy to libertie, and ouer-ruleth the minde already tainted and preoccupied with a particular custome, that it cannot iudge aright of others; an indifferent man iudgeth all things. He that is fastned to one place, is banished and deprived from all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receiue any. A Iudge that heares a cause with a preiudicate opinion, and inclineth to one part more than to another, cannot be a iust, vpright, and true iudge. Now a wise man must free himselfe from this brutish blockishnes, and present vnto himselfe as in a table this great image of our mother nature in her entire maiesty, marke and consider her in a realme, an empire, yea in this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and therereade that generall and constant varietie in all things, so many humors, iudgement, beleefes, customes, lawes; so many alterations of states, changes of fortune; so many victories and conquests buried and forgotten, so many pomps and greatneses vanished, as if they had neuer beene. Hereby a man may learne to know himselfe, to admire nothing, to think nothing new, or strange, to settle and resolute himselfe in all things. For the better attaining of this vniuersall spirit, this generall indifferencie, wee are to consider these foure or fife points.

1 The great inequality and difference of men in their nature, forme, composition, whereof we haue spoken.

2 The great diuersity of lawes, customes, manners, religions, opinions, whereof we will speake hereafter.

3 The diuers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers touching

ching vnitie and pluralitie, the eternitie and temporalitie, the beginning and end, the durance and continuance, the ages, estates, changes, and interchangeable causes of the world and the parts thereof, The Egyptian priests told *Herodotus* that since their first King (which was aboue eleuen thousand yeeres before, the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawne to the life) the Sunne had changed his course foure times. The *Chaldeans* in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) and *Cicero*, had a register of seuen hundred thousand yeeres. *Plato* saith, they of the citie of *Sais* had memorials in writing of eight thousand yeeres, and that the citie of *Athens* was built a thousand yeeres before the said citie of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Plinie*, and others haue affirmed, that *Socrates* liued six thousand yeeres before the time of *Plato*. Some haue said, that the world hath beene from all eternitie, mortall, and growing and being againe by interchangeable courses. Others and the more noble Philosophers, haue held the world for a god, made by another god greater than it, or as *Plato* auereth, and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature composed of a bodie and of a soule, which soule lodging in the centre thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it selfe by musicall numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heauen, the starres, composed of bodies and of a soule, mortall by reason of their composition, immortall by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects: that the heauen, the starres, the sunne change and quite alter by turnes their motion, in such sort, that that which was first is last, the East is made the West; and according to the ancient and most authentick opinion, and of the more famous spirits, worthy the greatnesse of God, and founded vpon reason, there are many worlds, in so much that there is nothing one and onely in this world, all kinds are multiplied in number, whereby it seemeth not to haue semblance of truth, that God hath made this onely worke, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *indivisum*; at the least Diuinitie saith, that God could make many, and infinite worlds; for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which wee haue learned of the discouerie of the new world, the East and West Indies, we see first that all our ancient writers haue beene deceiued, thinking to haue found the measure of the habitable earth, and to haue comprehended the whole *Cosmographie*, except some scattered Ilands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all vpon firme land inhabited, peopled, politickely gouerned, distinguished by realmes, and Empires, beautified with cities, that excell in beautie, greatness, opulencie, all those *Asia*, *Africa*, *Europe*, many thousand yeeres agoe: And who doubteth but that in time hereafter there will be discouered diuers others? If *Ptolomy* and other our ancient Writers haue beene heretofore deceiued, why should not he be likewise deceiued that affirmeth, that all is ready found and discouered? Say it he that will, I will beleue him as I list.

Secondly, we see that the Zones which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessiue heat and cold, are inhabitable.

Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteeme of here, and hold that they were first reuealed and sent from heauen, were commonly beleued and obserued (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them were in vse a thousand yeeres before we heard any tidings of them, both in the matter of religion, as the beleefe of one onely man the father of vs all, of the vniuersall deluge, of one God, who sometimes liued in the forme of a man vndefiled and holy, of the day of Iudgement, the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the Iewes, and *Mahomet*: And in the matter of policie, as that the elder sonne should succeed in the inheritance, that he that is exalted to a dignitie, loseth his owne name and takes a new, tyrannicall subsidies, armouries, tumblers, muscicall instruments, all sorts of sports, Artillery, Printing. From all these discourses we may easily draw these conclusions: That this great bodie which we call the world, is not that which wee thinke and iudge it to be; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is alwayes the same, but in perpetuall flux and reflux; That there is nothing said, held, beleued

leeued at one time and in one place, which is not likewise said, held, beleueed in another, yea and contradicted, reproued, condemned else-where, the spirit of man being capable of all things, the world alwayes tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes diuers; That all things are settled and comprehended in this course and reuolution of nature, subiect to increase, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climates, heauens, aires, countries. And from these conclusions wee learne, to marie our selues, to sweare to nothing, to admire, to trouble our selues at nothing; but whatsoeuer shall happen, whatsoeuer men talke of and trouble themselves about, to resolve vpon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things; but yet wisely to provide that nothing hurt vs by our owne weaknesse and deiection of minde. Enough is said of this perfect liberty of iudgement, established by these three parts, to iudge of all, to iudge nothing, to be vniuersall, wherein I haue the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palat of the world, it is an enemy to pedanterie as well as wisdom, but it is a faire floure or ornament of wisdom, which preferueth vs from two contrarie rockes, whereon the vulgar sort doe commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being heady, opinatiue, shamefull gainfayers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himselfe in a sweet, peaceable, and assured modestie and great libertie of spirit, noble and magnificall vniuersalitie. This is that great qualitie and sufficiencie of *Socrates*, the *Coryphaeus* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is said as *Plutarch* discourseth, That he neuer brought forth, but seru-
 uing as a Midwife, he made others to bring forth. This is ver-
 ry neere, and in some sense, the disorder of the *Pyrhonians*, the
 neutralitie and indifferencie of the *Academicks* from whence
 proceedeth, not to be astonished at any thing, not to admire
 any thing, the soueraigne good of *Pythagoras*, the magnani-
 mitie of *Aristotle*.

Nil admirari, prope res est una Numici

Solaq; qua possit facere, & seruire beatum,

One thing, at nothing wonder vp to take,

Is it, that may you happy keepe and make.

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea

is offended to heare speech thereof, loueth better to continue a slaue, to runne from one part to another, than to be to himselfe, to liue of his owne, to be aboute all, and to passe equally thorow all. 5. Hath he not reason to crie with *Tiberius*, and farre more iustly, *O homines ad seruitutem nati ! O men borne to seruitude*. What monster is this, to desire to haue all things free, his body, his members, his goods, and not his spirit, which neuerthelesse is onely borne vnto libertie? A man will willingly make benefit of whatsoeuer is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and seruice of his body, nourishment, health, ornament, and accommodate it all vnto his vse, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit and enriching, giuing his body the libertie of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison.

5

The other libertie which is of the will, must likewise be in high esteeme with a wise man. Wee speake not heere of the free will of man, according to the manner of Diuines : we say, that a wise man to maintaine himselfe in rest and liberty, must manage his will and his affections, in giuing himselfe and affecting but few things, and those iust (for the iust are but few in number if a man iudge wel) and that without violence and asperitie. There enter here into combat (or to speake more mildly, there are to be explicated and vnderstood) two popular and plausible opinions in the world, the one teacheth to be ready and willing in the seruice of another, to forget our selues for our neighbour, and principally for the weale publique, in respect whereof the particular is not to be respected: the other to cary our selues courageously with actiuitie, zeale, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused not to haue any charitie; He that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend, and not to haue that zeale or sufficiencie that hee ought. Some would haue these two opinions to preuaile beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not beene spoken hereof : for the heads or chieftaines many times preach things according to that vse for which they serue, not according as they are : And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selues too much to our selues, and with a tie too naturall, they would distract vs and draw

7
2. The second
part, libertie
of will.

vs along, as they that goe about to streighten a crooked staffe, bend it as much more the contrary way.

8

But these opinions ill vnderstood and ill taken, as they are by diuers, bring with them iniustice, trouble, paine, and much euill, as a man may see in those who backe-bite and detract from all, giuing themselues to hire, and the seruice of another: They doe not onely suffer themselues to be caried, and seased vpon, but they likewise thrust themselues into all matters, as well into those that concerne them not, as those that doe, as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and busie themselues; *In negotijs sunt negotij causa: That busie themselues because they would be busie:* And because they cannot hold and stay themselues, as if they had nothing to doe, with and within themselues, and that for want of inward, essentiall, proper and domesticall affaires, they seeke and vndergoe those that are strange vnto them. They are good husbands and frugall enough of their purse, but prodigall of their soules, their liues, their time, affection, and wills, the good husbandry whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they giue themselues to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their owne men, so wholly doe they engage and insinuate themselues thereinto. Great men seeke after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselues for them, and they allure them with faire promises and much Art, to win them vnto them; and they alwayes finde fooles enow that belecue them, but they that are wise will take heed of them.

9

This is first vniust, it wholly troubleth the state, driues away the rest and libertie of the spirit. It is, not to know that which euery one ought to know, and by how many offices euery man is obliged vnto himselfe; whilest they seeke to be officious and seruiceable to another, they are vniust to themselues. We haue all businesse enough with and within our selues, and need not seeke meanes to lose our selues without, and to giue our selues vnto others: euery man must hold him to himselfe. He that knowes not how to liue honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill aduised, and takes an ill and vnnaturall course, if he thinke to doe it by seruing another. He must affect and tie himselfe but to a few things, and those iust.

Second.

Secondly, this sharpe intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindereth the conduct of those affaires to which hee so much giueth himselfe; as in a precipitate pafe too much haste makes a man stumble and enterfeare, and so staies him whether he will, or no: *Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde festinatio tarda est: Qui nimium properat serius absolvit: Haste makes waste, and hinders it selfe: He that maketh too much speed dispatcheth too late.* So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entangleth and fettereth himselfe, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, growes into hard conceits and suspicions of others, becomes impatient in crosse or slow occurrents that fall not out according to his owne desire: *Male cuncta ministrat impetus: Violence doth nothing well.* This is scene not onely in serious affaires, but also vaine and friuolous, as in play, where hee that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubleth himselfe, and the more he troubleth himselfe, the more he loseth. He that walks moderately, is alwayes with himselfe, directeth his businesse with better aduantage, and more suredly and checrefully: hee dissembleth, applieth, deferreth all to his owne leasure, and as his occasions shall fall out: if he chance to be conuicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being alwayes ready for a new change: he alwayes marcheth with the bridle in his hand, *festinat lente.*

Thirdly, this violent affection infecteth and corrupteth euen the iudgement it selfe: for following one part and desiring the aduantage thereof, they wax mad if they be contradicted, attributing to their party false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusation; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their owne pleasure, and making them serue their owne designements. All that are of the contrary part, must needs be wicked and of contrary conditions, yea and they that speake any good, or descry any good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possibly be that a man honest in all things else, or at least in some thing, may follow a wicked person, maintaine a wicked cause? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it cary likewise the iudgement, and make that a foole, this is too much: It is the soueraigne and last part that should alwaies

maintaine it owne authoritie ; and we must ingenuously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our aduersaries, and the euill that is in those whom wee follow. The ground and foundation of the controuersie being laid aside, we must keepe moderation and indifferencie, and out of the businesse it selfe banish all choler, all discontent. And thus we see the euills that this ouer-great affection to any thing whatsoeuer bringeth with it ; of all, yea of goodnesse and wisdom it selfe a man may haue too much.

12
An aduise ment.

But for a rule herein, wee must remember, that the principle and most lawfull charge, that we haue, is in euery man the conduct and guide of himselfe. The reason why wee are here, is, that we should maintaine our selues in tranquillitie and libertie. And to doe this, the best remedie is, to lend our selues to others, and to giue our selues to none but to our selues, to take our affaires into our hands, not to place them in our hearts, to take businesse vpon vs, but not incorporate them into vs, to be diligent, not passionate, not to tie our selues but to a few, but rather alwayes to reserue our selues vnto our selues. This counsell condemneth not those offices due to the weale-publike, to our friends, our neighbour, yea it is so farre from it, that a wise man must be officious and charitable, applie vnto himselfe the customes of other men and the world, and the rather to doe it, he must contribute to publike society those offices and duties which concerne him. *Qui sibi amicus est, hunc omnibus scito esse amicum: He that is a friend to himselfe, is a friend to all.* But I require a double moderation and discretion heerein ; the one, that a man apply not himselfe to all that is presented vnto him, but to that which is iust and necessarie ; and that is not hard to be done : the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He must desire little, and that little moderately ; busie himselfe little, and that peaceably : and in those charges that he vndertaketh, employ his paise, his speech, his attentions, his sweatings, his meanes, and if need be, his bloud, his life ; but yet without vexation and passion, keeping himselfe alwayes to himselfe in health and tranquillitie. A man may performe his dutie sufficiently without this ardencie, and this so great contention of will. And they deceiue themselves very much, that thinke that a businesse is not well

well done, and there is no manner of affection, if it be not done with tempest, clamour and clatter: for contrariwise, it is that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduct thereof, as hath beene said. O how many men hazard their liues euery day in those warres which no way concerne them, and thrust themselues into the danger of that battell, the losse whereof doth no way trouble their sleepe: and all to the end they may not faile in their durie! whilst there is another in his owne house, that dares not enter the danger, or looke the enemy in the face, is more affected with the issue of that warre, and hath his minde more troubled than the souldier that aduentureth his blood and life in the field.

Finally, wee must know how to distinguish and separate our selues from our publike charges: euery one of vs plaieth two parts, two persons; the one strange and apparant, the other proper and essentiall: we must discerne the skinne from the shirt. An actiue man will performe his charge, and yet withall not leaue to iudge of the follie, vice, deceit that is therein: hee will conforme himselfe to euery thing, because the custome of his countrey requireth it, it is profitable to the weale-publike: the world liues so, & therefore it must be done. A man must serue and make vse of the world such as he findeth it; in the meane time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it selfe, know how to keepe and carrie himselfe apart, and to communicate himselfe to his owne trustie good, howsoeuer things fall out with himselfe.

CHAP. III.

True and essentiall honestie, the first and fundamentall part of wisdom.

HAuing prepared and disposed our scholar to wisdom by these precedent aduiselements, that is to say, hauing purified and freed him from all euils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and vniuersall libertie, to the end he may haue a perfect view, knowledge and power ouer all things (which is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man: *Spiritalis omnia dydicat: The spirituall man iudgeth all things.*) it is
now

now time to giue him instructions and generall rules of wisdom. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations, whereof the first and principall is honestie or probitie.

It will not be perhaps, any matter of difficultie, to make good this preposition, That honestie is the first principall and fundamentall part of wisdom: for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or feare to say the contrarie) doe applaud it; they alwayes honour it in the first place, confessing themselves seruitors and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to shew and perswade, which is that true and essentiall probitie we here require. For that which is in authoritie and credit, where-with the whole world contenteth it selfe, that which is only knowne, sought for, and possessed (I alwaies except some few of the wiser) is bastardy, artificiall, false, and counterfeit.

2
Masques of
honestie.

First we know that many times we are lead and pricked forward to vertue and honourable actions, by wicked and condemned meane, by default & naturall impotencie, by passion, and vice it selfe; chastitie, sobrietie, temperancie may be in vs by reason of our corporall imbecillitie; the contempt of the world, patience in aduersitie, constancie in danger, proceed many times from want of apprehension and iudgement: valour, liberalitie, iustice it selfe, from ambition: discretion, prudence, from feare, from auarice. And how many beautifull actions hath presumption and temeritie brought forth? So that the actions of vertue are many times no other but masques, they carry the outward countenance, but they haue not the essence; they may very well be termed vertuous in consideration of another, and of the visage they cary outwardly and in publike, but in truth and with the actor himselfe they are nothing so; for it will appeare at the last, that profit, glorie, custome, and other the like strange causes haue induced him to doe them.

Sometimes they arise frome stupiditie and brutish sortishnes, and therefore it is said, that wisdom and sortish simplicitie doe meet in one and the same point, touching the bearing and suffering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to iudge of the probitie or improbitie of a man by his actions: wee must sound him within, from what foundation these

these motions doe arise: wicked men performe many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and euill preserve themselves alike from doing euill: *Ordinem peccare boni & mali: Both good and euill feare to offend.* To discover therefore and to know which is the true Honesty, wee must not stay in the outward action, that is but the signe, the simplest token, and many times a cloke and maske to cover villanie: we must penetrate into the inward part, and know the motive which causeth the strings to play, which is the soule and the life that giueth motion to all. It is that whereby we must iudge, it is that wherein euery man should provide to be good and entire, and that which we seeke.

That honesty which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make expresse profession, who haue the title and publike reparation to be men of honesty and setled constancie, is scholasticall, and pedanticall, seruant to the lawes, enforced by hope, and feare, acquired, learned and practised out of a submission to, and a consideration of the religion, lawes, customes, commands of superiours, other mens examples, subiect to prescript formes, effeminate, fearefull, and troubled with scruples and doubts; *Sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet: Innocency without feare like not some*; which is not only in respect of the world diuers and variable, according to the diuersitie of religions, lawes, examples, formes, (for the iurisdiccions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it selfe vnequall, wauering; deambulatorie, according to the access, recesse, successe of the affaires, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath to doe, as a ship driuen with the winds and the oares, is carried away with an vnequall tottering paze, with many blowes, blasts, and billowes. To be briefe, these are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange euents, and not in veritie and essence: they vnderstand it not, and therefore it is easie to discover them, and to conuince them, by shaking of a little their bridle, and sounding them somewhat nearer, but aboue all, by that inequality and diuersity which is found in them; for in one and the same action they will giue diuers iudgements, and cary themselves altogether after a diuers fashion,

3
Vulgar honesty, and according to the stile of the world.

shion, going sometimes a slow pace, sometimes running a maine gallop. This vnequall diuersity proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which moue and stirre them, doe either pusse them vp, multiplie and increase them, or make them luke-warme and deiect them, more or lesse like accidents, *Qua recipiunt magis & minus.*

4
The description
of true honestie.

Now that true honestie, which I require in him that will be wise, is free, manly, and generous, pleasant, and cheerefull, equal, vniforme, and constant, which marcheth with a stayed pace, stately and haucie, going alwaies his owne way, neither looking on this side, or behinde him; without staying or altering his pace, or gate for the winde, the times, the occasions, which are changed; but that is not, I meane in iudgement and will, that is in the soule, where honestie residerh and hath it seat. For outward actions, especially the publike haue another iurisdiction, as shall be said in his place: This honestie I will describe in this place, giuing you first to vnderstand, that following the designement of this booke declared in the Preface, I speake of humane honestie and wisdom, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wise; not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to speake a word or two thereof.

5
Nature enioy-
neth honestie.

The iurisdiction of this honestie is Nature, which bindeth euery man to be, and to make himselfe such as he ought, that is to say, to conforme and rule himselfe according vnto it. Nature is together both a mistris which enioyneth and commandeth honestie, and a law and instruction which teacheth it vnto vs. As touching the first, there is a naturall obligation inward and vniuersall in euery man to be honest, iust, vp-right, following the intention of his author and maker. A man ought not to attend or seeke any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motiue of this honestie; and he can neuer know how to haue a more iust and lawfull, more powerfull, more ancient, it is altogether as soone as himselfe, borne with himselfe. Euery man should be, or should desire to be an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such, is a monster, renounceth himselfe, beliet, destroyeth himselfe, by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desist to be a man. It is necessarie that honestie grow in him by himselfe,

himselfe, that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a iust and regular will, any thing that is depraved, or corrupt, or other than it owne nature requireth, it implieth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would haue all his parts good and sound, his bodie, his head, his eies, his iudgement, his memorie, yea his hose and shooes; and why will he not likewise haue his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be whollie good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and haue his will firme and resolu'd to equitie and honesty for the loue of himselfe, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himselfe, and so his honestie shall be proper, inward, essentiall, euen as his owne essence is vnto him, and he vnto himselfe. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it bee, for such a cause being accidentall and outward, may happen to faile, grow weake, and alter, and consequently all that honesty that is grounded thereupon, must doe the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence, being in a solitarie place, where he hath no hope to be knownen, hee either ceaseth to be honest, or putteth it in practise very coldly and negligently. If for feare of the lawes, magistrates, punishments, if he can deceiue the lawes, circumuent the Iudges, auoid or disproue the proofes, and hide himselfe from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honestie. And this honestie is but fraile, occasioned, accidentall and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authority and vse, no man knowes of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or inui'd by some cause, or occasion; *nemo gratis bonus est: No man is freely good.* Now I would haue in this my wise man an essentiall and inuincible honestie, which dependeth of it selfe, and ariseth from it owne root, and may as hardly be separated, and rooted out, as humanity from a man. I will that he neuer consent vnto euill, & though his honesty be not made knownen to any, yer if he know himselfe, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much:

quid tibi prodest non habere consciunt, habenti conscientiam?
What is it to thee that hast a conscience, not to haue a witnesse of
thy conscience? And what though he receiue no great recom-
 pence for it? For what may it be that concerneth him so neere,
 as his owne proper essence? This were, not to care how bad the
 horse is, so the saddle be faire. I will then that these things be
 inseparable, to be, and to consent to liue a man, to be, and to
 be willing to be an honest man. This first hath bene suffici-
 ently pressed: Let vs come to the second.

6

Nature teach-
 eth honestie.

Now the paterne and rule to be honest, is this nature it selfe,
 which absolutely requireth that wee be such, it is, I say, this
 equitie and vniuersall reason which shineth in euery one of vs.
 Hee which worketh according to it, worketh truly according
 to God, for it is God, or at least, his first fundamentall and
 vniuersall law, which hath brought it into the world, and
 which came first from God, for God and nature are in the
 world, as in a state, the king, the author and founder, and the
 fundamentall law which he hath made for the preservation
 and gouernment of the said estate. This is a lightning and
 ray of the diuinity, a streame and dependance of the eternall
 law, which is God himselfe and his will: *Quid naturam
 Deus, & diuina ratio totum mundo, & partibus eius inserta? What
 is nature but God, and diuine reason inserted to the whole world,
 and all the parts thereof?* He worketh also according to him-
 selfe, for he worketh according to the sterne, and animated in-
 stinct, which he hath within himselfe moouing and stirring
 him: and to he is an honest man essentially, and not by acci-
 dent and occasion; for this law and light is essentiall and na-
 turall in vs, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of
 nature. He is also by consequent an honest man, alwaies and
 perpetually, vniformly and equally at all times and in all
 places: for this law of equity, and naturall reason is perpetu-
 all in vs, *Edictum perpetuum, A perpetuall edict*, inuiolable,
 which can neuer be extinct nor defaced, *Quam nec ipsa delet
 iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur; Which neither iniquity
 it selfe may deface; their worme shall neuer die.* Vniuersall and
 constant in all things, and alwaies the same, equall vniforme,
 which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiue
 neither access nor recesse, more nor lesse, *Substantia non recipit
 magis*

magis & minus. What seekest thou elsewhere, either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alleadge which thou hast not about thee and within, if thou wilt but feele & harken to thy selfe? A man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is, and will see the bill which he hath about him, *Quod petis intus habes; what thou demandest is within thy selfe;* Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy owne bosome. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. Gentes naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; lex scripta in cordibus nostris.* The light of thy countenance is sealed in vs. People naturally obserue the law: they see the worke of the law written in their hearts: the law is written in our hearts. The law of Moses in his decalogue, is an outward and publike copie, the law of the twelue tables, and the Romane law, the morall instructions of Diuines and Philosophers, the aduisements and counsels of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but piety and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if there be any law, that strayeth the least that may be from this first and originall mistris, it is a monster, falsehood, and error. To be brieft, all the lawes of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into iudgement, against thee that holdest hidden the originall, and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lieth, this light, which enlightneth thee within, *Qui veritatem Dei detinent in iniustitia, who detaine the truth of God in wrighteousnesse,* for these lawes had neuer been published abroad, but because that law which was inward, wholly celestially & diuine, hath bene too much contemned and forgotten. These are all rivers, but such as neither haue so much water, nor so pure as the source and inuisible fountaine, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perish, and to be lost: I say, not so much water, *Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, quae extra tabulas sunt.* Piety, humanity, liberality and faith require many things, that are not in the tables. O the miserable honestie of formalists, who hold themselves to the words of the law, and so think themselves discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quam angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse latius officiorum patet quam juris regula.* What a stricke innocency is required, according to the law; the rule of duty extendeth

Psal. 4.
Rom. 1.
August.

extendeth it selfe farther then the rule of the law. The rule of our dutie is farre larger than that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so liuely, witnesse this one thing, that well to vnderstand and know their intention, to quit our selues of ambiguity, difficultie, contrarietie, we must bring them to the source, and reentring into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature: *Animal legis ratio; Reason is the life of the law.* Behold then an essentiall, radicall, and fundamentall honestie, sprung in vs from it owne proper roots by the seed of that vniuersall reason which is in the soule, as the spring and ballance in a clocke, as the naturall hear in the body, maintaining it selfe of it selfe strong and inuincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himselfe, nature, the vniuersall order and policie of the world, quietly, sweetly and as silently without noise, as a ship that is not driuen but by the naturall and ordinary course of the water: All other is ingrafted by Art and accidentall discipline, as the heat and cold of feuers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamor and clatter ambitiously.

7
we must follow
nature.

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, that to liue well, is to liue according to nature, that the chiefest good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature as our guide and mistris, we can neuer erre, *Naturam si sequaris ducem, nusquam aberrabis: bonum est quod secundum naturam, omnia vitia contra naturam sunt: Idem beatè vivere & secundum naturam:* If thou follow nature as thy guide, thou shalt not erre: All goodnes is naturall; vices unnaturall: it is one and the same thing to liue blessedly, and according to nature: vnderstanding by nature that equity and vniuersall reason which shineth in vs, which containeth and hatcheth in it the seeds of all vertues, probitie, iustice, and is the matrix from whence all good and excellent lawes doe spring and arise, yea those true and iust iudgements that are sometimes pronounced by the mouth of an idiot. Nature hath disposed all things in the best state that they could be, and hath giuen them the first motion to good, and the end which they should seeke, in such sort, that he that will follow her, need not obtaine and possesse his owne good and his owne end, *Sapientia est in natura*

ram

ram converti, & cò restitui unde publicus error expulerit; Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplumq; formari sapientia est. It is wisdom to be conformable to nature, and to yeeld vnto it, whereby he may expell all publike and grosse error; From which not to wander, but to fashion and applie himselfe thereto is wisdom. Men are naturally good, and follow not euill, but for profit or pleasure, and therefore lawmakers to induce them to follow their naturall and good inclination, and not to enforce their wils, haue proposed two contrarie things, punishment and reward.

Doublelesse, Nature in euery one of vs is sufficient, and a sweet mistris and rule to all things; if we will hearken vnto her, employ and awaken her; and we need not seeke elsewhere, nor begge of Art and the Sciences, the meanes, the remedies, and the rules which we haue need of: Euery one of vs if he will, may liue at his pleasure of his owne. To liue content and happy, a man need not be wise, a Courtier, nor so actiue; all this sufficiencie that is beyond the common and naturall is vaine and superfluous, yea it bringeth more euill with it than good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, leade their liues more sweetly and cheerefully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, than the wisest men and most actiue. And if a man marke it well, he shall finde among peasants and other poore people examples of patience, constancie, equanimitie, more pure than all those that are taught in Schooles; they follow simplie the reason and conduct of nature, they trauell quietly and contentedly in their affaires, not enflaming or eleuating themselves, and consequently more soundly: Others mount themselves vpon their great horses, play the light horsemen, bandie themselves one against the other, keepe their braines alwaies in worke and agitation. A great master and admirable Doctor in nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in Art and science. *Socrates* by simple and naturall discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a country swaine, did furnish vs with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all euils, so substantiall and strong, that all the Art and science of the world could not deuise better or the like.

But we doe not only not hearken vnto it, beleue and fol-

T

low

8

As a good and
sufficient mistris.

By Art.

low it according to the counsell of the wise, but also (not to speake of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and peruerse delights and pleasures, suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the seed thereof) we endeavour to auoid it, we suffer it to sleepe and to cease, louing better to begge elsewhere our first rudiments, to runne to studie any Art, than to content our selues with that which is bred within vs. We haue a busie troublesome spirit, which offereth it selfe to rule and gouerne in all things, and which carrieth it selfe after our owne willes, disguiseth, changeth, and troubleth all, will adde, inuent, alter, and cannot stay it selfe in home-borne simplicitie, it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtiltie. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est: That simple and open vertue is euer turned into obscure and craftie cunning.* And it is a vice common amongst vs, not to account of any thing that is in vs, we esteeme only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from far: we prefer Art before nature, we shut the windowes at high noone, and light candles. This fault and follie proceedeth from another, that is, that we esteeme not of things according to their true and essentiall value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positieue and municipall law, than the naturall? Truly almost all, yea euen in the ceremoniall, and law of ciuilitie, which we haue framed to our selues, in respect whereof we disdain and are ashamed of nature. We speake little, we make a faire shew, and carefully keepe a *decorum* or decencie, and make no difficultie to goe directly against nature, dutie, conscience. So that the shadow is more vnto vs than the bodie, the roote, the countenance more than the substance and sound veritie. That we may not offend a ceremonie, we couer and hide things naturall; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we doe in no sort feare to doe, both lawfull and vnlawfull. We dare not speake that which is permitted to doe, we dare not directly to name our owne proper members, and yet we feare not to employ them in all manner of wickednesse: we pronounce, speake, and doe, without feare and without shame, wicked things, and such

By Ceremonie.

such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, assault, kill, deceive, and we blush to speake of things good, naturall, necessarie, iust and lawfull. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open view of the world, than to kill, lie, assault; nor a woman that will not rather utter any wickednesse in the world, than name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully doe. Euen to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the lawes of a ceremonie, and there fasten their deuouires. A strange thing, that iniustice should complaine of inciuility, malice of indiscretion! The act of a ceremonie doth it not preuaile against nature? The ceremonie forbiddeth vs to expresse naturall things and lawfull, and we giue credit thereunto: Nature and reason forbiddeth vs things vnlawfull, and no man beleeueth it: A man sends his conscience to the brothell-house, and keepes his outward countenance in order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found amongst beasts. I will not for all this say (as I perceiue malice doth already mutter) that ceremonie and decencie ought not carefully be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conuersations. *Amo verecundiam, in ea ornatus vita, & vis decori: I loue modestie, for in it is the ornament of our life, and the force of comelinesse.* But I say to them as our Sauour to men of the like spirit: *O hypocrita excolantes culicem, camelum deglutientes, qui minimacuratis, graviora spernitis: Hac oportet primum facere, tum illa non omitttere.* O ye hypocrites that straine a gnat, and swallow a Camell, which are carefull for small things, and despise greater matters: These ought ye first to doe, and also not to omit the rest.

Cicer.

Math. 23.

10

In such sort, that
it is no more
knowne in man.

From this generall and vniuersall alteration and corruption it is come to passe, that there is nothing of nature knowne in vs. If we must say what the lawes thereof are, and how many they are, we are much hindred. The ensigne and marke of a naturall law is the vniuersitie of approbation: for that which Nature shall haue truly ordained for vs, we with a common consent shall follow without doubting; and not only euery nation, but euery particular person.

Now there is not any thing in the world which is not denied and contradicted, not by one nation, but by diuers: and

there is not any thing so strange and vnnaturall in the opinion of diuers, which is not approued and authorised in many places by common vse. The little care of hauing children, the murder of parents, of children, of himselfe, mariage of the neereſt in bloud, theft, publike marchandize of their libertie and bodies, as well of males as females, are receiued by publike vse in many nations.

11

*And we must
ſeeke it else-
where.*

Doubtlesſe there remaineth no more any image or trace of nature in vs, we must goe ſeeke it in beaſts, where this troublesome and vnquiet ſpirit, this quick-ſiluer, neither Art, nor beautifull ceremonie hath power to alter it; they haue it pure and enure, if it be not corrupted by our vſage and contagion, as ſometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the firſt and vniuerſall rule which the author thereof hath giuen and eſta- bliſhed, except man only, who troubleth the policie and ſtate of the world with his gentle ſpirit, and his free-will to wicked- neſſe; he is the only irregular creature, and enemie of nature.

12

True honeſtie.

So then the true honeſtie (the foundation and pillar of wiſdome) is to follow nature, that is to ſay, reaſon. The good and the end of man, in whom conſiſteth his reſt, his libertie, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is, to liue and doe according to nature, when that which is the moſt excellent thing in him commandeth, that is to ſay, reaſon. True honeſtie is a right and firme diſpoſition of the will to follow the counſell of reaſon: And as the needle touched with the adamant neuer reſteth it ſelfe vntill he ſee the north point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the nauigation; ſo a man is neuer well, yea, he is as it were vndone, and diſlocated, vntill he ſee this law, and directeth the courſe of his life, his manners, his iudgements and wils, according to the firſt, diuine, naturall law, which is an inward domeſticall light, whereof all the reſt are but beames.

13

*The diſtinction
of true honeſty.*

But to effect it, and to come to the praſtiſe, it is farre more eaſie to ſome, than to others. There are ſome that haue their particular nature, that is to ſay, their temper and temperature ſo good and pleaſing (which eſpecially proceedeth from the firſt formation in the wombe of the mother, and afterwards from the milke of the nurſe, and this firſt and tender education) that they finde themſelues without endeuour, and with-

out

out Art or discipline, wholly caried and disposed to goodnesse and honestie, that is to say, to follow and conforme themselves to the vniuersall nature, whereby they are tearmed well-borne; *gaudeant bene nati.*

This kinde of naturall and easie honestie, and as it were borne with vs, is properly called goodnesse, a qualitie of a soule well borne and well gouerned, it is a sweetnesse, facilitie, and debonaire mildnesse of nature: and not (lest any bodie should be deceiued) a softnesse, a feminine, sottish calmenesse and vicious facilitie, whereby a man delighteth to please all, and not to displease or offend any, although he haue a iust and a lawfull cause, and it be for the seruice of reason and iustice; whereby it comes to passe, that they will not employ themselves in lawfull actions, when it is against those that take offence thereat; nor altogether refuse the vnlawfull, when they please thereby those that consent thereunto. Of these kinde of people it is said (and this commendation is iniurious) He is good, since he is good euen to the wicked; and this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not euill to those that are euill? We should rather call this kinde of goodnesse innocencie, as men call little children sheepe, and the like, innocent creatures. But an actiue, valiant, manly, and effectuall goodnesse is that I require, which is a readie, easie, and constant affection vnto that which is good, right, iust, according to reason and nature.

There are others so ill borne and bred, that it seeme (that like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were in despite of the vniuersall nature, so crosse and contrarie are they thereunto. In this case the remedie to correct, reforme, sweeten, make tame, and amend this euill, rough, sauage, and crooked nature, to bend it and applie it to the rule of this generall and great mistress the vniuersall nature, is to haue recourse to the studie of Philosophie (as Socrates did) and vnto vertue, which is a combat and painfull endeouour against vice, a laborious studie, which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in arduo & circa difficile: ad ianuam virtutis excubant labor & sudor. Dij mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio vondiderunt. Vertue is alwaies imployed about things difficult, at whose gate attends labour and paine. God for great paine and*

Acquired vertue.

trauell hath sold vertue vnto men. This is not to bring in a new, strange, or artificiall honestie, and so accidentall, and such, as I haue said before, is not the true; but it is by taking away the lets and hindrances, to stirre vp and enlighten this light almost extinct and languishing, and to reuiue those seeds almost choaked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particular person; as by taking away the moat from the cie, the sight is recouered, and the dust from off the glasse, a man seeth the clearer.

14
Three degrees of
perfection.

By all this that hath beene said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honestie; the one naturall, sweet, easie, iust, called goodnesse; the other acquired, difficult, painfull, and laborious, called verue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is as it were, composed of the two, and so there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facill and debonaire nature, distasted by it selfe by reason of vice; we haue named it goodnesse, innocencie. The second more high, which we haue named verue, is with a liuelie force to hinder the progresse of vice, and hauing suffered himselfe to be surprisid, with the first motions of the passions, to arme and binde himselfe to staie their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiefest, is out of a high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well framed, that temptations cannot so much as grow in him, and the seeds of vice are whollie rooted out, in so much that his vertue is turned into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called perfection; That and the first, which is called goodnesse, doe resemble one the other, and differ from the second, in that they are without stirre, paine, or endeupour. This is the true tincture of the soule, her naturall and ordinarie course, which costeth nothing. The second is alwaies in care and awe. The last and perfect is acquired by the long studie and serious exercise of the rules of philosophie, ioined to a beautifull and rich nature. For both are necessarie, the naturall and the acquired. This is that, those two sects did so much studie, the *Stoikes* and much more the *Epicures* (which would haue seemed strange if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testifie it, who are rather to be credited, than all the other more moderne) who made a sport and play-game of shame, want, sicknesse,

nelle, griefes, tortures, death: They did not only contemne, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties, but they sought them, they tooke pleasure and delight in them, and all to keepe their vertue in breath, and in action, which made them not only firme, constant, graue and seuer, as *Cato* and the *Stoicks*, but cheerefull, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, foole-hardy too.

By the comparison of these three together, it seemeth to some (who vnderstand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call vertue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeouours thereof, carrieth the honour, and that as *Metellus* said, to doe euill is an idle and a base thing; to doe good where there is neither paine nor danger, is a common thing and too easie; but to doe good where there is danger and paine, is the part of an honest man, and of vertue: it is the mot of that diuine Philosopher *χαλεπα τι καλόν*. But to speake in truth that which it is, besides that difficultie (as elsewhere hath beene said) is no true, nor iust and lawfull cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed; it is certaine, that in the like thing the naturall is more worth than the acquired; that it is farre more noble, more excellent and diuine to worke by nature than by Art, easily, equally, vniiformedly, than painfully, vnequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first manner, that is, the naturall and essentiall goodness, we dare not call him vertuous, nor the *Angels* and *Spirits* fortunate: they are called good. But because vertue maketh a greater clamor and stirre, and worketh with greater vehemencie and goodness, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish Iudges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extrauagant productions, which seeme to be all zeale and fire, are no part of the play, and doe not in any sort appertaine to true honestie; they are rather maladies and furious entrances, farre distant from that wisdom we heere require, which is sweet, equall, and vniiforme.

Thus much be spoken in grosse of honestie; for the parts thereof and the duties shall be handled in the third booke, especially in the vertue of Iustice. I will here adde a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of

detraction, and to stuy the plaints of those, that dislike that I attribute so much to nature (although it be God as hath beene said, and this booke speaketh not but of the naturall and humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required. Wherefore besides all that hath beene said, there remaineth yet one thing to make this worke compleat and perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this honestie, goodnesse, vertue, hath life, is brought forth in his due time, and receiueth it last and perfect portraict, it is eleuated, christened, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthie it due reward. Honestie is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and truly according to Art: the grace and spirit of God, is the blast and winde which expresseth the touch, giueth life, and maketh the instrument to speake, and to make a pleasant melodie. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our owne proper act and labour, it is a free gift from above, whereof it taketh the name, Grace: but we must desire it, aske, implore it, both humbly and ardently: O God, vouchsafe of thy infinite goodnesse to looke vpon me with the eye of thy clemencie, to accept and to like of my desire, mine essay, my little worke, which comes originally from thee, by that obligation and instruction, which thou hast giuen me in the law of nature, which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may returne vnto thee, and that thou mayest end that thou hast begun, that so thou mayest be both my α and ω : Sprinkle me with thy grace, keepe me, and account me thine, and so forth. The better to obtaine it, that is to say, to incline God vnto ~~us~~, is this honestie (as hath beene said in the Preface, whither (that I may not iterate it) I resend the Reader) the matter being well prepared, is the fitter for the forme, the grace, it is not contrarie, neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it releueth and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it selfe thereunto as to it contrarie, but put it on as a crowne. They are both of God, they must not therefore be confounded, euerie one hath his iurisdiction, his action a part: The organist and he that worketh at the bellowes are two, so are honestie and grace, the action good in it selfe naturally, morally, humanely,

manely, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those Philosophers and great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kinde of morall vertue, and is likewise found in misbeleeuers or Infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more than the couering, the crowne and perfection can be without the entire bodie. The player or organist may in euery point exercise his Art, without the bellows-blower, and so likewise honestie without grace. It is true that this cannot be but *as sonans*, and *cymbalum tinniens*, but this requireth that: where- in I see many to mistake themselves very grossely, who neuer haue any taste, or doe euer conceiue the image of true honestie, and continue puffed vp with a perswasion of grace, which they thinke to practise, to attract, to attaine by certaine easie and idle meanes, after the manner of the Pharisies, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any farther for the true honestie, *Promoti per saltum*, Masters without apprenticeship, Doctors and Nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kinde of people in the world, but very few such as *Aristides, Phocion, Cato, Regulus, Socrates, Scipio, Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true and solide morall vertue, and philosophical probitie. That complaint and reproach so frequent of the soueraigne Doctor of the truth, against hypocriticall Pharisies, will alwaies haue place, for such people will neuer be wanting, no nor amongst the Censors and reformers of the world. Now hauing spoken much of honestie, we must likewise in a word or two touch the contrarie thereunto.

Wickednesse is against nature, it is foule, deformed, and vnprofitable, it offendeth euery good iudgement, it breedeth a hatred of it selfe being well knowne, whereupon some haue said, that it was bred and brought forth by idlenesse and ignorance. Againe, wickednesse ingendreth offence and repentance in the soule, which like an vlcere in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth vp torments against it selfe: *Malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit: malum consilium consultori pessimum*: Malice it selfe supbeth vp the greatest part of his owne poyson: Euill counsell is worst to him that giueth it: Like the waspe, which with his sting offendeth

deth another, but much more himselfe, for he leaueth behind him, and that for euer, both his sting and his strength; vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be receiued, nor find place in the world, *Nemo enim animi causa malus est*; No man is wicked for his minde sake; but it doth withall ingender displeasure and offence, paine followeth sinne, saith *Plato*, yea it groweth with it, saith *Hesiodus*, which is quite contrarie to the will and to vertue, which reioyceth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment and satisfaction in well doing, it is the true and essentiall reward of a good soule, which can neuer faile him, and wherewith he must content himselfe in this world.

18

Whether it be
neuer permitted
to sinne.

Lib.3.cap.2.

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be avoided, and hated about all things; but it is a question whether there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carie with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sinne. It seemeth to diuers, that there may. Touching profit, if it be publike, there is no doubt (but yet with limitation, as shall be said in the vertue of politike prudence) but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. A man might speake and iudge hereof more certainly, if some certaine fact or example were proposed: but to speake simplie, we are firmly to hold the negatiue.

19

Whether all sin
ingender repen-
tance.
The distinction
of vice or wickednesse.

That sinne cannot inwardly furnish vs with such pleasure and content, as honestie doth, there is no doubt; but that it tormenteth (as hath beene said) it is not vniuersally and in all senses true: we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickednesse and wicked people: some are incorporated into euill, by discourse and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their vnderstanding it selfe approueth it and consenteth thereunto. This falleth out, when sinne hauing met with a strong and vigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there formed and as it were naturalized, and the soule infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others contrariwise doe ill by impulsions, according as the violent wind of temptation troubleth, stirreth and precipitateth the soule vnto sinne, and as they are surprisid and carried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemne it, contrarie

to

to the first, and they are not carried by passion or temptation, as the second; but in cold blood, hauing well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certaine price and measure they yeeld thereunto, and they thinke they haue some excuse to doe it. Of this sort of finnes are vsuries, obscenities or venereous pleasure, and other finnes many times resumed, consulted, deliberated, as also the finnes of complexion.

Of these three, the first doe neuer repent, without some extraordinary touch from heauen: for being settled and hardened in wickednesse, they feele not the pricke and sting thereof: for since the vnderstanding approueth it, and the soule is wholly tainted therewith, the will hath no will to gainsay it. The third repent, or seeme in a certaine fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it selfe, but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all: and to say the truth, and to speake properly, they doe not repent, since both their reason and conscience willeth and consenteth to the fault. The second are they that repent and readiue themselues, and of whom properly it is called repentance; whereof I will here take occasion to speake a word or two.

20
Their comparison.

Repentance is a disauowing or deniall, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or grieve ingendred in vs by reason, which driueth away all other sorrowes and griefes which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong than any other, as the heat and cold of a feauer is more violent than that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soule, the death of sinne, the cure of our willes and consciences: but it is necessarie that we well know it. First, it is not of euery sinne, as hath beene said, not of that which is inueterate, habituated, authorized by the iudgement it selfe, but of the accidentall, and that which happeneth either by surprise or by force; nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are sorrie we cannot repent; neither can it be in vs, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and designements. If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, conceit, and aduice; for that

21
Of repentance.

he

he must not repent him of his counsell and aduice, if he therein carrie himselfe as he ought, for a man cannot diuine of euents; and if a man did know them, yet he hath no place to consult of them; and we neuer are to iudge of counsels by their issues; neither must it grow in him by the age, impotencie, & distaste of things, this were to suffer his iudgement to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, because we are changed, by age, sicknesse, or other accidents. The growing wise, or amendment, which comes by anxietie, distaste, or feeblenesse, is not true and religious, but idle and languishing. The weaknesse of the bodie is no fit post to carrie vs to God, and to our duty and repentance, but true repentance is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow in vs not by the weaknesse of the bodie, but by the force of the soule and of reason.

22
Of confession and
excuse.

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and religious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the bodie we see two kindes of remedies, the one which healeth, taking away the cause and root of the maladie, the other which doth only couer it and bring it asleepe, and therefore the former is more forcible and more wholesome. So likewise in the maladies of the soule, the true remedie which cleanseth and healerh, is a serious and modest confession of our faults; the other false which doth only disguise and couer, is excuse, a remedie inuented by the author of euill it selfe, whereof the prouerbe is, That sinne soweth it selfe a garment, that is, excuse the garment made of figge leaues by the first offenders, who couered themselves both with words and deeds, but it was a garment without warmth. We should therefore learne to accuse our selues, boldly to confesse all our actions and thoughts; for besides that it were a faire and generous libertie, it were likewise a meane not to doe or thinke any thing, which were not honest and fit to be published: for he that will be content to be bound to tell all, will be likewise content to binde himselfe to doe nothing that a man is constrained to hide; but contrarily, euery man is discreet and secret in confession, but not in action. Boldnesse to sinne, is in some sort bridled by boldnesse to confesse. If it be vndecent to doe a thing, it is farre more vndecent not to dare to auouch it. Many great and holy men,

men, as Saint *Austin*, *Origen*, *Hippocrates*, haue published the errors of their opinions, and wee should doe the like of our manners. By going about to hide them, a man fallerh many times into great euils, as hee that solemnly denieth that he hath abused his bodie with another, by thinking to mend the matter marres it, at leastwise multiplies his sinne. This is not to excuse vice, but to adde thereunto.

CHAP. IIII.

To haue a certaine end and forme of life, the second foundation of Wisdom.

After this first foundation of true and inward honestie; there commerh as it were by way of preamble, a second foundation, necessary for the gouernment of our life, which is to prepare and frame our selues to a certaine and assured course of life, to make choice of that calling which doth best befit vs, and is proper vnto vs; that is to say, which our particular nature (following alwaies the vniuersall, our great and generall mist is and gouernor) doth willingly accommodate and apply it selfe vnto. Wisdom is a sweet and regular conduct and carriage of our soule, guiding it with measure and proportion, and consisteth in an equality of life and manners.

This choicethen is a matter of great difficulty, wherein a man carieth himselfe very diuersly, and wherein hee findeth himselfe hindered by diuers considerations, which draw him into diuers parts, and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happy therein, who by a great goodnesse and felicity of nature, haue knowne both speedily and easily how to choosse, and either by a certaine good hap, without any great deliberation, are, as it were, wholly carried into that course of life, which doth best befit them, in such sort that fortune hath beene their chooser, and led them vnto it, or by the friendly and prouident hand of another, they haue beene guided and directed. Others contrarily are vnhappy, who hauing failed euen from the entrance, and wanting the spirit, or industrie to know themselues, and in a good houre to be readuised how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in

2
*This choice a
difficult thing,
wherein a man
carieth him-
selfe
diuersly.*

in the middest of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconuenience and repentance.

But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himselfe well, and presuming too much of himselfe, whereby it falleth out that he must either shamefully desist from that which he hath vndertaken, or endure much paine and torment in persisting therein. He must remember that to carry a burthen, it is necessary there be more strength than burthen, otherwise a man is constrained either to leaue it, or to sinke vnder it. A wise man doth neuer charge himselfe with more businesse, than he knoweth how to goethorow : or in not setting himselfe in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they doe that are neuer pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they haue not, euery thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as businesse, to command as to obey. These kinde of people liue miserably, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet, they cease not to goe and come to no purpose, they seeme to doe much and doe nothing ; the actions of a wise man doe alwaies tend to some certaine end. *Magnanimum puta unum hominem agere, prater sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus.* Thinke it a great matter for a man to doe one thing ; Except no man, but a wise man doth one thing, for we are of many and diuers fashions and shapes. But the most part doe not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be led like oxen, or carried according to the times, company, occasion, and then know not how to giue a reason, why they are rather of this calling than another, except it be because their father profest the same, or that they were vnawares carried into it, and so haue continued therein, in such sort, that as they did neuer well consider of their entrance, so they know not which way to get out. *Panci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponant, ceteri eorum more qui fluminibus innatant, non eunt sed feruntur.* Few dispose aduisedly of themselves or their affaires : others doe it in that manner as men swimme ; who goe not, but are caried with the water and course of the streame.

Now, that a man may carry himselfe well herein, choose well,

Counsell in these
affaires.

well, and well acquite himselfe, he must know two things and two natures: his owne, that is, his complexion, his port and capacitie, his temperature, in what a man excelleth; in what he is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is vnfit: For to goe against his owne nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heauens, to leaue the businesse vndone, because he cannot doe it, *nec quidquam sequi quod assequi nequeas*, Attempt not any thing, that thou canst not attaine to, and to expose himselfe to laughter and mockery. Afterward he must know that which belongs to his affaires, that is to say, the estate, profession, and kinde of life that is proposed. There are some where in the affaires are great and weightie, others where they are dangerous, others where they are not so great, but are mingled, and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other businesse; These charges doe much afflict the spirit. Euery profession requireth more specially one certaine facultie of the soule, one the vnderstanding, another the imagination, another the memorie. Now to know these two natures, his owne, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath beene said of the diuers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will helpe much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well ioine and endure together, for it is necessarie that they agree: if a man be to contest with his owne nature, and to enforce it for the seruice and performance of a function and charge which he vndertaketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and insensibly it draw him, a man happen to faile or erre in his dutie, what disorder is there? Where is equitie? Where is decencie? *Si quicquam decorum, nihil profecto magis quam aequabilitas vitae uniuersae, & singularum actionum, quam conseruare non possis, si aliorum imiteris naturam, omittas tuam.* If any thing be comely, nothing is more comely than the equability of the whole life, and of euery particular action, which thou canst not preserue, if thou wilt follow the nature of other men, and omit thine owne. This is the account we must make, when wee thinke to doe any thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it selfe be wanting.

Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva :

If thy nature bend not to,

Neuer thinke to speake or doe.

Idquemque decet quod est suum maximè : sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam universam nil contendamus, ea servata propriam sequamur. That becomes every man best, that is his owne : so ought we to carrie our selves, as we contend not against univerſall nature, but that being kept, follow our owne. And if it fall out, that by mishap, imprudencie, or otherwise a man finde himselfe engaged in a vocation and course of life painfull and vnprofitable, and that a man cannot flie backe ; it is the part of wisdom, to resolve to beare it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it vnto himselfe as much as he can, doing as in a game at hazard, according to the counsell of *Plato*, wherein if the dicor card fall not out to be good, a man taketh it patiently, and indevoureth to mend his ill chance by his good play ; and like Bees, who from Tyme, a sharpe and drie hearbe, gather sweet honie, and as the proverbe is, make a vertue of necessity.

C H A P. V.

To studie true pietie, the first office of wisdom.

THe preparatiues made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set downe the rules of wisdom, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the religion and worship of God. Pietie holdeth the first place in the rank of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessarie therefore to be aduised, and to know how he that studieth wisdom should gouerne himselfe, which we purpose to doe, hauing a little discoursed of the state and successe of religions in the world, referring the rest vnto that which I haue said in my three Verities.

I
*Diuersitie of
religions.*

It is first a very fearefull thing, to consider the great diuersitie of religions which haue beene and are in the world, and much more of the strangenesse of some of them, so fantastickall and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the vnderstanding of man should be so much befotted and made drunken with impostures ;

postures ; for it seemeth, that there is nothing in the world, high or low, which hath not beene deified in some place or other, & that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped.

They all agree in many things, and haue likewise taken their beginning in the same climate. *Palestina* and *Arabia* which ioine together (I meane the more renowned and famous mistresse of the rest) haue their principles and foundations almost alike ; The beleefe of one God, the author of all things, of his prouidence and loue towards mankinde, the immortality of the soule, reward for the good, chastisement for the wicked after this life, a certaine outward profession of praying, inuocating, honouring, and seruing God. To winne them credit, and that they may be receiued, they alledge and furnish themselves, whether in deed and in verity, as the true, or by imposture and faire semblance, with reuelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodigies, holy mysteries, Saints. All haue their fountaine and beginning small, feeble, humble, but by little and little, by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictions as fore-runners, they haue taken footing, and beene authorised ; insomuch that they all are held with affirmation and deuotion, yea the absurddest amongst them. All hold and teach, that God is appeased and wonne by praiers, presents, vows, and promises, and the like : All beleue that the principall and most pleasant seruice of God, and the powerfullest meane to appease him, and to obtaine his grace, is to punish, to cut themselves, to impose vpon themselves some painfull and difficult labour ; wittenesse thorowout the world, and almost in all religions, and rather in the false than in the true, in Mahumetisme, than Christianity, so many orders, companies, hermitages, and frieries, destinated to certaine and diuers exercises very painfull and of a strict profession, euen to the lancing and cutting of their bodies, thinking thereby to merit much more than the common sort, who purifie not themselves with afflictions and torments as they doe, and euery day they prouide new : and the nature of man doth neuer cease to inuent meanes of paine and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures, which opinion is founded vpon the sacrifices, which

2

That all agree in many principles.

were vniuerfall thorowout the world before the birth of Christianity, and exercised not only vpon innocent beasts, which were massacred, with the effusion of their blood, for a pretious present vnto God, but (a strange thing that man should be so sottish) vpon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest as offenders, a custome practised with great religion almost in all nations : As the *Geta* a people of *Scythia*, who among other ceremonies and sacrifices dispatched vnto their god *Zamolxis*, from fise yeeres to fise, a man amongst them to demand things necessary for them. And because it was thought necessary that one should die suddenly, at an instant, and that they did expose themselues vnto death after a doubtfull manner, by running themselues vpon the points of three iauelins, whereby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order, vntill there came one that lighted vpon a mortall wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest fauour with their god, and not the rest: as the *Persians*, witnesse that fact of *Amestris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at one instant buried alieue foureteene young men of the best houses, according to the religion of the countrey : as the ancient *Gaules*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturne* their children, their fathers and mothers being present : the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddesse *Diana*, by whipping their youths in fauour of her, many times euen to death : the *Greekes*, witnesse the sacrifice of *Iphigenia* : the *Romans*, witnesse the two *Decij* : *Qua fuit tanta iniquitas decorum ut placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent ? Was the offence of the gods so great and so vnjust, as it could not be appeased, but by the death of such men as these ?* Turkes, who so massacre their visage, their brests, their members, to gratifie their Prophet: the new East and West *Indies* ; and in *Themistitan*, where they cement their idols with the blood of children. What madnesse was this, to thinke to flatter the Diuinity with inhumanity ; to content the Diuine Goodnesse with our affliction, and to satisfie the iustice of God with cruelty ! Iustice then thirsting after humane blood, innocent blood, drawen and shed with so much paine and torment ; *Vt sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem saviunt : As if the diuinity should be satisfied by our inhumanity.* From whence
can

can this opinion and beleefe spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath beene abolished thorowout Christendome, as before hath beene said.

They haue also their differences, their particular articles, whereby they are distinguished amongst themselues, and euery one prefers it selfe aboue the rest, assuring himselfe it is the better, and more true than the rest, reproching the one the other with some things, and so condemne and reiect one another.

3
They differ.

But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labour to know which is the truest; the Christian religion hauing so many advantages and priuileges, so high and so authentically aboue others, and especially these. It is the subiect of my second Veritie, where is shewed how farre all others are inferior vnto it.

4
Christian religion aboue all.

Now as they spring vp one after another, the younger doth alwaies build vpon the more ancient, and next precedent, which from the top to the bottome it doth not wholly disproue and condemne; for then it could not be heard or take footing; but it only accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, and that therefore it commeth to succeed it and to perfect it, and so by little and little ouerthroweth it, and enricheth it selfe with the spoiles thereof: as the Iudaicall, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Ægyptian religion the elder, the Hebrewes not being easily purified of their customs: the Christian built vpon the verities and promises of the Iudaicall; the Turkish vpon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Iesus, except the first and principall, which is his Diuinity: so that if a man will leape from Iudaisme to Mahumatisme, he must passe by Christianitie: and such there haue beene among the Mahumatists as haue exposed themselues to torments, to maintaine the truth of Christian religion, as a Christian would doe to maintaine the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient doe wholly condemne the younger, and hold them for capitall enemies.

5
The latter are built vpon the former.

All religions haue this in them, that they are strange and horrible to the common sense; for they propose and are built and composed of parts, whereof some seeme to the iudgement

6
All are strange to nature.

ment of man base, vnworthy and vnbesitting, wherewith the spirit of man somewhat strong and vigorous, iesteth and sporteth it selfe; others too high, bright, wonderfull, and mysticall, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things, it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no maruell, if it be hardly perswaded at the first onser, to receiue all religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, and therefore must be drawne thereunto by some occasion: for if it be strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *Pradicamus Iesum crucifixum, Iudeis scandalum, gentibus stultitiam: We preach Iesus crucified, a scandale to the Iewes, to the people follicie.* Whereof it comes to passe, that there are so many mis-beleeuers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their owne iudgements, thinking to examine and iudge of the affaires of religion according to their owne capacitie, and to handle it with their owne proper and naturall instrument, We must be simple, obedient, and debonaire, if we will be fit to receiue religion, to beleue and liue vnder the law, by reuerence and obedience to subiect our iudgement, and to suffer our selues to be led and conducted by publike authority; *Captiuantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected, and had in admiration as it ought; now it is necessarie that it be receiued and sworne to, as well authentically and reuerently, as difficultly: If it were such as were wholly pleasing to the palat and nature of man without strangenesse, it would be thought more easily, yet lesse reuerently receiued.

7
*Why they are not
 to be gotten by
 humane meanes.*

Now the religions and beleefes being such as hath beene said, strange vnto the comon sense, very farre exceeding all the reach and vnderstanding of man, they must not, nor cannot, be gotten nor setled in vs, by naturall and humane meanes (for then among so many great mindes as there haue beene rare and excellent, some had attained thereunto) but it must needs be, that they begiuen vs by extraordinary and heavenly reuelation,

reuelation, gotten and receiued by diuine inspiration, and as sent from heauen. In this manner likewise all doe affirme, that they hold their religion and belecue it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

But to say the truth, and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing ; they are, whatsoeuer some say, held by humane hands and meanes, which is true in euery respect, in false religions, being nothing but praiers, and humane or diabolicall inuentions : the true, as they haue another iurisdiction, so are they both receiued and held by another hand ; neuerthelesse we must distinguish. As touching the receiuing of them, the first and generall publication and installation of them hath beene, *Dominio cooperante, sermone confirmante, sequentibus signis ; God working, his word confirming, and signes following*, diuine and wonderfull : the particular is done by humane hands and meanes ; the nation, countrey, place, giues the religion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place and among those persons where he is borne, and where he liueth : He is circumcised, baptized, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man ; for religion is not of our choice or election, but man without his knowledge is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is borne in Iudaisme or Christianity ; and if he had beene borne elsewhere among the Gentiles, or Mahumetans, he had beene likewise a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the obseruation, the true and good professors thereof, besides the outward profession, which is common to all, yea to mis-beleeuers, they attribute to the gift of God, the testimony of the Holy Ghost within ; but this is a thing not common nor ordinary, what faire colour soeuer they giue it, witnesse the liues and manners of men, so ill agreeing with their beleefe, who for humane occasions and those very light, goe against the tenor of their religion. If they were held and planted with a diuine hand, nothing in the world could shake vs, such a tie would not be so easily broken : If it had any touch or ray of diuinity, it would appeare in all, it would produce wonderfull effects that could not be hid, as Truth it selfe hath said ; *If you haue but as much faith as a mustard seed, you should remoue mountaines*. But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the perswasion of the immortality of the

And yet they
are gotten by hu-
mane meanes.

soule, and a future reward so glorious and blessed, or so inglorious, and accursed, and the life that a man leadech? The only apprehension of those things that a man saith he doth firmly beleue, will take his senses from him: The only apprehension and feare to die by iustice, and in publike place, or by some other shamefull and dishonourable action, hath made many to lose their senses, and cast them into strange trances: and what is that in respect of the worth of that which religion teacheth vs is to come? But is it possible in truth to beleue, to hope for that immortality so happy, and yet to feare death a necessary passage thereunto? to feare and apprehend that infernall punishment, and liue as we doe? These are things as incompatible as fire and water. They say they beleue it, they make themselves beleue they beleue it, and they will make others beleue it too; but it is nothing, neither doe they know what it is to beleue. For a beleefe, I meane such as the scripture calleth historicall, is diabolicall, dead, informed, vnprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt than good. Such beleeuers (saith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impostors; and another saith, that they are in one respect, the most fierce and glorious, in another the most loose, dissolute, and villanous of the world; more than men in the articles of their beleefe, and worse than swine in their liues. Doubtlesse if we hold our selues vnto God, and our religion, I say not by a diuine grace as we should, but only after a simple and common manner, as we beleue a history, or a friend, or companion, we should place them farre aboue all other things for that infinite goodnesse that shineth in them, at the least they should be put in the same ranke or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that doe not feare lesse to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, than against his father, his master, his friend, his equals. All this hurtech not the dignity, purity, and height of Christianity, no more than the dunghill infecteth the beames of the Sunne, which shines vpon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contra*. But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Va* against those false hypocrites, whom Verity it selfe so much condemneth, as they belch out of their ownemouthes against themselves.

March. 23.

The

The better to know true piety, it is necessary first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfeir, to the end, we may not equiuocate as the most part of the world doth. There is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater paines to resemble true piety and religion, and yet that is more contrary and enemy thereunto, than superstition: like the Woolfe, which doth not a little resemble the dogge, but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrary: and the flatterer who counterfeiterh a zealous friend, and is nothing lesse; or like false coine which maketh a more glittering shew than the true; *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus aduersa: The people is subiect to superstition, contrary to true religion.* It is likewise enuious and iealous, like an amorous adulteresse, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, and care of the husband, than the true and lawfull wife, whom she endeouureth to make odious vnto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loueth and honoureth God, setleth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberall, free, and generous soule: Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wilde, and iniureth God himselfe, teaching to feare with horror and astonishment, to hide himselfe, and to flie from him, if it were possible; it is a weake, poore, and base malady of the soule; *Superstitio error insanus, amandus timet, quos colit violat: morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest.* Varro ait Deum à religioso vereri, à supersticioso timeri: Superstition is a franke error, it feareth friends; corrupteth those that loue it: It is the disease of a weake minde, which being infected with superstition, can neuer be at rest. Varro saith, religious men feare God for loue, the superstitious for punishment. Let vs speake of them both apart.

A distinction betwixt the true and false religion.

Tacit.

August.

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to liue in peace. He apprehendeth God as one anxious, spightfull, hardly contented, easily moued, with difficulty appeased, examining our actions after the humane fashion of a seuereludge, that watcheth our steps; which he proueth true by his manner of seruing him, which is all after one fashion. He trembleth for feare, he is neuer secure, fearing he neuer doth well enough, and that he hath left something vndone, by the

10
Superstition described.

omission whereof all is worth nothing that he hath done ; he doubteth whether God be well content, and laboureth to flatter him, to the end he may appease and winne him ; he importuneth him with praiers, vowes, offerings ; he faineth to himselfe miracles, easily beleeueth and receiueth such as are counterfeited by others, and interpreteth all things though purely naturall, as expressely sent and done by God, and runneth after whatsoeuer a man saith with all the care that may be : *Duo superstitionis propria, nimius timor, nimius cultus : Two things are proper to superstition ; too much feare, too much honour.* What is all this but by punishing himselfe, vilely, basely, and vnworthily to deale with God, and more mechanically, than a man would doe with a man of honor ? Generally all superstition and fault in religion, proceedeth from this, that we make not that account of God that we should, we reuoke him, and compell him into order, we iudge of him according to our selues, we put vpon him our humours. O what blasphemy is this !

11
It is naturall.

Now this vice and malady is almost naturall vnto vs, and we haue all a kinde of inclination thereunto. *Plutarch* deplo-
reth the infirmity of man, who neuer knoweth how to keepe
a measure, or to settle himselfe vpon his feet : for it leaneth
and degenerateth either into superstition and vanity, or into a
contempt and carelesnesse of diuine things. We are like to an
ill aduised husband, besotted and couzened with the coyning
subtilties of a light woman, with whom he conuerseth more
by reason of her artificiall flatteries, than with his honest
spouse, who honoureth and serueth him with a simple and na-
turall shamefastnesse : and euen so superstition pleaserh vs
more than true religion.

12
Popular.

It is likewise vulgar, it proceedeth from a weaknesse of the
soule, an ignorance or mis-knowledge of God, and that very
grosse, and therefore it is most commonly found in children,
women, old men, sicke, and such as haue beene assaulted with
some violent accident. To be brieft, it is in barbarous natures ;
*Inclinant naturam ad superstitionem barbari : Barbarous na-
tures incline soonest to superstition.* Of this then it is said, and
not of true religion, that it is true that *Plato* affirmeth, that the
weaknesse and idlenesse of men hath brought in religion, and
made

*Plutarch, in
sestoria.*

made it preuaile, whereby children, women, and old men should be most capable of religion, more scrupulous and deuout: this were to wrong true religion, to giue it so poore and fraile a foundation.

Besides these seeds and naturall inclinations to superstition, there are many that shake hands with it, and fauour it greatly for the great gaine and profit they receiue by it. Great men likewise and mighty, though they know what it is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a very fit instrument to leade a people withall, and therefore they doe not only enflame and nourish that which is already grafted in nature, but when need requireth they forge and inuent new, as Scipio, Sertorius, Sylla, and others: *Qui faciunt animos humiles formidine diuū, depressosq; premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficacius regit, quā superstio: Which makes their mindes humble for offending the gods, and lowly prostrate themselues to the ground. Nothing more forcibly carrieth a multitude than superstition.*

13
Nourished and
maintained by
humane reason.

Now quitting our selues of this foule and base superstition, (which I would haue him to abhorre, whom I desire to instruct vnto wisdome) let vs learne to guide our selues to true religion and piety, whereof I will giue some grounds and pourtraits as lesser lights thereunto. But before we enter thereinto, let me here say in generall, and by way of preface, that of so many diuers religions, and inanners of seruing God, which are, or may be in the world, they seeme to be the most noble, and to haue greatest appearance of truth, which without great externall and corporall seruice, draw the soule into it selfe, and raise it by pure contemplation to admire and adore the greatnesse and infinite maiesty of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his seruice; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodnesse, perfection, and infinitnesse, wholly incomprehensible and not to be knowne, as the *Pythagorians*, and most famous Philosophers doe teach. This is to approach vnto the religion of the Angels, and to put in practise that word of the Sonne of God, To adore in spirit and truth, for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another

14
An entrance to
the discourse of
true religion.

extremity,

293 To studie true pietie, the first office of Wisdome.

extremity, who will haue a visible Deitie, capable by the senses, which base and grosse error hath mocked almost all the world, euen Israel in the desert, in framing to themselves a molten Calse. And of these they that haue chosen the sunne for their god, seeme to haue more reason than the rest, because of the greatnes, beauty, and resplendent and vnknowne vertue thereof, euen such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reuerence of it selfe. The eye seeth nothing that is like vnto it, or that approacheth neere vnto it in the whole vniuerse, it is one Sunne, and without companion. Christianity, as in the middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, seruing God with spirit and body, and accommodating it selfe to great and little, whereby it is better established, and more durable. But euen in that too, as there is a diuersity, and degrees of soules, of sufficiency and capacity of diuine grace; so is there a difference in the manner of seruing of God: the more high and perfect incline more to the first manner, more spirituall and contemplatiue, and lesse external; the lesse and imperfect, *Quasi sub pedagogo*, As it were under a Tutor, remaine in the other, and doe participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

15
Diuers descriptions
of religion.

Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selues: (for it is a relatiue action betweene both) the office thereof is to extoll God to the vttermost of our power, and to beat downe man as low as low may be, as if he were viterly lost, and afterwards to furnish himselfe with meanes to rise againe, to make him feeble his misery and his nothing, to the end he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16

The office of religion is to ioine vs to the author and principall cause of all our good, to reunite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his root, wherein so long as he continueth firme and settled, he preserueth himselfe in his owne perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly fainteth and languisheth.

17

The end and effect of religion is faithfully to yeeld all the honor and glory vnto God, and all the benefit vnto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essentiall and inward good, is due vnto poore, wretched, and in all points miserable man: the glorie,

glorie, which is an outward ornament, is due vnto God alone, who is the perfection and fulnesse of all good, whereunto nothing can be added: *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus: Glory be to God on high, and peace with men upon earth.*

Thus much being first knowen, our instruction to piety is first to learne to know God: for from the knowledge of things proceedeth that honor we doe vnto them. First then we must beleue that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodnesse, wisdome, and that by it he gouerneth it; that his prouidence watcheth ouer all things, yea the least that are; that whatsoeuer he sendeth vs is for our good, and that whatsoeuer is euill proceedeth from our selues. If we account those fortunes euill that he sendeth vs, we blaspheme his holy name, because naturally we honour those that doe vs good, and hate those that hurt vs. We must then resolue to obey him, and to take all in good part which commeth from his hand, to commit and submit our selues vnto him.

18

An instruction
to piety.

1. To know God.

Secondly, we must honour him: and the most excellent and deuoutest way to doe it, is first, to mount vp our spirits from all carnall, earthly, and corruptible imagination, and by the chastest, highest, and holiest conceits, exercise our selues in the contemplation of the Diuinity; and after that we haue adorned it, with all the most magnificall and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine, that we acknowledge that we haue presented nothing vnto it worthy it selfe: but that the fault is in our weaknesse and imbecillity, which can conceiue nothing more high. God is the last endeouour and highest pitch of our imagination, every man amplifying the Idea, according to his owne capacity: and to speake better, God is infinitely aboue all our last and highest endeouours and imaginations of perfection.

19

2. To honor him.

Againe, we must serue him with our heart and spirit, it is the seruice answerable to his nature: *Deus spiritus est: si Deus est animus, sit tibi pura mente colendus: God is a spirit; if God be a spirit, worship him in purity of spirit.* It is that which he requi-
reth, that which pleaseth him: *Pater tales querit adoratores: The Father desireth such worshippers.* The most acceptable sacrifice vnto his Maiesty, is a pure, free, and humble heart: Sa-

20

3. To serue him

sacrificium

300 *To studie true pietie, the first office of Wisdome.*

Senec.
Lactan.
Mere.
Trism.

crificium Deo spiritus: A pure heart is a sacrifice vnto God. An innocent soule, an innocent life: Optimus animus, pulcherrimus Dei cultus: religiosissimus cultus imitari, unicus Dei cultus, non esse malum: A pure minde is the best seruice of God; the most religious worshipping of God is to follow him; the only honor of God, is not euill. A wise man is a true sacrifice of the great God, his spirit is his temple, his soule is his image, his affections are his offerings, his greatest and most solemne sacrifice, is to imitate him, to serue and implore him: for it is the part of those that are great, to giue; of those that are poore, to aske: Beatius dare quam accipere: It is better to giue than to take.

21

4. To serue him
with our bodies.

Neuerthelesse, we are not to contemne and disdain the outward and publike seruice, which must be as an assistant to the other, by obseruing the ceremonies, ordinances, and customes, with moderation, without vanity, without ambition, or hypocrisie, without avarice, and alwaies with this thought, That God will be serued in spirit: and that that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selues than for God; for humane vnity, and edification, than for diuine verity: *Quae potius ad morem quam ad rem pertinent: Which rather belong to manners and custome, than to the thing it selfe.*

22

5. To pray vnto
him.

Our voves and praiers vnto God should be all subiect vnto his will: we should neither desire nor aske any thing, but as he hath ordained, hauing alwaies for our bridle; *Fiat voluntas tua.* To aske any thing against his prouidence, is to corrupt the Iudge and Gouvernor of the world; to thinke to flatter him, and to winne him by presents and promises, is to wrong him: God doth not desire our goods; neither to say the truth, haue we any: all is his. *Non accipiam de domo tuo vitulos, &c. meus est enim orbis terra, & plenitudo ejus: I will not take the calves from thy house, &c. for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein.* But his will is, that we only make our selues fit to receiue from him, neuer expecting that we should giue vnto him, but aske and receiue: for it is his office to giue as being great, and it belongeth to man as being poore and needy, to begge and to receiue: to prescribe vnto him that which we want, and we will, is to expose our selues to the inconueniences of *Midas*, but that is alwaies best, which pleaseth him best. To be brieft, we must thinke, speake, and deale with God, as if all
the

the world did behold vs ; we must liue and conuerse with the world, as if God saw vs.

It is not with respect to honor the name of God as we ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him ouer: we must speake of God and his works soberly, but yet seriously, with shamefastnesse, feare, and reuerence, and neuer presume to iudge of him.

23

well to use his name.

And thus much summarily of pietie, which should be in high esteeme ; contemplating alwaies God, with a free, cheerful, and filiall soule ; not wilde, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the beleefe as obseruation, it is necessary that we tie our selues to the Christian, as to the true, more rich, high, and honourable to God, commodious and comfortable to man, as we haue shewed in our second Veritie, and therein remaining, we must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selues to that which the Catholike Church in all times hath vniuersally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our selues with nouelties, or selected and particular opinions, for the reasons set downe in my third Verity, and especially in the first and last Chapters, which may suffice vnto him, that cannot, or will not reade the whole booke.

24

The conclusion.

Let me only giue this one aduice, necessary for him that intendeth to be wise, and that is, not to separate pietie from true honesty, whereof we haue spoken before, and so content himselfe with one of them, much lesse to confound and mingle them together. These are two things very different, and which haue diuers iurisdictions ; pietie and probity, religion and honesty, deuotion and conscience ; I will that both of them be jointly in him whom I here instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confused. Behold here two rocks, whereof we must take heed, and few there be that know them, to separate them, and to rest contented with the one, to confound and mingle them, in such sort, that the one be the iurisdiction of the other.

25

An aduisement to ioine piety and probity together.

The first that separate them, and that haue but one of them, are of two sorts, for some doe wholly giue themselves to the worship

26

of those which

have pietie without probity.

Matth. 15. and 21.

27

A comparison.

28

Against those that confound pietie and probity.

worship and service of God, taking no care at all of true vertue and honesty, wherof they have no taste; a vice noted as naturall to the Jewes especially, (a race about all other superstitious, and for that cause odious to all) and much dispaired by their Prophets, and afterwards by the *Messias*, who reproched them, that of their Temple they had made a denne of theeves, a cloake and excuse for many wickednesses, which they perceived not, so were they besotted with this outward deuotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themselves discharged of all duty, yea they were made more hardy to doe any wickedness. Many are touched with this feminine and popular spirit, wholly attentive to those small exercises of outward deuotion; whereby they are made neuer the better, from whence came that proverbe; *An angel in the Church, a deuill in the house*: they lend the shew and outward part vnto God, like the Pharisees, they are sepulchers, white walles; *Populus hic labijs me honorat, cor eorum longe a me*; *This people honour me with their lips, but their heart is farre from me*: yea they make pietie a couer for impiety, they make it (as they say) an occupation or a merchandize, and alledge their offices of deuotion, to extenuate and recompence their sinne and iniquity. Others quite contrary make no account but of vertue and honesty, little caring for any thing that belongs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common amongst our Atheists. These are two vicious extremities, but which is the more or the lesse extreme, or which of the two is the more worthy, religion, or honesty, it is not my purpose to determine; I will only say (to compare them in three points) that the first is farre more easie, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is farre more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew, of spirits valiant and generous.

I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They peruert all order, and trouble all, confounding honesty, religion, the grace of God, (as hath beene said before) whereby it comes to passe that they have neither true honesty, nor true religion, nor consequently the grace of God, as they thinke, a people only content with themselves, and ready to censure and condemne others;

others; *Qui confidunt in se, & aspernant alios; Who trust in themselves, and contemne others.* They thinke that religion is a generality of all good, and of all vertue, that all vertues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other vertue nor honesty, but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrary; for religion which is the latter, is a speciall and particular vertue, distinguished from all other vertues, which may be without them and without probitie, as hath beene said of the Pharisees, religious and wicked; and they without religion, as in many Philosophers good and vertuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all diuinity teacheth, a morall humane vertue, appertaining to iustice, one of the foure cardinall vertues, which teacheth vs in generall, to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him, reseruing to euery one his place. Now God being aboue all, the vniuersall authour and master; we must giue vnto him all soueraigne honour, seruice, obedience, and this subalterne religion, and the *Hypothesis* of iustice, which is the generall *Thesis*, more ancient and naturall. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex auditu*; *Quomodo credent sine predicante? by hearing; How can they beleue, without preaching?*) engendreth honesty, which we haue shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into vs, from our first beginning. This is an inuerted order. These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hell: so that if they did not feare God, or feare to be damned. (for that is often their language) they would make a goodly peece of worke. O miserable honesty! What thanks deseruest thou, for that thou dost? ô cowardly and idle innocency; *quasi metum non placet! which pleaseth not without feare!* Thou keepest thy selfe from wickednesse, because thou darest not be wicked, and thou fearest to be beaten, and euen therein art thou wicked. *Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœne: The wicked forbear to offend, for feare of punishment.* Now I will that thou dare, but yet that thou wilt not though thou be neuer chidden; I will that thou be an honest man, not because thou wouldest goe to Paradise, but because nature, reason, God willeth it, because

cause the law and the generall policie of the world, whereof thou art a part, requireth it ; so as that thou canst not consent to be any other, except thou goe against thy selfe, thy essence, thy end. Doubtlesse such honesty occasioned by the spirit of religion, besides that it is not true and essentiall, but accidentall, it is likewise very dangerous, producing many times very base and scandalous effects (as experience in all times hath taught vs) vnder the faire and glorious pretext of pietie. What execrable wickednesses hath the zeale of religion brought forth ? Is there any other subiect or occasion, that hath yeelded the like ? It belongeth to so great and noble a subiect, to worke great and wonderfull effects :

*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,
Quae peperit saepe scelerosa atque impia facta :
So ill is good abus'd, and so accurst,
As the corruption of the best is worst :
For the vniustest warre we undertake,
Incontinent religion's brought to stake.
So Luther, Hungarie was cause to loose,
So Christ himselfe became a blocke to Iewes.*

Not to loue him, yea to looke vpon him with a wicked eie, as a man should looke vpon a monster, that beleueth not as he beleueth. To thinke to be polluted by speaking, or conuersing with him, is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kinde of people. He that is an honest man by scruple, and a religious bridle, take heed of him, and account of him as he is. And he that hath religion without honesty, I will not say, he is more wicked, but farre more dangerous than he that hath neither the one nor the other : *Omnis qui interficiet vos, putabit se obsequium prestare Deo ;* Who so killeth you, thinks he doth an acceptable service vnto God : not because religion teacheth, or any way fauoureth wickednesse, as some very foolishly and maliciously, from this place doe obiekt, for the most absurd and falsest religion that is, doth it not ; but the reason is, that hauing no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honesty, but by imitation, and for the seruice of religion, and thinking that to be an honest man is no other thing, than to be carefull to aduance religion, they beleue all things whatsoever, be it treason,

son, treacherie, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onely lawfull and sufferable, being coloured with zeale and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea worthy canonization, if it serue for the progresse and advancement of religion, and the ouerthrow of their aduersaries. The Iewes were wicked and cruell to their parents, vniust towards their neighbours, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gaue vnto the Temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and reiecting the whole world, by saying, *Corban*.

Math. 15.5.

Marc. 7.11.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wise man, a true honestie, and a true pietie, ioyned and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall aske it of him. *Deus dat spiritum bonum omnibus petentibus eum:* God giueth a good spirit to all that aske it of him: as hath beene said in the preface, article the 14.

S. Hierom.

CHAP. VI.

To governe his desires and pleasures.

IT is a principall duty of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures; for wholly to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wise man, that I hold this opinion to be not onely fantastickall, but vitious and vnnaturall. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and wholly condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learne how to governe them.

It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seeme to be men of vnderstanding, and professors of singular sanctitie, generally to contemne and tread vnder foot all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the body, retiring the spirit vnto it selfe, not hauing any commerce with the body, but eleuating it selfe to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensibly, neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kinde of people that ordinarie phrase of passing the time, doth very well agree; for it seemeth to them, that well to vse and employ this life, is silently to passe it ouer, & as it were to escape it, and

The first part.

An opinion of the contempt of the world.

rob themselves of it, as if it were a miserable, burthensome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide thorow the world, as that not only recreations and pastimes are suspected, yea odious vnto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but vnwillingly, and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection: and to be brieft, their life is offensive vnto them, and death a solace, pleasing themselves with that saying, which may be as well ill taken and vnderstood, as well, *Vitam habere in patientia, mortem in desiderio*: Not impatient of life, but rather to desire death.

2
Reiected.

But the iniquitie of this opinion may many waies be shewed. First, there is nothing so faire and lawfull, as well and duly to play the man, well to know how to lead this life. It is a diuine knowledge and very difficult, for a man to know how he should lawfully enjoy his owne essence, lead his life according to the common and naturall modell, to his proper conditions, not seeking those that are strange; for all those extravagances, all those artificiall and studied endeouours, those wandering waies from the naturall and common, proceed from follie and passion: these are maladies, without which whilest these men would liue, not by playing the men, but the diuines, they play the fooles; they would transforme themselves into angels, and they turne themselves into beasts: *aut Deus, aut bestia: homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto*: Either a God or a beast: I am a man, and I account my selfe no other than humane. Man is a body and a soule, and it is not well done to dismember this building, to diuide and separate this brotherly and naturall coniunction; but contrariwise, we should reuue it by mutuall offices, the spirit must awaken and reuiue the heauie bodie, the bodie must stay the lightnesse of the spirit, which many times prooues but a trouble-feast; the spirit must assist and fauour the bodie, as the husband the wife, and not reiect it, not hate it. It must not refuse to participate the naturall pleasures thereof, which are iust, and such as besit that marriage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wise, a true moderation. A man must studie, know and meditate on this life, to the end he may returne condigne thanks vnto

vnto him who hath lent it. There is nothing which God hath made for vs in this present life vnworthy our care, and we are accountable for them, euen to the very haire of our head; for it is no friuolous warrant or commission, for a man to direct himselfe and his life according to his naturall condition, but God hath giuen it him seriously and expressely.

But what greater follie is there, and more against nature than to account our actions vicious, because they are naturall; vnworthie because they are necessary? Now this necessitie and pleasure is an excellent mariage made by God himselfe. Nature willeth very wisely, that those actions which it hath enioined vs for our necessitie, be also delightfull, inuiting vs thereunto not only by reason, but also by appetite; and these rules these kinde of men goe about to breake. It is an equall fault and iniustice, to loath and condemne all pleasures, and to abuse them, by louing them ouer-much, we must neither run to them, nor flie from them, but receiue them, and vse them discreetly and moderately, as shall presently be said in the rule, Temperance which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well the insensibilitie and priuation of all pleasure, *stuporem natura*, which is the failing extremitie, as intemperancie, *Libidinem*, which is the exceeding extremitie. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, faciles odisse munditias & squallorem appetere: delicatas res cupere luxuria est, uisitas & non magno parabiles fugere, dementia est. It is against nature, to inforce our selues, to hate and contemne neat and necessarie things, and to desire filthinesse and deformitie: It is wantonnes to desire delicate things, and meere madnesse to auoid those that are common and needfull.*

He that desireth to discard his soule, let him boldly doe it if he can, when his bodie is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the end he may disburthen himselfe of that contagion: but he cannot doe it, as likewise he ought not to do it; for to speake according to right and reason, it should neuer abandon the bodie; it is apishnesse to doe it, it should behold pleasure and sorrow with a like settled countenance, in the one liue seuerely, the other cheerefully: but in all cases it should assist the bodie, to maintaine it alwaies in order.

To contemne the world, is a braue proposition, and many delight, nay glory to speake, to discourse thereof, but I cannot perceiue

perceiue that they well vnderstand it, much lesse that they practise it: what is it to contemne the world? What is this world? Is it the heauen, the earth, and in a word the creatures that are therein? No I thinke not so: What then? Is it the vse, the profit, the seruice, and commoditie that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against the authour that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to contemne them? If (in the end) thou wilt say that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, follie, excesse and wickednes that is in the world; I may answer that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so, but against the world, and the policie thereof, they are thy owne additions, not naturall, but artificiall. To preserue thy selfe from them as wisdom and the rule following teacheth, is not to contemne the world, which remaineth wholly entire without it; but it is well to vse the world, well to gouerne thy selfe in the world, and as Diuinitie teacheth, to make vse and benefit of the world, and not to enioy it, *uti, non frui*. Now these kinde of people thinke to practise the contempt of the world, by certaine outward particular manners and fashions, separated by the common course of the world: but this is but mockerie. There is nothing in the world so exquisite, the world laugheth not, and is not so wanton within it selfe, as without, in those places where men make profession of flying it, and trampling it vnder foot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who haue so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in forme, at the least in matter, which serueth them for no other vse, than to puffe them vp, to make them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrary to their institution; *Va vobis qui circuitis mare & aridam, ut faciatis unum preselytum, & cum factum fuerit, facitis silium gehenna: Voe be to you that compass sea and land, to make one of your profession, and when he is made, ye make him two-fold more the childe of hell: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it selfe which is the schoole of true and holy Philosophie. It is then a fantastickall and vnnaturall opinion, generally to reiect and condemne all desires and pleasures. God is the creator and author of pleasure,*

sure, Plantavit Dominus paradysum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiso voluptatis, protulit omne lignum pulchrum, suave, delectabile: God planted the paradise of pleasure, wherein he placed man, which brought forth all kinde of beautifull, sweet and delectable trees, as shall be said. But we must first learne how to cary our selues therein.

This instruction may be reduced to foure points (which if these mortified men, and great contemners of the world did know how to put in practise, they would worke wonders) to know little, naturally, moderately, and by a short relation to himselfe. These foure goe almost alwaies together, and make an entire and perfect rule, and hee that will may gather and comprehend all these foure in this word, Naturally, for nature is the fundamentall and sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter more cleare and easie, we wil distinguish these foure points. The first point of this rule, is to desire little: A short good, but an assured meanes to braue fortune, taking from it all accidents, and all power ouer vs to hinder the happy content of our life: and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he haue nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end: *Nil interest an habeas, an non concupiscas: It is all one whether thou hast it, or no, if thou desirest it not:* and therefore it was well said, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and enricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poore in desires is rich in contentment, *Summa opes inopia cupiditatum: The want of desires, is great riches.* To be briefe, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like vnto God, and those that are already blessed, who are happy and blessed, not because they haue and possesse all, but because they desire nothing: *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Ioue de felicitate contendit: Who bridleteth his desire, contendeth even with Iupiter in felicitie.* Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacie, wee shall continue in perpetuall paine and labour; superfluous things will become necessary, our soules will be made slaues to our bodies, and we can liue no longer, than that we liue in pleasure and delight. If we moderate not our pleasures and desires, and measure

6

*The second part
the rule in our
pleasures and
desires.*

Little.

them not by the compasse of reason, opinion will carie vs into a headlong downefall, where there is neither bottome nor brinke: as for example, we will make our shooes of velvet, afterwards of cloth of gold, and lastly of embroderie with pearles and diamonds; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of iasper and porpherie. Now this meane for a man to inrich himselfe, and to make him content, is very iust, and in the power of euery man: he need not to seeke this contentment elsewhere and without himselfe, let him but aske it, and he presently obtaineth it of himselfe. Let him stay the course of his desires, it is iniustice to importune God, Nature, the world, by vowes and prayers, to giue him any thing, since he hath so excellent a meane in his owne power to attaine thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to giue vnto mee, than my selfe not to desire? *Quare potius à fortuna impetrem ut det, quàm à me: ne petam? quare autem petam oblitus fragilitatis humana?* Wherefore should I rather desire fortune to giue vnto mee, then I seeke it of my selfe? but wherefore should I desire the obliuion of humane fragilitie? If I cannot or will not obtaine of my selfe not to desire, how and with what face can I presse another to giue, ouer whom I haue no right nor power? The first rule then touching our desires and pleasures is that this (little) or at least a mediocritie and sufficiencie is, that which doth best content a wise man and keeps him in peace. And this is the reason why I haue chosen for my deuice, *Peace and pouertie*. With a foole nothing sufficeth, nothing hath certaintie or content: he is like the Moone, who asketh a garment that might fit it; but it was answered, That that was not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and alwaies changeable.

Plutarch.

7
Naturally.

Seneca.

The other point couen-germane to this, is (naturally): for we know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one naturall, and these are iust and lawfull, and are likewise in beasts limited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no man is indigent, for euery thing yeelds something to content. Nature is contented with little, and hath so prouided, that in all things, that which sufficeth is at hand and in our owne power, *Parabile est quod natura desiderat et expositum: ad manum est quod sat est*. Readie and at hand is it, that

NATURAL

nature desires ; and at hand also that which sufficeth. It is this which nature demandeth for the preservation of it owne essence, it is a fauour for which wee are to thanke Nature, that those things that are necessarie for this life, it hath made easie to finde, and such as are hardly obtained are not so necessarie ; and that seeking without passion that which nature desireth, fortune can no way depriue vs of it. To these kinde of desires a man may adde (though they be not truly naturall, yet they come very neere) those that respect the vse and condition of euery one of vs, which are somewhat beyond, and more at large than those that are exactly naturall, and so are iust and lawfull in the second place. The other desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and fantasie, artificiall, superfluous, and truly passions, which wee may to distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, whereof we haue spoken before at large in the passions : from which a wise man must whollie and absolutely defend himselfe.

The third, which is moderately and without excesse, hath a large field and diuers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads ; that is to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himselfe ; of another without his scandall, offence, losse, preiudice ; of himselfe, without the losse of his health, his leisure, his functions and affaires, his honour, his duty.

8
*Moderately.
See lib. 3.
cap. 38.*

The fourth is a short and essentiall relation to himselfe ; besides that the carriere of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, and short, their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it selfe ; but in a circle, the two points whereof doe meet and end in our selues. Those actions that are directed without this reflexion, and this short and essentiall turning, as of couetous and ambitious men, and diuers others, who runne point blanke, and are alwaies without them, are vaine and vnfound.

9
By relation.

CHAP. VII.

To carrie himselfe moderately and equally in prosperitie
and aduersitie.

1

Here is a twofold fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperitie and aduersitie; these are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth vs vpon to stand vpon our guard, and to gather our wits about vs: they are the two schooles, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

2

The opinion of
the vulgar.

The vulgar ignorant sort doe acknowledge but one: they doe not beleue that we haue any thing to doe, that there is any difficultie, any fight or contradiction with prosperitie and good fortune, wherein they are so transported with ioy, that they know not what they doe, there is no rule with them: and in affliction they are as much astonished and beaten downe as they that are dangerously sicke, and are in continuall anguish, not being able to endure either heat or cold.

3

Which of the
two is more dif-
ficult to beare,
prosperity or
aduersity.
Arist.
Senec.

The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and impute it to one and the same vice and follie, not to know how to command in prosperitie, and how to carrie our selues in aduersitie: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, some saying it is aduersitie, by reason of the horror and bitterness thereof: *Difficilius est tristitiam sustinere quàm à delectabilibus abstinere: majus est difficilia perstringere quàm lata moderari.* Harder it is to sustaine griefe, then to abstaine from pleasures, but more hard to passe thorow difficult things, then to moderate our pleasures. Some affirming it to be prosperitie, which by her sweet and pleasing flatterie doth abate and mollifie the spirit, and insensibly robberth it of it due temperature, force and vigor, as *Dalila* did *Samson*, in such sort that many that are obdurate, obstinate, and inuincible in aduersitie, haue suffered themselues to be taken by the flattering allurements of prosperitie, *Magni laboris est ferre prosperitatem: segetem nimia sternit ubertas, sic immoderata felicitas rumpit.* Great labour is it to liue in prosperitie: too much plentie plasheth downe the corne: so too much felicitie casteth

vs downe. And againe, affliction moueth euen our enemies to pitie, prosperitie our friends to enuie. In aduersitie a man seeing himselfe abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced vnto himselfe, he taketh heart at grasse, he rowzeth himselfe, calles his wits about him, and with all his power addes his owne endeouours to his owne helpe: in prosperitie seeing himselfe assisted by all that laugh at him, and applaud all hee doth, he groweth lazie and carelesse, trusting in others, without any apprehension of danger or difficultie, and perswading himselfe that all is in safetie, when he is many times therein much deceiued. It may be, that according to the diuersitie of natures and complexions both opinions are true: but touching the vtilitie of either, it is certaine, that aduersitie hath this preheminence, it is the seed, the occasion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroicall vertues, *Virescit vulnere virtus, agra fortuna sana consilia melius in malis sapimus, secunda rectum auferunt. Vertue flourisheth by aduersitie, we better know sound advice by the difficult fortune of distasterous things; prosperity blindeth the truth.*

Now wisdom teacheth vs to hold our selues indifferent and vpright in all our life, and to keepe alwaies one and the same countenance, pleasant and constant. A wise man is a skilfull artificer, who maketh profit of all; of euery matter he worketh, and formeth vertue, as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all manner of images; whatsoeuer lighteth into his hands hee maketh it a fit subject to doe good, and with one and the same countenance, hee beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad utroque casus sapiens aptus est, bonorum rector, malorum victor: In secundis non confidit, in aduersis non deficit, nec avidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non expectans, ad utrumque paratus; aduersus utrumque intrepidus, nec illius tumultu, nec huius fulgore percussus. Contra calamitates fortis & contumax; luxuria non aduersus tantum, sed & infestus: hoc precipuum in humanis rebus erigere animum supra minas & promissa fortuna. A wise man fiteth himselfe for all fortunes, hee governeth the good, subdueth the euill; He presumes not in prosperitie, nor despaires in aduersity; he neither desires danger, nor shuns it, he expecteth not prosperity, but is readie at all assaies; fearing neither felicitie nor aduersitie; not moued with the clamor of the one, nor the*

4

The aduice of the wise vpon both.

fortune hath two faces

it is good to shun it

glorie

glory of the other. Strong and despising all miseries, not only against all superfluitie and excesse, but euen an enemy vnto it; who in worldly things, hath a spirit erected aboue fortunes threats or promises. Wisdome furnisheth vs with armes & discipline for both combats; against aduersity with a spurre, teaching vs to raise, to strengthen and incite our courage; and this is the vertue of fortitude: against prosperitie, it furnisheth vs with a bridle, and teacheth vs to keepe and clap downe our wings, and to keepe our selues within the bounds of modestie; and this is the vertue of temperancie: these are the two morall vertues, against the two fortunes; which that great Philosopher *Epictetus* did very well signifie, containing in two words all morall Philosophie, *Sustine & abstine*, beare the euill, that is, aduersitie; abstaine from the good, that is, from pleasure and prosperity. The particular aduilements against the particular prosperities and aduersities shall be in the third booke following, in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie. Heere we will only set downe the generall instructions and remedies against all prosperitie and aduersitie, because in this booke we teach the way in generall vnto wisdome, as hath beene said in the preface thereof.

5
Of Prosperitie. Against all prosperity, the common doctrine and counsell consisteth in three poins: The first, that honors, riches, and the fauours of fortune, are ill and wrongfully accounted and called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reforme a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastned our felicitie to a rotten cable, and ancred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more vncertaine and inconstant, than the possession of such goods, which come and goe, passe and runne on like a riuer? like a riuer they make a noyse, at their comming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment; and when they are quite dried vp, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

6 The second point is to remember, that prosperitie is like a honnied poison, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous, whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and euery thing falleth out according to our owne hearts, then should we feare most, and stand vpon our guard, bridle our affections,

fections, compose our actions by reason, aboue all auoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the fauour of the time. Prosperitie is a slipperie pafe, wherein a man must take sure footing, for there is no time wherein men doe more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to finde a man who doth willingly attribute vnto him the cause of his felicitie. And this is the cause why in the greatest prosperitie we must vse the counsell of our friends, and giue them more authoritie ouer vs, than at other times; and therefore we must cary our selues as in an euill and dangerous way, goe with feare and doubt, desiring the hand and helpe of another. In these times of prosperitie, aduersitie is a medicine, because it leadeth vs to the knowledge of our selues.

The third is to retaine our desires, and to set a measure vnto them. Prosperitie puffeth vp the heart, spurreth vs forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth vs beyond our selues, and in this state it is where a man loseth himselfe, drowneth and maketh a mockery of himselfe. He playeth the Monkey, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then sheweth his taile. Oh how many haue beene lost, and haue perished miserably, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperitie! We must therefore either stay our selues, or goe forward with a slower pafe, if we will enioy the benefit of our prosperity, and not hold our selues alwayes in chase and purchase. It is wisdom to know how to settle our owne rest, our owne contentment, which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Si qua finire non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: What cannot be determined is beyond wisdom.*

Against all aduersitie, these are the generall aduiselements. In the first place, wee must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwayes different from true reason: for to discredit and to bring into hatred and horreur all aduersitie and afflictions, they call them euils, disasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor euill. Neuer did aduersitie make a man wicked, but hath rather serued as a meanes to mend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked.

Doubt-

8
Of aduersitie,
and that it is
no euill.

9

It is common to
all, but diuersly.

Doubtlesse, crosses and heauy accidents are common to all, but they worke diuers effects, according to that subject whereupon they light. To fooles and reprobate persons they serue to driue them into despaire, to afflict and enrage them: Perhaps they enforce them (if they be heauy and extreme) to stoope, to cry vnto God, to looke vp vnto heauen; but that is all: To sinners and offenders they are so many liuely instructions, and compulsions to put them in minde of their duty, and to bring them to the knowledge of God: To vertuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their vertue, to winne vnto themselues greater commendations and a neerer alliance with God: To wise men they are matter of good, and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to passe and mount vp to all height and greatnesse, as we see and may reade of diuers, who being assailed by such and so great crosses, as a man would haue thought them their veter ouerthrow and vndoing, haue beene raised by the selfe-same meanes to the highest pitch of their owne desires, and contrariwise without that infelicitie, had still remained vnder hatches, as that great *Athenian* Capitaine knew well, when he said, *Perieramus nisi perissemus: We should utterly haue perished, if we had not perished.* A very excellent example hereof was *Ioseph* the sonne of *Iacob*. It is true that these are blowes from heauen, but the vertue and wisdom of man serueth as a proper instrument, from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *To make of necessitie a vertue.* It is a very good husbandry, and the first property of a wise man, to draw good from euill, to handle his affaires with such dexteritie, and so to win the winde, and to set the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good vse, and better his owne condition.

10

It hath three
causes and three
effects.

Afflictions and aduersities proceed from three causes, which are the three authors and workers of our punishments; sin the first inuentor which hath brought them into nature; the anger and iustice of God, which setteth them aworke as his Commissaries and executioners; the policie of the world troubled and changed by sinne, wherein as a generall reuolt, and ciuill tumult, things not being in their due places, and nor doing their office, all euils doe spring and arise; as in a body the dis-joynting of the members, the dislocation of the bones

bones bringeth great paine, and much vnquietnesse. These three are not fauourable vnto vs, the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be auoided as an imposture. That a man may the better defend and quit himselfe from all three, there is no better way than to vse their owne proper armes, wherewith they punish vs, as *Dauid* cut off *Goliaths* head with his owne sword, making of necessitie a vertue, profit of paine and affliction, turning them against themselves. Affliction is the true fruit or science of sin, being well taken, is the death and ruine thereof, and it doth that to the author thereof, which the viper doth to his dam that brought him forth. It is the oile of the Scorpion, which healeth his owne sting, to the end it may perish by it owne inuention: *perijt arte sua: patimur quia peccauimus: patimur ut non peccemus: He perisheth by his owne Art: we suffer because we haue sinned: we suffer that we should not sin.* It is the file of the soule, which scoureth, purifieth and cleanseth it from all sin. And consequently it appeaseth the anger of God; and freeth vs from the prisons and bandes of Iustice, to bring vs into the faire and cleare sun-shine of grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth vs from the world, it plucketh vs from the dug, and maketh vs distaste with the bitterness thereof, like wormewood vpon the teat of the nurse, the sweet milke and food of this deceitfull world.

A great and principall meane for a man to cary himselfe well in aduersitie, is to be an honest man. A vertuous man is more peaceable in aduersitie, than a vicious in prosperitie: like those that haue a feuer, who feele and finde more harme and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremitie of their fits, than such as are found in the heat and cold of Summer and Winter. And euen so they that haue their consciences sicke, are much more tormented, than they that are sound, that are honest men. For, hauing the inward part whole and healthfull, they can no way be endamaged by the outward, especially opposing against it a good courage.

Aduersities are of two sorts: some are true and naturally as sicknesse, griefes, losse of those things we loue: others are false and fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in veritie. That it is so, man hath his spirit and bodie, as much

11
A generall ad-
uice.

12
An aduice more
speciall.

much at command, as before they hapned. To these kinde of men, onely this one word; That which thou complaineſt of, is neither painfull nor troublesome, but thou makeſt it ſuch, and makeſt thy ſelfe to beleue it.

13
*Naturall.
To endure is
naturall and
humane.*

As touching the true and naturall, the more prompt and popular and more ſound opinions are the more naturall and more iuſt. Firſt we muſt remember, that a man indureth nothing againſt the humane and naturall law, ſince euen at the birth of man all theſe things are annexed, and giuen as ordinary. In what ſo euer doth afflicte vs, let vs conſider two things, the nature of that that hapneth vnto vs, and that which is in our ſelues: and vſing things according to nature, wee can receiue no tediousneſſe or offence thereby. For offence is a maladie of the ſoule contrary to nature, and therefore ſhould by no meanes come neere vnto vs. There is not any accident in the world which may happen vnto vs, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptneſſe in vs to receiue it, and to turne it to our contentment. There is no manner of life ſo ſtrait, that hath not ſome ſolace and recreation. There is no priſon ſo ſtrong and darke, that giues not place to a ſong ſometimes to comfort a priſoner. *Jonas* had leaſure to make his prayer vnto God euen in the bellie of the Whale, and was heard. It is a fauour of nature that it findeth a remedie and eaſe vnto our euils in the bearing of them, it being ſo that man is borne to be ſubiect to all ſorts of miſeries, *Omnia ad que gemimus, que expaveſcimus, tributa vita ſunt: All things that afflicte or grieue vs, are the tributes of life.*

14
*It toucheth but
the leſſer part
of man.*

Secondly, we muſt remember, that there is only the leſſer part of man ſubiect to fortune; we haue the principall in our owne power, and it cannot be ouercome without our owne conſent. Fortune may make a man poore, ſicke, afflicted, but not vitious, diſſolute, deiected; it cannot take from vs probitie, courage, vertue.

15
*It is againſt rea-
ſon and iuſtice.*

Afterwards we muſt come to fidelitie, reaſon, iuſtice. Many times a man complaineſt vniuſtly, for though he be ſometimes ſurpriſed with ſome ill accident, yet he is more often with a good, and ſo the one muſt recompence the other. And if a man conſider well thereof, he ſhall finde more reaſon to content himſelfe with his good fortunes, than to complaine of

of his bad : and as we turne our eyes from those things that offend vs, and delight to cast them vpon greene and pleasant colours, so must we diuert our thoughts from heauie and melancholike occurrents, and applie them to those that are pleasant and pleasing vnto vs. But we are malicious, resembling cupping-glasses, which draw the corrupt blood, and leaue the good, like a couerous man who selleth the best wine, and drinks the worst, like little children, from whom if you take away one of their play-games, in a furie they cast away all the rest. For if any misfortune happen vnto vs, we torment our selues, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort vs: yea some there are that for small losses terme themselves vnfortunate in all things, and forget that they euer received any good; in such sort, that an ounce of aduersity brings them more hearty grieve than ten thousand of prosperitie, pleasure or delight.

We must likewise cast our eyes vpon those that are of a far worse condition than our selues, who would thinke themselves happy if they were in our place.

16
It is little in
comparison.

Cum tibi displiceat rerum fortuna tuarum,

Alterius sp. Eta, quo sis discrimine peior.

If thou griene thou art not such

As thy neighbour, ouer much,

Streight, reflect vpon the poore,

Thinke the rest, and griene the more.

It were good and necessary that these complainers did practise the saying and aduice of a wise man, that if all the euills that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enjoy, the diuision being equally made, they may see by the ouer-plus of that good they enjoy, the iniustice of their complaint.

-7

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all euills and aduersities, which may be reduced almost to one; Custom for the vulgar and baser sort, and meditation for the wiser. Both of them haue their force from time, the common and strongest salve against all euills; but the wise take it before hand, this is foresight, and the feeble and vulgar sort after hand. That Custom preuileth much it doth plainly appeare, in that those things that are

are

are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby easie and pleasing. *Natura calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem invenit: Custome mitigateth calamitie.* Slaues weepe when they enter into the gallies, and before three months be ended they sing. They that haue not bene accustomed to the sea, are afeard, though it be at the calmest, when they wey anchor, whereas the mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of her husband, and before a yeere be expired she loues another. Time and custome bring all things to passe; that which offendeth vs is the noueltie of that which happeneth vnto vs, *Omnia novitate grauiora sunt: All new and vexpected crosses, are more intolerable.*

18
Foresight or
providence.

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinaries: *Quae alij diu patiendū leuia faciunt, sapiens leuia facit diu cogitando: That which some make light by long suffering, a wise man makes light and easie by long cogitation.* He considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth vnto himselfe whatsoever may happen vnto him most grievous and insupportable, as sicknesse, pouerty, exile, iniuries, and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. For foresight or prouidence is a great remedy against all euils, which cannot bring any great alteration or change, hapning to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrarie they wound and hurthim greatly, that suffereth himselfe to be surprisid by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giueth the true temper to the soule, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steele, impenetrable against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soeuer, can giue no great blow to him that keeps himselfe vpon his guard, and is alwayes readie to receiue them. *Præmeditati mali mollis ictus venit: quicquid expectatum est diu, leuius accidit: The hurt is small, if the harme before be knowne: what soeuer we doe long expect, doth happen the lighter.* Now to attaine this foresight, we must first know that nature hath placed vs heere, as in a thorny and slippery place; that that which is hapned vnto another, may also light vpon vs; that that which hangeth ouer all, may fall vpon euery

every one of vs ; and that in all the affaires that we vndertake, wee premeditate the inconueniences and euill encounters which may happen vnto vs, to the end wee be not surprised vnawares. O how much are wee deceiued, and how little judgement haue wee, when wee thinke that that which happeneth to others cannot likewise fall vpon vs ! When wee will not be warie and prouident, for feare lest wee should be thought fearefull. Contrariwise, if wee take knowledge of things, as reason would haue vs, we would rather wonder that so few crosses happen vnto vs, and that those accidents that follow vs so neere, haue staied so long before they catch vs, and hauing caught vs, how they should handle vs so mildly. Hee that taketh heed, and considereth the aduersitie of another, as a thing that may happen vnto himselfe, before it shall happen, is sufficiently armed. We must thinke of all, and expect the worst ; they are fooles, and ill aduised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, that hee that is suddenly surprised, is halfe beaten, and he that is warned is halfe armed, nay it is two against one. A wise man in time of peace makes his preparation for warre : A good mariner before he goe forth of the hauen, makes prouision of what is necessarie to resist the violence of a tempest : it is too late to provide against an euill, when it is already come. In whatsoeuer we are prepared before hand, we finde our selues apt and admirable, what difficultie soeuer it haue ; and contrariwise there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder vs, if wee be but nouelists therein ; *Id videndum ne quid inopinatum sit nobis, quia omnia novitate grauiora sunt : We ought to foresee that nothing happen vnto vs vnllooked for, because all nouelties are the more greuous.* Doubtlesse it seemeth that if we were so prouident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is hapned vnto thee, why then wonderest thou ? Let vs then take a course that accidents doe not surprise vs ; let vs euer stand vpon our guard, and foresee what is to come. *Animus aduersus omnia firmandus, ut dicere possimus, non ulla laborum, O virgo, nova mi facies inopinave surgit, Omnia percepi atque animo mecum ipse peregi. Tu hodie ista denuntias ; ego semper denuntiavi tibi ; hominem paravi ad humana.* The minde must bee armed for all things ;
Y that

that we may hold nothing tedious or painefull. O virgin, there seemes vnto me a new and v unexpected countenance to appeare. I haue considered of all things, and am resolved thereof in minde. To day hast thou shewed me all these things, which alwaies I foretold to my selfe: I haue framed man for humane things.

CHAP. VIII.

To obey and obserue the Lawes, Customes, and Ceremonies of the Countrey, how and in what sense.

I
The beginning,
institution and
authoritie of the
lawes.

EVEN as a sauage and vntamed beast, will not suffer himselfe to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flieth and hideth himselfe from him, or armeth himselfe against him, and with furie assaulteth him, if hee approach neere vnto him; in such sort that a man must vse force mingled with Art and subtiltie to take and tame him: So follie will not be handled by reason, or wisdom, but striueth and stirreth against it, and addeth follie vnto follie; and therefore it must be taken, and led, like a wilde beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wise man is to a foole) astonished, feared and kept short, that with the more ease it may be instructed and won. Now the proper meane or helpe thereunto, is a great authoritie, a thundring power and grauitie, which may dazell it with the splendor of his lightning, *Sola auctoritas est qua cogit stultos ut ad sapientiam festinent: It is onely authoritie that inforseth fooles to applie themselves to wisdom.* In a popular fight or sedition, if some great, wise, ancient and vertuous personage come in presence, that hath wonne the publike reputation of honour and vertue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendor of his authoritie, are quiered, attending what he will say vnto them.

Auguſt.

*Voluit magno in populo cum saepe coorta
Seditio est, sevitque animis ignobile vulgus,
Iamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:
Tum pietate gravem ac meritis, si forte virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arectisque auribus astant,
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

Enam

*Euen as when tumults to sedition grow,
And Hobborne-mad, though cause he none doe know
Without himselfe; example so encharmes
This headlong rout, whose fury giues it armes,
As fire-brands, stones, and all things fly about,
Their rage encounters: so there is no doubt
Of certaine harmes; unlesse (as sent from God)
Some graue censorious Cato with his rod
Appeare in time, at whose authoritie
They silent stand, and heare him speake well nigh
An houre together, till their fury dye.
So all is hisht: the same that now doe sing,
Each to his tent, now crie God saue the King.*

There is nothing greater in this world than authoritie, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heauen: if it be soueraigne, it is called maiestie; if subalterne, authoritie: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and feare mingled together. Now this maiestie and authoritie is first and properly in the person of the soueraigne prince and law-maker, where it is liuely, actuall and moouing, afterwards in his commandements and ordinances, that is to say, in the law, which is the head of the worke of the prince, and the image of a liuely and originall maiestie. By this are fooles reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight, necessitie and vilitie authoritie and the law is in the world.

The next authority, and that which is likest to the law, is custome, which is another powerfull and emperious mistres; ² *Of custome.* It seafeth vpon this power, and vsurpeth it traiterously and violently, for it planteth this authoritie by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing; and humble beginning; hauing settled and established it selfe by the helpe of time, it discouereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more libertie or power left, so much as to lift vp ones eyes; It taketh it authoritie from the possession and vse thereof; it increaseth and ennobleth it selfe by continuance like a riuer; it is dangerous to bring it backe to his originall fountaine.

Law and custome establish their authoritie diuersly, custome ³ *A comparison of them both.* by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, by

by the common consent of all, or the greater part, and the author thereof are the people. The law springeth vp in a moment with authoritie and power, and taketh his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the liking of the subiect, whereupon some compare it to a tyrant, and custome to a king. Againe custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment, neuerthelesse they may mutually helpe and hinder one another. For custome which is but of sufferance, authorized by the soueraigne, is better confirmed: and the law likewise setteth it owne authoritie by possession and vse; and contrariwise custome may be caschiered by a contrarie law, and the law loseth the force thereof by suffering a contrary custome: but ordinarily they are together, that is, law & custome; wise & spiritual men considering it as a law, & simple men as a custome.

4

*Their diuersity
and strangenes.*

*Of lawes and
customes in the
world.*

There is not a thing more strange, than the diuersitie and strangenes of some lawes and customes in the world; Neither is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so madde, which is not established by lawes and customes in some place or other: I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of belecfe herein, how farre this proposition doth goe. Yet omitting to speake of those things that belong to religion, which is the subiect where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceiued, I will not meddle with it. See then a brieue of those that for the strangenes are best worth the noting. To account it an office of pietie in a certaine age to kill their parents and to eat them. In Iunes to pay the shot, by yeelding their children, wiues and daughters to the pleasure of the hoste: publike brothelhouses of males: old men lending their wiues vnto young: women common: an honor to women to haue accompanied with many men, and to cary their locks in the hembes of their garments: daughters to goe with their priuie parts vncouered, and married women carefully to keepe them couered: to leaue the daughters to their pleasures, and being great with childe to enforce an abort in the sight and knowledge of all men; but married women to keepe themselves chaste and faithfull to their husbands: wo-
men,

men the first night before they company with their husbands, to receiue all the males of the estate and profession of their husbands, inuited to the mariage, and euer after to be faithfull to their husbands : young married women to present their virginity to their Prince, before they lie with their husbands : mariages of males : women to goe to warre with their husbands : to die and to kill themselues at the decease of their husbands, or shortly after : to permit widowes to mary againe, if their husbands die a violent death, and not otherwise : husbands to be diuorced from their wiues without alledging any cause : to sell them if they be barren, to kill them for no other cause but because they are women, and afterwards to borrow women of others at their need : women to be deliuered without paine or feare : to kill their children because they are not faire, well featured, or without cause : at meat to wipe their fingers vpon their priuities and their feet : to liue with mans flesh : to eat flesh and fish raw : many men and women to lie together to the number of tenne or twelue : to salute one another by putting the finger to the ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heauen : to turne the backe when they salute, and neuer to looke him on the face whom a man will honour : to take into the hand the spetle of the Prince : not to speake to the King but at a peepe-hole : in a mans whole life neuer to cut his haire nor nailes : to cut the haire on one side, and the nailes of one hand, and not of the other : men to pisse sitting, women standing : to make holes and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang rings and iewels in : to contemne death, to receiue it with ioy, to sue for it, to plead in publike for the honor thereof, as for a dignity and fauour : to account it an honorable buriall to be eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in peece and pounded, and the powder to be cast into their ordinary drinke.

When we come to iudge of these customes, that is the complaint and the trouble : the vulgar sot and pedante, are not troubled herewith, for euery seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoever pleaseth not their palat, that is to say, the common vse and custome of their countrey. And if a man shall tell them, that others doe speake and iudge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as we

5
Examination
and iudgement.

with theirs, they cut a man short after their manner, tearing them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more aduised, as shall be said, he maketh not such haste to iudge, for feare lest he wrong his owne iudgement: and to say the truth, there are many lawes and customes which seeme at the first view to be sauage, inhumane, and contrary to all reason, which if they were without passion, and soundly considered of, if they were not found to be altogether iust and good, yet at the least they would not be without some reason and defence. Let vs take amongst the rest for example the two first which wee haue spoken of, which seeme to be both the strangest and farthest off from the dutie of pietie: to kill their owne parents at a certaine age, and to eat them. They that haue this custome doe take it to be a testimonie of pietie and good affection, endeuoring thereby first of meere pitie to deliuer their old parents, not onely vnprofitable to themselues and others, but burthensome, languishing, and leading a painfull and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease; afterwards giuing them the most worthy and commendable sepulcher, lodging in themselves and their owne bowels the bodies and reliques of their parents, in a maner reuiuing them againe, and regenerating them by a kinde of transmutation into their liuing flesh, by the meanes of the digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seeme ouer-light to him that is not possessed with a contrary opinion: and it is an easie matter to consider, what cruelty and abomination it had beene to these people, to see their parents before their owne eyes to suffer such griefe and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and rottenneise, and the foode of wormes, which is the worst that can be done vnto it. *Darius* made a triall, asking some Greekes for what they would be perswaded to follow the custome of the Indians in eating their dead fathers. To whom they answered, that they would not doe it for any thing in the world. And on the other side assaying to perswade the Indians to burne the bodies of their dead parents, as the Greekes did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficulty and horror, as that they would neuer be drawne vnto it. I will adde onely one other, which

which concerneth onely matter of decencie and comelineſſe, and is more light and more pleaſant : One that alwayes blew his noſe with his hand, being reprehended for inciuitie, in the defence of himſelfe, asked what priuiledge that filthie excrement had, that a man muſt afford it a faire handkerchiefe to receiue, and afterwards carefully wrap and fold it vp, which he thought was a matter of greater loathſomneſſe than to caſt it from him. So that we ſee that for all things there may be found ſome ſeeming reaſon, and therefore we are not ſuddenly and lightly to condemne any thing.

But who would belecue how great and imperious the authoritie of cuſtome is? He that ſaid it was another nature, did not ſufficiently expreſſe it ; for it doth more than nature, it conquereth nature : for hence it is that the moſt beautifull daughters of men draw not vnto loue their naturall parents, nor brethren, though excellent in beautie, win not the loue of their ſiſters. This kinde of chaſtitie is not properly of nature, but of the uſe of lawes, and cuſtomes, which forbid them, and make of inceſt a great ſin, as we may ſee in the faſt not onely of the children of *Adam*, where there was an enforced neceſſitie, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren ; of *Jacob* and *Judas* Patriarchs, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other holy men : And it is the law of *Moses* which forbad it in theſe firſt degrees ; but it hath alſo ſometimes diſpenſed therewith, not onely in the collaterall line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wiues, which was a commandement, and not a diſpenſation : and which is more, betweene the naturall brother and ſiſter of diuers wombs ; but alſo in the right line of alliance, that is to ſay, of the ſonne with the mother in law ; for in the right line of bloud, it ſeemeth to be altogether againſt nature, notwithstanding the faſt of the daughters of *Lot* with their father, which neuertheleſſe was produced purely by nature, in that extreme apprehenſion and feare of the end of humane kinde, for which cauſe they haue bene excuſed by great and learned Doctours. Now againſt nature there is not any diſpenſation, if God the onely ſuperior thereunto giue it not. Finally, of caſuall inceſts and not voluntarie the world is full, as *Tertullian* teacheth. Moreouer, cuſtome doth enforce the rules of nature, witneſſe thoſe Phyſicians who many times

6
The authority thereof.

Gen. 11. 20.
29. 35.
Exodus 6.
Leuit. 28.

Deuter. 25.
2. Reg. 12.
3. Reg. 2.

Chryſoſt.
Ambroſ.
Auguſt.

In Apolog.

leauē the naturall reasons of their Art by their owne authoritie, as they that by custome doe liue and sustaine their liues with poyson, Spiders, Emmets, Lyzards, Toades, which is a common practise amongst the people of the West Indies. It likewise dulleth our senses, witnesse they that liue neere the fall of the riuer of *Nilus*, neere clocks, armories, milles, and the whole world according to some Philosophers, with the sound of a heauenly kinde of musicke, and the continuall and diuers motions of the heauens dulleth our senses, that we heare not that which we heare. To conclude, (and it is the principall fruit thereof) it ouercommeth all difficultie, maketh things easie that seeme impossible, sweetneth all sowre; and therefore by the meanes hereof a man liues in all things content, but yet it mastereth our soules, our beliefes, our iudgements, with a most vniust and tyrannicall authority. It doth and vndoeth, authoriseth and dis-authoriseth whatsoeuer it please, without rhythme or reason, yea many times against all reason: It establisheth in the world against reason and iudgement all the opinions, religions, beleeves, obseruances, manners, and sorts of life most fantastickall and rude, as before hath beene said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degraderth, robbeth, beateth downe in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation, and maketh them base and vile.

*Nil adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam
Principio, quod non cessent mirarier omnes
Paulatim. —*

*Nine dayes a wonder; nought so wonderfull
At first; but time and frequencie will dull,
And so the Raine-bow, Manna, Moone and Sunne,
Haue not the same respect, that first was done.*

So that we see that custome is a thing great and powerfull. *Plato* hauing reprehended a youth for playing at cob-nut, or chery-pit, and receiuing this answer from him; That he controuled him for a matter of small moment, replied; My childe, custome is not a matter of small moment. A speech wel worth the noting for all such as haue youth to bring vp. But it exerciseth it power with so absolute authority, that there is no struiuing against it, neither is it lawfull to reason, or call into question

question the ordinances thereof: it enchanteth vs in such sort, that it maketh vs beleue, that what is without the bounds thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and iust, but what it approueth; *ratione non componimur, sed consuetudine abducimur: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus: We are not made by reason, but misled by custome; wee hold that most honest, that is most used. Error hath place in vs before Right.* This is tolerable with idiots and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiencie to looke into the depth of things, to trie and to iudge, doe well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonly held and receiued: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to be caried with customes.

Now the aduice which I heere giue vnto him that would be wise, is to keepe and obserue both in word and deed the lawes and customes which he findeth established in the countrey where he is: and in like manner to respect and obey the magistrates and all superiors, but alwayes with a noble spirit, and after a generous manner, and not seruilely, pedantically, superstitiously, and withall not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange lawes and customes, but freely and soundly iudging and examining the one and the other, as hath beene said, and not binding his iudgement and beleefe but vnto reason onely. Hereof a word or two.

7
An aduice.

In the first place according to all the wisest, the rule of rules, and the generall law of lawes, is to follow and obserue the lawes and customes of the Countrey where hee is, *νόμος* *ἡμετέριος* *καλόν*, auoiding carefully all singularitie, and strange extrauagant particularitie, different from the common and ordinarie, for whatsoeuer it be it alwayes hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of follie, hypocrisie, ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceed from a sicke and weake soule. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se, novitate vitæ convertet: He that is wise will not seeke to alter the manners of the people; neither pull men upon him with his innovations.* Wee must alwayes walke vnder the couert of the lawes, customes, superiors, without disputation or tergiversation, without vndertaking sometimes to dispense with the lawes,

1
Lawes and customes are to be obserued.

2
Not for their
iustice and e-
quitie.

lawes, sometimes like a frugall seruant to enhance the price.
But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good mind
and after a good manner, nobly and wisely, neither for the
loue nor feare of them, nor for the iustice or equiry that is in
them, nor for feare of that punishment that may follow for not
obeying them: to be brieft, not of superstition, nor constrain-
ed, scrupulous, fearefull seruitude, *Eadem qua populus, sed
non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens: A wise man
doth those things that other men doe; but not in that fashion, nor
to the same end,* but freely and simply for publique reuerence,
and for their authoritie. Lawes and customes are maintained
in credit, not because they are iust and good, but because they
are lawes and customes; this is the mysticall foundation of
their authoritie, they haue no other, and so is it with superi-
ours, because they are superiours; *Quia supra cathedram se-
dent: Because they sit in the chaire of authoritie,* not because
they are vertuous and honest: *qua faciunt, nolite facere: what
they doe, doe not you.* He that obeyeth them for any other
cause, obeyeth them not because hee should; this is an euill
and a dangerous subiect, it is not true obedience, which must
be pure and simple, *Vnde vocatur depositio discretionis, mera ex-
ecutio, abnegatio sui: From whence it is named, a putting off of
his owne reason, a meere obedience in the execution, and a de-
nying of himselfe.* Now to goe about to measure our obedience
by the iustice and goodnesse of lawes and superiours, were by
submitting them to our iudgement, to serue them with pro-
cess, and to call our obedience into doubt and disputation,
and consequently the state and policie according to the in-
constancie and diuersitie of iudgements. How many vniust
and strange lawes are there in the world, not onely in the parti-
cular iudgements of men, but of vniuersall reason, wherewith
the world hath liued a long time in continuall peace and rest,
with as great satisfaction as if they had beene very iust and
reasonable? And hee that should goe about to change or
mend them, would be accounted an enemy to the weale-
publique, and neuer be admitted: The nature of man doth
accommodate it selfe to all with the times, and hauing once
caught his fish, it is an act of hostilitie to goe about to alter
any thing: we must leaue the world where it is; these trouble-
houses

houses and new-fangled spirits, vnder a pretext of reformation, marre all.

All change and alteration of lawes, beleeves, customes and obseruances is very dangerous, and yeeldeth alwayes more euill than good; it bringeth with it certaine and present euils, for a good that is vncertaine and to come. Innouators haue alwayes glorious and plausible titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they cannot escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they thinke to see more cleerely than others, and that to establish their opinions, the state, policie, peace and publike quiet must be turned topsie turvie.

Against inno-
uators.

I will not say for all this that hath beene said before, that we must absolutely obey all lawes, all commandements of superiors, for such as a man knoweth evidently to be either against God or nature, he is not to obey, and yet not to rebell and to trouble the state: how he should gouerne himselfe in such a case shall be taught hereafter, in the obedience due vnto Princes; for to say the truth, this inconuenience and infelicicie, is rather, and more common in the commandements of Princes, than in the lawes: neither is it sufficient to obey the lawes and superiors, because of their worth and merit, nor seruilely and for feare, as the common and prophane sort doe; but a wise man doth nothing by force or feare, *Sed hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat inuitus, recta sequitur, gaudet officio:* This is onely incident to wise men, that they doe nothing by constraint; they follow the right, and performe their dutie: hee doth that which he should, and keepes the lawes, not for feare of them, but for the loue of himselfe, being iealous of his dutie; hee hath not to doe with the lawes, to doe well, that is that wherein he differeth from the common sort, who cannot doe well, nor know what they ought to doe, without lawes; *at iusto & sapientinon est lex posita:* The law was not ordained for the iust and righteous. By right a wise man is aboue the lawes, but in outward and publike effect, he is their voluntary and free obedient subiect. In the third place thereof, it is an act of lightnesse and iniurious presumption, yea a testimonie of weaknesse and insufficiencie, to condemne that which agreeth not with the law and custome of his country. This proceedeth either from
want

3
Strange things
are not lightly
to be condemned.

want of leasure or sufficiency to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his owne iudgement, whereby he is enforced many times to recant, and not to remember that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eie of his spirit to be hoodwinked, and brought a sleepe by a long custome, and prescription to haue power ouer iudgement.

4
Wisely to examine all things.

Finally, it is the office of a generous spirit and a Wise man (whom I here endeuour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together all the lawes and customes of the world, which shall come to his knowledge, and to iudge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath beene said, but to exercise his office, since he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth, and vniuersall reason, and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himselfe, or staining his iudgement with error: and to content himselfe to yeeld obedience vnto those whereunto he is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall haue cause to complaine of him. It may fall out sometimes, that we may doe that, by a second, particular, and municipall obligation (obeying the lawes and customes of the countrey) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, vniuersall nature and reason; but yet we satisfie nature by keeping our iudgements and opinions true and iust according to it. For we haue nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the world hath nothing to doe with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publike course of the world, and must giue an account thereof: so that many times, we doe iustly that, which iustly we approue not. There is no remedy, for so goes the world.

5
Of Ceremonies.

After these two mistresses, Law and Custome, comes the third, which hath no lesse authority and power with many, yea is more rough and tyrannicall to those that too much tie themselves thereunto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth; is for the most part but vanity, yet holdeth such place, and vsurperh such authority, by the remif-nesse and contagious corruption of the world, that many thinke that Wisdome consisteth in the obseruation thereof, and

and in such sort doe voluntarily enthrall themselues thereunto, that rather than they will contradict it, they preiudice their health, benefit, businesse, liberry, conscience and all; which is a very great folly, and the fault and infelicity of many Courtiers, who aboue others are the idolaters of Ceremony. Now my will is, that this my Wise man, doe carefully defend himselfe from this captiuitie; I doe not meane, that out of a kinde of loose inciuitie, he abuse a ceremony, for we must forgive the world in something, and as much as may be outwardly conforme our selues to that which is in practise; but my will is, that he tie not, and enthrall himselfe thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse he know how to leaue it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such manner, as that he giue all men to know, that it is not out of carelesnesse, or delicacie, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seeme ignorant how to esteeme of it as is fit, not suffer his iudgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanity, and that he lendeth himselfe to the world when it pleaseth him, but neuer giueth himselfe.

CHAP. IX.

To carry himselfe well with another.

THis matter belongeth to the vertue of iustice, which teacheth how to liue well with all, and to giue to euery one that which appertaineth vnto him, which shall be handled in the booke following, where shall be set downe the particular and diuers opinions according to the diuersity of persons. Here are onely the generall, following the purpose and subiect of this booke.

There is here a two-fold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two manners of conuersing with the world, the one is simple, generall and common, the ordinary commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affaires, the voyages, and encounters doe daily leade, and change acquaintance from those we know, to those we know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntary consents: the other speciall is in affected and desired compa-

nie

nie and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath beene embraced, and that either for spirituall or corporall profit or pleasure, wherein there is conference, communication, priuicie, and familiaritie: each of them haue their aduiselements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse, by way of preface, to giue you some generall and fundamentall aduice of all the rest.

3
Facilitie and
vniuersalitie
of humours.

It is a great vice (whereof this our wise-man must take heed) and a defect inconuenient both to himselfe and to another, to be bound and subiect to certaine humours and complexions, to one only course; that is, to be a slaue to himselfe, so to be captiuated to his proper inclinations, that hee cannot be bent to any other, a testimonie of an anxious scrupulous minde, and ill bred, too amorous, and too partiall to it selfe. These kinde of people haue much to endure and to contest; and contrariwise it is a great sufficiencie and wisdom to accommodate himselfe to all. *Istud est sapere, qui ubicunque opus sit animum possis flectere: It is wisdom to frame the minde, as occasion shall still require.* To be supple and maniable, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himselfe into order, when there is need. The fairest mindes, and the best borne, are the more vniuersal, the more common, appliable to all vnderstandings, communicatiue and open to all people. It is a beautifull qualitie, which resembleth and imitateth the goodnesse of God, it is the honour which was giuen to old Cato. *Huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcunque ageret: Whose minde was apt for all things: which generally was such, as whatsoeuer he did, he was said to be borne to the same purpose.*

4
The first part.
Aduice touching
simple and com-
mon conuersation.

Let vs see the aduiselements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conuersation, I will here set down some, whereof the first shall be, to keepe silence and modestie.

5

The second, not to be ouer-formall, in not applying himselfe to the follies, indiscretions and lightneses which may be committed in his presence; for it is an indiscretion to condemne all that pleaseth not our palat.

6

The third, to spare, and thriftily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiencie that he hath attained, and to be more willing to heare than to speake, to learne than to teach;
for

for it is a vice to be more ready and forward to make himselfe knowne, to talke of himselfe, and to shew all that is in him, than to learne knowledge of another; and to spend his owne stocke than to get new.

The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a duty and respect, nor against our inferiours, where the match is not equall.

7

The fift, to be honestly curious in the enquiry of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugally, to make profit by them.

8

The sixt and principall is, to employ his iudgement in all things, which is the chiefe part which worketh, ruleth, and doth all; without the vnderstanding all other things are blind, deafe, and without a soule, it is least to know the historie, the iudgement is all.

9

The seuenth is, neuer to speake affirmatiuely, and imperiously, with obstinacie and resolution; that hurteth and woundeth all.

10

Peremptorie affirmation and obstinacie in opinion, are ordinary signes of senselesnesse and ignorance. The stile of the ancient Romans was, that the witness depoling, and the Iudges determining that which of their owne proper knowledge they knew to be true, they exprest their minde by this word, *It seemeth* (*Ita videtur.*) And if these did thus, what should others doe? It were good to learne to vse such words as may sweeten and moderate the temeritie of our propositions, as, *It may be, It is said, I thinke, It seemeth,* and the like: and in answering, *I vnderstand it not, What is that to say? It may be, It is true.* I will shut vp this generall part in these few words; To haue the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his minde and thought covered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discret, alwayes to keepe himselfe to himselfe, and to stand on his guard, *frons aperta, lingua parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere:* His face open; his tongue silent; his minde secret; and to trust none: to see and heare much, to speake little, to iudge of all, *Vide, audi, iudica.*

The conclusion.

Let vs come to the other consideration, and kinde of conversation more speciall, whereof the instructions are these. The second part

11

The

of speciall con-
uersation.

The first is to seeke, to conferre, and conuerse, with men of constancy and dexterity ; for thereby the minde is confirmed and fortified, and is eleuated aboue it selfe, as with base and weake spirits it is debased, and viterly lost : the contagion herein is, as in the body, and also more.

12

The second is, not to be astonished at the opinions of another, for how contrary soeuer to the common sort, how strange, how friuolous or extrauagant they seeme, yet they are sutable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, and therefore it is weaknesse to be astonished at them.

13

The third is, not to feare or to be troubled with the rude in- ciuility and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustome himselfe. Gallant men beare them with courage, this tenderesse, and fearefull and ceremonious mild- nesse, is for women. This society and familiarity must be va- liant and manly, it must be couragious both to giue hard speeches, and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to haue to doe with a people that yeeld, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

14

The fourth is, to aime alwaies at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingenuously and cheerefully to yeeld vnto it, of what side soeuer it be, vsing alwaies and in all things sincerity, and not as many, especially pedantries, by right or by wrong to defend himselfe, and to quell his aduersary. It is a fairer victory to range himselfe according to reason, and to vanquish himselfe, than to ouercome his aduersary, whereunto his owne weak- nesse doth many times helpe, being farre from all passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confesse his doubt and ignorance, to yeeld when there is occasion, are acts of iudgement, gen- tlenesse, and sincerity, which are the principall qualities of an honest and wise man ; whereas obstinacy in opinion accu- seth a man of many vices and imperfections.

15

The fift is, in disputation not to imploy all the meanes that a man may haue, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent and pressing, and that with breuiry, for euen in a good cause a man may say too much, for long discourses, am- plifications, and repetitions, are a testimony of ostentation, desire to speake, and tedious to the whole company.

The

The sixth and principall is, in all things to keepe a forme, order and aptnesse. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and conferre with a foole, a trifler, that vttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter ! It is the only iust excuse to cut off all conference : for what can a man gaine but torment, that knowes not how, or what to speake as he should ? Not to vnderstand the argument that is made, to wedd himselfe to his owne opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himselfe to words, and to leaue the principall, to mingle and trouble the conference with vaine amplifications, to deny all, not to follow the forme of disputation, to vse vnprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouthe it out, to tie himselfe to formes, and neuer to diue into the bottoome; are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See here how wisdom is discerned from folly ; this is presumptuous, rash, obstinate, assured ; that neuer satisfieth it selfe, is fearefull, aduised, modest : this pleaseth it selfe, goes forth of the lists merily and gloriously, as hauing wonne the victory, when it neuer came nere it.

The seuenth, if there be place of contradiction, he must take heed that he be not bold, obstinate, bitter ; for either of these three makes it vnwelcome, and doth more hurt himselfe, than another. That it may winne good entertainment of the company, it must arise from that very houre of the controuersie that is handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsewhere, not from any former precedent ground ; neither must it touch the person, but the matter only, with some commendation of the person if there be cause.

CHAP. X.

To cary himselfe wisely in his affaires.

THis doth properly belong to the vertue of prudence, whereof we shall speake in the beginning of the booke following, where shall bee set downe in particular diuers counsels and aduisements according to the diuers kindes of prudence and occurrents in our affaires. But I will here set downe the principall points and heads of wisdom, which

are generall and common aduise-ments to instruct in grosse our disci-ple, to cary himselfe well and wisely in the trafficke and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affaires ; and they are eight.

I
*Knowledge of
the persons and
affaires.*

The first consisteth in vnderstanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deale, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, designement, and intention, their proceedings : to know likewise the nature of the businesse which he hath in hand, and which is proposed vnto him, not onely in their superficial and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof, not onely to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and consequents that belong thereunto. The better to doe this, he must looke into them with all manner of visages, consider them in all senses ; for there are some that in one side are very precious and pleasing, and on the other base and pernicious. Now it is certaine, that according to the diuers natures of the persons and affaires, we must change our stile and manner of proceeding, like a Sea-man, who according to the diuers state of the sea, and the diuersity of the windes, doth diuersly turne and guide his sailes and his oares. For he that in all things shall direct and carrie himselfe after one and the same fashion, would quickly marre all, play the foole, and make himselfe ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge of the persons and affaires is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited ; but the way to attaine thereunto, is to consider them attentiuely and aduisedly, reuoluing them many times in our mindes, and that without passion.

2
*Estimation of
things.*

*Not according
to the vulgar
iudgement.*

We must likewise learne to esteeme of things according to their true worth, giuing vnto them that price and place which appertainerh vnto them, which is the true office of wisdom and sufficiency. This is a high point of Philosophie ; but the better to attaine thereunto, we must take heed of passion, and the iudgement of the vulgar sort. There are six or seuen things which moue and leade vulgar spirits, and make them to esteeme of things by false ensignes, whereof wisemen will take heed ; which are, nouelty, rarity, strangeness, difficulty, Art, inuention, absence, and priuation, or deniall, and about all, report, shew, and prouision. They
esteeme

esteeme not of things if they be not polished by Art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and naturall, of what value soeuer they be, they attend not; they escape and drop away insensibly, or at least are accounted plaine, base, and foolish, a great testimony of humane vanity and imbecillity, which is paid with winde, with false and counterfeit money, in stead of currant, from whence it is, that a man preferreth Art before Nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie; vehement motions, and impulsions, before complexion, constitution, habit; the extraordinary before the ordinary; ostentation and pompe, before true and secret verity; another mans, and that which is strange, which is borrowed, before that which is proper and naturall. And what greater follie can there be than all this? Now the rule of the wise is, not to suffer themselves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and iudge and esteeme of things, first by their true, naturall, and essentiall value, which is many times inward and secret, and then by their profit and commodity; the rest is but deceit or mockery. This is a matter of difficulty, all things being so disguised and sophisticated: many times the false and wicked being more plausible, than the true and good. And Aristotle saith, That there are many fallshoods, which are more probable, and haue a better outward appearance, than verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and diuine: *Si separaveris pretiosum à vili, quasi os meum eris: If thou wilt separate the pretious from those things that are base and vile, thou shalt be as it were my mouth:* And necessary before all workes; *quàm necessarium pretiis imponere? how necessary is it to put a price upon things?* for to small purpose doth a man endeavour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what ranke to place things; riches, health, beauty, nobility, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedencie and preheminance of things, is a high and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult, especially when many present themselves; for plurality hindreth, and herein men are neuer of one accord. The particular tastes and iudgements of men are diuers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all runne not together after one and the same thing, and so be a let or hindrance

But according to the wise.

Difficult.
Excellent.
Necessary.
Seneca.

From hence cometh the knowledge of things.

Eight principall
heads of goods
spirituall and
corporall.

drance to another. For example, let vs take the eight principall heads of all goods spirituall and corporall, foure of each kinde, that is to say, *Honesty, Health, Wisdome, Beauty, Ability* or *Aptnesse, Nobility, Science, Riches*. We doe here take the words according to the common sense and vse; *Wisdome* for a prudent and discreet manner of life and carriage with and towards all; *Ability* for sufficiency in affaires; *Science* for the knowledge of things acquired out of bookes: the other are cleare enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many diuers opinions are there? I haue told my owne, and I haue mingled, and in such sort enterlaced them together, that after and next vnto a spirituall, there is a corporall correspondent thereunto, to the end we may couple the soule and the body together. *Health* is in the body; that which *honesty* is in the soule; the health of the soule, is the honesty of the body: *Mens sana in corpore sano: A perfect minde in a sound body.* *Beauty*, is as *Wisdome*, the measure, proportion, and comeliness of the body; and *wisdome* a spirituall beauty. *Nobility* is a great aptnesse and disposition to vertue. *Sciences* are the riches of the spirit. Others doerange these parts otherwise, some place all the spirituall first, before they come to the first corporall, and the least of the spirit about the greatest of the body: some place them apart, and all diuersly, euery one aboundeth in his owne sense.

3
Choice and election of things.

After and from this sufficiency and part of prudence, to know well how to esteeme of things, doth spring and arise another, that is to know well how to chuse, where not onely the conscience, but also the sufficiency and prudence is likewise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficultie, and of a vice, of that which is honest, & that which is commodious, of duty and of profit: for the preheminance of the one is so great about the other, that when they come to encounter, honesty alwaies winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circumstance, and in publike affaires onely, as shall be said hereafter in the vertue of Prudence: but there are other choices farre more hard and troublesome, as when a man is caught or driuen into a narrow strait betweene two vices, as was that *Doctor Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to prostitute himselfe to the carnall

carrell pleasure of a base impure *Aethiopian*. The rule is, that when a man findeth himselfe in any doubt or perplexity touching the choice of those things that are not euill, he must choose that part that hath most honesty and iustice in it, for though it fall out otherwise than well, yet it shall be alwaies some comfort and glory to a man to haue chosen the better; and besides, a man knoweth not (if he had chosen the contrary part) what would haue hapned, or whether he had escaped his destiny: when a man doubteth which is the better and shortest way, he must take the straitest. And in those things that are euill (whereof there is neuer any choice) a man must auoid the more base and vniust: this is a rule of conscience, and belongeth to honesty. But to know which is the more honest, iust, and profitable, which the more dishonest, vniust, and vnprofitable, it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and sufficiencie. It seemeth that in such like straits and extremities, the surer and better way is to follow nature, and to iudge that the more iust and honest which cometh neereſt vnto nature, that the more vniust and dishonest which is farthest from it. Before we leaue this discourse of the choice and election of things, in two words let vs remoue this question: From whence cometh in our soules the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The *Stoicks* say, from an extraordinary, immoderate, strange, and rash operation of the soule. But a man may say, that neuer doe two things present themselues vnto vs, wherein there is not some difference or other, be it neuer so little, and that there is alwaies something in the one, which moueth vs to that choice, although it be insensible, and such as we cannot expresse. He that is equally ballanced betwixt two desires, can neuer choose; for euery choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality.

Another precept in this matter, is to take aduice and counsell of another: for, for a man to belceue himselfe, and to trust onely in himselfe, is very dangerous. Now here are required two aduertisements of Prudence, the one is in the choice of those, to whom a man must adresse himselfe for counsell; for there are some whose counsell we should rather auoid, and flie from, First, they must be honest and faithfull men (which

4
Consultation.

is here all one) and secondly, men sensible, aduised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellors, honesty, and sufficiency. A man may adde a third, and that is, that neither they nor their neereft and inward friends haue any particular interest in the businesse; for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to giue good counsell, being, as is said, honest men: yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophicall honesty, which is no way touched with it owne proper interest, be very rare, it is also a great point of folly to bring it into doubt and anxiety, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other aduertisement is, well to heare and entertaine the counsels, receiuing them without attending the euent, with iudgement and gentlenesse, delighting in the free deliuey of the truth. Hauing entertained and followed it as good, and comming from a good hand, and a friendly, he must not repent himselfe of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels haue bad euents. But a wise man must rather content himselfe to haue followed good counsell which hath brought forth bad effects, than bad counsell which hath had a happie euent, as *Marius; Sic correcti Marij temeritas gloriam ex culpa inuenit*: So the rashnesse and temerity of *Marius* receiued glory and honor euen from his fault: and not to doe like fooles, who hauing aduisedly deliberated and chosen, thinke afterwards to haue chosen the worse, because they weigh onely the reasons of the contrary opinion, neuer counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereunto. Thus much briefly be said of those that seeke counsell: of those that giue it, we shall speake in the vertue of Prudence, whereof the counsell is a great and sufficient part.

Lib. 3 cap. 2.
art 17.

5

Temperature
betwixt feare
and assurance.

The first aduice which I here giue, to cary himselfe well in his affaires, is a temperature and mediocrity betwixt too great a confidence, and distrust, feare and assurance. To trust and secure himselfe, doth many times hurt, and to distrust offendeth: he must take speciall heed of making any shew of distrust, euen when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemy. But yet a man is not to be ouer-credulous, and confident, except he

be of his best assured friends ; he must alwaies keepe the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose nor too streight. He must neuer speake all, and let that which he speaketh be euer true. He must neuer deceiue, but yet let him take heed he be not deceiued. He must euer temper and moderate that col-
lumbine innocencie and simplicity, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdom and subtilty, and keeping himselfe vpon his guard, and preserving himselfe from the deceits, treasons, and ambushments of another. Subtilty to defend, is as commendable, as it is dishonest to offend. He must neuer therefore aduance and engage himselfe so farre, but that he haue alwaies a meane when he will, and when it shall be necessary to retire himselfe without great dammage or dislike. He must neuer forsake his owne hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himselfe, that he fall into a kinde of presumption and carelesnesse of his affaires, like those that thinke that no man sees to cleere as themselues, that looke that euery man should yeeld vnto them, that no man should dare to entertaine a thought to displease them, and by that meanes become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end they are blinded, surprised, and deceiued.

Another aduice and very important, is to take all things in their times & seasons, and to good purpose, and for that cause, he must about all things auoid precipitation, an enemy to wisdom, the step-mother of all good actions, a vice much to be feared in young and youthfull people. It is in truth the worke of a skillfull and actiue man, to apply euery thing to his true end, well to manage all occasions and commodities, to make vse both of the times and the meanes. All things haue their seasons, and euen the good, which a man may doe without purpose. Now too much speed and precipitation is contrary hereunto, which troubleth, marreth, and confoundeth all : *Canis festinans cacos facit catulos* : A forward bitch bringeth forth blinde whelpes : It proceedeth commonly from that passion which carieth vs ; *Nam quicupit, festinat : qui festinat evertit : unde festinatio improvida & caca : duo aduersissima recta menti celeritas & ira* : For who so desires, doth hasten ; who hasteth, destroyeth : hastinesse therefore is improuident and blinde : hastinesse and anger are two of the greatest aduersaries to a discreet minde :

6
To take time
and occasion.
Against pre-
cipation.

Idleness.

and often enough from insufficiency. The contrarie vice, laziness, sloth, carelesnesse, which seemeth sometimes to haue some aire of maturity and wisdom, is likewise pernicious and dangerous, especially in the execution. For it is said, that it is lawfull to be slow and long in deliberation and consultation, but not in the execution; and therefore the wisest say, That a man must consult slowly, execute speedily, deliberate with leisure, and with speed accomplish. It falleth out sometimes that the contrary is practised with good success, and that a man is happy in the event, though he haue bene sudden and rash in his deliberation; *Subiti consilij, eventus felices*: Sudden counsels, happie events: But this is very seldome, and by chance or fortune, according to which we must not rule and direct our selues, but take heed lest enuy and emulation ouertake vs; for commonly a long and vnprofitable repentance is the reward of headlong hastinesse. Behold then two rocks and extremities which we must equally auoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be ready, whilest they be greene and raw, as to suffer them to grow till they be ouer-ripe and past the taking. The first fault, young men and forward hot-spurres commit, who for want of patience, giue no leisure to time and the heauens to doe any thing for them, they run, but they catch nothing: The second, heauie, lazie, and dull spirited men doe commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it, a man must haue his spirit valiant and vigilant, and likewise patient: he must foresee it, watch, attend it, see it comming, and prepare for it, and so take it iust at that instant when it is ready.

7
Industrie and
Fortune.

The seventh aduice is, well to cary himselfe with these two masters and superintendents of the affaires of the world, which are industrie or vertue, and fortune. It is an ancient question which of these two hath most credit, force, and authoritie: for it is out of all doubt, that both haue; and it is clearly false, that one only doth all, and the other nothing: It were perhaps to be wished that it were true, and that one only had the whole empire, the businesse would goe the better, a man would wholly attend that, whereby it would be the more easie; the difficulty is to ioyne them together, and to attend them both. Commonly they that settle themselues vnto the one, contemne

contemne the other, the younger and bolder sort respect and trust to fortune, hoping much good from it, and many times by them it worketh great matters, in so much that it seemes to fauour them; the more ancient and staied, trust to their industrie; and these of the two haue the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two, industrie is the more honest, the more certaine, glorious; for though fortune be contrary to it, and shall make all industry and diligence vaine, yet neuerthelesse there remaineth great contentment, in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or duty, hath caried himselfe like a man of courage. They that follow the other part, are in danger to attend in vaine, & though perhaps things succeed according to their owne desires, yet they want that honour and glory that the former hath. Now the aduice of wisdome is, not wholly, and so much to settle our selues to the one, that we contemne, and exclude the other; for they haue both a good part, yea many times they help, and doe mutually attend one the other. A wise man then must cary himselfe with them both, but yet vnequally, for the aduantage and preheminence must be giuen, as hath beene said, to vertue, industrie; *Virtute duce, comite fortuna: Vertue the guide, fortune the companion, the follower.* This aduice likewise is required, to keepe discretion, which seasoneth and giueth a taste or relish to all things; this is not a particular qualitie, but common, which minglet h it selfe in all: Indiscretion marreth all, and takerh away the grace from the best actions, whether it be to doe good to another, for all gratifications are not well bestowed vpon all sorts of people; or to excuse himselfe, for inconsiderate excuses serue for accusations; or to play the part of an honest and courteous man, for a man may exceed and degenerate into rusticitie; or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

CHAP. XI.

To keepe himselfe alwayes ready for death, a fruit of wisdome.

THe day of death is the master day, and Iudge of all other daies, the triall and touch-stone of all the actions of our life. The day of death.

life. Then doe wee make our greatest assay, and gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that iudgeth of the life of a man, must looke how he carieth himselfe at his death; for the end crowneth the worke, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an euill defameth and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well iudge of any, without wronging of him, before he hath plaied the last act of his Comedie, which is without all doubt the most difficult. *Epaminondas* one of the wise men of *Greece*, being demanded whom of three men he esteemed most, himselfe, *Chabrias*, or *Iphicrates*, answered; We must first see all three die, before we resolute that question: the reason is, because in all the rest a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble.

*Nam vera voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eijciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.*

Then onely, onely then, and then no doubt

Doe men unmaske, and now the truth comes out.

Fortune from farre seemeth to watch, and lie in wait for vs, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her power, and in a moment ouerthrow all that we haue built, and gathered together in many yeeres, and to make vs crie out with *Laberius*; *Nimirum hac die unna plus vixi mihi, quam vivendum fuit*: Surely I haue liued more to my selfe in this one day, than in all the time before. And so was it well and wisely said of *Solon* to *Cresus*; *Ante obitum nemo beatus*: Before death no man is happy.

It is an excellent thing to learne to die, it is the studie of wisdome, which aimeth wholly at this end: hee hath not spent his life ill, that hath learned to die well; and hee hath lost his whole time, that knowes not well how to end it. *Male vivit, quisquis nescit bene mori: non frustra nascitur qui bene moritur: nec inutiliter vixit, qui feliciter desit: Mori tota vita descendum est, & precipuum ex vita officys est.* Hee liueth badly, that knoweth not how to die well; he was not borne in vaine, that dieth well; neither hath he liued vnprofitably, that departeth happily: To die, is the studie and learning of all our life, and the chiefeft thing, and dutie of life. He shoots not well, that lookes not on the marke; and hee cannot liue well that hath not an eye to his death. To be bricfe, the science of dying is the

2

To know how
to die.

Senec.

the science of libertie, the way to feare nothing, to liue well, contentedly and peaceably; without this knowledge there is no more pleasure in life, than in the fruition of that thing which a man seareth alwayes to lose.

First, and aboue all, wee must endeouour that our sinnes die before our selues: Secondly, that wee be alwayes ready and prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that houre he haue no other thing to doe, but to die! that hee haue no more need of any thing, not of time, not of himselfe, but sweetly and contentedly departeth this life, saying:

Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi:

I haue done, my taske is set: or,

Scilicet videlicet,

To liue's a gift; to die's a debt.

Thirdly we must endeouour, that our death be voluntarie; for to die well, is to die willingly.

It seemeth that a man may carry himselfe in death fve diuers waies: He may feare and flie it, as a very great euill; attend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing naturall, ineuitable, reasonable; contemne it, as a thing indifferent, and of no great importance; desire and seeke after it, as the onely haue of rest from all the torments of this life, yea a very great gaine; giue it to himselfe, by taking away his owne life. Of these fve, the three middle-most are good, besitting a good and settled soule, although diuersly, and in a different condition of life; the two extremes are vitious and out of weaknesse, though it be with diuers visages. A word or two of them all.

4
A fve-fold manner of cariages in death.

The first is not approued by men of vnderstanding, though by the greater part it be practised: a testimonie of great weaknesse. Against these kinde of men, and for your better comfort, either against your owne death, or the death of another, thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men feare more, or haue more in horroure than death: neuer thelesse, there is not a thing where there is lesse occasion or matter of feare, or that contrarily yeeldeth greater reasons to perswade vs with resolution to accept of it. And therefore we must say, that it is a meere opinion, and a vulgar error that hath won the world thus to thinke of it. Wee giue too much credit to the

5
To feare death.

inconsi-

It is opinion.

inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell vs, That it is a very great euill, and to little credit to wisdom it selfe which teacheth vs, that it is a freedome from all euils and the haue of life. Neuer did a present death doe hurt to any man; and some that haue made triall, and partly knew what it is, complaine not of it: and if death be counted an euill, it is of all the euils the onely that doth no harme, that hath no euill in it; it is the imagination only of death before it come, that maketh vs to feare it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not veritie; and it is truly where opinion bandeth it selfe most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in vs, with the maske of death: there cannot be any reason to feare it, because no man knowes what it is, that he should feare it: for why, or how should a man feare that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely said he, that of all others was accounted the wisest, that to feare death is to make shew of greater vnderstanding and sufficiencie than can be in a man, by seeming to know that, that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himselfe; for being sollicitated at his death by his friends, to pleade before the Iudges, for his iustification, and for his life, this oration he made vnto them: My masters and friends, if I should pleade for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speake against my selfe, and desire my owne losse and hinderance, because I know not what it is to die, nor what good or ill there is in death: they that feare to die presume to know it; as for my selfe, I am utterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired. Those things that I know to be euill, as to offend my neighbour, I flie and auoid; those that I know not to be euill, as death, I cannot feare. And therefore I commit my selfe vnto your selues; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for me to die, or not to die, determine you thereof as you shall thinke good.

6
It is weaknesse.

For a man to torment himselfe with the feare of death, it is first great weaknesse and cowardlinesse: There is not a woman that in few dayes is not appeased and content with the death, yea the most painfull that may be, either of her husband or her childe; And why should not reason and wisdom doe that in an houre, at an instant (as we haue a thousand examples)

amples) which time performeth in a foole, in the weakest sex? What vse is there of wisdom and constancie in man, to what end serue they, if they speed him not in a good action, if hee can doe no more with their helpe, than a foole with his follie? From this weaknesse it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolue themselues, that it is their last houre, and there is not any thing where this deceitfull hope doth more busie man, which, it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter, and that all things haue an interest in vs, and at our death must suffer with vs, so much doe we esteeme our selues.

Againe, a man sheweth himselfe herein vniust; for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he feare it? If an euill thing, why doth he make it worse, and adde vnto death euill vpon euill, sorrow and griefe where there is none? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest into the sea, to let men know how little he is grieued with his losses.

Finally, to feare death, is for a man to be an enemy to himselfe, and to his owne life: for hee can neuer liue at ease and contentedly, that feareth to die. That man is only a free man, which feareth not death; and contrarily, life is but a slavery if it were not made free by death: For death is the onely stay of our liberty, the common and ready receptacle of all euils: It is then a miserie (and miserable are all that doe it) to trouble our life with the care and feare of death, and our death with the care of life.

But to say the truth, what complaints and murmuring would there be against nature, if death were not, if we should haue continued here, will wee, nill we, with and against our owne wills? doubtlesse men would haue cursed nature for it. Imagine with thy selfe how much more insupportable, and painefull a durable life would haue beene, than a life with a condition to leaue it. *Chiron* refused immortallitie, being informed of the conditions thereof by the god of Time, *Saturne* his father. Doubtlesse death is a very beautifull and rich inuention of nature; *Optimum natura inuentum, nusquam satis laudatum*: The best inuention of nature, neuer sufficiently to be praised: and a very proper and profitable, necessary to many things;

7
In iustice.

8
To be enemy to
his owne life.

9

things; If it were quite taken from vs, wee should desire it more, than now we feare it, yea thirst after it more than life it selfe; such a remedy is it against so many euils: such a meane to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitternesse? doubtlesse men would runne vnto it with great desire and indiscretion. To keepe therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither loue life too much, nor flie it, feare death, nor runne after it, both of them, sweetnesse and sharpnesse, are therein tempered together.

IO
Remedies not to
feare death.

The remedy that the vulgar sort doe giue herein, is too simple; and that is, neuer to think or speake thereof; Besides that such a kind of carelesnesse cannot lodge in the head of a man of vnderstanding, it would likewise at the last cost him deare: for death comming vnawares, & vnexpected, what torments, out-cries, furies and despaires are there commonly seene? Wisdome aduiseeth much better, that is, to attend and expect death with a constant foot, and to encounter it: and the better to do this, it giueth vs contrary counsell to the vulgar sort, that is, to haue it alwayes in our thoughts, to praetise it, to accustom our selues vnto it, to tame it, to present it vnto vs at all houres, to expect it, not onely in places suspected and dangerous, but in the midst of feasts and sports: that the burden of our song be, *Remember thy end*; that others are dead, that thought to haue liued as long as our selues; that that which hapned then to them may happen now to vs; following herein the custome of the *Egyptians*, who in their solemne banquets placed the image of death before their eyes; and of the *Christians* and all other, who haue their Church-yards neere their temples and other publike and frequented places, that men might alwayes (as saith *Lycurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is vncertaine in what place death attends vs, and therefore let vs attend death in all places, and be alwayes ready to receiue it.

*Omne crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,
Grata superveniet qua non sperabitur hora.
Thinke every day thy last; each ready bee,
And so th'uncertaine houre shall welcome thee.*

II
The grievances
and excuses of

But let vs consider the excuses and grievances that these poore people alledge to couer and colour their complaints, which

which are all vaine and friuolous : It grieueth them to die young, and they complaine as well in regard of others as themselves, that death preuenteth them and cutteth them off in the flowre and strength of their yeeres. The complaint of the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account nothing precious, but that which is long, and durable ; whereas contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin, fine and delicate. It is the marke of a skilfull worke-master to enclose much in a little space : and a man may say, that it is fatall to great and glorious men, not to liue long ; Great vertue, and great or long life doe seldome or neuer meet together. Life is measured by the end, provided that that be good, and all the rest hath a proportion thereunto : the quantitie is nothing to make it more or lesse happie, no more than the greatnesse of a circle makes the circle more round than the lesse ; the figure here doth all : A little man is as perfect a man as a greater : Neither men nor their liues are measured by the ell.

fearefull men
answered.

Againe, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends, or to be slaine, & to remaine vnburied : they desire to die in peace, in their beds, amongst their friends, being comforted by them and comforting them. All they that follow the warres, and ride post to be in the battell, are not of this minde : these men runne willingly to their end, and seeke a tombe amongst the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children feare men when they are masked ; discover their faces, and they feare them no more : And euen so beleue it, fire and sword astonish vs, when wee thinke of them ; take off their maske, the death wherewith they threaten vs, is but the same death wherewith women and children die.

2

They are troubled to thinke they must leaue all the world. And why ? They haue seene all, one day is like another, there is no other light, nor other night, nor other Sunne, nor other course of the world. One yeere telleth vs that all things grow euery yeere worse and worse, they haue seene the childhood, the youth, the virility, the old age of the world : there is no Art, no way to begin againe.

3

Yea, but they leaue their parents and their friends. Where they goe they shall finde more, and such as they haue neuer yet seene,

4

seene, and those they leaue behinde them and desire so much shall shortly follow them.

5 But what shall become of their small children and orphans left without guide, without support? As if those their children were more theirs than Gods, or as if they could loue them more than he that is their first and their truest father: and how many such so left haue risen to higher place and greater abilitie than other men?

6 But it may be they feare to goe alone. This is great simplicitie, so many people dying with them, and at the selfe-same houre.

7 Finally, they goe into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawfull to resume it, they would refuse it, and if a man were worthie to know what it is before he receiue it, he would neuer accept of it: *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus*: No man would accept of life, if he knew what he receiued. Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either wholly nothing as miscreants beleue, or in farre better state than before, as the wisest of the world doe affirme? Why then are they offended with death, since it quits them of all grieve? The selfe-same iourney they haue made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without feare, they make againe from life vnto death; *Reverti unde veneris, quid grave est?* To returne from whence thou camest, what burden, what grieve is it?

8 But it may be that the spectacle of death displeaseth them, because they that die looke gaffly. It is true, but this is not death, but the maske of death, that which is hid vnder it, is very beautifull, for death hath nothing in it that is fearefull: we haue sent idle and poore spies, to know it, who report not what they haue seene, but what they haue heard, and what they feare.

9 But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh vs from them, and vs from our selues, it taketh vs from that we know, and haue been accustomed vnto, and bringeth vs to an estate vnknowne, *At horremus ignota*: But we abhorre things vnknowne; it taketh vs from the light, to bring vs into darknesse; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution. These are the weightiest obiections: whereunto in a word

word a man may answer, that death being the ineuitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we need not dispute so much thereof, for it is a folly to feare that which a man cannot auoid. *Dementis est timere mortem, quia certa expectantur, dubia metuntur, mors habet necessitatem aquam & inuictam* : It is meeere folly to feare death, because things certaine are expected ; doubtfull things are feared ; the necessity of death is most iust and inuincible. But these kinde of people make not their count well, for it is quite contrary to that which they say, for in stead of taking any thing from vs, it giueth vs all ; in stead of taking vs from our selues, it sets vs in liberty, and makes vs free to our selues ; in stead of bringing vs into darknesse, it taketh it from vs, and puts vs into the light ; and it doth the same to vs, that we doe to all fruits, spoiling them of their barks, their shels, their foldings, their speres, their skinnes, to bring them into sight, vse, nature ; *Ita solet fieri, pereunt semper uelamenta nascentium* ; So it was wont to be done, for alwaies the veils and conering of euery thing doth perish ; It taketh vs from a strait, incommodious, rumatike darke place, where we see but a small part of the heauens, and the light but a farre off, through the two narrow holes of our eies, to bring vs into an open liberty, an assured health, a perpetuall light, into such a place, such an estate, where we may wholly see the whole heauens, and the light in his naturall place ; *Aequaliter tibi splendet omne cali latus, totam lucem suo loco propè totus aspicias quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intue- ris & miraris*. Euery part of heauen shall together shine vpon thee, who wholly shalt behold all the glory thereof in his due place, which now through the streight and narrow passage of the sight, thou dost but see and discerne a farre off : To conclude, it taketh vs from that death, which beganne in the wombe of our mother, and now endeth, to bring vs to that life which shall neuer end. *Dies iste quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est* : This day which thou fearest as thy last, is the birth day of eternity.

The second manner of the cariage of man in this matter of death, is of a good, sweer, and moderate soule, and is iustly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content

12

To attend death
it is good.

A a

them-

themselves to indure it, but gouerning themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it commeth. This is a well tempered mediocrity, futable to such a condition of life, betweene the extremities (which are to desire and feare, to seeke and to flie, vitious and faulty : *Summum ne metuas diem nec optes* (*mortem concupiscentes, & timentes eque objurgat Epicurus*) Feare not thy last day, neither wish for it (for both to desire death, and to feare it, is alike condemned by Epicurus) if they be not couered and excused by some reason, not common and ordinary, as shall be said in his place. To seeke and desire death is ill ; it is iniustice to desire death without a cause, and to be out of charity with the world, which our liues may be beneficiall vnto. It is to be vnthankfull to nature, to contemne it, and not to make the best vse thereof: to be ouer anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that estate that is not burthensome, and we are called vnto. To flie and feare death on the other side, is against nature, reason, iustice, and all dutie.

13
Death is natural.

For to die it is a thing naturall, necessarie, and ineuitable, iust, and reasonable ; Naturall, for it is a part of the order of the whole Vniuerse, and of the life of the world : wilt thou then that the world be ruinated, and a new made for thy selfe ? Death holdeth a high place in the policie and great commonwealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the workes of nature : the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others : *Sic rerum summa novatur* : And it is not onely a part of this great whole Vniuerse, but of our particular essence, not lesse essentiall than to liue, to be borne. In flying death, thou fliest thy selfe ; thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieueth thee to die, why wert thou borne ? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to goe forth againe, and therefore he that is not willing to goe forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to death as to life.

Nascentes morimur, finisq; ab origine pendet.

Man borne to die, doth oftentimes doe so,

Even (if he could) before he can say, no :

His

*His birth and death, concurring so together
As doe a dogs two ends in coldest weather.*

Sola mors ius æquum est generis humani, vivere noluit qui mori non vult; vita cum exceptione mortis data est; tam stultus qui timet mortem, quàm qui senectutem: Death onely is mans due right; he should not desire to live, that would not desire to die; life is giuen vs with exception of death; As foolish is he that feareth to die, as to be old.

To be vnwilling to die, is to be vnwilling to be a man, for all men are mortall, and therefore a wise man said, and that without passion, hauing receiued newes of the death of his sonne; I knew I begot, and bred him vp a mortall man. Death being then a thing so naturall and essentiall, both for the world in grosse, and for thy selfe in particular, why should it be horrible vnto thee? Thou goest against nature, the feare of griefe and paine is naturall, but not of death: for being so seruiceable to nature, and nature hauing instituted it, to what end should it imprint in vs a hatred and horror thereof? Children and beasts feare not death, yea many times they suffer it cheerefully: it is not then nature that teacheth vs to feare it, but rather to attend and receiue it, as being sent by it.

Secondly, it is necessary, fatall, ineuitable; and this thou knowest, that fearest and weepest. What greater folly can there be, than for a man to torment himselfe for nothing, and that willingly and of purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knowes to be inexorable; to knocke at that doore, that cannot be opened? What is there more inexorable and deafe than death? We must therefore feare things vncertaine; doe our best endeouours in things that are not remediable; but such as are certaine, as death, we must attend, and grow resolute in things past remedy. The sot feareth and flieth death; the foole seekes and runnes after it; the wise man attendeth it: It is folly to griue at that, that cannot be mended; to feare that, that cannot be auoided: *Feras non culpes, quod vitari non potest? Wilt thou not beare the blowes thou canst not auoid?* The example of *Dauid* is excellent, who vnderstanding of the death of his deare childe, put on his best apparell, and made himselfe merry, saying to those that wonde-

14
Necessary.

red at this kinde of cariage, that whilest his sonneliued, he importuned God for his recouery, but being dead, that care was ended, and there was no remedy. The foole thinks he maketh a better answer, to say, that that is the cause of his griefe, and that he tormenteth himselfe, because there is no remedy, but he doubleth and perfecteth his owne folly thereby. *Scienter frustra niti extrema dementia est : It is extreme madnesse to labour mittingly, and on set purpose in vaine.* Now death being so necessary and ineuitable, it is not onely to no purpose to feare, but making of necessity a vertue, we must welcome it and receiue it kindly ; for it is better for vs to goe to death, than that death should come to vs, to catch that, before that catch vs.

15
Iust and reason-
able.

Thirdly, to die is a thing reasonable and iust, it is reason to ariue to that place, towards which we are alwaies walking, and if a man feare to come thither, let him not walke, but stay himselfe, or turne backe againe, which is impossible to doe. It is reason that thou giue place to others, since others haue giuen place to thee : If thou haue made thy commodity of this life, thou must be satisfied and be gone, as he that is invited to a banquet takes his refection and departeth. If thou haue not knowen how to make vse and profit thereof, what needest thou care if thou lose it ? or to what end wouldest thou keepe it ? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawne that must be restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy owne schedule, thy faith, thy duty ? It is then against reason to spurne against death, since that thereby thou acquirest thy selfe of so much, and dischargest thy selfe of so great an account. It is a thing generall and common to all, to die ; why then troublest thou thy selfe ? Wilt thou haue a new priuiledge, that was yet neuer scene, and be a lone man by thy selfe ? Why fearest thou to goe whither all the world goeth ? where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee ? Death is equally certaine to all, and equality is the first part of equiry : *Omnes eodem cogimur : omnium versatur urna ; serius ocyus sors exitura, &c.* We all are drinen thereunto : men daily die, euen as their lot fallles forth, &c.

16
To contemne

The third is the part of a valiant and generous minde, which

which is practised with reason, in a publike, eleuated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters goe, a man must more account thereof than of his life, which is placed vpon the stage and scaffold of this world: he must runne his race with resolution, that he may giue a lustre to his other actions, and performe those things that are profitable and exemplary. He must lay downe his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemne death, shall neuer not onely performe any thing of worth, but he exposeth himselfe to diuers dangers; for whilest he goeth about to keepe his life safe and sure, he laieth open and hazardeth his deuoir, his honour, his vertue and honesty. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldest, and most honourable exploits whether in good or euill. Hee that feareth not to die feares nothing; he doth whatsoever he will, he makes himselfe a master both of his owne life, and of anothers: the contempt of death, is the true and liuely source of all the beautifull and generous actions of men: from hence are deriued the braue resolutions and free speeches of vertue vttered by so many great personages. *Eluidius Priscus* whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the Senate, or comming, to speake as he would haue him, answered, That as he was a Senator, it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there, he were required to giue his aduice, he would speake freely that which his conscience commanded him. Being threatned by the same man, that if he spake he should die; Did I euer tell you (saith he) that I was immortall? Do you what you will, and I will doe what I ought: It is in your power to put me vnjustly to death, and in me to die constantlie. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yeeld themselues to *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into their country with a great power; one for the rest answered, What hard dealing can they suffer that feare not to die? And being told by the same *Philip* that he would breake and hinder all their designements; What, say they, will he likewise hinder vs from dying? Another being asked by what meanes a man may liue free,

death is good, if
it be for a thing
that deserves it.

answered, By contemning death. And another youth being taken and sold for a slaue, said to him that bought him, Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a foole to liue a slaue whilest I may be free, and whilest he spake, cast himselfe down from the top of the house. A wise man said vnto another, deliberating with himselfe how he might take away his life, to free himselfe from an euill that at that time pressed him sore, Thou dost not deliberate of any great matter : it is no great thing to liue, thy slaues, thy beasts doe liue, but it is a great matter to die honestly, wisely, constantly. To conclude and crowne this article ; Our religion hath not had a more firme and assured foundation, and wherein the author thereof hath more insisted, than the contempt of this life. But many there are that make a shew of contemning death, when they feare it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it grieueth them to die : *Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihili aestimo* : I would not die, but I make little account of death. Many deliberate in their health and soundest iudgements to suffer death with constancie, nay to murder themselves, a part played by many, and for which end *Helioabalus* made many sumptuous preparations ; but being come to the point, some were terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poisoned himselfe. Others haue turned away their eies and their thoughts, as if they would steale vpon it, swallowing it downe insensibly as men take pilles, according to that saying of *Cesar*, That the best death was the shortest ; and of *Pliny*, That a short death was the happiest houre of a mans life. Now no man can be said to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eies open, as *Socrates* did, who had thirry whole daies to ruminare and to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeouour, mildly and cheerefully. *Pomponius Atticus*, *Tullius Marcellinus*, Romans, *Cleantes* the Philosopher, all three almost after one manner : for hauing assaied to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those maladies that did torment them, but finding themselves rather cured thereby, neuertheless they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to

pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Orho* and *Cato* hauing prepared all things fit for their death, vpon the very point of the execution setled themselues to sleepe, and slept profoundly, being no more astonished at death, than at any other ordinary and light accident.

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute minde, practised in former times by great and holy personages, and that in two cases, the one the more naturall and lawfull, is a painfull and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a farre worse death: To be brieft, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedy. This is to desire death as the retrait and onely haue from the torments of this life, the soueraigne good of nature, the only stay and pillar of our liberty. It is imbecillity to yeeld vnto euils, but it is folly to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to liue is rather a burthen than a blessing, and there is more ill in life than good; for, to preferue our life, to increase our torment, is against nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to auoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more then to flie those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farre worse than death, for which we should rather die and not liue at all, than liue. And therefore the *Lacedemonians* being cruelly threatened by *Antipater*, if they yeelded not to his demand, answered; If thou threaten vs with any thing that is worse than death, death shall be welcome vnto vs. And the wisest were wont to say, That a wise man liueth as long as he should, not so long as he can, death being more at his command and in his power, than life. Life hath but one entrance, and that too dependeth vpon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our owne willes, and the more voluntary it is, the more honourable; and there are a thousand waies vnto it. We may want meanes whereby to liue, but not to die. Life may be taken away from euery man, by euery man, but not death; *Vbiq; mors est; optime hoc cavit Deus, eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, at nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patent: Death is euery where; God best foresaw this; one man may bereane another of life, but of death no man; whereunto there are infinite waies and meanes:* The most fauourable present that nature hath bestowed vpon vs, and that takech

17
To desire death.

away from vs all meanes of complaint, is, that it hath left vn-
to vs the key of the closet, liberty to die when we will. Where-
fore complainest thou in this world ? it holdeth thee not : if
thou liue in paine, thy idlenesse and feare is the cause ; for to
die, there is nothing necessary, but a will.

The other case is a liuely apprehension and desire of the
lifeto come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after
a great gaine, the seed of a better life, the bridge vnto Paradise,
the way to all good, and an earnest penny of the resurrection.
A firme beleefe and hope of these things is incompatible with
the feare and horror of death : it perswadeth vs rather to be
weary of this life, and to desire death ; *Vitam habere in patien-*
tia, & mortem in desiderio ; To endure our life with patience,
but rather to desire death : To haue life in affliction, and death
in affection : their life is a crosse, their death a comfort, and
therefore their vowes and their voices are ; *cupio dissolui : mihi*
mors lucrum : quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius ? I de-
sire to be dissolued : for death is profitable vnto me : who shall
then free me from death ? And for this cause those Philoso-
phers and Christians haue beene iustly reproched (which is
to be vnderstood of those that are weake and idle, and not of
all) that play the publike dissemblers, and doe not in verity
beleue that which they doe so much talke of, and so highly
commend, touching that happy immortality, and those vn-
speakable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, and
feare death so much, the necessary passage thereunto.

18

To kill himselfe.

The fift and last, is the execution of this precedent desire,
which is for a man to be his owne executioner, and the au-
thor of his owne death. This seemeth to proceed from ver-
tue, and the greatnesse of a mans courage, hauing beene anci-
ently practised by the greatest and most excellent men and
women of euery nation and religion, *Greekes, Romans, Egyp-*
tians, Persians, Medes, French, Indians, Philosophers of all
sects, *Jewes*, witnes that good old man *Razis*, called the father
of the *Jewes* for his vertue ; and his wiues, who vnder *Antio-*
chus, hauing circumcised their children, cast themselues head-
long from the rocke with them: And Christians too, witnesse
those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius* and *Sophronia*, whereof
the first, with his mother and sisters, cast himselfe into the
riuer,

riuer, and the other killed her selfe with a knife, to auoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour : Yea witnesse diuers people and whole cities, as *Capona* in *Italy*, *Astupa*, *Numantia* in *Spaine* besieged by the *Romans* ; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip*, a citie in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approued and authorized by many common-weales, by lawes and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the Ile of *Cea* ; in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean* Ilands, and iustified by many great reasons, drawne from the precedent article, which is of the iust desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to aske, to seeke after death, why should it be an ill act to giue it vnto our selues ? If a mans owne death be iust in the will, why should it not be as iust in the hand, and the execution ? Why should I expect that from another, which I can doe my selfe ? and why should it not be better to giue it, than to suffer another to giue it ; to meet, than to attend it ? for the fairest death is the more voluntarie. Finally, I offend not the law made against theeues and robbers, when I take but my owne goods, and cut but my owne purse ; neither am I guiltie of the lawes made against murderers by taking away my owne life. But this opinion is reprovved by diuers, not onely Christians, but Iewes, as *Iosephus* disputeth against his captaines in the caue *du Pais* : and Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not onely for a vice of cowardlines and impatiencie, for it is for a man to hide himselfe from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and liuely vertue must neuer yeeld, for euils and crosses are nourishments thereunto, and it is greater constancie well to vse the chaine wherewith wee are tied, than to breake it ; and more settled resolution in *Regulus*, than in *Cato*.

Rebus in aduersis facile est contemnere vitam,

Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.

Si fractus illabitur orbis

Impavidum ferient ruinae.

'T is no vertue to despise

A life long led in miseries:

But to smile in fortune rude,

Is the mott of fortitude.

The

*The ruinous world, should it on this man fall,
Kill him it may, daunt him it neuer shall.*

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commandement of him that gaue it him, we are not here for our selues, nor our owne masters. This then is not a matter beyond all doubt or disputation.

It is first beyond all doubt, that we are not to attempt this last exploit without very great and iust cause (nay I cannot see how any cause should be great and iust enough) to the end that it be as they say *εὐλογος εἰσαγγελία*, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoever some say, that a man may die for light causes, since they that hold vs in life are not weightie. It is ingratitude to nature, not to accept and vse her present, it is a signe of lightnesse to be too anxious and scrupulous, to break company for matters of no moment, and not for such as are iust and lawfull, if there be any such. And therefore they had not a sufficient excuse, and iust cause of their death, of whom I made mention before, *Pomponius Atticus*, *Marcellinus*, and *Cleantes*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this onely reason, because they were already neere vnto it. The wiues of *Petius*, of *Scantius*, of *Labio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and diuers others, who died onely to accompany their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Cato* and others, who died because their businesse succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill vsage at their hands. They that haue murdered themselues because they would not liue at the mercie, and by the grace and fauour of those whom they hated, as *Granius Siluanus*, and *Statius Prætextatus* being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recouer a shame and dishonour past, as that *Romane Lucretia*, *Spartacus* the sonne of *Queene Tomiris*, *Boges* the Lieutenant of *King Xerxes*. They that for no particular cause, but only because they see the weale-publike in a bad and declining estate, murder themselues, as *Nerna* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Viricus*, *Inbellius* in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with liuing, or for private cause loath to liue any longer.

Neither

Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and iust, but that it be necessary and remediable, and that all manner of meanes to preserve life be first put in practise. For precipitation and anticipated despaire is very vicious, as in *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reliques of the Roman liberty whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Cleomenes*, must manage his life, and make use thereof to the uttermost: for to take it away, a man neuer wants time, it is a remedy which he hath alwaies in his owne hands; but the state of things may change and grow better. *Ioseph* and diuers others haue to their great benefit practised this counsell: things that seeme altogether desperate, doe many times change and haue a happy successe; *Aliquis carnifici suo superstes fuit: Some men haue out-lined their miseries.*

*Multa dies variusq; labor mutabilis aevi
Retulit in melius.*

*Haue patience man, and be content to live;
That which a day denies, a day may giue.*

A man must cary himselfe in his place and calling as a defendant against him that assaileth him, *Cum moderamine inculcata tutele: with the government of blamelesse protection*: he must trie all manner of meanes before he come to this extremitie. Secondly, and without doubt it is far better and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firme to the end, than fearefully and cowardly to flie or die; but forasmuch as it is a gift not giuen vnto all, no more than continencie is: *Non omnes capiunt verbum istud, unde melius nubere quam uri: All men like not this saying, Better to marie than to burne*: the question is, whether an insupportable and remediable euil hapning, which may vtterly vndoe and turne topsie turuie our whole resolution, and drive vs into despaire, despite and murmuring against God, it be more expedient, or a lesse euil for a man courageously to deliuer himselfe, hauing his senses sound and settled, than by standing to it, for feare of failing in his duty, expose himselfe to the danger of sinking and being vtterly lost. It is not a lesse euill to quit the place, than to be obstinate and perish, to flie, than to be taken. It is true that it seemeth by all humane and philosophicall reason to be practised, as hath beene said, by so many famous people of

of all countries and climates. But Christianitie doth no way approue it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

20

Finally, it is a great point of wisdom to learne to know the point and period, to chuse a fit houre to die: Euery man hath his time and season to die; some preuent it, others prolong it: there is weaknesse and valour in them both, but there is required discretion. How many men haue suruiued their glory, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, haue darkned it againe, and liued to helpe burie their owne honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no relish or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthie clout sowed to the hemme of a rich and beautifull ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteeth and growes worse and worse; and the losse is as great too, if it be gathered too soone. Many saints and holy men haue fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the Church and weale-publike, though in respect of their own particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charitie to desire to liue for the benefit of another; *Si populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem: If I am needfull to thy people, I refuse not labour.*

21

Formes of death
diuers.

Death hath diuers formes, some more easie than other, and taketh diuers qualities according to the fantasie of euery one. Among those that are naturall, they that proceed from weaknesse and a numnesse of the members are the sweetest and the easiest: among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, and the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplarie and demonstratiue death of constancie and sufficiencie; this is to consider another thing, and to seek their owne reputation: but this is vanitie, for this is no act of societie, but of one only person, who hath enough to do with himselfe, to minister to himselfe inward comfort, and hath no need to trouble himselfe with what belongeth to another, especially all the interest he hath in his reputation, ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it selfe, quiet, solitarie, and attendeth wholly to that, which at that time is fittest. That great assistance of parents and friends, bringeth a thousand discommodities, it oppresseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his eares, another his eyes, another his mouth; their cries and complaints, if they be true, stifle the heart;

heart; if sained, afflict and torment it. Many great personages haue sought to die farre from their friends, to auoid this inconuenience, accounting it a childish thing, and a foolish humour, to be willing by their miseries to moue sorrow and compassion in their friends; we commend constancie to suffer bad fortune, we accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our owne case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with vs, but they must afflict themselues too: A wise man that is sicke should content himselfe with the setled countenance of his assistants.

CHAP. XII.

To maintaine himselfe in true tranquillitie of spirit, the fruit and crowne of wisdom, and the conclusion of this Booke.

THE tranquillitie of the spirit is the soueraigne good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wisest secke by sea and by land, on foot and a horse-backe; all our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labours and studies, the crowne of wisdom. But lest a man should mistake himselfe herein, you must know that this tranquillitie is not a retrait or vacation from all affaires, a delightfull solitarinesse and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelesnesse of all things: if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enioy as great a good as the wisest can aspire vnto with all their studie: Neither multitude nor scarcitie of businesse doth any thing herein. It is a beautifull, sweet, equall, iust, firme and pleasant estate of the soule, which neither businesse nor idlenesse, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time can any way trouble, alter, mend, or depresse; *Vera tranquillitas non concuti: Nothing troubles true tranquillitie.*

Themeanes to attaine thereunto, to get and preferue it, are the points that I haue handled in this second booke, whercof this is a brieue collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets and impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertaine and preferue it. The things

things that do most hinder and trouble the rest and tranquillitie of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous; and secondly desires and passions, which ingender in vs a kinde of delicacie and difficultie: which are the cause that a man is neuer content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrary fortunes, prosperity and aduersitie, as with two violent and mighty winds: and finally, that vile and base captiuitie wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the iudgement and will) is enthralled like a beast vnder the yoke of certaine locall and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himselfe from these stockes and vniust subiections, and bring his spirit into libertie, restore himselfe to himselfe, free, vniuersall, open, seeing into all, and wandring through the beautifull and vniuersall circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus, mundum ut unam domum spectans, totum se inferens mundo, & in omnes ejus actus contemplationem suam mittens: Hec that is begotten generally, holds this world but as one house, applying himselfe to the whole world, and exercising his contemplation in all the actions thereof.*

3

The place being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are a true honestie, and to liue in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fir. The principall parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and seale this building, are first true piety, whereby, with a soule not astonished, but settled, pure, free, deuout, a man contemplateth God, the great, soueraigne, and absolute work-matter of all things, who can neither be seene nor knowne: but yet he must be knowne, adored, worshipped, serued with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all manner of good, and to feare no euill: afterwards he must walke roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the lawes and customes, liue with a heart open both to the eies of God and the world; *Conscientiam suam aperiens semperque, tanquam in publico vivens, se magis veritus, quam alios: Shewing his conscience, and alwayes lining as it were in publike, more afeard of himselfe, than of others.* Againe, he must keepe in himselfe and with others, and generally in all things, in his thoughts, speeches, designements, actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillitie, laying aside all pompe

pompe and vanitie, rule his desires, content himselfe with a mediocrity and sufficiencie ; *Quod sit esse velit, nihilq; malit: would be as he is, and rather nothing than so*; reioyce in his fortunes. A tempest hath a great deale lesse force, and doth lesse hurt when the sailes are taken downe, than when they are hoisted vp, and laid open to the windes. He must be constant against whatsoeuer may wound or hurt him, raise himselfe above and beyond all feare, contemning all the blowes of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all euils, and not the cause of any ; *Contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia qua contingunt acciduntq; eminens. Imperturbatus, intrepidus* : A contemner or despiiser of all things, wherewith mans life may be afflicted, raising himselfe above all things that may chance or happen, without perturbation, without feare. And so hold himselfe firme vnto himselfe, agree with himselfe, liue at ease without any paine or inward contention, full of ioy, of peace, of comfort and content in himselfe ; *Sapiens plenus gaudio, hilaris, placidus cum dijs ex pari vivit* : Sapiencie effectus gaudij aequalitas, solus sapiens gaudet : A wise man is full of ioy, merry, peaceable, liueth in equall pleasure with the gods : the effect of wisdom is the equality of ioy, wherein onely a wise man delighteth. He must I say entertaine himselfe, and continue content in himselfe, which is the proper fruit and effect of wisdom ; *Nisi sapienti suauon placent : omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat* : No man, but a wise man is content with his owne : euery fool es trauels dislike him. No man is happy, but he that so thinkes himselfe.

To conclude, to this tranquillitie of spirit, two things are necessarie, innocencie and a good conscience; this is the first and principall part which doth maruellously arme and confirme him with assurance; but this is not alwayes sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seene in diuers that are troubled and lost ; *Erit tanta tribulatio ut seducantur iusti* : There shall be so great tribulation, that euen the righteous shall be seduced. And therefore the other is likewise necessary, which is force and constancy of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is marvellous, it makes vs to betray, to accuse our selues,
and

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and for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against vs.


Occultum quatiens animo tortore flagellum.

Shaking a double rellish with a whip

That strikes the soule, whereas the devils skip.

It frameth an enditement, condemneth and executeth vs, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith *Epicurus*, because they neuer can assure themselves to be hid, their owne conscience alwayes discovering them to themselves, *Prima est hac ultio, quod se iudice nemo nocens absolvitur*: This is the first reuenge of sinne, that euery man being his owne Iudge, no sinner is quit. So likewise neither a weake and fearfull soule, be it neuer so holy, nor a strong and couragious, if it be not sound and pure, can neuer enioy this so rich and happy tranquillitie, but he that hath them all worketh wonders, as *Socrates*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, of whom there are three admirable exploits touching this subiect. These two Romans being publicquely accused, made their accusers to blush, won the Iudges and the whole assembly being stricken with an admiration. He had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius* of *Scipio*, to know how to be faultie, and to debase himselfe so much, as to defend his owne innocencie.

F I N I S.



OF
W I S D O M E,
THE
THIRD BOOKE,

*Wherein are handled the particular
aduifements of Wifdome, by the foure
morall vertues.*

THE PREFACE.



Enasomuch as our purpose in this Booke, is by peccemeale to instruct vnto Wifdome, and to giue the particular aduifements after the generall handled in the Second Booke, that we may the better hold a certaine course and order therein, we haue thought that we cannot doe better, than to follow the foure mistris and morall vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, and Temperance; for in these foure, almost all the duties of our life are comprehended. Prudence, is as a generall guide and conduct of the other vertues, and of our whole life, though properly it be exercised in the affaires that belong thereunto. Iustice concerneth the persons of men; for it is to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him. Fortitude, and Temperance, concerneth all accidents good and euill, pleasant and painfull, good and ill fortune. Now in these three, persons, affaires, and accidents,

dents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the trafficke of this world.

Of Prudence, the first vertue.

CHAP. I.

Of Prudence in generall.

1
The excellency
thereof.

Prudence is with reason put in the first ranke, as the generall Queene, superintendent, and guide of all other vertues, *Auriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautifull, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our affaires, and in a word, the Art of our life, as physicke the Art of our health.

2
The definition.

It is the knowledge and choice of those things we must either desire or flie; it is the iust estimation and triall of things; it is the eie that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one ranke; to consult and deliberate well, to iudge and resolute well, to conduct and execute well.

3
It is vniuersall.

It is a vniuersall vertue, for it extendeth it selfe generally to all humane things, not only in grosse, but by peccemeale to euery particular thing, and is as infinite, as are the individuals.

4
Difficult.
Seneca.

It is very difficult, both by reason of the aforesaid infiniteness, for the particulars are without knowledge, as without number; *Si qua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt*; Things infinite and that cannot be defined, are beyond wisdom: And of the great vncertainty and inconstancy of humane things, which are the greater by reason of their accidents, circumstances, apperтенances, dependancies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one only, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it selfe is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together and temperature of contrary things, the distinction and triall of those that are like one another; the contrariety and resemblance hindreth much.

5
Obscure.

It is very obscure, because the causes and iurisdctions of things are vnknowne, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such

as the nature of man cannot finde, nor ought to seeke after. *Ocultat eorum semina Deus, & plerunque bonorum malorumq; causa sub diversa specie latent : Their seedes God keepeth vnknowne, and for the most part the causes of good and euill lie hid under diuers similitudes.* Moreouer, fortune, destinie, (vse what words you will) a soueraigne, secret, and vnknowne power and authority, hath alwaies the aduantage, and maintaineth it against all counsels, foresights, and preuentions whatsoever : whereby it many times comes to passe, that the best counsels haue the worst issues, that one and the same counsell doth very happily succeed to one, vntravelling to another, in one and the same case, and with one and the same man, things went luckily yesterday, vntravelling to day. It is an opinion iustly receiued, that we ought not to iudge of counsels, nor of the sufficiency and capacity of persons by the euent. And therefore one answered those well that marvelled and were astonished at the ill successe of their businesse, considering with how wise and mature deliberation they were vndertaken, That they were masters of their deliberations, not of the successe of their affaires; for that was in the power of fortune, which seemeth to sport it selfe with all our fairest designements and counsels, ouerthroweth in a moment that which hath a long time beene projected and deliberated, and seemeth to be strongly fortified, choking, as they say, our artillery. And indeed, fortune to shew it authority in all things, and to abate our presumption, not being able to make men wise, that are not apt thereunto, maketh them neuerthelesse happie in despite of vertue, whereby it many times comes to passe, that simple men bring to a happie end great matters both publike and priuate. Prudence then is a sea without either bottome or brinke, and which cannot be limited and prescribed by precepts and aduiselements. It doth but compass things and goeth about them, like a darke cloud, many times vaine and fruitlesse.

Neuerthelesse, it is of such weight and necessity, that alone and of it selfe, it can doe much, and without it all the rest is nothing, no not riches, meanes, force : *Vis consilij experts mole ruit sua, mens una sapiens plurimum vincit manus ; Et multa quæ natura impedita sunt, consilio expediuntur : Strength void of*

6
Necessary.

Horat. 3. od.

Euripid.

Lilius.

Senec. l. de
element.

Xenophon in
pædag.

7
The acquisition
thereof.

counsell falleth to ruine euen of it selfe, One wise mind ouercommeth the bands of many, And many things that are hindred by nature, are ended by counsell. And the principall cause of this necessitie is the peruerse nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other creatures; *Impatiens aequi, nedum seruitutis; Impatient of equitie, much more of seruitude;* and which must be handled with Art and industrie, for it doth not more willingly set it selfe against any, than against those that would contentme it. Now prudence is the Art to handle it, and a gentle bridle, that holdeth it within the compasse of obedience.

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other vertues, be in vs by nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more than any other, and that in some sort by precepts and aduiselements; this is the Theoricke: but much better & principally (though with more time) by experience and practise; which is twofold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personall, whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we haue seene and handled: the other is strange by the act of another; this is historie which we know by relation or by reading. Now experience and vse is more firme and more assured; *Vsus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister, Vse and experience is a most effectuall master of all things,* the father and mistris of all the Arts, but more long; it is old, *Serui venit usus ab annis, Experience commeth in a mans latter daies,* more difficult, painfull, rare. The knowledge of history, as it is lesse firme and assured, so is it more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his owne charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience and Historie, doth prudence arise, *Vsus me genuit, mater peperit memoria, seu memoria anima & vita historia. Experience begat me, my mother memorie bare me; the soule and life of memorie is historie.*

8
The distinction.

Now Prudence may and must be diuersly distinguished according to the persons and the affaires. In regard of the persons there is priuate prudence, whether it be solitary and indiuiduall, which can hardly be termed prudence; or sociable and Oeconomically among a small company, and prudence publike and politike. This more high, excellent, difficult,

cult, and vnto which those foresaid qualities doe properly belong, and it is twofold, peaceable and military.

In regard of the affaires, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinarie, easie; the other extraordinary. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficulty and ambiguity. A man may likewise say, that there is an ordinary and easie prudence, which walketh according to the lawes, customs, and course already established; another extraordinary and more difficult.

There is likewise another distinction of prudence, both in respect of the persons, and of the affaires, which concerneth rather the degrees, than the kindes thereof, that is to say, proper prudence, whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsell of himselfe; the other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsell of another. The wise say, that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men: the first and chiefest is of those that haue a cleere insight into all things, and know of themselves how to finde the remedies and helps; but where are these to be found? Doubtlesse they are rare and singular: the other is of those that know how to take, to follow, to make vse of the good counsels of another, for they that know neither how to giue, nor to take counsell, are fooles.

The generall and common aduiselements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affaires, hath beene touched and briefly deliuered in the second Booke, and they are eight: first, knowledge of the persons and affaires; secondly, estimation of things; thirdly, choice and elections; fourthly, from them to take counsell vpon all; fifthly, temperance betweene feare and assurance, confidence and diffidence; sixthly, to take all things in their season, and to sease the occasion; seuenthly, to cary himselfe well, with industry and fortune; lastly, discretion in all. We must now handle the particulars, first of publike wisdom, which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which respecteth the affaires.

Hesiod.
Liuius.
Cicero.

9

Chap. 10.

*Of the politicke prudence of a soueraigne
to gouerne states.*

THE PREFACE.

THis doctrine belongeth to soueraignes and gouernours of states. It is vncertaine, infinite, difficult, and almost impossible to be ranged into order, to be limited and prescribed by rules and precepts: but we must endeouour to giue some small light, and brieve instruction thereof. We may referre this whole doctrine to two principall heads, which are the two duties of a soueraigne. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a state, principall and essentiall parts of publike gouernment, as the bones and sinewes of this great body, to the end that a soueraigne may prouide for himselfe and his state; which are seuen principall, that is to say, knowledge of the state, vertue, manners and fashions, counsels, treasure, forces and armes, alliances. The three first are in the person of the soueraigne, the fourth in him and neere him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ and to make vse of the aforesaid meanes, that is to say, in grosse, and in a word, well to gouerne and maintaine himselfe in authority, and the loue both of his subiects and of strangers, but distinctly; this part is twofold, peaceable and military. Behold here summarily and grossely the worke cut out, and the first great draughtes that are to be handled hereafter. We will diuide then this politicke matter, and of state, into two parts; the first shall be of prouision, that is to say, of the seuen necessary things; the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the Prince. This matter is excellently handled by *Lipsius*, according as he thought good: the marrow of his booke is here: I haue not taken, nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this generall diuision, and more you shall hereafter: I haue likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of my owne, and other mens.

CHAP. II.

The first part of this politicke prudence and gouernment of state, which is of promise.

THe first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the state: for the first rule of all prudence consisteth in knowledge, as hath beene said in the second booke. The first in all things, is to know with whom a man hath to deale. For in as much as this ruling and moderating prudence of states, which is a knowledge and sufficiencie to gouerne in publike, is a thing relatiue, which is handled betweene the soueraigne and the subiects; the first duty and office thereof, is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the people, and the souerainty, that is to say, of the state. First then the humours and natures of the people must be knowen. This knowledge formeth, and giueth aduice vnto him that should gouerne them. The nature of the people in generall hath beene described at large in the first booke, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vaine, a louer of nouelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperity, cowardly and dejected in aduersity) but it must likewise be knowen in particular: so many cities and persons, so many diuers humours. There are people cholericke, audacious, warriors, fearefull, giuen to wine, subiect to women, some more than others: *Noscenda natura vulgi est, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur.* The nature of the vulgar sort is to be knowen, and by what meanes it may be temperately ruled. And in this sense is that saying of the wise to be vnderstood: He that hath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command: *Nemo bene imperat, nisi qui ante paruerit imperio*: Not because soueraignes should or can alwaies take vp on them the name of subiects, for many are borne kings and princes: and many states are successiue: but that he that will well command, should acquaint himselfe with the humors and willes of his subiects, as if himselfe were of their ranke, and in their place. He must likewise know the nature of the state, not onely in generall, such as it hath beene described, but in particular that which he hath now in hand, the forme, establishment, birth thereof, that is to say, whether it be old

The chiefe point of this promise, to know the state.

Seneca.

or new, fallen by succession, or by election, obtained by the lawes, or by armes, of what extent it is, what neighbours, meanes, power, it hath : For according to these and other circumstances, he must diuersly manage the scepter, loole and straiten the raines of his gouernment.

2

*The second head
of this promise
is vertue.*

After this knowledge of the state, which is as a preamble, the first of those things that are required, is vertue, necessary in a soueraigne, as well for himselfe as for the state. It is first necessary and convenient that he that is aboue all should be better than all, according to the saying of *Cyrus*: And then it standeth him vpon for his credit and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth and spreadeth abroad the speeches and actions of him that gouerneth. He is in the eie of all, and can no more hide himselfe than the sunne: and therefore what good or ill soeuer he doth, shall not want meanes to blasen it, shall be talked of enough. And it importeth him much, both in respect of himselfe and his state, that his subjects haue a good opinion of him. Now a soueraigne ought not only in himselfe, and in his life and conuersation to be vertuous, but he must likewise endeouour that his subjects belike vnto himselfe. For as all the wisest of the world haue euer taught, a state, a citie, a companie cannot long continue nor prosper, where vertue is banished; and they doe grossly equiuocate, who thinke that princes are so much the more assured in their states, by how much the more wicked their subjects are, because, say they, they are more proper, and as it were borne to seruitude & the yoke; *Patientiores seruitutis, quos non decet in se esse seruos*: Very patient of seruitude, in whom it becometh not to be other than seruants. For contrarily, wicked men beare their yoke impatiently; and they that are good and debonaire feare much more than their cause is. *Pessimus quisque asperum rectorem patitur*: Contrary facile imperium in bonos, qui in actuentis magis quam in metuendi: The worst wicked are most impatient of authority: contrarily the best men are most obedient, fearing others more, than they are to be feared themselves. Now the most powerfull meanes to induce them, and to forme them vnto vertue, is the example of the Prince; for as experience telleth vs, all men doe frame themselves to the pattern and modell of the Prince. The reason is, because example preleth more

Salust. ad
Cæsar.

Plin. Pan.

Salust. ad
Cæsar.

than

than law. It is a mute law which carrieth more credit than a command, *nee tam imperia nobis opus quam exemplo: & mitius iubetur exemplo: Neither doe we so much need commandment, as example* 3 and it is more gentle to command by example. Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesse are alwaies vpon the great; they admire and simply belecue, that all is good and excellent that they doe: and on the other side, they that command, thinke they sufficiently enioyne and binde their inferiours to imitate them by acting only. Vertue then is honourable and profitable in a soueraigne, yea, all vertue.

Pli. Paneg.

But especially and aboue all, Pietie, Iustice, Valour, Clemencie. These are the foure principall and princely vertues in principality. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that Pietie and Iustice did deifie Princes. And *Seneca* saith, that clemency agreeth better with a Prince, than any other. The pietie of a Soueraigne consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preservation of religion, as the protector thereof. This maketh for his owne honour, and preservation of himselfe: for they that feare God dare not attempt, nay thinke of any thing either against their Prince, who is the image of God vpon earth, or against the state. For as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is religion that maintaineth humane society, which cannot otherwise subsist, and would soone be filled with all manner of wickednes and sauage cruelties, if the respect and feare of religion did not bridle men and keepe them in order. The state of the Romans did increase, and flourish more by religion, saith *Cicero* himselfe, than by all other meanes. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeouour that religion be preserved in it purity, according to the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrey, and hinder all innouation, and controuersies therein, roughly chastising those that goe about to breake the peace thereof. For doubtlesse change in religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and declination in the Commonwealth, as *Mecenas* well discourseth to *Augustus*.

3
Especially
4. vertues.

Dion.

4
Iustice.

After pietie commeth iustice, without which states are but robberies, which a Prince must keepe and practise both in himselfe and others: In himselfe, for he must detest all those tyrannicall and barbarous speeches, which dispence with soueraignes,

raignes, quitting them from all lawes, reason, equitie, obligation; which tell them that they are not bound vnto any other dutie, than to their owne wills and pleasures; that there is no law for them; that all is good and iust that serueth their turns; that their equiuy is their force, their duty is in their power. *Principi leges nemo scripsit: licet, si libet. In summa fortuna, id equius quod validius: nihil iniustum quod fructuosum: Sanctitas, pietas, fides, privata bona sunt: quæ iuvat reges eant: None hath written lawes for the Prince: his will is his law. In the highest degree of fortune, that is most iust, that is of most force; Nothing is vniust that is profitable: Sanctity, piety, faith, are private goods, and goe that way that may benefit the Prince. And he must oppose against them those excellent and holy counsels of the wise, that hee that hath most power in him to breake lawes, should take most care to keepe them, and liue most in order. The greatest power should be the straightest bridle, the rule of power is duty; *minimum decet liberè, cui nimium licet, non fas potentes posse, fieri quod nefas: Hee that hath power to doe too much, ought to be least free; it is not lawfull that mighty men should doe that, which is unlawfull to be done.* The Prince then must first be iust, keeping well and inuiolably his faith, the foundation of iustice, to all and euery one whosoeuer he be. Then he must cause that his iustice be kept and mainrained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cause he is installed. He must vnderstand the causes and the persons, giue vnto euery one that which appertainerth to him, iustly according to the lawes, without delay, labyrinths of suits and controuersies, inuolution of proceffe, abolishing that villanous and pernicious mystery of pleading, which is an open faire, or marchandize, a lawfull and honorable robbery, *concessum latrocinium*; auoiding the multiplictie of lawes and ordinances, a testimonie of a sicke Common-weale, *Corruptissima reipublica plurime leges: The most corrupted Common-wealths abound with most lawes*; as medicines and plaisters of a body ill disposed: and all this, to the end that that which is established by good lawes be not destroyed by too many lawes. But you must know, that the iustice, vertue, and probitie of a soueraigne goeth after another manner, than that of priuate men: it hath a gate more large and more free by reason of the great weight and dangerous*

Plin. Pan.
Tacitus.
Senec. in tr.

Senec.
Euripides.

Colum.
Tacit.
Plin. Pan.

An aduertisement.

rous charge which hee carrieth and swayeth, for which cause it is fit to march with a pafe, which seemeth to others vneafie and irregular, but yet is necessarie and lawfull for him. Hee must sometimes step aside, and goe out of the way, mingle prudence with iustice, and as they say, couer himselfe with the skinne of the Lion, if that of the Fox serue not the turne. But this is not alwayes to be done, and in all cases, but with these three conditions, that it be for the euident and important necessitie of the weale publike, (that is to say, of the State and of the Prince, which are things conioyned) vnto which hee must runne; this is a naturall obligation, and not to be dispensed with: and to procure the good of the common-weale, is but to doe his dutie.

For the weale-
publike.

Salus populi suprema lex esto.
Princes counsels, loue and hate,
Doe homage to the Law of state,
That peoples safety haue no mate.
Other lawes doe very well,
But peoples safety beares the bell.

For defence and
conservation.

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preserue himselfe, and not to increase his greatnesse, to sue and shield himselfe either from deceits and subtilties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprises, and not to practise them. It is lawfull by subtiltie to preuent subtiltie, and among foxes to counterfeite the fox. The world is full of Art and malicious coufenge, and by deceits and cunning subtilties, states are commonly overthrowne, saith *Aristotle*. Why then should it not be lawfull, nay why should it not be necessarie to hinder, and to diuert such euill, and to saue the weale publike by the selfe-same meanes that others would vndermine and overthrow it? Alwayes to deale simply and plainly with such people, and to follow the streight line of true reason and equitie, were many times to betray the State, and to vndoe it.

Thirdly, it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to giue credit and countenance to their owne wickednes. For it is neuer permitted to leaue vertue and honesty, to follow vice and dishonestie. There is no composition or compensation

5
Discreetly with-
out wickednesse.

penſation betwixt theſe two extremities. And therefore away with all iniuſtice, treacherie, treaſon, and diſloyaltie. Curſed be the doctrine of thoſe, who teach (as hath bene ſaid) that all things are good and lawfull for ſoueraignes : but yet it is ſometimes neceſſarie and required, that hee mingle profit with honeſtie, and that he enter into compoſition with both. He muſt neuer turne his backe to honeſtie, but yet ſometimes goe about and coaſt it, employing therein his ſkill and cunning, which is good, honeſt and lawfull, as ſaith that great *S. Baſil*, *καλῶ καὶ ἐπαινετὸν πανουργίαν* ; and doing for the weale publike as mothers and phyſitians, who feede their children and ſicke with faire ſpeeches, and deceiue them for their health. To be brieſe, doing that cloſely which hee may not doe openly, ioyned wiſdome to valour, Art and ſpirit, where nature and the hand ſufficeth not ; be, as *Pindarus* ſaith, a Lion in his blowes, a Fox in his counſell ; a Dove and a Serpent, as diuine verities ſpeaketh.

6

*Diſtruſt requi-
red in a Prince.*

And to this matter more diſtinctly, there is required in a ſoueraigne, diſtruſt, and that he keepe himſelfe cloſe, yet ſo, as that he be ſtill vertuous and juſt. Diſtruſt, which is the firſt, is wholly neceſſarie, as the contrary, which is credulitie, and a careleſſe truſt or confidence, is vitious, and very dangerous in a ſoueraigne. He watcheth ouer all, and muſt answer for all, his faults are not light, and therefore he muſt be well aduiſed. If he truſt much, hee diſcouereth himſelfe, and is expoſed to ſhame, and many dangers, *opportunus fit injuria*, yea, he encourageth ſuch as are falſe and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickedneſſe, *Aditum nocendi perfido praestat fides* : *Truſt maketh way for the treacherous to doe miſchiefe*. It is neceſſary therefore that hee couer himſelfe with this buckler of diſtruſt, which the wiſeſt haue thought to be a great part of prudence, and the ſinews of wiſdome, that is to ſay, that he watch, belecue nothing, take heed of all : and hereunto doth the nature of the world induce him, wholly compoſed of lies, coloured counterſeit, and dangerous, namely ſuch as are neere vnto him in the court and houſes of great perſonages. He muſt then truſt but few, and thoſe knowne by long experience and often trials : Neither is it neceſſary that hee abandon them, and in ſuch ſort leane all
the

Seneca.

*Epichar.
Euripid.
Cicero.*

the cord, that he still hold it not by one end, and haue an eye vnto them : But he must couer and disguise his diffidence, yea when he distrusteth, he must make a shew and countenance of great trust and confidence. For open distrust wrongerth, and inuirteth as much to deceiue, as an ouer-carelesse confidence, and many by making too great a shew of feare to be deceiued, shew the way how they may be deceiued. *Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli : Many haue taught to deceiue, whilest they feare to be deceiued :* as contrarily a professed and open trust, hath taken away the desire to deceiue, hath obliged to loyalty, and ingendred fidelitie ; *Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem : Eucry man would be beleueed, and to be credited for the most part bindeth trust the more.* Senec.

From distrust comes dissimulation the science or seed thereof ; for if that were not, and that there were trust and fidelitie in all, dissimulation which openeth the front, and couereth the thought, could haue no place. Now dissimulation which is vicious in priuate persons, is very necessary in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to command : And they must many times dissemble not onely in warre, with strangers and enemies, but also in time of peace, and with their subiects, though more sparingly. Simple and open men, and such as cary (as they say) their hearts in their foreheads, are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their state : But yet he must play this part with Art and dexterity, and to the purpose, neither so openly nor so simply as that it may be discerned. For, to what purpose doest thou hide and couer thy selfe, if a man may see thee obliquely or side-waies? Wilie deceits and cunning subtilties, are no more deceits and subtilties when they are knowne and vented out. A Prince then the better to couer his Art, must make profession of louing simplicity, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies to dissimulation ; and in matters of lesse importance he must proceed openly, to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

All this is in omission, in retaining himselfe, not acting : but it is likewise required sometimes that hee passe farther and come to action, and this is two-fold. The one is to make and frame

frame secret practises and intelligences, cunningly to winne and draw vnto him the hearts and seruices either of the officers, seruants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and foraine Lords, or of his owne subiects. This is a subtiltie which is much in request and authoritie, and very common among Princes, and a great point of prudence, saith *Cicero*. It is wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especially by presents and pensions, meanes so powerfull, that not only the Secretaries, the chiefe of the counsell, the most inward friends and fauorites, haue beene thereby drawne to giue aduice, and to diuert the designements of their master, yea, great captaines to giue their helping hand in the warre, but also wiues haue beene won to discouer the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtile policie is all allowed and approued by many without difficultie or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subiect whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelitie and amitie, it is not greatly to be doubted: But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kinde of trecherie, which is neuer permitted.

9
Subtilties.

Plato.
Plin.
Val. Max.

The other is to winne some aduantage, and to obtaine his purpose, by close and couert meanes, by equiuocations and subtilties, to circumuent by faire speeches and promises, letters, ambassages, working and obtaining by subtile meanes, that which the difficultie of times and affaires will not permit him otherwise to doe, and to doe that closely which he cannot doe openly. Many great and wise men say that this is lawfull and to be permitted; *Crebro mendacio & fraude uti imperantes debent ad commodum subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est: Great commanders ought to use lying and fraud for the commoditie of their subiects. To deceiue according to the state and condition of times, is wisdom.* It were overboldnesse simply to affirme that it is permitted. But a man may say, that in case of great necessitie, in a troublesome and tumultuous time, when it is not onely to procure the great good, but to diuert a great mischiefe from the state, and against such as are wicked and traiterous, that it is no great fault, if it be a fault.

But

But there is a greater doubt and difficultie in other things, because they haue a smell of much iniustice in them. I say much, and not wholly, because with their iniustice there are mingled in them some graines of iustice. That which is wholly and apparently vniust, is reprobued of all, euen of the wicked, at leastwise in word and shew, if not in earnest and in deed. But of these actions ill mingled, there are so many reasons and authorities on the one side and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to resoluue himselfe. I will reduce them heere to certaine heads. To dispatch and secretly to put to death, or otherwise without forme of iustice, some certaine man that is troublesome and dangerous to the state, and who wel deserueth death, but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterprised and repressed by an ordinarie course; here-in there is nothing violated but the forme. And the prince, is he not aboue formes?

10
Iniustice profitable to the weale publike.

To cut the wings, and to lessen the great meanes of any one, that shall raise and fortifie himselfe too much in the state, and maketh himselfe fearefull to his soueraigne; not staying till he be inuincible and able to attempt any thing against the state, and the head of his soueraigne when it pleaseth him.

To take by authoritie the riches of the richest in a great necessity and pouertie of the state.

To weaken and cancell the lawes and priuiledges of some subiects, who hold them to the preiudice and diminution of the authority of the soueraigne.

To take by preuention, and to possesse himselfe of a place, city or prouinee, very commodious for the state, rather than to suffer another strong and fearefull neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, subiection and perpetuall alarm of the said state.

All these things are approued as iust and lawfull by many great and wise men, provided that they succeed well and happily; of whom these are the sayings and sentences: To doe iustice in great matters, a man may sometimes goe astray in small; and, To execute iustice in grosse, it is permitted to doe wrong by retails: for commonly the greatest actions and examples haue some iniustice, which satisfieth particular men

Plutarchi
Tacit.

Plutarch. in
flam.

Senec.

Aristot. in
Politico.
Democrit.

men by the profit which ariseth to all in generall, *Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod adversus singulos utilitate publica rependitur.* That a prudent and wise prince should not onely know how to command according to the lawes, but also the lawes themselves, if necessitie require; and they must make the lawes to will it, when they cannot doe that they would. In confused and desperate affaires, a prince must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that which is necessarie to be executed. Necessitie, a great support, and excuse to humane fragilitie, infringeth all law, and therefore hee is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint. *Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humana patrocinium, omnem legem frangit: non est nocens quicumque non sponte est nocens.* If a prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be halfe good, and that he be not wholly wicked: That it cannot possibly be that good princes should commit no iniustice. To all this I would adde for their iustification, or diminution of their faults, that princes finding themselves in such extremities, they ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great unwillingnesse and grife of minde, acknowledging that it is an infelicitie and a disfaour from heauen, and so carrying themselves therein as a father, when hee is enforced to cauterise or cut off a member of his childe, to saue his life, or to plucke out a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bold, which referre all to profit, which they either equall or preferre before honestie, an honest man must euer abhorre them.

Wee haue staied long vpon this point of the vertue of iustice, because of the doubts and difficulties that arise from the accidents and necessities of states, and which doe many times hinder the most resolute and best aduised.

11

Valour.

After iustice commeth valour; I meane that militarie vertue, wisdome, courage, and sufficiencie to play the warriour, necessarie in a Prince for the defence and safetie of himselfe, the state, his subiects, of the publike peace and libertie, and without which he can hardly deserue the name of a prince.

12

Clemencie.

But let vs come to the fourth princely vertue, which is clemency, a vertue which inclineth the Prince to a sweet kinde of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lesseneth and qualifieth the rigor of iustice, with iudgement and discretion. It moderateth

rateth and sweetly manageth all things, deliuereth those that are faultie, releueth those that are fallen, saueth those that are like to be lost. It is that in a Prince which humanity is in a common person. It is contrary to cruelty, and extreme rigour, not to iustice, from which it differeth not much, but it sweetneth and moderateth it. It is necessary by reason of our humane infirmity, the frequency of offences, the facility to offend; for an ouer-great and continuall rigour and seuerity, ruineth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Seueritas amittit assiduitate auctoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor, moueth rebellions, and men by despight are made wicked. For feare that keepeth men in their dutie, must be sweet and temperate; if it be too sharpe and continuall, it is changed into rage and reuenge: *Temperatus timor est qui cohibet, assiduus & acer in vindictam excitat*. Temperate feare is that which restraineth, but continuall stirreth up reuenge. It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and a State, it winneth the loue and good wils of his subiects, and consequently confirmeth and assureth the state, *Firmissimum id imperium quo obediens gaudent*; That Empire is most firme, where the subiects so obey, as they reioyce, as shall be said hereafter. It is likewise very honorable to a soueraigne, for his subiects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutor, their father, and in stead of fearing him, they will feare all for him, lest any ill happen vnto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to beleue all, yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to haue found good subiects, than to haue made them such, to pardon light fautes, to lessen the rigour of the great: not to be ouer-straight and exact in punishing, (which is as great a dishonour and infamie to a Prince, as to a Physitian many patients that die vnder his hand) to content himselfe many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

Seneca.

Seneca.

Tit. Livius
cap. 3. in the
beginning.

Tacit.
Agricol.

ignoscere pulchrum
Iam misero, pœnaque genus vidisse precantem.

'Tis foule and faire enough, for them and thee,

To pardon, where the Lord afflicts, not we.

And let him not feare that which some obiekt very vnruly,
that it debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authority of the
soueraigne

Salust. ad
Cæsar.

soueraigne and of the state; for contrarily it fortifieth it, and giues credit and vigor thereunto: And a Prince beloued, shall doe more by loue, than by feare, which makes men feare and tremble, but not obey: and as *Salust* discoursed to *Cæsar*, those states that are gouerned with feare, are neuer durable. No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise feare many, and that feare which he would put vpon all, falleth vpon his owne head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behinde, nor on any side is couered, but is alwaies in agitation, in danger, in feare. It is true, as hath beensaid in the beginning, that it must be with iudgement; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remisse, it is very pernicious.

13.
After which
are required al-
so liberalitie.

After these foure principall and royall vertues, there are also others, though lesse worthy and necessary, yet in a second place very profitable, and requisite in a soueraigne, that is to say, liberality, so fit and necessarie for a Prince, as it is lesse besitting him to be vanquished by armes, than by magnificence. But yet there is herein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtfull, than commodious.

Liberality two-
fold.

There is a two fold liberalitie, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serues to small purpose. For it is an idle thing in soueraignes, and to little end, to endeour by great and excessiue charges to make shew of themselves, or to increase their credit especially with their subiects where they haue power to doe what they list. It is a testimonie of pusillanimitie, and that they vnderstand not what they are, and besides that, it seemeth to their subiects, the spectators of these triumphs, that they make this glorious shew with their owne spoiles, that they feast it at their charges, that they feede their eyes with that, that should feede their bellies. And againe a Prince should thinke that he hath nothing properly his: he oweth himselfe to another. The other liberality, consisteth in gifts bestowed vpon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well gouerned, and he must be well aduised to whom, how, and how much he must giue. He must giue to those that haue deserued it, that haue done seruice to the weale-publique, that haue run their fortunes, and spent themselves in the warres. No man will

will enuy them, if they be not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect and merit, shame the giuer, and purchase enuie to the receiuer, and is receiued without thankfulness and acknowledgement. Some tyrants haue bene sacrificed to the malice of the people, euen by those whom they haue aduanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making knowne how much they contemne and hate him from whom they receiued them. Againe, this liberality must be with measure, for if it be not, and that he giue vnto all, and vpon all occasions, the ruine of the state and soueraigne must needs ensue: This is to play, and to lose all. For men will neuer be satisfied, but be as excessiue in asking as the Prince shall be in giuing, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasure shall faile, he shall be enforced to lay hands vpon the goods of another, and supplie by iniustice, that which ambition and prodigality did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per scelera suppleendum*. Now it is farre better not to giue at all, than to take away to giue; for a man shall neuer enioy in so high a degree the loue and good will of those whom he hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoiled. And againe, this liberality without measure, worketh the ruine of himselfe, for a fountaine drieth vp, if it be ouer-much drawne. *Liberalitate liberalitas perit: By liberalitie, liberalitie perisheth.* Hieronym.
 Liberalitie likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little and little, and not all together, for that which is done ouerspeedily, be it neuer so great, is in a manner insensible, & soone forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must bee exercised with ease and leasure, that a man may haue time to taste them: Things rude and cruell (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily. There is then Art and Prudence in giuing, and in the practise of liberality. *Falluntur* Tacit.
quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt. They are deceived whom riot blindeth, in shew of liberality: many know how to waste, but not how to giue. And to say the truth, liberality is not properly any of the royall vertues, for it agreeth and carrieth it selfe well with tyranny it selfe. And such as are the gouernors of young Princes doe wrong in working

king so strong an impression of this vertue of bounty in their mindes and wils, that they should refuse no meanes to put it in practise, and thinke nothing well employed but that which they giue (this is their common language) but they doe it either for their owne benefit, or else they know not to whom they speake it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberality in the minde of him that hath meanes to furnish himselfe as much as he will at the charges of another. A prodigall or liberall Prince without discretion and measure, is worse than a couetous: but if this liberality be well ruled and ordered, as hath beene said, it is well befitting a Prince, and very profitable both to himselfe and the state.

14
Magnanimitie
and moderation
of choler.
Senec.

Tacit.

Another vertue requisite in a Prince in a second degree, is magnanimitie, and greatnes of courage, to contemne iniuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; neuer to vex himselfe for the outrages and indiscretions of another: *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; injurias & offensiones superne despicere, indignas Caesaris ira.* A great minde becommeth a great fortune; and highly to despise injuries and offences, which be unworthy the anger of Cesar. For a man to afflict himselfe, and to be moued, is to confesse himselfe to be faultie, whereas by neglect and light account it easily vanisheth. *Conuictis si irascere, agnita videntur: spreta exolescunt.* Thou seemest to confesse those accusations being angry; which contemned, either vanish of themselves or returne vpon their Author. And if there be fit place, and a man must be angry, let it be openly and without dissimulation, in such sort that he giue not occasion to suspect a hidden grudge and purpose of reuenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best befitting the baser sort: *Obscure & irrevocabiles reponunt odia: Seue cogitationis indicium secreto suo satiari.* Base persons and unrecoverable doe conceale their hatreds: It is a token of a barbarous and cruell minde, to be glutted with secret grudge. It doth better become a great personage to offend, than to hate. The other vertues are lesse royall and more common.

The third head
of this prouisi-
on: The manners
of the Prince.

Tacit.

After vertue come the manners, cariages, and countenances that become and belong vnto Maiestie, very requisite in a Prince. I will not stand vpon this point: I only say as it were passing

passing by, that not only nature helpeth much hereunto, but also Art and studie. Hereunto doe appertaine the good and beautifull composition of the visage, his port, pafe, speech, habilliments. The generall rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate and venerable grauity, walking betwixt feare and loue, worthy of all honor and reuerence. There is likewise his residence and conuersation or familiarity. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, and eminent place, and as neere as may bee in the middle of the whole state, to the end he may haue an eye ouer all, like the Sunne, which from the middle of heauen giueth light to all: for keeping himselfe at one end, he giueth occasion to those that are farthest from him to rise against him, as he that standeth vpon one end of a table, maketh the other end to rise vp. His conuersation and company, let it be rare; for to shew and to communicate himselfe too much, breedeth contempt and deiecteth maiestie: *Continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit. Maieitati maior ex longinquo reuerentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est.* Often and daily aspect causeth great men the lesse to be feared: But the rarenesse of their presence procures the greater reuerence, because all strange and unknowne things seemes stately and magnificent.

Lucius.
Tacit.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, vertue and manners, which are in the person of the Prince, comethose things which are neere and about the Prince; That is to say, in the fourth place Counsell, the great and principall point of this politique doctrine, and so important, that it is in a manner all in all. It is the soule of the state, and the spirit that giueth life, motion and action to all the other parts: and for that cause it is said, that the managing of affaires consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a Prince had in himselfe counsell and prudence sufficient to gouerne and to prouide for all, which is the first and highest degree of wisdom, as hath beene said; and if so it were, the affaires would goe farre better: but this is rather to be wished than hoped for, whether it be for want of a good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one only head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters: *Nequit princeps sua scientia cuncta completi, nec unius mens tanta molis est capax.* The Prince

16
The fourth head
of this prouision.
Counsell.

Chap. 1.

Tacit.

Tit. Liui.
Tacit.

Plin.

17
The condition of
good counsellors.
Fidelitie.
Plin.
Sufficiencie.

Curtius.

cannot comprehend all things by his owne knowledge, neither is the minde of one alone capable of so much greatnesse. A lone man seeth and heareth but little. Now kings haue need of many eyes, and many cares; and great burthens, and great affaires haue need of great helpes. And therefore it is requisite that he prouide and furnish himselfe with good counsell, and such men as know how to giue it: for he, whosoeuer hee be, that will take all vpon himselfe, is rather held to be proud, than discreet or wise. A Prince then had need of faithfull friends and seruitours to be his assistants, *quos assumat in partem curarum: whom he may take to beare part of his cares.* These are his true treasures, and profitable instruments of the state: In the choice whereof hee should especially labour and employ his whole iudgement, to the end hee may haue them good. There are two sorts of them; the one aide the Prince with their dutie, counsell and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serue him with their hands and actions, and may be called Officers. The first are farre more honourable: For the two greatest Philosophers say, that it is a sacred and diuine thing, well to deliberate, and to giue good counsell.

Now Counsellors must be first faithfull, that is to say in a word, honest men, *Optimum quemque fidelissimum puto: Every man that is truly honest, I hold to be most faithfull.* Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilfull in the state, diuersly experimented and tried (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions; *Mihi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suadendi: Fortune hauing taken from me many things, hath given me the faculty of wel perswading.*) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quicke and not ouer-sharpe: for such kinde of men are roo moueable; *novandis quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignea: These fiery wits are fitter for inuouation, than administration.* And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they be old and ripe, for besides that young men by reason of the soft and delicate tendernesse of their age, are easily deceiued, they doe as easily belecue and receiue euery impressiō. It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtil; but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times,

times, the subtile only sometimes for necessity. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giuing good & wholesome counsell, they cary themselues freely and couragiously, without flattery, or ambiguity, or disguise, not accommodating their language to the present state of the prince; *Ne cum fortuna potius principis loquantur quam cum ipso*: Lest they speake rather with the fortune of the prince, than with himselfe; but without sparing the truth, speake that which is fit and requisite. For although liberty, roundnesse of speech and fidelity, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it selfe, yet afterwards it is reuerenced and esteemed. *In presentia quibus resistis, offendis, deinde illis ipsis suspicitur laudaturque*: For the present thou offendest them whom thou contradictest, but afterwards thou art euen of them respected and praised. And fourthly, constantly, without yeelding, varying and changing at euery meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure and passion of another, but without opinatiue obstinacie, and a spirit of contradiction, which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, hee must sometimes change his opinion, which is not inconstancie, but prudence. For a wise man marcheth not alwayes with one and the same pafe, although he follow the same way, he changeth not, but accommodateth himselfe; *Non semper in uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed aptat*: Seneca. As a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and the winde, it is necessary many times to turne and winde, and to arriue to that place obliquely, by fetching a compasse, when he cannot doe it directly, and by a straight line. Againe, a religious dexterity to keepe secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing very necessary in the managing of affaires; *Res magna sustineri nequeunt ab eo cui tacere grave est*: Curtius. Great affaires cannot be sustained by him, who cannot be secret. And it sufficeth not to be secret, but he must not pricke and search into the secrets of his Prince, this is an ill, and a dangerous thing; *Exquirere abditos principis sensus illicitum & anceps*: yea he must be vnwilling and auoid all meanes to know them. And these are the principall good conditions and qualities of a counsellor, as the euill which they must warily auoid are presumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and determine ouer boldly and obstinately;

Liberty.

Tacit.

Silence.

Curtius.

Tacit.

The vices that
counsellors must
avoid.
Presumptuous
confidence.
Tit. Liuius.

Passion.

Tacit.

Precipitation.
See lib. 2. ca. 10.
Tacit.

18
The duty of the
prince in chusing
good counsellors.

for a wise man in deliberating, thinketh and rethinketh, redoubting whatsoeuer may happen, that he may be the bolder to execute. *Nam animus vereri qui scit, scit tuto aggredi*: For the minde that knoweth how to feare, knoweth how with safety to execute: Contrarily the foole is hardy and violent in his deliberation; but when he comes to the issue, his nose falles a bleeding: *Conflia calida & audacia prima specie lata sunt, tractatu dura, eventu tristia*: Hastie and audacious counsels at the first shew are plausible, but in the managing prove hard, and in the end full of discontent. Secondly, all passion of choler, enuy, hatred, avarice, concupiscence, and all priuate and particular affection, the deadly poyson of iudgement, and all good vnderstanding: *Privata res semper offecere, officient q̃ publicis consilijs, pessimum veri affectus & iudicij venenum sua cuique utilitas*: Private affaires haue euer beene hurtfull, and doe hinder publike counsels, and euery mans particular profit is the worst poyson of true affection and iudgement. Lastly, precipitation an enemy to all good counsell, and only fit to doe mischief. And thus you see what manner of men good counsellors ought to be.

Now a Prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his owne knowledge and iudgement, or if he cannot so doe, by their reputation, which doth seldome deceiue, whereupon one of them said to his prince, Hold vs for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam singuli decipere & decipi possunt, nemo omnes; neminem omnes fefellerunt*: For euery one may deceiue and be deceiued, no man all; all haue deceiued none: And let him take heed that he chuse not his minions and fauorites, courtiers, flatterers, slaues, who shame their masters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous than the counsell of the cabinet. And hauing chosen and found them, he must wisely make vse of them, by taking counsell of them at due times and houres, not attending the euent and execution, and losing the time whilest he harkneth to them; and this must he doe with iudgement, not suffering himselfe to be caried ouer-loosely by their counsels, as that simple Emperor *Claudius* was; and with mildnesse, without roughnesse, being more reasonable, as that wise *Marc. Antonius* was wont to say, to follow the counsell of a good number of friends, than such as are constrained to bend vnto his will. And making vse of them, doe it with an indifferent

different authority, neither rewarding them with presents for their good counsell, lest by the hope of the like presents he draw such as are wicked vnto him, nor vse them ouer-roughly for their bad counsels; for he shall hardly finde any to giue him counsell, if there be danger in giuing it: and againe, many times bad counsell hath a better successe than good, by the prouident care and direction of the soueraigne. And such as giue good counsell, that is to say, happy and certaine, are not therefore alwaies the best, and most faithfull seruitors, nor for their liberty of speech neither, which he should rather agree vnto, looking into such as are fearefull and flatterers with a wary eie. For miserable is that prince with whom men hide or disguise the truth; *Cujus aures ita formata sunt, ut aspera qua uisilia, & nil nisi iucundum & lesurum accipiant: Whose eares are so framed, that they will not hearken to profitable things that are harsh, nor any thing but what is pleasing though hurtfull.* And lastly, he must conceale his owne iudgement and resolution, secrecie being the soule of counsell: *Nulla meliora consilia, quam quae ignorauerit aduersarius antequam fierent: They are the best counsels which the aduersary knoweth not before they be effected.*

Curtius.

Tacit.

Veget.

As touching officers which are in the next place, and who serue the Prince and state in some charge, hee must make choice of honest men, of good and honest families. It is to be thought that such as serue the Prince, are the best sort of people, and it is not fit that base people should be neere him, and command others, except they raise themselues by some great and singular vertue, which may supplie the want of Nobilitie: but by no meanes let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of some odious condition. So likewise they should be men of vnderstanding, and employed according to their natures. For some are fit for the affaires of the warre, others for peace. Some are of opinion that it is best to choose men of a sweet carriage, and indifferent vertue, for these excellent surpassing spirits, that keepe themselues alwayes vpon the point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affaires; *Vt pares negotijs, neque supra: sint recti, non erecti: Men sufficient for their employments, not fastidious, equall in their affaires, and not much above them.*

19

Of Officers.

After

20
The fifth head
of provision.
Treasure.

Exchequer
knowledge in
three points.

21
1. To lay the
foundation.

1

2

3

4

After counsell, we place treasure, a great and puissant meane. This is the sinewes, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharpe and penetrable, as that of siluer, nor master so imperious, nor orator that winneth the hearts and wills of men, or conquer Castles and cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must prouide that his treasurie neuer faile, neuer be dried vp. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to employ them well, to haue alwayes a reseruatiō, and to lay vp some good part therof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince must auoid two things, iniustice, and base niggardlinesse, in preferuing right towards all, and honour for himselfe.

Touching the first, which is to lay the foundation and to increase the treasury, there are diuers meanes, and the sources are diuers, which are not all perpetuall, nor alike assured, that is to say, the demaine and publique reuenue of the state, which must be managed and vsed, without the alienating of it in any sort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Conquests made vpon the enemy, which must be profitably employed, and not prodigally dissipated, as the ancient *Romans* were wont to doe, carrying to the Exchequer very great summes, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countries, as *Livy* reporteth of *Camillus Flaminius*, *Paulus Emilius*, of the *Scipios*, *Lucullus*, *Cesar*; and afterwards receiuing from those conquered countries, whether from their naturall countries left behinde them, or from colonies sent thither, a certaine annuall reuenue. Presents, gratuities, pensions, free donations, tributes of friends, allies, and subiects, by testaments, by donations amongst the liuing, as the Lawyers terme it, or otherwise. The entrance, comming and going, and passages of merchandize, into docks, hauens, riuers, as well vpon strangers as subiects, a meanes iust, lawfull, ancienr, generall, and very commodious with these conditions: Not to permit the trafficke and transportation of things necessarie for life, that the subiects may be furnished, nor of raw vnwrought wares, to the end the subiect may be set on worke, and gaine the profit of his owne labours. But to permit the trafficke of things wrought and dressed, and the bringing in of such wares as are raw, and not of such as are wrought; and in all things to charge.

charge the stranger much more than the subiect. For a great forren imposition increaseth the treasure, and comforteth the subiect: to moderate neuerthelesse the imposts vpon those things that are brought in, necessarie for life. These foure meanes are not onely permitted, but iust, lawfull and honest. The fift which is hardly honest, is the trafficke which the so-ueraigne vseth by his factors, and is practised in diuers man-ners more or lesse bale, but the vilest and most pernicious is of honors, estates, offices, benefices. There is a meane that com-meth neere to trafficke, and therefore may be placed in this ranke, which is not very dishonest, and hath beene practised by very great and wise princes, which is, to employ the coine of the treasure or exchequer to some small profit, as fine in the hundred, and to take good security for it, either gages, or some other sound and sufficient assurance. This hath a three-fold vse, it increaseth the treasure, giueth meanes to particular men to trafficke and to make gaine; and which is best of all, it sauerh the publike treasure from the pawes of our theeuing Courtiers, the importunate demands and flatteries of fau-rites, and the ouer-great facilitie of the prince. And for this only cause, some princes haue lent their publike treasure with-out any profit or interest, but onely vpon paine of a double forfeiture for not paiement at the day. The sixt and last is in the lones and subsidies of subiects, whereunto hee must not come but vnwillingly, and then when other means doe faile, and necessity presseth the state. For in this case it is iust, ac-cording to that rule, That all is iust that is necessarie. But it is requisite, that these conditions be added, after this first of ne-cessitie, To leuy by way of lone (for this way will yeeld most siluer, because of the hope men haue to recouer their owne againe, and that they shall lose nothing, besides the credit they receiue by succoring the weale publique) and afterwards the necessitie being past, and the warres ended, to repay it a-gaine, as the *Romans* did, being put to an extremitie by *Han-nibal*. And if the common treasure be so poore that it cannot repay it, and that they must needs proceed by way of im-po-sition, it is necessary that it be with the consent of the sub-iects, making knowne vnto them the pouertie and necessitie, and preaching the word of that King of Kings, *Dominus vs*

Antonius.
Pius.
Seuerus.
August.

opus habet: The Lord hath need of them; insomuch that they make them see, if need be, both the receipt, and the charge. And, if it may be, let perswasion preuaile without constrain, as *Themistocles* said, *Impetrare melius quàm imperare*: It is better to obtain by request than by command. It is true that the prayers of soueraignes are commandements; *Satis imperat qui rogat potentia, armata sunt preces regum*: He commandeth sufficiently that intreateth with power, the requests of kings are armed; but yet let it be in the forme of a free donation, at the least that they be extraordinary monies, for a certaine prefixt time, and not ordinarie; and neuer prescribe this law vpon the subiects, except it be with their owne consent. Thirdly, that such impositions be leuied vpon the goods, and not the heads of men (capitation being odious to all honest people) be recall and not personall (being vniust that the rich, the great, the nobles, should not pay at all, and the poorer people of the countrey should pay all.) Fourthly, that they be equally vpon all. Inequality afflicteth much, and to these ends these monies must be bestowed vpon such things as the whole world hath need of, as salt, wine, to the end that all may contribute to the present necessity. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay ordinary imposts and great, vpon such marchandize and other things as are vicious, and that serue to no other end, than to corrupt the subiects, as whatsoever serueth for the increase of luxury, insolency, curiosity, superfluity in viands, apparell, pleasures, and all manner of licentious liuing, without any other prohibition of these things. For the deniall of a thing sharpeneth the appetite.

22
To employ the
treasure.

The second point of this science, is well to employ the treasure. And these in order are the articles of this employment and charge; The maintenance of the kings house, the pay of men of warre, the wages of officers, the iust rewards of those that haue deserued well of the Common-weale, pensions and charitable succors to poore, yet commendable persons. These five are necessarie, after which come those that are very profitable, to repaire cities, to fortifie and to defend the frontiers, to mend the high-waies, bridges, and passages, to establish colledges of honour, of vertue, and learning; to build publique houses. From these five sorts of reparations, fortifi-

fortifications, and foundations, commeth very great profit, besides the publike good: Arts and Artificers are maintained; the enuy and malice of the people because of the leuie of monies ceaseth, when they see them well employed; and these two plagues of a common-weale, idlenesse and pouerty, are driuen away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and vnreasonable gifts, to some particular fauorites; the great, proud, and vnneccessary edifices, superfluous and vaine charges, are odious to the subiects, who murmure that a man should spoile a thousand to cloath one; that others should braue it with their substance, build vpon their bloud and their labors.

The third point consisteth in the reseruatiō, which a man must make for necessitie, to the end he be not constrained at a need, to haue recourse to ready, vniust, and violent meanes, and remedies: this is that which is called the treasury or exchequer. Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and siluer, though it be by honest and iust meanes, is not alwaies the best, because it is an occasion of warre actiue or passiue, either by breeding enuie in others to see it done, when there is no cause, there being plenty of other meanes, or else because it is a bait to allure an enemy to come, and it were more honourable to employ them as hath beene said: So to spend all and to leaue nothing in the Exchequer is farre worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise princes take heed of this. The greatest treasuries that haue beene in former times, are that of *Darius* the last king of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found fourescore millions of gold. That of *Tiberius* 67. millions; of *Traian* 55. millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *Dauid* did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small a state) wherein there were six score millions. Now to prouide that these great treasuries be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowles, as the *Persians* and *Romans*: or they put them into the temples of their gods, as the safest places; as the *Greeks* in the temple of *Apollo*, which neuerthelesse hath beene many times pilled and robbed; the *Romans* in the temple of *Saturne*. But the best and securest way and most profitable is, as hath beene said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, vpon good gages,

23

3. To make spare
and reseruatiō.

Esay 30.

2. Paralip.

gages, or sufficient securiry. So likewise for the safer custody of the treasures from thecues and robbers, the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanickall persons, but giuen to gentlemen and men of honour, as the ancient *Romans* were accustomed to doe, who chose out young men from amongst their nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honors and charges of the common-wealch.

24

*The sixt head of
this prouision.
An armed
power.*

After counsell and treasure, I thinke it not amisse to put armes, which cannot subliste, nor be well and happily leuied and conducted without these two. Now an armed power is very necessary for a prince, to guard his person and his state: for it is an abuse to thinke to gouerne a state long without armes. There is neuer any surety betweene the weake and the strong; and there are alwaies some that will be stirring either within or without the state. Now this power is either ordinary at all times, or extraordinary in times of warre. The ordinary consisteth in the persons and places; The persons are of two sorts; the guard for the body and person of the soueraigne, which serue not only for the surety and conseruation, but also for his honour and ornament: for that good saying of *Agesselaus* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to try and trust vnto it, That a prince may liue safely enough without guard, if he command his subiects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of man stayeth not it selfe in so faire a way.) And certaine companies, maintained and alwaies ready for those necessities and sudden occurrences that may fall out. For at such times to be busied in leuying powers is great imprudencie. Touching the places, they are the fortresses and cittadels in the frontiers, in place of which, some, and they ancient too, doe more allow of the colonies. The extraordinary force consisteth in armes, which he must leuie and furnish in times of warre. How he should gouerne himselfe therein, that is to say, enterprise and make warre, it belongeth to the second part, which is of the action: this first belongeth to prouision. Only I here say, that a wise prince should besides the guard of his body, haue certaine people alwaies prepared, and experienced in armes, either in great number or lesse, according to the extent or largenesse

*In the Chapter
following.*

largenesse of his state, to repress a sudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his state, reseruing the raising of greater forces, vntill hee must make warre, either offensive or defensive, willingly and of purpose; and in the meane time keeping his arsenals and store-houses well furnished, and prouided with all sorts of offensive and defensive armes, to furnish both foot and horsemen, as likewise with munitions, engins, and instruments for war. Such preparation is not onely necessarie to make warre, (for these things are not found and prepared in a short time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is so foole-hardy, as to attempt a state, which hee knoweth to be ready to receiue him, and thoroughly furnished. A man must arme himselfe against warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it; *Qui cupit pacem, paret bellum*: Hee that desireth peace, let him prouide for warre.

After all these necessary and essentiall prouisions, wee will lastly put alliances or leagues, which is no small prop and stay of a state. But wisdom is very necessarie in the choice thereof, to build well and to take heed with whom and how hee ioyne in alliance; which he must do with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weake and farre off, wherewith can they giue aide? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, that from their ruine ours may follow. For then are we bound to succour them, and to ioyne with them because of this league, whosoeuer they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledge of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treacherie and wickednesse, which is vterly forbidden, but not wisdom and policie, especially for the defence and surety of his state.

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of leagues or alliances: the lesser and more simple is for commerce and traffike onely, but commonly it comprehendeth amitie, commerce and hospitalitie; and it is either defensive onely, or defensive and offensive together, and with exception of certaine princes and states, or without exception. The more strait and perfect is that which is offensive and defensive towards all,

25
The seventh
head of this prouision.
Alliance or
leagues.
With whom.

2. How.

all, and against all, to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies : and such it is good to make with those that are strong and puissant, and by equall alliance. Leagues are likewise either perpetuall, or limited to certaine times ; commonly they are perpetuall, but the better and surest is, to limit it to certaine times, to the end he may haue meanes to reforme, to take away, or adde to the articles, or wholly to depart if need be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would iudge them to be such, as should be perpetuall, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must doe before the time be expired) than to make them perpetuall. For they languish and grow cold, and whosoever findeth himselfe aggriued, will sooner breake them, if they be perpetuall, than if they be limited, in which case he will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seuen necessary prouisions.

CHAP. III.

The second part of this politicke prudence and government of the state, which concerneth the action and government of the Prince.

A summarie description of the action of the Prince.

Beneuolence, Authoritie, two pillars of a prince and state.

HAVING discoursed of the prouision, and instructed a so-
ueraigne with what and how hee should furnish and defend himselfe and his state, let vs come to the action, and let vs see how hee should employ himselfe, and make vse of these things, that is to say, in a word, well to command and gouern. But before wee come to handle this distinctly, according to the diuision which wee haue made, we may say in grosse that well to gouerne and to maintaine himselfe in his state, consisteth in the acquisition of two things, good will and authoritie. Good will is a loue and affection towards the soueraigne and his state, Authoritie is a great and good opinion, an honourable esteeme of the soueraigne and his state. By the first, the soueraigne and the state is loued, by the second, feared. These are not contrary things, but different, as loue and feare. Both of them respect the subiects and strangers, but it seemeth

meth that more properly, Beneuolence belongeth to the subiect, and authority to the stranger; *Amorem apud populares, metum apud hostes quarat*: The Prince must seeke loue from his owne, feare from enemies. To speake simplic and absolutely, authoritie is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The temperature and harmonic of both is a perfect thing, but according to the diuersitie of states, of peoples, their natures and humours, the one is more easie and more necessarie in some places than in others. The meanes to attaine them both, are contained and handled in that which hath beene said before, especially of the manners and vertue of a foueraigne; neuerthelesse of each we will speake a little.

Beneuolence or good will (a thing very profitable and almost wholly necessary, insomuch that of it selfe it preuaileth much, and without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained by three meanes, gentlenes or clemencie, not only in words and deeds, but much more in his commands and the administration of the state, for so doe the natures of men require, who are impatient both of seruing wholly, and maintaining themselues in entire libertie, *Nec totam seruitutem pati, nec totam libertatem*: Neither to endure wholly seruitude, nor altogether liberty. They obey willingly as subiects, not as slaues, *Domiti ut pareant, non ut seruiant*. And to say the truth, a man doth more willingly obey him which commandeth gently and mildly; *Remissius imperanti melius paretur*: qui vult amari languida regnet manu. He that will be beloued, let him reigne with a soft hand. 2
Beneuolence is attained by clemency.

Power (saith Caesar a great Doctor in this matter) indifferently exerciseth preserueth all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commands, is neuer beloued nor assured. But yet it must not be an ouer-loose, and soft effeminate mildnesse, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse than feare. *Sed incorrupto ducis honore*; The leaders honour being both waies intemperate. Tacit. It is the part of wisdom to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himselfe terrible, nor loued by too much debasing himselfe.

The second meane to attaine beneuolence is beneficence, I meane first towards all, especially the meaner people, by prouidence and good policie, whereby corne and all other 3
Beneficence.

necessarie things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound if it be possible, that dearenesse and dearth afflict not the subiect. For the meaner sort haue no care for the publike good, but for this end, *Vulga una ex republica annona cura: The only care the vulgar sort haue of the common-wealth is the prouision of victuall, and other necessaries.*

Tacit.

4

Liberalitie.

The third meane is liberalitie (beneficence more speciall) which is a bait, yea, an enchantment, to draw, to winne and captivate the wills of men: So sweet a thing is it to receiue, honourable to giue. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a state did better defend it selfe by good deeds, than by armes. This vertue is alwaies requisite, but especially in the entrance and in a new state. To whom, how much, and how liberalitie must be exercised, hath beene said before. The meanes of beneuolence haue beene wisely practised by *Augustus*; *Qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit: Who won the souldiers with gifts, the people with prouision of victualls, and all with the sweetnesse of rest and peace.*

Chap. 2. art. 23.

Tacit.

5

Authoritie.

Authoritie is another pillar of state; *Majestas imperij, salutis tutela: The maiestie of Empire is the gardian of safetie*; The inuincible fortresse of a prince, whereby he bringeth into reason all those, that dare to contemne or make head against him: Yea because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and fauour with him. It is composed of feare and respect, by which two a prince and his state is feared of all, and secured. To attaine this authoritie, besides the prouision of things aboue named, there are three meanes which must carefully be kept in the forme of commanding.

By what it is
acquired.

6

Seueritie.

The first is seueritie, which is better, more wholesome, assured, durable, than common lenitie, and great facilitie, which proceedeth first from the nature of the people, which as *Aristotle* saith, is not so well borne and bred, as to be ranged into duty and obedience by loue, or shame, but by force and feare of punishment; and secondly from the generall corruption of the manners, and contagious licentiousnesse of the world, which a man must not thinke to mend by mildnesse and lenitie, which doth rather giue aid to ill attempts. It ingendreth contempt, and hope of impunitie, which is the plague

plague of Common-weales and states : *Illecebra peccandi maxime spes impunitatis* : Hope of impunity is the greatest allurements to offend. It is a fauor done to many, and the whole weale-publike, sometimes well to chastise some one. And he must sometimes cut off a finger, lest the Gangrene spread it selfethrough the whole arme, according to that excellent answer of a king of *Thrace*, whom one telling that he played the mad man, and not the king, answered, That his madnesse made his subjects sound and wise. Seuerity keepeth officers and magistrates in their deuoir, driueth away flatterers, courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demanders, and pery tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise, too great facility openeth the gate to all these kinde of people, whereupon followeth an exhausting of the treasuries, impunity, of the wicked, impouerishing of the people, as rheumes and fluxes in a rheumatike and diseased body, fall vpon those parts that are weakest. The goodnesse of *Pertinax*, the licentious libertie of *Heliogabalus*, are thought to haue vndone and ruinated the Empire : The seuerity of *Seuerus*, and afterwards of *Alexander*, did reestablish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this seuerity must be with some moderation, intermission, and to purpose, to the end that rigor towards a few might hold the whole world in feare ; *Vt poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes* : That as the punishment lights vpon a few, so the feare may innuade all. And the more seldome punishments serue more for the reformation of a state, saith an ancient writer, than the more frequent. This is to be vnderstood, if vices gather not strength, and men grow not opinatiuely obstinate in them ; for then he must not spare either sword or fire : *Crudelem medicum intemperans ager facit* : An intemperate sicke person maketh a cruell physitian.

The second is constancy, which is a stayed resolution, whereby the prince marching alwaies with one and the same case, without altering or changing, maintaineth alwaies, and enforceth the obseruation of the ancient lawes and customes. To change and to be readuised, besides that it is an argument of inconstancy and irresolution, it bringeth both to the lawes and to the soueraigne, and to the state, contempt and sinister opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort doe so much

forbid the change, and rechange of any thing in the lawes and customes, though it were for the better: for the change or remoue bringeth alwaies more euill and discommoditie, besides the vncertainty and the danger, than the nouelty can bring good. And therefore all innouators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great, euident, and certaine vtility, or publike necessitie. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were stealthingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little and almost insensibly, *leuiter & lentè*.

8

The third is to hold alwaies fast in the hand the sterne of the state, the raines of gouernment, that is to say, the honour and power to command and to ordaine, and not to trust or commit it to another, referring all things to his counsell, to the end that all may haue their eye vpon him, and may know that all dependeth vpon him. That soueraigne that loseth neuer so little of his authority marreth all. And therefore it standeth him vpon, not ouer-much to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatus, neminem unum magnum facere*: The common and surest guard of principalltie is to make no one man too great. And if there be already any such, he must draw him backe and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently; and neuer make great and high charges and offices perpetuall or for many yeares, to the end a man may not get meanes to fortifie himselfe against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nil tam utile, quàm breuem potestatem esse, quæ magna sit*. Nothing so profitable, as short authority if it be great.

Aristot.

Senec.

9

Against vniuersal
authoritie and
tyranny.

Behold here the iust and honest meanes in a soueraigne to maintaine with beneuolence and loue his authority, and to make himselfe to be loued and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhorre tyrannicall authority, and that feare that is an enemy to loue and beneuolence, and is with a publike hate, *Oderint quem metuant*, They will hate whom they feare, which the wicked seeke after abusing their power. The conditions of a good Prince and of a tyrant are nothing alike, and easily distinguished. They may be all reduced to these two points, the one

one to keepe the lawes of God and of nature, or to trample them vnder foot; the other to doe all for the publike good and profit of the subiect, or to employ all to his particular profit and pleasure. Now a Princethat he may be such as he should, must alwaies remember, that, as it is a felicitie to haue power to doe what a man will, so it is true greatnesse to will that that a man should; *Casari cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, vel potius quantum debeas.* Seeing all things are lawfull for Caesar to doe, it is therefore the lesse lawfull for him to doe it: As it is a felicity to be able to doe whatsoeuer thou wilt, so it is a point of greatnesse to will what thou shouldest, or rather what thou oughtest. The greatest infelicity that can happen to a Prince, is to belecue that all things are lawfull that he can, and that please him. So soone as he consenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is setled in them by the help of flatterers, who neuer cease alwaies to preach vnto them the greatnesse of their power; and very few faithfull seruitors there are, that dare to tell them what their dutie is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, than that wherewith a man flattereth himselfe, when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same; there is no remedie for this disease. Neuerthelesse it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good King must doe those things which in outward appearance may seeme tyrannicall, as when it is a question of repressing another tyranny, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious liberty of whom, is a true tyranny: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize ouer the poore and meaner people: or when the king is poore and needy, not knowing where to get siluer, to raise loanes vpon the richest. And we must not thinke that the severity of a Prince is alwaies tyranny, or his guards and fortresses, or the maiestie of his imperious commands, which are sometimes profitable, yea necessarie, and are more to be desired than the sweet prayers of tyrants.

Plin. de
Traia.

These are the two true staves and pillars of a Prince, and of a state, if by them a Prince know how to maintaine and preserve himselfe from the two contraries, which are the murderers of a Prince and state, that is to say, hatred and contempt,

10

Hate and contempt two murderers of a Prince.

Arist.lib. 5.
Pol.
Hatred.

Cicero.

II
Hatred proceedeth from cruelty.
Cap. 2. art. 12.

An aduice for punishments.
Senec.

12
Avarice.

whereof the better to auoid them, and to take heed of them, a word or two. Hatred contrary to beneuolence, is a wicked and obstinate affection of subiects against the prince and his state: It ordinarily proceedeth from feare of what is to come, or desire of reuenge of what is past, or from them both. This hatred when it is greit, and of many, a prince can hardly escape it; *Multorum odijs nulla opes possunt resistere*: No power or riches can resist the hatred of many. He is exposed to all, and there needs but one to make an end of all. *Multa illis manus, illi una cervix*: They haue many hands, he but one necke. It standeth him vpon therefore to preserue himselfe, which he shall doe by flying those things that ingender it, that is to say, cruelty and avarice, the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of beneuolence.

He must preserue himselfe pure and free from base cruelty, vnworthy greatnesse, very infamous to a prince: But contrarily he must arme himselfe with clemency, as hath beene said before, in the vertues required in a prince. But forasmuch as punishments, though they be iust and necessary in a state, haue some image of cruelty, he must take heed to cary himselfe therein with dexterity, and for this end I will giue him this aduice: Let him not put his hand to the sword of iustice, but very seldome and vnwillingly: *Libenter damnat quicito: ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis*: He condemneth willingly that doth it hastily; therefore he is to be sparing euen of the basest blood. 2. Enforced for the publike good, and rather for example, and to terrifie others from the like offence: 3. That it be to punish the faulty, and that without choler, or ioy, or other passion: And if he must needs shew some passion, that it be compassion: 4. That it be according to the accustomed manner of the countrey, and not after a new, for new punishments are testimonies of cruelty: 5. Without giuing his assistance, or being present at the execution: 6. And if he must punish many, he must dispatch it speedily, and all at a blow; for to make delaies, and to vse one correction after another, is a token that he taketh delight, pleaseth and feedeth himselfe therewith.

He must likewise preserue himselfe from avarice, a sinne ill besitting a great personage. It is shewed either by exacting and

and gathering ouermuch, or by giuing too little. The first doth much displease the people, by nature couetous, to whom their goods are as their bloud and their life : The second, men of seruice and merit, who haue laboured for the publike good, and haue reason to thinke that they deserue some recompence. Now how a prince should gouerne himselfe herein, and in his treasure and exchequer affaires, either in laying their foundation, or spending or preserving them, hath beene more at large discoursed in the second chapter. I will here only say, That a prince must carefully preserve himselfe from three things : First from resembling, by ouer-great and excessiue impositions, these tyrants, subiect-mongers, cannibals ; *Qui devorant plebem sicut escam panis Inuicem, quorum ararium spoliarium civium cruentarumq, pradarum receptaculum ;* Who deuoure the people as a morsell of bread, and whose storehouse is the receptacle of the spoiles of the citizens, and bloody preies, for this breeds danger of tumult, witnesse so many examples, and miserable accidents : Secondly, from base vn-honest parsimony, as well in gathering together, (*indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari ; & ut dicitur, etiam à mortuo auferre ;* To smell unworthy gaine out of euery occasion, and as it is said, to take away euen from the dead, and therefore he must not serue his turne herein with accusations, confiscations, vniust spoiles) as in giuing nothing, or too little, and that mercenarily, and with long and importunate suit : Thirdly, from violence in the leuie of his prouision, and that if it be possible, he neuer seise vpon the moueables and vten-sils of husbandry. This doth principally belong to receiuers and purueyers, who by their rigorous courses, expose the prince to the hatred of the people, and dishonour him ; a people subtil, cruell, with six hands and three heads, as one saith. A prince therefore must prouide that they be honest men, and if they faile in their duties, to correct them seuerely, with rough chastisement, and great amends, to the end they may restore and disgorge like sponges, that which they haue sucked and drawn vniustly from the people.

Let vs come to the other worse enemy, contempt ; which is a sinister, base, and abiect opinion of the prince, and the state : This is the death of a state, as authority is the soule

and life thereof. What doth maintaine one only man, yea an old and worne man, ouer so many thousands of men, if not authority and the great esteeme of his person? which if it be once lost by contempt, the prince and state must necessarily fall to the ground. And euen as authority, as hath beene said, is more strong and large than beneuolence, so contempt is more contrary and dangerous than hatred, which dareth not any thing, being held backe by feare, if contempt which shakereth off feare, arme it not, and giue it courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not so common, especially if he be a true and lawfull prince, except he be such a one, as doth wholly degrade and prostitute himselfe, *Et videatur exire de imperio; And seeme to giue ouer his empire.* Neuerthelesse we must see from whence this contempt doth come, that we may the better know how to auoid it. It proceedeth from things contrary to those meanes that winne and get authority, and especially from three, that is to say, from too loose, effeminate, milde, languishing and carelesse, or very light forme of government, without any hold or stay; this is a state without a state; vnder such princes the subiects are made bold, and insolent, all things being permitted, because the prince takes care of nothing. *Malum principem habere, sub quo nihil ulli liceat: pejus sub quo omnia omnibus:* It is an euill thing to haue a prince, vnder whom nothing is lawfull for any man: But worse to haue him vnder whom all things are lawfull for all men. Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicity of the prince, whether it be in his affaires which succeed not well, or in his line and issue, if he haue no children, who are a great prop and stay to a prince, or in the vncertainty of his successors, whereof *Alexander* the great complained: *Orbitas mea quod sine liberis sum, spernitur: Munimen aula regis liberi:* My want of children maketh me to be despised: Royall children are a defence to the kings house. Thirdly, from manners, especially dissolute, loose, and voluptuous, drunkennesse, gluttony, as also rusticity, childishnesse, scurrility.

Art. 5.

Plin. in Pan.

An ill forme of
gouernment.

Infelicity.

Manners.

14

The distinction
of the action of a
prince.

Thus in grosse haue I spoken of the action of a prince. To handle it more distinctly and particularly, we must remember, as hath beene said in the beginning, that it is twofold, peaceable and military; by the peaceable I here vnderstand that

that ordinary action, which is euery day done, and at all times of peace and of warre; by the military, that which is not exercised, but in time of warre.

The peaceable and ordinary action of a soueraigne cannot be wholly prescribed, it is an infinite thing, and consisteth as well in taking heed to doe, as to doe. We will here giue the principall and more necessary aduiselements. First therefore a Prince must provide that he be faithfully and diligently aduertised of all things. This all things may be reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two sorts of aduertisements and aduertisers, who must be faithfull and assured, wise and secret, though in some there be required a greater liberty and constancy than in others. Some are to aduertise him of his honor and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kinde of people in the world, who haue so much need of such friends, as Princes haue; who neither see nor vnderstand but by the eyes and eares of another. They maintaine and hold vp a publike life, are to satisfie so many people, haue so many things hid from them, that before they be aware, they fall into the hatred and detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had beene in time aduertised of them. On the other side free aduertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are perillous about soueraignes, though Princes be ouer delicate and shew great infirmity, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free aduertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power, whatsoeuer they heare, to doe what they list. Others are to aduertise the Prince of whatsoeuer passeth, not onely amongst his subiects, and within the circuit of his state, but with his bordering neighbours. I say of all, that concerneth either a farre off, or neere at hand, his owne state or his neighbours. These two kinde of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephestion* and *Crateras*, of whom the one loued the King, the other *Alexander*, that is to say, the one the state, the other the person.

Secondly, a Prince must alwaies haue in his hand a little booke or memoriall containing three things: first and principally a brieue register of the affaires of the state; to the end he may know what he must doe, what is begunne to be done, and that

Of the peaceable;

An aduice.

15

2 To haue a memoriall of the
1 Affaires.

2. *Persons.*3. *Gifts.*

16

3. *To appoint rewards and punishments.*

17

4. *To distribute rewards.*

18

Of the militarie action which consisteth in three points.

To enterprize, where two things are required.

that there remaine nothing imperfect, and ill executed : A catalogue or bedrowle of the most worthy personages that haue well deserued, or are likely to deserue well of the weale-publique : A memoriall of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom and wherefore ; otherwise without these three, there must necessarily follow many inconueniences. The greatest Princes and wisest Politicians haue vsed it, *Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Trajan, Adrian, the Antonies.*

Thirdly, in asmuch as one of the principall duties of a prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is fauourable, the other odious, a prince must retaine vnto himselfe the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces and fauours, and leaue vnto his officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, depriuations, and other punishments.

Fourthly, in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwayes be ready and willing, giue them before they be asked, if he can, and not to looke that he should refuse them ; and he must giue them himselfe, if it may be, or cause them to be giuen in his presence. By this meanes gifts and good turnes shall be better receiued, and giuen to better purpose, and he shall auoid two great and common inconueniences, which depriue men of honour and worth of those rewards that are due vnto them : the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must vndergoe, to obaine that which he would, and thinketh to haue deserued, which is no small grieffe to honourable minds, and men of spirit : The other, that after a man hath obtained of the prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one halfe, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

Let vs come to the militarie action, wholly necessary for the preservation and defence of a prince, of the subiects, and the whole state, let vs speake thereof briefly. All this matter or subiect may be reduced to three heads, To enterprize, make, finish warre. In the enterprize, there must be two things, iustice and prudence, and an auoidance of their contraries, iniustice and temeritie. First, the warre must be iust, yea iustice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution.

These

These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred, That right consisteth in force; That the issue or event decideth it; That the stronger carrieth it away. But a prince must looke into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue: Warre hath it lawes and ordinances as well as peace. God fauoreth iust warres, and giueth the victory to whom it pleaseth him, and therefore we must first make our selues capable of this fauour by the equity of the enterprise. Warre then must not be begunne and vndertaken for all causes, vpon euery occasion; *Non ex omni occasione querere triumphum: Not to seeke triumph for euery occasion:* And aboue all a prince must take heed that ambition, auarice, choler, possesse him not and cary him beyond reason, which are alwaies, to say the truth, the more ordinary motiues to warre: *Vna & ea vetus causa bel- landi est profunda cupiditas imperij & diuitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant: Rupere foedus impius lucri furor, & ira praecepta:* One, and that an ancient cause of warre is the greedy desire of rule and of riches: they esteeme the greatest glory in the greatest command: the wicked rage of gaine breaketh leagues, and stirrs up wrath.

That a warre may be in all points iust, three things are necessary, that it be denounced and vndertaken by him that hath power to doe it, which is only the soueraigne.

19
Three things
make an enter-
prise iust.

20

That it be for a iust cause, such as a defensiu war is, which is absolute iust, being iustified by all reason amongst the wise, by necessity amongst barbarians, by nature amongst beasts: I say defensiu, of himselfe, that is, of his life, his liberty, his parents, his countrey: of his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath giuen; of such as are vniustly oppressed. *Qui non defendit, nec obstitit, si potest, injuria, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes, aut patriam, aut socios deserat:* He that defendeth not, nor resisteth iniury, if he can, is as much in fault, as if he betrayed his parents, his countrey or his friends. These three heads of defence are within the bounds of iustice, according to Saint Ambrose; *Fortitudo, qua per bellat uetur à barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena iustitia est:* It is fortitude full of Iustice, which by warres defendeth the countrey from barbarians, or protecteth the weake, or companions or friends from robbers. Another more briefly, diuiderh it into two heads, faith.

Cic. pro Milio.

In officio.

Salust.

412 *The second part of this politicke prudence*

faith and health ; *Nullum bellum à civitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute : No war is undertaken by any worthy citie, but either for faithfulnessse or for safety ;* and to offensive warre he puts two conditions ; That it proceed from some former offence giuen, as outrage or vsurpation, and hauing redemanded openly by a Herald that which hath beene surprised and taken away (*post clarigatum*) and sought it by way of iustice, which must euer goe formost. For if men be willing to submit themselues vnto iustice, and reason, there let them stay themselues ; if not, the last, and therefore necessary, is iust and lawfull : *Iustum bellum, quibus necessarium ; pia arma quibus nullam nisi in armis relinquitur spes : That warre is iust to whom it is necessary ; armes are honest and righteous to them, that haue no other hope or refuge left but only in armes.*

Thirdly, to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnesse. *Sapientes pacis causa bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otij sustentant : ut in pace sine injuria vivant : Wise men wage warre for peace sake, and sustaine labour in hope of rest ; that they may line in peace without iniury.*

After iustice commeth prudence, whereby a man doth aduisedly deliberate before by sound of trumpet he publisheth the warre. And therefore, that nothing be done out of passion, and ouer-rashly, it is necessary that he consider of the points : of forces and meanes, as well his owne, as his enemies ; secondly of the hazard and dangerous reuolution of humane things, especially of armes, which are variable, and wherein fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more her empire, than in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such, that in an houre it carieth all : *Simul pars ac sperata decorum hinc fortuna euertere potest : The fortune of one houre may ouerthrow all honour both gotten and hoped for.*

Thirdly, of those great euils, infelicities, and publike and particular miseries, which warre doth necessarily bring with it, and which be such as the only imagination is lamentable. Fourthly, of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproches that are spread abroad against the authors of the warre, by reason of those euils and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing more subiect to the tongues and iudgements of men than warre. But all lighteth vpon the Chiefetaine. *Iniquissima bel-*

Plin. lib. 22. nat. hist. cap. 2.

Linus.

22

Prudence.

Linus.

Tacit.

lorum

lorum conditio hac est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant, adversa uni imputantur: This is a most uniuersall condition of warre, when all do challenge to themselves the prosperous euents, and the unhappie successes are imputed to one alone. All these things together make the iustest warre that may be, detestable, saith S. Augustine; and therefore it standeth a soueraigne vpon, not to enter into warres but vpon great necessitie, as it is said of Augustus; and not to suffer himselfe to be caried by those incendiaries and fire-brands of warre, who for some particular passion, are ready to kindle and enflame him; quibus in pace durius seruitium est, in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant: They to whom seruice is hard in peace, are borne to this, that neither themselves can be quiet, nor yet suffer others. And these men are commonly such, whose noses doe bleed when they come to the fact it selfe. Dulce bellum inexpertis: War is sweetest to them that haue not knowne it. A wise soueraigne will keepe himselfe in peace, neither prouoking, nor fearing war, neither disquieting either his owne state, or anothers, betwixt hope and feare, nor comming to those extremities of perishing himselfe, or making others to perish.

The second head of militarie action, is to make war, whereunto are required threethings, Munitions, Men, Rules of war. The first is prouision and munition of all things necessary for warre, which must be done in good time and at leasure, for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and prouision of those things which hee should haue alwayes readie; *Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celerius: It must be long preparing, that thou mayst the speedier overcome.* Now of the ordinarie and perpetuall prouision required for the good of the Prince and the state at all times, hath beene spoken in the first part of this chapter, which is wholly of this subiect. The principall prouisions and munitions of warre are three, Money, which is the vitall spirit, and sinews of warre, whereof hath beene spoken in the second Chapter. 2. Armes both offensive and defensive, whereof likewise heretofore. These two are ordinarie, and at all times. 3. Victuals, without which a man can neither conquer, nor liue, whole armies are ouerthrowne without a blow stricken, souldiers grow licentious and vnruled, and it is not possible to doe any good.

Disci-

23
The second head
to make warre,
whereunto three
things are requi-
red.
Prouision, and
munition.

Cassiod.

Disciplinam non servat jejunus exercitus : A fasting and hungry armie obserueth no discipline. But this is an extraordinary provision, and not perpetuall, and is not made but for warre. It is necessary therefore that in the deliberating of warre, there be great store-houses made for victuals, corne, powdered flesh, both for the armie which is in the field, and for the garrisons in the frontiers, which may be besieged.

24

Men.

The second thing required to make warre, are men fit to assaile and to defend ; we must distinguish them. The first distinction is, into souldiers, and leaders or captaines, both are necessarie. The souldiers are the bodie, the captaines the soule, the life of the armie, who giue motion and action: we will speake first of the souldiers who make the body in grosse. There are diuers sorts of them : There are footmen and horsemen ; naturall of the same countrey, and strangers ; ordinarie and subsidiarie. Wee must first compare them all together, to the end we may know which are the better, and to be preferred, and afterwards we will see how to make our choice, and lastly, how to gouerne and discipline them.

25

Rather foot than horse.

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especially rude and barbarous people, preferre horsemen before footmen; others quite contrary. A man may say that the foot are simply and absolutely the better, for they serue both throughout the warre, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hillie, rough, craggie, and strait places, and in sieges the caualarie is almost vnprofitable. They are likewise more readie and lesse chargeable : and if they be well led and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the chocke of the horsemen. They are likewise preferred by such as are doctors in this Art. A man may say that the caualarie is better in a combat, and for a speedie dispatch ; *Equestrium virium, proprium cito parare, cito cedere victoriam*: It is proper to the troups of horsemen quickly to get, and quickly to lose the victorie. For the foot are not so speedie, but what they doe, they performe more surely.

26

And naturall than strangers.

As for naturall souldiers and strangers, diuers men are likewise of diuers opinions touching their precedencie; but without all doubt the naturall are much better, because they are more loyall than mercenarie strangers.

Vena-

Venaleſq; manus, ibi fas, ubi maxima merces.

Theſe mercenary hands that uſe to fight,

For greateſt wages, not for greateſt right.

More patient and obedient, carrying themſelves with more honour and reſpect towards their leaders, more courage in combats, more affection to the victorie, and good of their cuntry: They coſt leſſe, and are more readie than ſtrangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greateſt neceſſities, making more ſtir, than doing ſervice, and the moſt part of them are importunate, and burthenſome to the Common-weale, cruell to thoſe of the country, whom they forrage as enemies. Their coming and departure is chargeable, and many times they are expected and attended with great loſſe and inconuenience. If in ſome extremitie there be need of them, be it ſo, but yet let them be in farre leſſe number than the naturall, and let them make but a member and part of the armie, not the bodie. For there is danger that if they ſhall ſee themſelves equall in force, or more ſtrong than the naturall, they will make themſelves their maſters that called them, as many times it hath fallen out. For hee is maſter of the ſtate, that is maſter of the forces. And againe, if it be poſſible, let them be drawne from allies and confederates, who bring with them more truſt and ſervice than they that are ſimple ſtrangers. For to make more uſe of ſtrangers, or to employ them more than naturall ſubiects, is to play the tyrants, who feare their ſubiects, and becauſe they handle them like enemies, they make themſelves odious vnto them, whereby they feare to arme them or to employ them in the warres.

As touching ordinarie ſouldiers and ſubſidiaries, both are neceſſarie, but the difference betweene them is, that the ordinarie are in leſſe number, are alway a foot and in armes both in peace and in warre: and of theſe wee haue ſpoken in the prouiſion, a people wholly deſtinated and confined to the warres, formed to all exerciſe of armes, reſolute. This is the ordinarie force of the prince, his honour in peace, his ſafeguard in warre: ſuch were the *Roman* legions: Theſe ſhould be diuided by troupes in times of peace, to the end they raiſe no commotions. The ſubſidiaries are in farre greater number, but they are not perpetuall, and wholly deſtinated to warre: they

27
As well ordinarie
as ſubſidiarie.

they haue other vocations : At a need and in times of warre, they are called by the sound of a trumpet, enrolled, mustred, and instructed to the warres ; and in times of peace they returne, and retire themselues to their vocations.

28
Well to choose.

We haue vnderstood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them : A matter whereof wee must be carefully aduised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the victorie, but valour ; and commonly they are but few that giue the ouerthrow. An vnbridled multitude doth more hurt than good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potius impedimentum quam auxilium*: It is not of force, but a burden; a hindrance rather than a helpe. Victorie then consisteth not in the number, but in the force and valour ; *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus*: In warre there is need of hands, not of many names. There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell-mell) that they be not voluntarie aduenturers, ignorant of warre, taken forth of cities, corrupt, vicious, dissolute in their manners, arrogant boasters, hardie and bold to pillage, farre enough off from blowes, leuerets in dangers, *Assueti latrocinij bellorum, insolentes, galeati lepores, purgamenta urbium, quibus ob egestatem & flagitia maxima peccandi necessitudo* : Accustomed to pillage, and the robberies of the warres, insolent, armed hares, the off-scumme of the city, on whom want and the crimes they be subiect vnto, haue brought a necessity of offending.

29
Election of soldiers consisteth in five things.
1. Country.
Veget.

To chuse them well, there needs iudgement, attention and instruction, and to this end five things must be considered of, that is to say, the place of their birth and education. They must be taken out of the fields, the mountaines, barren and hard places, countries neere adioyning to the sea, and brought vp in all manner of labour. *Ex agris supplendum præcipue robur exercitus, aptior armis rustica plebs sub dio & in laboribus enutrita, ipso terra sua solo & cælo acrius animantur. Et minus mortem timet, qui minus deliciarum novit in vita* : The strength of the armie is chiefly to be supplied out of the fields ; country people are fitter for armes, being trained up abroad in the aire, and in labours, and are more eagerly encouraged by the soyle, and open aire of the fields. And hee feareth death least, who hath least tasted

tasted of delights in his life. For they that are brought vp in Cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gaine, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; *Vernacula multitudo, lascivia sueta, laborum intolerans*: The home-bred multitude, used to slouth and wantonnesse, are impatient of labour. Secondly, ^{2 Age.} the age, that they be taken young, at eightene yeeres of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, and not so fit for discipline. Thirdly, the ^{3 Bodies.} bodies, which some will haue to be of a great stature, as *Marius* and *Pirrhus*: but though it be but indifferent, so the body be strong, drie, vigorous, sinowie, of a fierce looke, it is all one. *Dura corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus, major animi vigor.* Hard bodies, well knit ioynts, a fierce and threatening countenance, great courage and vigor of spirit.

Fourthly, the spirit, which must be liuely, resolute, bold, glorious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproach. Fifthly the condition, which importeth much; for they that are of a base and infamous condition, of dishonest qualities, or such as are mingled with effeminate Arts, seruing for delicacie and for women, are no way fit for this profession. ^{4 Spirit.} ^{5 Condition.}

After the choice and elections commeth discipline: for it is not enough to haue chosen those that are capable, and likely to proue good souldiers, if a man make them not good; and if he make them good, if he keepe and continue them not such. Nature makes few men valiant, it is good institution and discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessarie and profitable good discipline is in warre: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that wonne it the signorie of the world: yea, it was in greater account, than the loue of their children. Now the principall point of discipline is obedience, to which end serued that ancient precept, that a souldier must more feare his Capitaine, than his enemie. ³⁰ *Well disciplined.*

Now this discipline must tend to two ends; to make the souldiers valiant, and honest men: and therefore it hath two parts, valour, and manners. To valour three things are required; daily exercise in armes, wherein they must alwaies keepe themselves in practise without intermission; and from hence commeth the Latine word *Exercitus*, which signifieth ³¹ *Discipline hath two parts.* ^{1.} *Valour which is attained by exercise.*

2 Trauell.

3 Order.

an armie. This exercise in armes, is an instruction to manage and vse them well, to prepare themselves for combats, to draw benefit from armes, with dexterity to defend themselves, to discouer and present vnto them whatsoever may fall out in the fight, and come to the triall, as in a ranged battell: to propose rewards to the most apt and actiue, to enflame them. Secondly, trauell or paines, which is as well to harden them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *Exercitus labore proficit, otio con- senescit, An armie profiteth by labour, and decaieth with ease and idleneſſe*, as for the good and seruice of the army, and fortification of the field, whereby they must learne to digge, to plant a pallisade, to order a barricado, to run, to carrie heauie burthens. These are necessary things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprise the enemy. Thirdly order, which is of great vse, and must be kept in warre for diuers causes, and after a diuers manner. First, in the distribution of the troopes, into battallions, regiments, ensignes, camerades. Secondly, in the situation of the campe, that it be disposed into quarters with proportion, hauing the places, entries, issues, lodgings fitted both for the horsemen and footmen, whereby it may be easie for euery man to finde his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field, and against the enemy, that euery one hold his ranke; that they be equally distant the one from the other, neither too neere, nor too farre from one another. Now this order is very necessary and serues for many purposes. It is very pleasing to the eye, cheereth y^e friends, astonisheth the enemy, secureth the armie, maketh all the remoues and the commands of the Captaines easie; in such sort, that without stirre, without confusion the Generall commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purposes come euen to the least. *Imperium ducis simul omnes copie sentiunt; & ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondent. All the armie together know their leaders command; and answer without tumult the will of the Generall.* To be brieſe, this order well kept maketh an armie almost inuincible; and contrarily, many haue lost the field for want of this order, and good intelligence.

32
Manners the second part of discipline.

The second part of this militarie discipline concerneth manners, which are commonly very dissolute and in armes hardly

ly ordered, *Assidue dimicantibus difficile morum custodire mensuram*: It is a hard matter for souldiers that are in continuall employment to keepe a measure in their manners. Neuertheless there must be paines taken, and especially to enstall (if it may bee) three vertues; Continencie, whereby all gluttonie, drunkenness, whoredome, and all manner of dishonest pleasures are chased away, which doe make a souldier loose and licentious. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum*; A souldier degenerateth from courage and vertue, by custome of sensuall pleasures; witnesse Hannibal, who by delicacie and delights in a winter was effeminated, and he by vice was vanquished, that was inuincible, and by armes vanquished all others. Modestie in words, driuing away all vanity, vaine boasting, brauery of speech; for true valour stirreth not the tongue but the hands, doth not speake but execute. *Viri nati militie factis magni, ad verborum linguaq; certamina rudes: discrimen ipsum certaminis differunt: viri fortes, in opere acres, ante id placidi*. Men that are borne for warfare be stout in deeds, and rude in words: prolong the danger of the conflict: valiant men are fierce in execution. And contrarily great speakers are small doers. *Nimij verbis lingua feroces*. Now the tongue is for counsell, the hand for combat, saith Homer; Modestie in action, (that is, a simple and readie obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the Captaines) *Hæc sunt bonæ militiæ, velle, vereri, obedire*: These things are fit in good souldiers, to stand in feare and ready to obey. Abstinencie, whereby souldiers keepe their hands cleane from all violence, forraging, robbery. And this is a brieft summe in the military discipline; the which the Generall must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good and valorous, and by seuerer punishments against offenders: for indulgence vndoeth souldiers.

Continencie.

Tacit.

Modestie.

Abstinencie.

Let this suffice of souldiers: Now a word or two of Captaines, without whom the souldier can doe nothing: they are a body without a soule, a ship with oares without a master to hold the sterne. There are two sorts, the Generall and first, and afterwards the subalterne, the Master of the Campe, Colonels: But the Generall (who must neuer be but one, vnder paine of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that

33.
Of Captaines.

Of the Generall.

Tacit.

an army can doe as much as a Generall can doe ; and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest : *Plus in ducere pones, quàm in exercitu : Repose more in the Generall, than in the armie.* Now this Generall is either the prince himselfe and soueraigne, or such as he hath committed the charge vnto, and made choise of. The presence of a prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victory ; it doubleth the force and courage of his men ; and it seemeth to be requisite when it standeth vpon the safegard and health of his state, and of a prouince. In warres of lesse consequence he may depute another : *Dubijs praliorum exemptus summa rerum & imperij seipsum reseruet : In a doubtfull battaile he may exempt himselfe from the danger, and reserue himselfe for the security of himselfe and state.* Finally, a Generall must haue these qualities ; he must be wise and experienced in the Art military, hauing seene and suffered both fortunes : *Secundarum ambiguarumq, rerum sciens eoque interritus : Hauing tasted both good and bad fortune, and therefore fearelesse.*

Tacit.

Tacit.

Sertori. in
Plut.

Secondly, he must be prouident and well aduised ; and therefore staid, cold, and setled ; farre from all temerity, and precipitation, which is not onely foolish, but vnfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended : *Non licet in bello bis peccare : Faults may not twice be committed in warre.* And therefore he must rather looke backe, than before him ; *Ducem oportet potius respicere, quàm prospicere.* Thirdly, he must be vigilant and actiue, and by his owne example, teaching his souldiers to doe his will. Fourthly, happy ; good fortune comes from heauen, but yet willingly it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

34
The third head
of the rules and
counsels to make
warre.

After the munitions and men of warre, let vs come to the rules and generall aduisements to make warre. This third point is a very great and necessary instrument of warre, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies ; *Plura consilio quàm vi perficiuntur : More things are brought to passe by counsell than by force.* Now to prescribe certaine rules and perpetuall, it is impossible : For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, and whereunto a man must accommodate himselfe, whereupon it was well said, That men giue not counsell to the affaires, but the affaires to men, that

that a man must order his warre by his eye. A man must take his counsell in the field, *Consilium in arena*: for new occurrences yeeld new counsels. Neuerthelesse there are some so generall, and certaine, that a man cannot faile in the deliuey and obseruation of them. We will briefly set downe some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be obserued throughout a warre, which we will speake of in the first place, others are for certaine occasions and affaires.

1 The first is carefully to watch and to meet the occasions: not to lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his: occasion hath a great place in all humane affaires, especially in warre, where it helpeth more than force.

Rules for the whole time of warre.

2 To make profit of rumours and reports that runne abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may doe much, especially in the beginning. *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumve impellit animos.* By fame or report wars continue, fame endeth warre, and moueth mens mindes either to hope or feare.

3 But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him: hee may consider of them, but let them not hinder him to doe that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firme to that which reason hath counselled him.

4 About all, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he growes into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and carelesse; it is the most dangerous euill that can fall out in warre. He that contemneth his enemy, discouereth and betrayeth himselfe, *Frequentissimum initium calamitatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quam qui non timet. Nil tutum in hoste despicitur: quem spreueris, valentiorum negligentia facies.* Securitie is the most common beginning of calamitie. No man is sooner overcome, than he that feareth not; Nothing safely is to be despised in an enemy: thou wilt make by thy negligence him whom thou despisest more strong and valiant. There is nothing in warre that must be despised: for therein there is nothing little: and many times that which seemeth to a man to be of small moment, yeeldeth great effects. *Sape parvis momentis magni casus: ut nihil timendi, sic nihil contemnendi.* From things of small mo-

ment oftentimes arise great events: As nothing is to be feared, so nothing to be contemned.

5 To enquire very carefully, and to know the estate and affaires of the enemy, especially these points: 1. The nature, capacity, and designments of the Chieftaine. 2. The nature, manners, and manner of life of his enemies. 3. The situation of the places, and the nature of the countrey where he is. *Hannibal* was excellent in this.

35
For the fight.

6 Touching the fight or maine battell, many things are aduisedly to be considered of; when, where, against whom, and how, to the end it be not to small purpose. And a man must not come to this extremity, but with great deliberation, but rather make choice of any other meane, and seek to breake the force of his enemy by patience, and to suffer him to beat himselfe with time, with the place, with the want of many things, before he come to this hazard. For the issue of battailes is very vncertaine, and dangerous: *Incerti exitus pugnarum: Mars communis, qui saepe spoliantem & jam exultantem evertit; & perculit ab abiecto*: The issue and euent of warre is vncertaine: *Mars is common to all, who often ouerthroweth him that spoileth, and now triumpheth, and confoundeth and striketh him by the abiect, and by him that was vanquished.*

When.

7 A man then must not come to the battell, but seldome, that is to say, in great necessities, or for some great occasion. In necessitie, as if the difficulties grow on his part; his viands, his treasure faileth; his men beginne to distaste the warres, and will be gone, and he cannot long continue; *Capienda rebus in malis praecepta via est*; In extremities a sudden course is to be taken; vpon great occasion, as if his part be clearely the stronger; that the victory seemeth to offer it selfe, that the enemy is weake and will shortly be stronger, and will offer the battell; that he is out of doubt and feare, and thinketh his enemy farre off; that he is weary and faint, reuietualleth himselfe; his horses feed vpon the litter.

Where.

8 He must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battels. In generall, he must not attend (if he may preuent it) his enemy till he enter within his owne territories. He must goe forth to meet him, or at least stay him in the entrance. And if he be already entered, not hazard the battell,

battell, before he haue another army in readinesse, to make a supply; otherwise he puts his state in hazard. More particularly he must consider the field where the battell is to be fought, whether it be fit for himselfe, or his enemy: for the field many times giues a great aduantage. The plaine champion is good for the caualary; strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of ditches, trees, for the infantry.

9 He must consider with whom he is to fight, not with the strongest, I meane not the strongest men, but the strongest and stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giueth more heart and courage, than necessity, an enemy inuincible. And therefore I say, that a man must neuer fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazard a battell within his owne countrey, for an enemy being entered fighteth desperately, knowing if he be vanquished, he cannot escape death, hauing neither fortresse, nor any place of retreat or succour; *Vnde necessitas in loco, spes in virtute, salus ex victoria: When necessity is in place, hope is in courage, and resolution, and safety out of victory.* With and against whom.

10 The manner of fight that brings best aduantage with it, whatsoeuer it be, is the best, whether it be surprize, subtilty, close and couert faining to feare, to the end he may draw the enemy, and catch him in his ginne; *Spe victoria inducere, ut vincantur; To bring him into hope of victory, that he may be vanquished;* to watch and marke his ouersights and faults, that he may the better preuaile against him, and giue the charge. How.

For ranged battels these things are required. The first and principall is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supply and succour alwaies ready, but close and hidden, to the end that comming suddenly and vnawares, it may astonish and confound the enemy. For all sudden things though they be vaine and ridiculous, bring feare and astonishment with them. 36 Rules for ranged battels.

Primi in omnibus praelijs oculi vincuntur & aures.

In skirmishes and battels all,

The eies and eares are first that fall.

3. To be first in the field, and ranged in battell ray. This a Generall doth with so much the more ease, and it much increaseth the courage of his souldiers, and abateth his enemies;

for this is to make himselfe the assailant, who hath alwaies more heart than the defendant. 4. A beautifull, gallant, bold, resolu'd countenance, of the Generall and other leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the souldiers, and to lay open vnto them the honor, commodity, and security that there is in valor; That dishonour, danger, death, are the reward of cowards: *Minus timoris minus periculi, audaciam pro muro esse, effugere mortem, quicquam contemnit*: The lesse feare, the lesse danger; courage is a wall of defence, he auoideth death that contemneth it.

37
Having ioyned
battaile.

Being come to hand-strokes, if the army wauer, the Generall must hold him firme, doe the duty of a resolute Leader, and braue man at armes, runne before his astonished souldiers, stay them recoyling, thrust himselfe into the throng, make all to know, both his owne, and his enemies, that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

And if it fall out that he haue the better, and the field be his, he must stay and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselues, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to be feared, which hath many times cometo passe, that the vanquished gathering heart, make vse of despaire, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquishers, for this necessity is a violent schoole-mistress. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia*: & *cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido*: The courage of them that are inclosed groweth out of despaire: and when there is no hope, feare taketh armes. It is better to giue passage vnto them, and to remoue all lets and hindrance that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a Generall suffer himselfe or his men to attend the booty, or to be allured thereby ouer-hastily, if he be conqueror. He must vse his victory wisely, lest the abuse thereof turne to his owne harme. And therefore he must not defile it with cruelty, depriving the enemy of all hope, for there is danger in it. *Ignauiam necessitas acuit*; *sape desperatio spei causa est, gravissimi sunt morsus irritata necessitatis*: Necessity sharpneth cowardise; despaire is oftentimes the cause of hope; most bitter are the bitings of vrged necessity. But contrarily, he must leaue some occasion of hope, and ouerture vnto peace, not spoiling and ransacking the countrey which he hath conquered; for fury and rage are dangerous beasts. Againe he must not staine his victory with insolency, but
cary

cary himselfe modestly, and alwaies remember the perpetuall flux and reflux of this world, and that alternatiue reuolution, whereby from aduersity springeth prosperity, from prosperity aduersity. There are some that cannot digest a good fortune : *Magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt : fortuna vitrea est, tunc cum splendet frangitur : O insidam fiduciam ! & saepe victor victus : They cannot digest great felicity : fortune is brittle, and slippery, when it shineth it breaketh : O faithlesse confidence ! that often the victor is vanquished.* If he be vanquished, wisdom is necessary well to weigh and consider of his losse, it is sottishnesse to make himselfe beleue that it is nothing, and to feed himselfe with vaine hopes, to suppress the newes of the ouerthrow. He must consider thereof as it is at the worst, otherwise how shall he remedy it ; And afterwards with a good courage hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new leuy, seeke new succours, put good and strong garrisons into his strongest places. And though the heauens be contrary vnto him, as sometimes they seeme to oppose themselues to holy and iust armes ; it is neuerthelesse neuer forbidden to die in the bed of honor, which is farre better than to liue in dishonor.

And thus we haue ended the second head of this subiect, which is to make warre, except one scruple that remaineth : That is to say, whether it be lawfull to vse subtilty, policie, stratagems, in warre. There be some that hold it negatiuely, that it is vnworthy men of honour and vertue, reiecting that excellent saying ; *Dolus, an virtus quis in hoste requirat ? Whether deceit or courage is most requisite in an enemy ? Alexander would take no aduantages of the obscurity of the night, saying, that he liked not of theeuing victories ; Malome fortuna pigeat, quam victoria pudeat : I had rather be sory for my fortune, than victory should shame me.* So likewise the first Romanes sent their schoolemaster to the Phaliscians ; to Pyrrhus his traiterous Physitian, making profession of vertue, disauowing those of their countrey that did otherwise, reprouing the subtilty of the Greekes and Aphricanes, and teaching that true victory is by vertue ; *Quae salua fide & integra dignitate paratur, Which is gotten with a safe faith, and true honor ;* That which is gotten by wit and subtilty, is neither generous, nor honorable, nor secure.

38

A question of the stratagem of warre.

cure. The vanquished hold not themselves to be well vanquished, *non virtute, sed occasione & arte ducis se victos rati. Ergo non fraude neque occultis sed palam & armatum hostes suos ulcisci.* Thinke not themselves to be conquered by courage, but by occasion, and by the cunning and subtilty of the Generall: Therefore they would not be renewed on their enemies by deceit, or secret fraud, but openly and by force of armes. Now all this is well said and true, but to be vnderstood in two cases, in priuate quarrels, and against priuate enemies, or where faith is not giuen, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say in war, and without the preiudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any meanes whatsoever to conquer the enemy that is already condemned. This, besides the iudgement of the greatest warriors (who contrarily haue preferred the victory gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is won by open force; whereupon to that they haue ordained an ox for a sacrifice, to this onely a cocke) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Cum iustum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis, aut ex insidijs, nihil ad iustitiam interest: When a iust war is undertaken, it is no preiudice to iustice, whether any fight openly or by lying in wait, and by wiles.* Warre hath naturally reasonable priuiledges, to the preiudice of reason. In time and place it is permitted to make vse and aduantage of the sottishnesse of an enemy, as well as of his weaknesse or idlenesse.

Polyb.
Plut. in Marc.
Vlp. lib. 1. de
Prob.
Aug. quest.
sup. Iosue.

39
The third head
of this military
subiect, to finish
warre.

Of peace in re-
spect of the
vanquished.

Let us come to the third head of this military matter more short and pleasing than the rest, which is to finish the warre by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects: *pax optima rerum quas homini novisse datum est. Pax una triumphis innumeris potior: Peace is the best thing that is giuen to man; one peace is better than innumerable triumphs.* And very commodious to both parts, the conquerours and conquered. But first to the vanquished, who are the weaker: to whom I doe first giue this counsell, to continue armed, to make shew of security, assurance and resolution. For he that desireth peace must be alwaies ready for war, whereupon it hath beene said, That treatises of peace doe well and happily succeed when they are concluded vnder a buckler. But this peace must be honest, and vpon reasonable conditions:

conditions: otherwise, though it be said, that a base peace is more profitable than a iust warre, yet it is better to die freely and with honour, than to serue dishonourably. And againe, it must be pure and free, without fraud and hypocrisie, which finisheth the warre, deferreth it not: *Pace suspecta tutius bellum*: Warre is more safe than a doubtfull and suspicious peace. Neuerthelesse in times of necessitie a man must accommodate himselfe as he may. When a pilot feareth a shipwracke, he casteth himselfe into the Sea to saue himselfe; and many times it succeedeth well, when a man committeth himselfe to the discretion of a generous aduersary; *Victores qui sunt alto animo secunda res in miserationem ex ira vertunt*: Fortunate and good successe turneth the minde of a noble and generous conquerour from wrath to mercie. To the vanquishers I giue this counsell, that they bee not ouer-hardly perswaded to peace, for though perhaps it be lesse profitable vnto them, than to the vanquished, yet some commoditie it bringeth, for the continuance of warre is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make warre often against one and the same enemies, because they learne thereby to defend themselves, and in the end to assaile too. The birings of dying beasts are mortall; *Fractis rebus violentior ultima virtus*: The last courage is more violent in a state ouerthrowne. And againe, the issue is alwayes vncertaine; *Melior tutiorque certa pax sperata victoria, illa in tua, hac in deorum manu est*: Better, and more safe is a certaine peace, than a hoped for victorie; the one is in thine owne hand, the other in the hand of God. And many times the poison lieth in the taile, and the more fauourable fortune is, the more it is to be feared; *Nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest*: No man can with safety present himselfe long to often dangers. But it is truly honorable, it is a glory hauing a victory in his hands, to be facill & easily perswaded vnto peace: it is to make knowe that hee vndertaketh a warre iustly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrarily, to refuse it, and afterwards by some ill successe to repent the refusall, it is very dishonourable, and will be said that glorie hath vndone him. Hee refused peace, and would haue honour, and so hath lost them both. But he must offer a gracious and a debonaire peace, to the end it may be durable.

In respect of the
vanquishers.

Honourable.

S. Bernard.

Liuius.

durable. For if it be ouer-rough and cruell, at the first aduantage that may be offered, the vanquished will reuolt; *Si bonam dederitis fidem & perpetuam, si malam, haud diuturnam*: If thou shalt grant a good peace, it will be faithfull and perpetuall, if euill, it will not last long. It is as great greatnesse to shew as much lenitie towards the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemy. The Romans did very well put this in practise, and it did them no harme.

CHAP. IIII.

Of that prudence which is required in difficult affaires and ill accidents publike and private.

THE PREFACE.

HAuing spoken of that politicke prudence required in a soueraigne, for the carriage of himselfe and his good gouernment, wee will heere seuerally speake of that prudence that is necessarie for the preservation of himselfe, and remedying of those affaires, and difficult and dangerous accidents, which may happen either to himselfe, or his particular subiects.

The diuision of this matter by distinction of the accidents.

First, these affaires and accidents are very diuers: they are either publike or particular: either to come, and such as threaten vs, or present and pressing vs: the one are only doubtfull and ambiguous, the other dangerous and important, because of their violence. And they that are the greater and more difficult, are either secret and hid; and they are two, that is to say, conspiracie against the person of the Prince, or the state, and treason against the places and companies: or manifest and open, and these are of diuers sorts. For they be either without forme of warre and certaine order, as popular commotions for small and light occasions, factions and leagues betweene subiects, of the one against the other, in small and great number, great or little: seditions of the people against the prince or magistrate, rebellion against the authority and head of the Prince: or they are ripe and formed into a warre, and are called ciuill warres: which are of so many kindes,

kindes, as the aboue named troubles and commotions, which are the causes, foundations and seeds of them : but haue growen, and are come into consequence and continuance. Of them all wee will speake distinctly, and wee will giue aduice and counsell, as well to foueraignes, as particular persons, great and small, how to carrie themselues wisely therein.

I. Of the evils and accidents that doe threaten vs.

IN those crosse and contrary accidents, whereunto wee are subiect, there are two diuers manners of cariage : and they may be both good, according to the diuers natures both of the accidents, and of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans selfe against the accident, to remoue all things that may hinder the diuerting thereof, or at least to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and obstinate minde, and hath need of hard and painfull care. The other is incontinently to take and receiue these accidents at the worst, and to resolue himselfe to beare them sweetly and patiently, and in the meane time to attend peaceably whatsoever shall happen, without tormenting himselfe, or hindering it. The former studieth how to range the accidents; this himselfe. That seemeth to be more couragious; this more sure. That continueth in suspence, is tossed betweene feare and hope; this putteth himselfe into safetie, and lieth so low that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the seat of constancie. That laboureth to escape; this to suffer : and many times this maketh the better bargain. Often times it falleth out, that there is greater inconuenience and losse in pleading and contending, than in losing; in flying for safetie, than in suffering. A couetous man tormenteth himselfe more than a poore, a zealous than a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because hee is in action; in this patience. But what hindereth, but that a man may performe both in order : and that where prudence and vigilancie can do nothing, there patience may succeed? doubtlesse in publike euils a man must assay the first, which such
are

are bound to doe, as haue the charge and can doe it; in particular let euery one chuse the best.

*II. Of euils and accidents present, pressing,
and extreme.*

THe proper meanes to lighten euils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppose himselfe, for opposition enflameth and increaseth them much more. A man by the ieaousie of contention and contradiction sharpneth and stirreth the euill: but it is either in diuerting them elsewhere, as Physitians vse to doe, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a disease, seeke to diuert it into some other part lesse dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensibly. This is an excellent remedy against all euils, and which is practised in all things, if a man marke it well, whereby we are made to swallow the sowrest morsels, yea death it selfe, and that insensibly: *Abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, loci denique mutatione tanquam aegroti non conualescentes saepe curandus est: The minde is to be led away to other studies, cares, businesse, lastly with change of place, like sicke persons not recovering, is often cured.* As a man counselleth those that are to passe ouer some fearefull deepe place, either to shut or to diuert their eies. When a man hath occasion to launce a sore in a childe, he flattereth him, and withdraweth his minde to some other matter. A man must practise the experiment and subtilty of *Hypomenes*, who being to runne with *Atlanta*, a damsell of excellent beauty, and to lose his life if he lost the goale, to marie the damsell if he wonne it, furnished himselfe with three faire apples of gold, which at diuers times he let fall, to stay the course of the damsell whilest she tooke them vp, and so by diuerting her, got the aduantage of her, and gained her selfe: so if the consideration of some present vnhappy accident, or the memory of any that is past doe much afflict vs, or some violent passion, which a man cannot tame, doe moue and torment vs, we must change and turne our thoughts to some thing else, and substitute vnto our selues some other accident and passion lesse dangerous. If a man cannot vanquish it, he must escape it, goe out of the way, deale cunningly, or weaken
and

and dissolue it, with other thoughts and alienations of the minde, yea breake it into many peeces; and all this by diuersions. The other aduice, in the last and more dangerous extremities that are in a maner past hope, is a little to cast downe the head, to lend vnto the blow, to yeeld vnto necessitie, for there is great danger, that by too much obstinacie in not relenting at all, a man giueth occasion to violence to trample all vnder foot. It is better to make the lawes to will that they can, since they cannot doe that they would. It was a reproach vnto *Cato* to haue beene ouer-rough in the ciuill warres of his time, and that he rather suffered the common-weale to runne into all extremities, than succoured it by tying himselfe ouer-strictly to the lawes. Contrarily *Epaminondas* in a necessitie, continued his charge beyond his time, though the law vpon the paine of his life did prohibit him: and *Philopœmenes* is commended, that being borne to command, he did not onely know how to gouerne according to the lawes, but also command the lawes themselues, when publique necessitie did require it. A Leader at a necessitie must stoupe a little, applie himselfe to the occasion, turne the table of the law, if not take it away, goe a little out of the way, that he lose not all, for this is prudence, which is no way contrarie either to reason or iustice.

III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affaires.

IN things doubtfull, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inabilityie to see and choose that which is most commodious, bringeth with it vncertainie and perplexitie, the best and safest way is to leane to that part where there is most honestie and iustice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwayes remaine an inward content, and an outward glorie to haue chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrarie part, what would haue hapned, and whether he had escaped his destinie. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the straiter.

III. Diffi-

IIII. Difficult and dangerous affaires.

IN difficult affaires, as in agreements, to be ouer-carefull to make them ouer-sure, is to make them lesse firme, lesse assured, because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindered, more things, more clauses are mingled and interposed, than are needfull, from whence arise all differences. Adde hereunto, that a man seemeth hereby to scorne fortune, and to exempt himselfe from her iurisdiction, which cannot be, *Vim suorum ingruentem refringi non vult* : He will not weaken their approaching force. It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, than to be so exact and curious.

In dangerous affaires a man must be wise and couragious, he must foresee and know all dangers, make them neither lesse nor greater than they are by want of iudgement, thinke that they will not all happen, or shall not all haue their effects, that a man may auoid many by industrie or by diligence, or otherwise, what they are from whom hee may receiue aid and succour, and thereupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest enterprise. A wise man is couragious, for hee thinketh, discourseth, and prepareth himselfe for all, and a couragious man must likewise be wise.

V. Coniurations.

The description.

WE are come now to the greatest, most important, and dangerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expressly describing them one after the other, giuing afterwards in euery one of them some aduisements fit for a soueraigne, and in the end for euery particular person.

Coniuration is a conspiracie and enterprise of one or many against the person of the prince or the state ; It is a dangerous thing hardly auoided or remedied, because it is close and hidden. How should a man defend himselfe against a couert enemy, such a one as carrieth the countenance of a most officious friend ? How can a man know the will and thoughts of another ?

another? And againe, he that contemneth his owne life, is master of the life of another, *contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem prius*: He contemneth all men that first contemneth death. In such sort that the Prince is exposed to the mercie of a priuate man, whosoeuer he be.

Machiavel setteth downe at large, how a man should frame and order, and conduct a conspiracie; we, how it may be broken, hindered, preuented.

1 The counsels and remedies hereupon are, first a priuie search and counterminie by faithfull and discreet persons fit for such a purpose, who are the eies and cares of the Prince; These must discouer whatsoeuer is said and done, especially by the principall officers. Conspiratours doe willingly here and there defame the Prince, or lend their cares to those, that blame and accuse him. Their discourse and conference then touching the Prince must be knowne, and a Prince must not sticke to be bountifull in his rewards and immunities to such discouersers: But yet he must not ouer-lightly giue credit to all reports; He must lend his eare to all, not his beleefe, and diligently examine, to the end he oppresse not the innocent, and so purchase vnto himselfe the hatred and hard speech of the people.

2
Remedies and
aduiselements.

2 The second aduice is, that he indeuour by clemencie and innocencie to winne the loue of all, euen of his enemies, *fidissima custodia principis innocentia*: Innocency is the most faithfull safeguard of the Prince. By offending no man, a man taketh a course to be offended by none: And it is to small purpose for a man to shew his power by wrongs and outrages. *Malè vim suam potestas, aliorum contumelijs experitur*: Power doth ill make prooffe of it force, by the contempt of others.

3 The third is to make a good shew, to shew a good countenance according to the accustomed manner, not changing or depressing any thing; and to publish in all places, that he is well perswaded of those meetings and assemblies that men appoint, and to make them belecue that he hath them not in the winde, that he descrieth not their plots and purposes. This was an experiment which *Denys* the tyrant made good vse of, against an enemy of his, which cost him deare.

4 The fourth is to attend without astonishment and trouble

whatsoever may happen vnto him. *Caesar* did well put in practise these three latter meanes, but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, than to liue, nay to die alwaies in a trance, and a continuall feuer of an accident, which is past remedie, and must be wholly referred vnto God. They that haue taken another course, and haue endeouored to preuent it by punishments and reuenge, haue very seldome found it the best way, and haue not for all that escaped the danger, as many Roman Emperors can well witnesse.

3
Punishment of
conspirators, and
the aduice
thereupon.

But the conspiracy being discovered, the truth found out, what is to be done? The conspirators must rigorously be punished: To spare such people, is cruelly to betray the weale publike. They are enemies to the libertie, good, and peace of all: Iustice requireth it. But yet wisdom and discretion is necessarie herein; and a man must not alwaies carry himselfe after one and the same manner. Sometimes he must execute suddenly, especially if the number of the conspirators be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not seeke by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise and secretly he may know them, and to make as though he knew them not, is good) for a man seeketh that which he would not finde. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a small number, good subiects are contained in their dutie, and they diuerted from their attempts, that either are not, or thinke not themselves bewraied. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stirre vnmens hearts against him. Sometimes he must delay the punishment, but yet neuer beslow in procuring his safety. But yet the conspirators may be such, and the treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantly is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to preuent the conspiracie, to frustrate it, faining neuertheless not to know the conspirators, but so to carry himselfe, as if he would prouide for another thing, as the Carthaginians did to *Hannon* their Captaine. *Optimum et solum saepe insidiarum remedium, si non intelligantur: The best, and oftentimes the only remedie of trecheries, is, that a man seeme not to know them.* And which is more, a Prince must sometimes pardon, especially if he be a great man, that hath deserued well of the Prince and state, and to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose

Iustin. li. i.
Tacit.

whose children, parents, friends, are mighty. For what should he doe? How should he breake this band? If with safety he may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemencie in this case is sometimes not only glorious to a Prince, *nil gloriosius principe impune laso*; but it helpeth much for safety to come, diuerteth others from the like designments, and worketh either shame in them or repentance; the example of *Augustus* towards *Cinna* is very excellent.

VI. Treason.

TReason is a secret conspiracie or enterprise against a place, or a troupe or companie: it is as a coniuration, a secret euill, dangerous and hardly auoided: for many times a traitor is in the middle and bosome of the company, or place which he selleth and betraieith. To this vnhappy mysterie are willingly subiect, such as are couetous, light spirits, hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a faire shew of trust and fidelitie, they commend and keepe it carefully in small matters, and by that meanes endeuoring to couer, they discouer themselves. It is the marke whereby to know them. Description.

The aduiselements are almost the same, that belong to coniurations: except in the punishments, which here must be speedie, grievous, and irremissible: for they are a kinde of people ill borne and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world, whom to pitie it is crueltie. 2
Aduiselements
and remedies.

VII. Commotions of the people.

THere are many sorts, according to the diuersitie of the causes, persons, manner and continuance, as we shall see hereafter: faction, confederacie, sedition, tyrannie, ciuill warres. But we will speake heere simply and in generall of those that are raised in a heat, as sudden tumults, that endure not long. The aduiselements and remedies are to procure some one or other to speake, and shew himselfe vnto them, that is of authority, vertue, and singular reputation, eloquent, hauing grauity mingled with grace, and industrie with smooth speech. 1
2
Aduiselements and
remedies.

speech to winne the people : for at the presence of such a man, as at a sudden lightning, the people grow calme and quiet :

*--Veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta
Seditio est, seditq; animis ignobile vulgus,
Iamq; faces, & saxa volant : furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si fortè virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arrectisq; auribus adstant.
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

*When as the commons in tumultuous guise
with furious rage doe in sedition rise,
Then stones and fire, and all things flie about,
as furie fills the hands of that base rout:
And if by chance a man both graue and sage,
of good desert, and reuerenc't for his age,
They hap to see, then silent straight they stand,
with listning eares his words to understand:
He with sweet words their anger doth assuage,
rules their stout mindes, and doth appease their rage.*

Sometimes the Captaine himselfe must vndertake this business. But it must be done with an open front, a strong assurance, hauing his minde free and pure from all imagination of death, and the worst that may happen vnto him : for to goe amongst them with a fearefull and vncōstant countenance, with flattery and humble cariage, is to wrong himselfe, and to doe little good. This *Cesar* did excellently put in practise vpon those mutinous legions and armies that rose vp against him.

*—stetit aggere fulti
Cespidis intrepidus vultu, meruitq; timeri
Nil metuens. —*

*On high vpon a heape of turfes y rear'd,
Vndaunted stood, as in his lookes appeard,
And fearelesse, shew'd him worthy to be fear'd.*

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Aetiac* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two meanes to quiet and appeased moued and furious people : the one is by rough vsage, and pure authority and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becommeth a Captaine, if it stand him vpon; but yet he

he must take heed how he doe it, as hath beene said. The other more ordinarie is by flattery and faire speeches, for hee must not make an open resistance. Sauage beasts are neuer tamed with blowes: and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and faire promises. In this case the wise haue permitted a man to lie, as men vse to doe with children and sicke folke. Herein *Pericles* was excellent, who won the people, by the eies, the eares, and the belly, that is to say, by shewes, comedies, feasts, and hereby did what he list. This meanes more base and seruile, but yet necessarie, must be practised by him whom the Captaine sendeth, as *Menenius Agrippa* did at *Rome*. For if he thinke to winne them by maine force, when they are without the bounds of reason, no way yeelding vnto them, as *Appius*, *Ceriolanus*, *Cato*, *Phocion*, endeoured to doe, he is mistaken, and deceiueth himselfe.

VIII. Faction and confederacie.

FAction or confederacy is a complot and association, of *Description.*
 one against another betweene the subiects, whether it be betweene the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are betweene priuate men and certaine families, but for the most part from ambition (the plague of states) euery one coueting the first ranke. That which falleth out betweene great personages, is more pernicious. There are some that stickenot to say, that it is in some sort profitable for a soueraigne, and it doth the selfe same service to a common-weale, that brawles of seruants doe in families, saith *Cato*. But that cannot be true, except it be in tyrants, who feare lest their subiects should agree too well, or in small and light quarrels betweene cities, or betweene ladies of the Court to know newes. But not important factions, which must bee extinguished in their first birch with their markes, names, habiliments, which are many times the seeds of villanous effects, witnesse that great deflagration, and those bloody murthers hapned in *Constantinople*, for the colours of greene and blew, vnder *Iustinian*. The aduilements
 hereupon are, that if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeavour by good words or threat-
 nings

2

The aduilements
and remedies.

nings to make peace and atonement betwixt them, as *Alexander* the Great did betwixt *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot doe it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspicion and passion. The like he should doe, if the faction be betwixt diuers subiects, or cities, and communities. And if it fall out that it be necessary that he speake himselfe, he must doe it with counsell, being called, to auoid the malice and hatred of those that are condemned. If the faction be betweene great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by iustice, the prince is to employ his force for the vtter extinguishment thereof. But he must take heed that he cary himselfe indifferent, not more affectioned to one than to another; for therein there is great danger, and many haue vndone themselves: And to say the truth, it is vnworthy the greatnesse of a prince, and he that is master of all to make himselfe a companion to the one, and an enemy to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light vpon those that are the principall heads, and let that suffice.

IX. Sedition.

The description.

Sedition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a Prince or a Magistrate. It ariseth and groweth either from oppression or feare: For they that haue committed any great offence, feare punishment; others thinke and feare they shall be oppressed, and both of them by the apprehension of an euill, are stirred to sedition to preuent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious liberty, from want and necessity, in such sort, that men fit for this businesse, are such as are indebted, male-contented, and men ill accommodated in all things, light persons, and such as are blowen vp, and feare iustice. These kinde of people cannot continue long in peace: peace is warre vnto them, they cannot sleepe but in the midst of sedition, they are not in liberty but by the meanes of confusion. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they confer together in secret, they make great complaints, vse doubtfull speeches, afterwards speake more openly, seeme zealous of their liberty, and of the publike good, and ease of the people, and

and by these faire pretences they draw many vnto them. The aduise-
ments and remedies are. First, the selfe same that serued for popular commo-
tions, to cause such to shew themselues and to speake vnto them, that are fit for such a purpose, as hath
beene said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arme and for-
tifie himselfe, and for all that, not proceed against them, but ra-
ther giue them leasure and time to put water in their wine, to
the wicked to repent, to the good to reunite themselues. Time
is a great Physitian, especially in people more ready to mutine
and rebell, than to fight. *Ferocior plebs ad rebellandum, quàm
bellandum: tentare magis quàm tueri libertatem:* The common
people are more stont for rebellion, than for battell: apter to assay,
than to defend their liberty. Thirdly, he must in the meane time
try all meanes to shake and dissolue them, both by hope and
seare; for these are the two waies; *Spem offer, metum intende:*
Offer mercy, and intend iudgement. Fourthly, endeouour to dis-
ioine them, and to breake the course of their intelligence. Fifthly,
he must winne and draw vnto him vnder hand, some
few amongst them by faire promises and secret rewards, where-
by some of them withdrawing themselues from their compa-
nie, and comming vnto him, others remaining with them to
serue him and to giue intelligence of their cariages and pur-
poses, they may the better be brought a sleepe, and their heat
be somewhat allaid. Sixtly, to draw and winne the rest, by
yeelding vnto them some part of that which they demand,
and that with faire promises and doubtfull termes. It shall af-
terwards be easie, iustly to reuoke that, which they haue vn-
iustly by sedition extorted, *Irrita facies qua per seditionem ex-
presserint,* and to inake all whole with lenity and clemency.
Lastly, if they returne vnto reason and obedience, and become
honest men, they must be handled gently, and a man must be
contented with the chastisement and correction of some few
of the principall authors and fire-brands, without any further
inquiry into the rest of the confederates, that all may thinke
themselues in safety, and in grace and fauour.

X. Tyrannie and rebellion.

The description.

TYranny, that is to say, a violent rule or domination against the lawes and customes, is many times the cause of great and publike commotions, from whence cometh rebellion, which is an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyrannie, to the end they may drive him away and plucke him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so farre, being raised onely from a discontent of the government, complaining and desiring an amendment thereof. Now this tyranny is practised by people ill bred, cruell, who love wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers; hate and feare men of honesty, and honour; *Quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omissi gestique honores pro crimine, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minus ex magna fama quam mali: To whom other mens vertue is ever fearefull, nobility, riches, honours, are accounted for crimes; for vertues they render most assured destruction; and no lesse out of good, as euill report.* But they cary their punishment with them: being hated of all, and enemies to all. They liue in continuall feare and apprehension of terror; they suspect all things; they are pricked and gauled inwardly in their consciences, and at last die an euill death, and that very soone; For an old tyrant is seldome seene.

The aduiselements and remedies in this case, shall be set downe at large hereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two, at his entrance to stay and hinder him, lest he get the mastery; being enstalled and acknowledged, to suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, than to moue sedition and ciuill warre; *Peius, deteriusq; tyrannide, siue injusto imperio bellum civile; Ciuill warre is worse than tyranny or vniust government; for there is nothing gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked princes and makes them more cruell: Nihil tam exasperat feruorem vulneris, quam ferendi impatientia: Nothing so much exasperateth the heat of the wound, as impatience in suffering it.* Modestie and obedience allaieth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a prince:

prince : for the clemency of a prince, saith that great prince *Alexander*, doth not only consist in their owne natures, but also in the natures of their subiects, who many times by their ill cariage and bad speeches, doe prouoke a prince, and make him farre worse : *Obsequio mitigantur imperia, & contra contumaciâ inferiorum lenitatem imperitantis diminui : contumaciam cum pernicië quàm obsequium cum securitate malunt : Soueraigne authorities are mitigated by dutifull seruice ; and contrariwise the mildnesse of the soueraigne is diminished by the contumacy of subiects : They rather loue disobedience with destruction, than dutifulnesse with security.*

Curt.
Tacit.

XI. Ciuill warres.

WHen one of these forenamed publike commotions, popular insurrections, faction, sedition, rebellion, comes to fortifie it selfe, and to continue vntill it get an ordinary traine and forme, it is a ciuill warre : which is no other thing, but a presse and conduct of armies by the subiects, either amongst themselues ; and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacy : or against the prince, the state, the magistrate, and this is sedition or rebellion. Now there is not a mischiefe more miserable, nor more shamefull, it is a sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, That it is not properly warre, but a malady of the state, a fiery sicknesse, and frensie. And to say the truth, he that is the authour thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kinde of wickednesse that it is freed from, impiety and cruelty betweene parents themselues, murders with all manner of impunity : *Occidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo licet, non ætas, non dignitas quenuam protegit, nobilitas cum plebe perit, lateq; vagatur ens : It is lawfull to kill openly, but not to pardon but in deceiuing : No age, no dignity, protecteth any man ; the nobility perissheth with the common people, and the sword wandereth farre and wide. All kinde of disloyalty, discipline abolished ; In omne fas, nefasq; avidos aut venales, non sacro, non prophano abstinentes : Greedy and mercenary in all mischiefe, abstaining neither from sacred nor prophane. The inferiour and basest sort are companions*

I
The description.

nions with the best. *Rheni mihi Caesar in undis dux erat, hic socius. Facinus quos inquinat, aequat*: Caesar was both my Captaine and companion on the riuer of Rhene. Them whom mischief de-fileth, it maketh equall. He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approue it not; *Obnoxys ducibus & prohibere non ausis*: The leaders being guilty of the same crimes dare not forbid them. It is a horrible confusion; *Metu ac necessitate huc illuc mutantur*: With feare and necessity they are changed hither and thither. To conclude, it is nothing but misery: But there is nothing so miserable as the victory. For though it fall into the hand of him that hath the right on his side, yet there followeth this inconueniencie, that it maketh him insolent, cruell, inhumane, yea though he were before of a milde and generous nature. So much doth this intestine warre flesh a man in bloud; yea, it is a poison that consumeth all humanity. Neither is it in the power of the captaines to with-hold the rest.

2
The causes.

There are two causes to be considered of ciuill warres. The one is secrete, which as it is neither knowne nor seene, so it cannot be hindred nor remedied; It is destinie, the will of God, who will chastise or wholly dispeople a state. *In se magna ruunt, latet hunc numina rebus Crescendi posuere modum*: They bring great ruines on themselves; God hath set this stop to their growing prosperity. The other is well vnderstood by the wise, and may happily be remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and generall corruption of manners, whereby men of no worth, and that haue nothing to doe, endeavour to turne all topsie turuy, to put all into combustion, couer their wounds with the hurt of the state, for they loue better to be overwhelmed with the publike ruine, than their owne particular. *Miscere cuncta, & privata vulnera reipublica malis operire: nam ita se res habet, ut publica ruina quisque malis quam sua proteri, & idem passurus minus conspici*: They confound all things, and couer priuate wounds by the evils of the common-wealth: for the case so stands, that euery one had rather be trodden downe in the publike ruine, than in his owne, and to be least scene when they suffer the same.

3

Now the aduisements and remedies for this mischief of ciuill

ciuill warre, are to end it as soone as may be, which is done by *The counsels*
 two meanes, agreement and victory. The first is the better, al- *and remedies.*
 though it be not such as a man desireth, time will help the rest.
 A man sometimes must suffer himselfe to be deceiued, to the
 end he may end a ciuill war, as it is said of *Antipater, bellum*
finire cupienti, opus erat decipi: He that desireth to end the war,
had need to be deceined. Victory is dangerous, because it is to
 be feared that the conqueror will abuse it, whereby a tyranny
 may ensue. To the end a man may carry himselfe well herein,
 he must quit himselfe of all the authors of troubles and other
 commotions, and such like bloud-suckers, as well on the one
 part as the other, whether it be by sending them farre off with
 some charge, or vnder some faire pretext, and so diuiding
 them; or by employing them against the stranger; and hand-
 ling the meaner sort with lenity and gentlenesse.

*XII. Aduisements for particular persons touching
 the foresaid publike diuisions.*

THUS we haue seene many kindes of publike troubles and
 diuisions, for which and euery one of them, we haue gi-
 uen counsels and remedies in respect of the Prince: it remain-
 eth that we now giue them for particular persons. This can-
 not be determined in a word: there are two questions; the
 one, whether it be lawfull for an honest man to ioyne himselfe
 to one part, or to remaine quiet and indifferent; the second,
 how a man must carry himselfe in both cases, that is to say, be-
 ing ioyned to one part, or not ioyned to either. Touching the *Two questions.*
 first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are not yet
 ingaged to any part, for if they be, this first question belongs
 not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, be- *The first.*
 cause a man may ioyne himselfe to the one part, not of pur-
 pose and by election, yea to that part which he approueth not,
 but only because he findeth himselfe carried and bound with
 strong and puissant bands, which he may not easily breake,
 which carrie with them a sufficient excuse, being naturall
 and equivalent. Now the first question hath contrarie reasons
 and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest
 man cannot doe better than to keepe himselfe quiet, for he
 knoweth.

knoweth not how to betake himselfe to either part without offence, because all these diuisions are in their owne natures vnlawfull, and cannot be caried, nor subsist without inhumanitie and iniustice. And many good people haue abhorred it, as *Asinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc. Antonie*. On the other side, is it not a thing reasenable for a man to ioyne with the good, and such as haue right on their side? Wise *Solon* hath iudged affirmatiuely, yea roughly chastised him, that retireth himselfe and taketh not part. The professor of vertue *Cato*, hath likewise put it in practice, not being content to take one part, but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it seemeth that men of worth and renoume, who haue both publike charge and credit, and sufficiencie in the state, may and ought to range themselves into that part which they shall iudge the better: for they must not abandon in a tempest the sterne of that ship which in a calme sea they are content to gouerne; especially being an honorable part to prouide for the safetie of the state; And secondly that priuate men, and such as are of a lower degree in the charge of the state, should stay and retire themselves into some peaceable and secure place, during the diuision: and both of them so to carry themselves as shall be said hereafter. Finally, touching the choise of the part, sometimes there is no difficulty, for the one is so vniust, and so vnfortunate, that a man cannot with any reason ioyne himselfe thereunto: But at another time the difficulty is very great, and there are many things to be thought of besides the iustice and equity of the parts.

The second.

Let vs come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counsell and rule of moderation, following the example of *Atticus*, so renowned for his modestie and prudence in such tempests, alwayes held to fauour the good part, yet neuer troubling, nor intrangling himselfe with armes, and without the offence of the contrary part.

*Outragious.
Moderate.*

1. For they that are knowne to be of one part, must not be moued ouer-much, but cary themselves with moderation, not busying themselves with the affaires, if they be not wholly caried and pressed vnto it, and in this case carrie themselves in
such

such order and temperature, that the tempest being passed ouer their heads, without offence they haue not any part in these great disorders and insolencies that are committed, but contrarily sweetning and diuerting them as they can. 2. They that are not ingaged to any part (whose condition is sweetest and best) though it may be inwardly and in affection they incline rather to one than another, must not remaine as neutrers, that is, taking no care of the issue, and of the state of either the one or the other, liuing to themselues, and as spectators in a Theater, feeding vpon the miseries of other men. These kind of men are odious to all, and at the last they run a dangerous fortune, as wee reade of the *Thebanes* in the warre of *Xerxes*, and of *Iabes Gilead*; *Neutralitas nec amicos parit, nec inimicos tollit*: *Neutralitie neither getteth friends, nor taketh away enemies*. Neutrallitie is neither faire nor honest, if it be not with consent of parts, as *Cesar*, who held neutrers for his friends, contrary to *Pompey*, who held them for enemies; or that hee be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatnesse and dignitie ought not to mingle himselfe with such a rout, but rather reclaime them if hee can, arbitrating and moderating all. Much lesse must men in such a case be inconstant, wauering mungrels, *Prothees*, farre more odious than neutrers, and offensive to all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our owne) be common in their actions, offensive to none, officious and gracious to all, complaining of the common infelicities. These kind of people neither get enemies, nor lose their friends. They are fit to be mediators, and louing arbitrators, who are better than the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are foure, two are euill, neutrers, and inconstant persons; two good, common, and mediators: but alwayes the one more than the other, as of partakers there are two sorts, heady, outrageous, and moderate.

Neutrers.

Iudg. 21.
Tit. Liu.

Inconstant.

Common.

Mediators.

XIII. Of priuate troubles and diuisions.

IN priuate diuisions a man may commodiously and loyally carry himselfe betweene enemies, if not with equall affection, yet in such a temperate manner, as that he engage not himselfe

selfe so much to one more than to another, as that either part may thinke they haue more interest in him, and so contenting himselfe with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are knowne, or that serue in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one that he may not say to the other in it due time, changing only the accent and the forme thereof.

Of Iustice the second vertue.

CHAP. V.

Of Iustice in generall.

1
The description.

Iustice is to giue to euery one that which appertaineth vnto him, to himselfe first, and afterwards to others: so that it comprehendeth all the duties and offices of euery particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himselfe, the second to another, and they are contained in that generall commandement, which is the summarie of all iustice; *Thou shalt loue thy neighbour as thy selfe*: which doth not only set downe the duty of a man towards another in the second place, but it sheweth and ruleth it according to the patterne of that dutie and loue he oweth towards himselfe: for as the Hebrews say, a man must beginne charitie with himselfe.

2
The first and originall iustice.

The beginning then of all iustice, the first and most ancient commandement, is that of reason ouer sensualitie. Before a man can well command others, he must learne to command himselfe, yeelding vnto reason the power of commanding, and subduing the appetite, and making it pliant to obedience. This is the first originall, inward, proper, and most beautifull iustice that may be. This command of the Spirit ouer the brutall and sensuall part, from whence the passions doe arise, is compared to an esquire or horseman, who by reason that he keepeth his horse and mounteth him often, and is euer in the saddle, he turneth and manageth him at his pleasure.

3
The distinction of iustice.

To speake of that iustice which is outwardly practised and with another, we must first know that there is a two-fold iustice;

iustice; the one naturall, vniuersall, noble, philosophicall; the other after a sort artificiall, particular, politike, made and restrained to the necessitie of policies and states; That hath better rules, is more firme, pure and beautifull, but it is out of vse, vnprofitable to the world such as it is; *Veri juris germanaq; iustitie solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbris & imaginibus utimur*: We hold no sound and true image of right and perfect Iustice; we only vse the shadow and imaginations thereof: it is not in a manner capable thereof, as hath beene said. That is the rule of *Polycletus*, inflexible, invariable. This is more loose and flexible accommodating it selfe to humane weaknesse, and vulgar necessitie. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yeeldeth and bendeth it selfe as there is need, and as the times, persons, affaires, and accidents doe require. This permitteth vpon a necessitie, and approueth many things, which that wholly reiecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawfull, and many good actions vnlawfull. That respecteth wholly and purely reason, honestie; This profit, ioyning it as much as may be with honesty. Of that, which is but an Idea and in conremplation we shall not need to speake.

The vsuall iustice, and which is practised in the world, is first two-fold, that is to say, equall, bound, and restrained to the termes of the law; according to which Iudges and Magistrates are to proceed: the other iust and conscionable, which not enthralling it selfe to the words of the Law, marcheth more freely, according to the exegencie of the case, yea sometimes against the words of the law. Now to speake better, it handleth and ruleth the law as need requireth. And therefore saith a wise man, the lawes themselues and iustice haue need to be ordred and handled iustly, that is to say, with equitie; *Que expositio & emendatio legis est, exponit sensum, emendat defectum*: which is an exposition and amending of the law, expoundeth the meaning and amendeth the defect. This is the fine floure of iustice, which is in the hand of those that iudge in soveraignty. Againe, to speake more particularly, there is a two-fold iustice; the one commutative, betwixt priuate men, which is handled and practised by Arithmeticke proportion; the other distributive, publicly administred by Geometricall proportion, it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

4
Iustice in practise
distinguished.

Now

5
*There is no true
 iustice in the
 world.*

Now this vsuall and practised iustice, is not truly and perfectly iustice: humane nature is not capable thereof no more than of all other things in their puritie. As humane iustice is mingled with some graine of iniustice, fauour, rigour, too much, or too little, and there is no pure and true mediocritie; from whence haue sprung these ancient prouerbs, That he is enforced to do wrong by retaile, that will do iustice in grosse: and iniustice in small things that will do iustice in great. Lawyers to giue course and passage to commutative iustice, doe couertly and silently suffer themselues to deceiue one another, and that in a certaine measure, so that they passe not the moitie of the iust price; and the reason is, because they know not how to doe better. And in distributive iustice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned, how many guiltie quit and set at libertie, and that without the fault of the Iudges, neuer dreaming either of that too much, or too little, which is almost perpetuall in the purest iustice? Iustice is a let and hindrance to it selfe, and humane sufficiencie cannot see and provide for all. And heere we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive iustice, in that it punisheth onely and rewardeth not, although these are the two parts and the two hands of iustice: but as it is commonly practised, it is lame, and inclineth wholly vnto punishment. The greatest fauour that a man receiueth from it, is indemnitie, which is a play too short for such as deserue better than the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man be falsely accused, and vpon that accusation committed, hee is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last his innocencie being knowne, he escapeth perhaps his vttermost punishment, but without amends of that wrongfull affliction hee hath endured, euen such perhaps as shall neuer leaue him. And the accuser in the meane time, be the colour and ground of his accusation neuer so light (which is easie to doe) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is iustice in rewarding, as that it consisteth wholly in chastisement, whereof that common speech ariseth, That to doe iustice, and to be subiect vnto iustice, is alwayes to be vnderstood of punishment. And it is an easie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger and punishment, euen to such

such an estate, as that he shall neuer know which way to get forth, but with losse.

Of iustice and duty there are three principall parts : for man is indebted to three, to God, to himselfe, to his neighbour : to one about himselfe, to himselfe, and to others beside himselfe : of his duty towards God, which is pietie and religion, hath sufficiently beene spoken before. It remaineth that wee now speake of his dutie towards himselfe and his neighbour.

6
*The diuision of
this matter.*

L. 2. C. 5.

CHAP. VI.

Of the iustice and dutie of man towards himselfe.

THIS is sufficiently contained in this whole worke ; in the first booke which teacheth a man to know himselfe, and all humane condition ; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end giueth aduiselements and rules ; and in the rest of this booke, especially in the vertues of fortitude and temperance. Neuerthelesse I will heere summarily set downe some aduiselement, more expresse and formall.

The first and fundamentall aduice is, to resolue not to liue carelessly, after an vncertaine fashion, and by chance and aduventure, as almost all are accustomed to doe, who seeme to mocke and deceiue themselues, and not to liue in good earnest, nor leading the life seriously and attentiuely, but liuing from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possesse not, they enioy not their life : but they vse it to make vse of other things. Their designments and occupations doe many times trouble, and hurt their life more than doe it ser- uice. These kinde of people doe all things in good earnest, except it be to liue. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole bodie thereof passeth away as if they thought not thereof : it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident is principall vnto them, and the principall as an accessarie. They affect and incline themselues to all things, some to get know- ledge, honours, dignities, riches : others to take their plea- sures, to hunt, to sport themselues, to passe away the time ;

G g

others

others to speculations, imaginations, inuentions : others to manage and order affaires: others to other things ; but to liue is the least they thinke of. They liue as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted and fastning their thoughts vpon other things. Life is vnto them but as a tearme, and a procrastination or delay to employ it about other things. Now all this is very vniust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans selfe : it is for a man to lose his life, and to goe against that which euery man should doe, that is, liue seriously, attentiuely, and cheerefully, *bene vivere & latari : sibi semper valere & vivere doctum*: To liue well and cheerefully : euer to doe good to himselfe and to liue learned, to the end he may liue well, and well die: it is the fault of euery man. A man must leade and order his life, as if it were a businesse of great weight and consequence, and as a bargaine made whereof he must giue an account exactly by parts and parcels. It is our greatest businesse, in respect whereof all the rest are but toies, things accessary and superficiall. There are some that deliberate and purpose to doe it, but it is when they must liue no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling till the market be past, and when they see their folly, they complaine saying, Shall I neuer haue leisure to make my retrait, to liue vnto my selfe? *quàm seruum est incipere vivere cum desinendum est? quàm stulta mortalitatis obliuio? dum differtur, vita transcurrit.* How late is it to beginne to liue, when a man must cease to liue? how foolish is it to forget our mortality? whilst it is deferred, life passeth away. And this is the reason why the wise crie out vnto vs, well to vse the time, *tempori parce*; That we haue not need of any thing so much as time, saith *Zenon*. For life is short, and Art is long; not the Art to heale, but rather to liue, which is wisdom. To this first and principall aduice, these following doe serue:

To learne to dwell, to content, to delight himselfe alone, yea to quit himselfe of the world if need bee, the greatest thing is for a man to know how to be himselfe, vertue is content with it selfe, let vs winne so much of our selues, as to be able in good earnest and willingly, to liue alone, and to liue at our ease. Let vs learne to quit our selues of all those bands that fasten and binde vs to another, and that our contentment depend

depend of our selues, neither seeking nor disdainig or refusing company, but cheerefully to goe on, with or without company, as either our owne, or anothers need doe require: but yet not so to shut vp our selues, and to settle and establish our pleasure, as some that are halfe lost being alone. A man must haue within himselfe wherewith to entertaine and content himselfe, & *in sinu suo gaudere, And to reioyce within himselfe.* He that hath won this point pleaseth himselfe in all places and in all things. He must carry a countenance conformable to the company and the affaires that are in hand and present themselves, and accommodate himselfe vnto another, besad if need be, but inwardly to keepe himselfe one and the same: this is the meditation, and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *cujus vivere est cogitare; Whose life is cogitation.* Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any businesse which we doe more often, continue longer, that is more easie, more naturall and more our owne, than to meditate and to entertaine our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one manner, but very diuers, according to the diuersitie of spirits. In some it is weake, in others strong; in some it is languishing idlenesse, a vacancy and want of other businesse. But the greater spirits make it their principall vacation and most serious studie, whereby they are neuer more busied, nor lesse alone, (as it is said of *Scipio*) than when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affaires, in imitation of God himselfe, who liueth and feedeth himselfe with his eternall thoughts and meditations. It is the businesse of the gods (saith *Aristotle*) from whence doth spring both their, and our blessednesse.

Now this solitary imployment, and this cheerefull entertainment of a mans selfe, must not be in vanity, much lesse in any thing that is vitious; but in study and profound knowledge, and afterwards in the diligent culture of himselfe. This is the price agreed, the principall, first and plainest trauell of euery man. Hee must alwaies watch, taste, sound himselfe, neuer abandon, but be alwaies neere, and keepe himselfe to himselfe: and finding that many things goe not well, whether by reason of vice and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casuall accident that troubleth him, he must

3
To know and culture himselfe.

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quietly and sweetly correct them, and prouide for them. He must reason with himselfe, correct and recall himselfe courageously, and not suffer himselfe to be carried away either with disdain or carelesnesse.

4
To keepe him-
selfe in exercise.

He must likewise in auoiding all idlenesse, which doth but rust and marre both the soule and bodie, keepe himselfe alwaies in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not ouer-bent, violent and painfull, but aboute all, honest, vertuous and serious. And that he may the better doe it, he must quit himselfe of other businesse, and propose vnto himselfe such designements as may delight him, conferring with honest men, and good bookes, dispensing his time well, and well ordering his houres, and not liue tumultuously and by chance and hazard.

5
To make use of
all things.

Againe, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented vnto him, done, said, and make them an instruction vnto him, applie them vnto himselfe, without any shew or semblance thereof.

6
To gouerne his
spirit, that is
his iudgement.

And to particularise a little more, we know that the dutie of man towards himselfe consisteth in three points, according to his three parts, to rule and gouerne his spirit, his bodie, his goods. Touching his spirit (the first and principall, whereunto especially doe belong these generall aduise-ments which we are to deliuer) we know that all the motions thereof are reduced to two, to thinke, and to desire, the vnderstanding and the will; whereunto doe answer science and vertue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the vnderstanding, he must preserue it from two things, in some sort contrary and extreme, that is, sottishnesse and folly, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the one side; this is to bastardise and to lose it: it was not made to play the nouice or baboune, *non ad iocum & lusum genitus, sed ad seueritatem potius*; Not borne to sport and play, but rather for gravity; and from phantasticall, absurd, and extrauagant opinions, on the other side; this is to pollute and debase it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious, and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and naturall opinions: and so much care must not be taken to eleuate and mount it, to extend it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For
order

order and continencie is the effect of wisdom, and which giueth price to the soule, and aboue all to be free from presumption and obstinacy in opinion; vices very familiar with those that haue any extraordinary force and vigor of spirit; and rather to continue in doubt and suspence, especially in things that are doubtfull, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing, and the securest way, well to know how to doubt, and to be ignorant, and the most noble Philosophers haue not beene ashamed to make profession thereof, yea it is the principall fruit and effect of science.

Touching the will, it must in all things be gouerned and submit it selfe to the rule of reason, which is the office of vertue, and not vnto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lesse vnto passion. These are the three that moue and gouerne our soules. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himselfe according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphall, and suspects whatsoever dependeth vpon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liueth in peace, passeth away his life cheerefully and pleasingly, is not subiect to repentance, recantations, changes; because whatsoever falleth out, he could neither doe, nor choose better, and therefore he is neuer kindled nor stirred; for reason is alwaies peaceable. The foole that suffereth himselfe to be led by these two, doth nothing but wander and warre with himselfe, and neuer resteth. He is alwaies readuising, changing, mending, repenting, and is neuer contented; which to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and vertue to make himselfe such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composuit. No rest more pleasing, than that which reason hath settled.* An honest man must gouerne and respect himselfe, and feare his reason and his conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort that he cannot without shame stumble in their presence: *rarum est, ut satis se quisque vereatur.* It is a rare thing, that any man should sufficiently be afraid of himselfe.

Astouching the body, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is folly to goe about to separate and funder these two principall parts the one from the other; but

contrarily it is fit and necessary they be vnited and ioyned together. Nature hath giuen vs a body as a necessary instrument to life : and it is fit that the spirit as the principall should take vpon it the guardianship and protection of the body. So farre should it be from seruing the body, which is the most base, vniust, shamefull, and burthensome seruitude that is, that it should assist, counsell it, and be as a husband vnto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not seruice : It must handle it as a Lord, not as a Tyrant ; nourish it, not pamper it ; giuing it to vnderstand, that it liueth not for it, but that it cannot liue here below without it. This is an instruction to the worke-man, to know how to vse, and make vse of his instruments. And it is likewise no small aduantage to a man, to know how to vse his body, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of vertue. Finally, the body is preserued in good estate by moderate nourishment and orderly exercise. How the spirit must haue a part and beare it company in those pleasures that belong vnto it, hath beene said before, and shall hereafter be set downe in the vertue of temperance.

9

Touching goods and the duty of euery man in this case, there are many and diuers offices ; for to gather riches, to keepe them, to husband them, to employ them, to yeeld vnto them, all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other vnderstandeth nothing, neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches hath more parts than the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preseruatiō and custody, which is proper to the woman, is the labour to couer them.

These are two extremities alike vicious, to loue and affect riches ; to hate and reiect them. By riches I vnderstand that which is more than enough, and more than is needfull. A wise man will doe neither of both, according to that wish and praier of *Salomon* ; Giue me neither riches nor pouerty : but he will hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing of it selfe indifferent, matter of good and euill, and to many good things commodious.

The euils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, haue beene spoken of before. Now in fīue words we set downe a rule touching a mediocrity therein. 1. To desire

fire them, but not to loue them. *Sapiens non amat diuitias, sed mauult: A wise man doth not loue riches, but would willingly haue them.* As a little man and weake of body, would willingly be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or paine vnto himselfe, seeking that without passion, which nature desireth, and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lesse to seeke them at the cost and dammage of another, or by Art, and bad and base meanes, to the end no man should complaine or enuie his gaines. 3. When they come vpon him, entring at an honest gate, not to reiect them, but cheerefully to accept them, and to receiue them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his loue, as being vnworthy thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestly and discreetly, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leaue, be lost or stollen from him, that he be not sorrowful, but that he suffer them to depart with themselues, without any thing of his. *Sidivitia effluxerint, non auferent nisi semetipsas: If riches passe away, let them carry nothing with them but themselves.* To conclude, he deserueth not to be accepted of God, and is vnworthy his loue, and the profession of vertue, that makes account of the riches of this world.

Aude hospes contemnere opes, & te quoque dignum finge Deo:
Be bold to set at nought base trash and pelfe,
And worthie of a God frame thou thy selfe.

Of the iustice and dutie of man
towards man.

An Aduertisement.

THis duty is great, and hath many parts, we will reduce them to two great ones: In the first we will place the generall, simple, and common duties required in all, and euery one, towards al and euery one, whether in heart, word, or deed; which are amity, faith, verity, and free admonition, good deeds, humanity, liberality, acknowledgement or thankfulnes. In the second shall be the speciall duties required for some speciall

ciall and expresse reason and obligation betweene certaine persons, as betweene a man and his wife, parents and children, masters and seruants, princes and subiects, magistrates, the great and powerfull, and the lesse.

*The first part, which is of the generall and common duties of all towards all,
and first*

CHAP. VII.

Of loue or friendship.

1
The description.

AMitie is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts first by nature, and hath expressed it first heat betweene the husband and the wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters; and afterwards growing cold hath recovered heat by Art, and the inuention of alliances, companies, fraternities, colleges, and communities. But forasmuch as in all this being diuided into many parts, it was weakned, and mingled with other profitable and pleasant considerations, to the end it might restrengthen it selfe and grow more feruent, it hath re-collected it selfe, and vnited it owne forces into a narrower roome, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amitie, which is so much more feruent and spirituall than other, by how much the heart is hotter than the liuer, and the blood than the veines.

2

Amity is the soule and life of the world, more necessary (say the wise) than fire and water: *Amicitia, necessitudo, amici necessary: Friendship, familiarity, are necessary friends.* It is the summe, the staffe, the salt of our life; for without it all is darknesse, and there is no ioy, no stay, no taste of life: *Amicitia iustitia confors, natura vinculum, civitatis praesidium, senectutis solatium, vita humana portus: ea omnia constant, discordia cadunt: Friendship is the companion of Iustice, the bond of nature, the defence of a citie, the comfort of old age, and the quiet harbour of mans life: By it all things consist, and discord decays.* And we must not thinke that friendship is profitable and delightfull to priuate

3
How necessary

private men onely, for it is more commodious to the weale-
 publike: it is the true nursing mother of humane society, the
 preseruer of states and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor
 displeaseth any but tyrants and monsters, not because they
 honor not it in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that
 number, for only friendship sufficeth to preserue the world.
 And if it were euery where in force, there would be no need of
 a law, which hath not beene ordained but as a helpe, and as a
 second remedie for want of friendship, to the end it might en-
 force and constrain by the authority thereof that which for
 loue and friendship should be freely and voluntary; but how-
 soeuer, the law taketh place farre below friendship. For friend-
 ship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the
 effects, the law cannot provide for that which is without. This
 is the reason why *Aristotle* said, that good law-makers haue
 euer had more care of friendship, than of Iustice: And because
 the law and iustice doe many times lose their credit, the third
 remedie and least of all hath beene in armes and force, altoge-
 ther contrary to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see
 by degrees the three meanes of publike gouernment. But loue
 or friendship is worth more than the rest, for second and sub-
 diary helps are no way comparable to the first and principall.

The diuersity and distinction of friendship is great: That
 of the ancients into foure kindes, Naturall, Sociable, Hospitall,
 Venereous, is not sufficient. We may note three; The first is
 drawen from the causes which ingender it, which are foure;
 nature, vertue, profit, pleasure, which sometimes goe together
 in troope; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone:
 But vertue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spi-
 rituall, and in the heart as friendship is: Nature in the blood,
 profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body.
 So likewise vertue is more liberall, more free, and pure, and
 without it the other causes are poore, and idle, and fraile. He
 that loueth for vertue, is neuer weary with louing, and if friend-
 ship be broken, complaineth not: He that loueth for profit,
 if it faile, complaineth, and it turneth to his reproch, that
 when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all: He that loueth
 for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his loue ceaseth with it, and
 without complaint estrangeth himselfe.

4
 The first distin-
 ction of the
 causes.

The

5
2 Of persons.

The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in three kindes ; the one is in a straight line, betweene superiours and inferiours ; and it is either naturall, as betweene parents and children, vncles and nephues ; or lawfull, as betweene the Prince and the subiects, the Lord and his vassals, the master and his seruants, the doctor and the disciple, the prelat or gouernour and the people. Now this kinde to speake properly, is not friendship, both because of the great disparity that is betwixt them, which hindreth that inwardnesse and familiarity and entire communication, which is the principall fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse liberty and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason why men giue it other names than of friendship : for in inferiours, there is required of them honour, respect, obedience ; in superiours, care and vigilancie, ouer their inferiours. The second kinde of friendship in regard of the persons, is in a collaterall line betweene equals, or such as are neere equals. And this is likewise two-fold, for either it is naturall, as betweene brothers, sisters, cosens, and this comes neerer to friendship than the former, because there is lesse disparity. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side it knitteth and fastneth, so on the other it looseth : for by reason of goods, and diuisions, and affaires, it is not possible but brothers and kinsfolke must sometimes differ : Besides that many times the correspondencie and relation of humours and wils, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them ; He is my brother or my kinsman, but yet he is a wicked man, a foole : Or it is free and voluntary, as betweene companions and friends, who touch not in bloud, and hold of nothing but only of friendship and loue : and this is properly and truly friendship.

3 The third kinde of friendship in regard of the persons, is mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it should be more strong, this is matrimoniall of married couples, which holdeth of loue or friendship in a straight line, because of the superiority of the husband, and the inferiority of the wife ; and of collaterall friendship, being both of them companions

companions ioyned together by equall bands. And therefore the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foot, but the side of man. Againe, such as are married, in all things and by turnes exercise and shew both these friendships; that which is in a straight line in publike, for a wise woman honoureth and respecteth her husband; that which is collaterall in priuate, by priuate familiaritie. This matrimoniall friendship is likewise after another fashion double and compounded; for it is spirituall and corporall, which is not in other friendships, saue only in that which is reprov'd by all good lawes, and by nature it selfe. Matrimoniall friendship then, is great, strong, and puissant. There are neuerthelesse two or three things that stay and hinder it, that it cannot attaine to the perfection of friendship; The one, that there is no part of marriage free but the entrance, for the progresse and continuance thereof is altogether constrained, enforced, I meane in Christian mariages; for euery where else it is lesse enforced, by reason of those diuorcements which are permitted: The other is the weaknesse and insufficiencie of the wife, which can no way correspond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and iudgements: her soule is not strong and constant enough to endure the straitnesse of a knot so fast, so strong, so durable: it is as if a man should sow a strong and courle peece of cloth to a soft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vanissheth, and is easily torne from the other. Againe, this in-conuenience followeth the friendship of married couples, that it is mingled with so many other strange matters, children, parents of the one side and the other, and so many other distastefull businesse that doe many times trouble and interrupt a liuely affection.

The third distinction of friendship respecteth the force and intention, or the weaknesse and diminution of friendship. 7 *Of degrees.* According to this reason, there is a two-fold friendship, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiaritie, priuate acquaintance: and it hath infinite degrees, one more strict, intimate and strong than another: and the perfect, which is inuisible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceiued by imagination.

We shall know them both by confronting them together; 8 *The differences* and.

and by knowing their differences. The common may be attained in a short time. Of the perfect it is said, that wee must take long time to deliberate, and they must eat much salt together before it be perfected.

2 The common is attained, built, and ordered by diuers profitable and delightfull occasions and occurrents; and therefore a wise man hath set downe two meanes to attaine vnto it, to speake things pleasant, and to doe things profitable; the perfect is acquired by an onely true and liuely vertue reciprocally knowne.

3 The common may be with and betweene diuers, the perfect is with one onely, who is another selfe, and betweene two onely, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it selfe amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrary offices, if the one should commit to my secrecie a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept herein? Doubeleffe, diuision is an enemy to perfection, and vnion her cousin-germane.

4 The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications, it is kindled and cooled, subiect to accession and recession, like a feuer, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equall pace, firme, haughtie, and constant.

5 The common receiueth, and hath need of many rules and cautions giuen by the wise, whereof one is, to loue without respect of piety, verity, vertue, *Amicus usq; ad aras*. Another, so to loue as that a man may hate; so to hate, as that he may likewise loue, that is, to hold alwayes the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himselfe so profusely, that hee may haue cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to vntie.

Againe, to aid and succour at a need without intreatie: for a friend is bashfull, and it costs him deare, to request that that he thinkes to be his due. Againe, not to be important to his friends, as they that are alwayes complaining, after the manner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholesome in ordinarie friendships, but haue no place in this soueraigne and perfect.

We shall know this better by the portrait and description of perfect friendship, which is a very free, plaine, and vniuersall confusion of two soules. See heere three words. 1. A confusion, not only a coniunction, and ioyning together, as of solid things, which howsoeuer they be fastned, mingled, and knit together, may be separated and knowne apart. For the soules of men in this perfect amitie are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be diuided, neither would they, than things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built vpon the pure choise and libertie of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntary than affection. 3. Vniuersall, without any exception of all things, goods, honours, iudgements, thoughts, wills, life. From this vniuersall and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or giue to the other, and there is no speech betwixt them of good turnes, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulness, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of diuision and difference, as I know not how to thanke my selfe for the seruice I doe vnto my selfe, neither doth that loue which I beare vnto my selfe increase by those succours and helpes I giue vnto my selfe. And in mariage it selfe, to giue some resemblance of this diuine knot, though it come farre short thereof: donations are forbid betweene the husband and the wife: and if there were place for the one to giue vnto the other, hee is the giuer that giues cause to his friend to expresse and imploy his loue; and he receiueth the good turne, that by giuing bindes his companion: for the one and the other seeking aboue all things: euen with a greedy desire to doe good to one another, he that giueth the occasion and yeeldeth the matter, is he that is liberall, giuing that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desireth.

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquitie yeeldeth some examples. *Blosius* taken for a great friend of *Examples.* *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what hee would doe for his sake, and hee answering that hee would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would doe if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? To whom he

he answered, that *Gracchus* would neuer intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him. A very bold and dangerous answer. He might boldly haue said, that *Gracchus* would neuer haue required such a matter, and that should haue beene his answer, for according to this our description a perfect friend doth not only fully know the will of his friend, which might haue sufficed for an answer, but hee holdeth in his sleeue, and wholly possesseth it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would haue required it, he would haue done it, it is as if he had said nothing, it neither altereth nor hurteth his first answer concerning that assurance that he had of the will of *Gracchus*. This of wills and iudgements. 3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make vs thinke that this was no perfect amity) two rich, and one poore charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marry; this man dying made his will, wherein he bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him, to the other his daughter, to be married by him, enioyning him withall to bestow vpon her the best dowry that his ability would afford, and if it should happen that the one of them should die, hee should substitute the other. The people made themselves merry with this Will or Testament, the legataries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them receiued vnto them their legacy; but hee that had taken the mother, departing this life within fīue dayes after, the other suruiuing and remaining the sole vniuersall inheritour, did carefully intertaine the mother, and within a few dayes after he married in one day his owne and onely daughter, and her that was bequeathed vnto him, diuiding betwixt them by equall portions all his goods. The wise, according to this description, haue iudged that the first dying, expressest greatest loue, and was the more liberall, making his friends his heires, and giuing them that contentment, as to employ them for the supply of his wants. 4. Touching life, that history is sufficiently knowne of those two friends, whereof the one being condemned by the tyrant to die at a certaine day and houre, hee requested, that giuing baile, hee might in the meane time goe and dispose of his domesticall affaires, which the tyrant agreeing

agreeing vnto vpon this condition, that if he did not returne by that time, his baile should suffer the punishment. The prisoner deliuered his friend, who entred into prison vpon that condition : and the time being come, and the friend who was the baile resolving to die, his condemned friend failed not to offer himselfe, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more than astonished, and deliuering them both from death, desired them to receiue, and to adopt him in their friendship as a third friend.

CHAP. VIII.

Of faith, trust, treachery, secrecy.

ALl men, yea the most treacherous know and confesse that faith is the band of humane societie, the foundation of all iustice, and that about all things it ought to be religiously obserued ; *Nihil augustius fide, quæ iustitia fundamentum est, nec ulla res vehementius rempublicam continet & vitam : Sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum : Nothing is more excellent than faith, which is the foundation of iustice, neither doth any thing more mightily bridle and rule the common-wealth and the life of man. It is the most sacred good in the breasts of men.*

^I
The dignitie of
fidelitie.

Ante Iovem generata, decus diuinaq; hominumq; Cic.

Qua sine non tellus pacem, non aquora norunt,

Iustitia consors, tacitumq; in pectore mimen.

Borne before Iupiter, of gods and men the grace,

Without which neither land, nor seas for peace haue place,

Consort to Iustice, in mans breast,

A God-head not to be exprest.

Neuerthelesse the world is full of treacheries. There are but few that doe well and truly keepe their faith. They breake it diuers wayes, and they perceiue it not. So they finde some pretext and colour thereof, they thinke they are safe enough. Others seeke corners, euasions, subtilties ; *Querunt latebras perjurio.* Now to remoue all the difficulties that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man should carry himselfe, there are foure considerations, whereunto all the rest may be referred : The persons, as well he that giueth faith, as hee that receiueth it; the subiect whereof the question is made, and the manner according to which the faith is giuen.

²
Fidelitie rare.

The diuision of
this matter.

As

3
He that giueth
faith.

As touching him that giueth faith, it is necessarie that hee haue power to doe it : If he be subiect to another, hee cannot giue it, and hauing giuen it without the leaue and approbation of his master, it is of none effect, as it did well appeare in the Tribune *Saturnine* and his complices, who comming forth of the Capitoll (which they had taken by rebellion) vpon the faith giuen by the Consuls, subiects, and officers of the Common-weale, were iustly slaine. But euery free man must keepe his faith, how great and honorable soeuer hee be: yea the greater he is, the more he is bound to keepe it, because he is the more free to giue it. And it was well said, That the simple word of a Prince should be of as great force, as the oath of a priuate man.

4
He that recei-
ueth it.

As touching him to whom faith is giuen, whosoeuer he be, it must carefully be kept, and there are but two exceptions, which are cleare enough, the one if hee receiued it not, and were not contented with it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred thing, must simply be receiued; otherwise it is no more faith, nor trust, when hostages are demanded, sureties are giuen; to take gages or cautions with faith, is a thing ridiculous. Hee that is held vnder the guard of men, or walls, if hee escape and saue himselfe, is not faultie. The reason of that Roman is good; *Vult sibi quisque credi, & habita fides ipsam sibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relativa sunt*: Euery one would haue himselfe to be credited, and faith giuen bindeth faith vnto him: faith requireth trust, and haue relation the one to the other. The other if hauing accepted it, he first brake it; *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eadem*: quando tu me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Consule: With him that breaketh faith, let faith also be broken: when thou holdest not me for a Senator, I will not hold thee for Consul. A treacherous man deserueth not by the law of nature that faith should be kept vnto him, except it be after an agreement, which couereth the treachery and maketh reuenge vnlawfull. Now these two cases excepted, a man must keepe his faith to whomsoeuer, to his subiect as shall be said. 2. To an enemy, witnesse the act of *Attilius Regulus*, the proclamation of the Senat of Rome against all those that had beene licenced by *Pyrrhus* vpon their faith giuen to depart; and *Camillus*, who would

would not so much as make vse of the treachery of another, but resent the children of the *Falissians* with their master.

3. To a theefe and publike offender, witnesse the fact of *Pompey* to the pirats and robbers, and of *Augustus* to *Crocotas*.

4. To the enemies of religion, according to the example of *Iosua* against the *Gabaonites*. But faith ought not to be giuen to these two latter, theeues and heretickes, or apostataes, nor taken of them : for we ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittingly of peace and alliance with such kinde of people, except it be in extreme necessitie, or for the winning of them to the truth, or for the publike good ; but being giuen, it ought to be kept.

As touching the thing subiect, if it be vniust or impossible, a man is quit : and being vniust, it is well done to flie from it, and a double fault to keepe it. All other excuses besides these two, are of no account, as losse, damage, displeasure, discommoditie, difficultie, as the *Romans* haue many times practised, who haue reiected many great aduantages to auoid the breach of faith, *quibus tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit* : With whom faith was better accounted, than so much profit.

5
The subiect of
faith.

Livy.

Touching the manner of giuing faith, there is some doubt : for many thinke that if it haue beene extorted either by force and feare, or by fraud and sudden surprise, a man is not bound vnto it, because in both cases, he that promised hath not a will whereby all things are to be iudged. Others are of a contrary opinion : and to say the truth, *Iosua* kept his faith and promise to the *Gabaonites*, though it were extorted from him by a great surprise, and false intelligence, and it was afterwards declared that he did therein what he ought to doe. And therefore it seemeth that a man may say, that where there is only a simple word and promise past, a man is not bound, but if faith or promise giuen be confirmed and authorized by an oath, as in the fact of *Iosua*, he is bound to performe it in regard of the name of God : but yet that it is afterwards in iudgement to seeke meanes to right himselfe of that either deceit or violence. Faith giuen with an oath, and the interposition of the name of God, bindeth more than a simple promise ; and the breach thereof which includeth periurie with

6
The manner of
giuing faith.

treacherie, is farre worse. But to thinke to giue assurance of faith by new and strange oathes, as many doe, is superfluous amongst honest men, and vnprofitable, if a man will be disloyall. The best way is to sweare by the eternall God, the reuenger of those that vainely vse his name, and breake the faith.

7
Treachery iniur-
ious to God.

Treachery and periury is in a certaine sense, more base and execrable than Atheisme. The Atheist that beleueth there is no God, is not so iniurious against him in thinking there is no God, as he that knoweth him, beleueth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth periuriously abuse his name. He that sweareth to deceiue, mocketh God, and feareth man. It is a lesse sinne to contemne God, than to mocke him. The horror of treachery and periury cannot be better deciphered, than it was by him that said, It was to giue a testimony of the contempt of God, and the feare of men. And what thing is more monstrous than to be a coward with men, and resolute and valorous with God? Treachery is secondly the traitor and capirall enemy of humane society. For it breaketh and destroyeth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth vpon the word and promises of men, which if it faile we haue nothing else to sticke vnto.

To man.

8
To keepe secrets.

To the keeping of faith belongeth the faithfull guard of the secrets of another, which is a charge full of inconuenience, especially of great personages, which though it may wisely be performed, yet it is good to flie the knowledge of them, as sometimes that Poet did the secrets of *Dysmachus*. He that takes into his custodie the secrets of another, drawes a greater trouble vpon him, than he dreams of: for besides the care that he takes vnto himselfe, to keepe them well, he bindes himselfe to faine, and to deny his owne thoughts, a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Neuerthelesse he that takes that charge vpon him, must keepe it religiously, and to the end hee may doe it well, and play the good secretary, hee must be such a one by nature, not by Art and obligation.

CHAP. IX.

Veritie and free admonition.

Free and hartly admonition is a very wholesome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amitie. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to loue soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Euangelicall commandements: *Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, corripe illum, &c. If thy brother sinne against thee, reprove him, &c.*

All haue sometimes need of this remedie, but especially all those that are in prosperity, for it is a very hard thing to be happy and wise together. And Princes who lead a life so publicke and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and haue so many things hid from them, cannot see nor vnderstand, but by the eies and cares of another. And therefore they haue great need of aduertisements: otherwise they may chance to runne strange and hard fortunes, if they be not very wise.

This office is vndertaken by very few; There are required thereunto (as the wise affirme) three things, iudgement or discretion, couragious libertie, amitie and fidelitie. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that doe it, for feare of offending, or want of true amity, and of those that doe it, few there are that know how to doe it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applied, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with griefe, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended and to be reprehended vnfittingly and to small purpose, is the selfe-same wound, and a matter a like faultie in him that doth it. Verity how noble soeuer it be, yet it hath not this priuiledge, to be employed at all houres and in all fashions. A wholesome holy reprehension may be vitiously applied.

The counsels and cautions for a man well to gouerne himselfe herein (it is to be vnderstood where there is no great inwardnesse, familiaritie, confidence, or authority and power, for in these cases there is no place for the carefull obseruation of these rules following) are these: 1. To obserue place and time; that it be neither in times nor places of feasting and

great ioy, for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast; nor of sorrow and aduersitie, for that were a point of hostility, and the way to make an end of all; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Crudelis in re aduersa, objurgatio, damnare est objurgare, cum auxilio est opus.* Chiding is cruell in aduersitie, to chide is to condemne, when helpe is needfull. King *Persens* seeing himselfe thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all things indifferently, not small and light offences, this were to be enuious, and an importunate, ambitious reprehender; not great and dangerous, which a man of himselfe doth sufficiently feele, and feares a worse punishment to come, this were to make a man thinke he lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretly and not before witnesse, to the end he make him not ashamed, as it hapned to a young man, who was so much abashed, that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himselfe. And *Plutarch* is of opinion, that it was for this cause that *Alexander* killed his friend *Chitus*, because he reprehended him in company: but especially that it be not before those whose good opinion he that is reprehended desireth to retaine, and with whom he desires to continue his credit, as before his wife, his children, his disciples. 4. Out of a simple carelesse nature and freedome of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the minde, be it neuer so little. 5. To comprehend himselfe in the same fault, and to vse generall termes, as, We forget our selues; What doe we thinke of? 6. To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of seruice and helpe, this tempereth the tartnesse of correction, and giues a better entertainment: Such and such a thing becomes you well, but not so well such and such a thing. 7. To expresse the fault with better words than the nature of the offence doth require; as, You haue not beene altogether well aduised; in stead of, You haue done wickedly: Receiue not this woman into your company, for she will vndoe you; in stead of, Allure her not, perswade her not to yeeld to your desires, for thereby you will vndoe your selfe: Enter not into dispute with such a man; in stead of, Quarrell not, enuie not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended, be not presently gone, but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.

CHAP. X.

Of flatterie, lying, and dissimulation.

Flatterie is a very dangerous poison to euery particular person, and almost the onely cause of the ruine of a Prince and the state: it is worse than false witnesse, which corrupteth not the Iudge, but deceiueth him onely, causing him to giue a wicked sentence against his will and iudgement: but flatterie corrupteth the iudgement, enchanterh the spirit, and makes him vnapt to be farther instructed in the truth. And if a Prince be once corrupted by flatterie, it necessarily followeth that all that are about him, if they will liue in grace and fauour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villanous vice of a base beggerly minde, as foule and ill bebecoming a man, as impudencie a woman. *Vt matrona meretrici dispar erit atque discolor, infido scurra distabit amicus:* Looke how different and unlike a modest matron is to an impudent harlot, so farre distant is a friend from a faithlesse iester. Flatterers are likewise compared to harlots, forcerers, oile-sellers, to woolfes; and another saith, that a man were better fall among crows than flatterers.

1
Flatterie a pernicious and villanous thing.

There are two sorts of people subiect to be flattered, that is to say, such as neuer want people to furnish them with this kinde of merchandize, and easily suffer themselues to be taken by it; that is to say, Princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinary to corrupt the chastity of women, as to feed and entertaine them with their owne commendations.

2
Especially to two sorts of people.

Flattery is hardly auoided, and it is a matter of difficultie to be preserued from it, not only to women by reason of their weaknesse, and their natures full of vanity and desirous of praise, and to Princes, because they are their kinsfolke, friends, principall officers, whom they cannot auoid, that professe this mysterie; (*Alexander* that great King and Philosopher could not defend himselfe from it, and there is not any priuate man that would not yeeld much more vnto it than kings, if he

3
Hardly auoided.

were daily assaulted and corrupted by such base rascall sort of people as they are) but generally vnto all; yea to the wisest, both by reason of the sweetnesse thereof, in such sort, that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseth, and though he oppose himselfe against it, yet he neuer shutteth it quite out of doores: *Vnde sape exclusa nouissime recipitur; Though often rejected, yet at last received:* and because of the hypocrisie thereof, whereby it is hardly discovered: for it is so well counterfeited and couered with the visage of amitie, that it is no easie matter to discern it.

It imitateth and resembleth amitie, but it is the plague thereof.

It vsurpeth the offices, it hath the voice, it carrieth the name and counterfeit thereof so artificially, that you will say, that it is the same. It studieth to content and please, it honoureth and commendeth; It busieth it selfe much and takes much paines to doe seruice, it accommodateth it selfe to the willes and humours of men: What more? It takes vpon it euen the highest and most proper point of amity, which is to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brieft, a flatterer will seeme to exceed in loue him that he flattereth, whereas contrariwise, there is nothing more opposite vnto loue, not detraction, not iniury, not professed enmity: It is the plague and poison of true amity; they are altogether incompatible; *Non potes me simul amico & adulate uti: Thou canst not use me together both for a friend and a flatterer.* Better are the sharpe admonitions of a friend, than the kisses of a flatterer. *Meliora vulnera diligentis, quam oscula blandientis.*

4
The description and antithesis of flattery and amitie.

Wherefore not to mistake it, let vs by the true picture thereof, finde out the meanes to know it, and to discern it from true amity. 1. Flattery respecteth for the most part it owne particular benefit, and thereby it is knowne; but true friendship seeketh not the good of it selfe. 2. The flatterer is changeable and diuers in his iudgements, like wax, or a looking-glasse, that receiueth all formes: He is a Camelion, a *Polypus*: faine to praise or dispraise, and he will doe the like, accommodating himselfe to the minde of him he flattereth. A friend is firme and constant. 3. He carrieth himselfe too violently and ambitiously in all that he doth, in the view and knowledge of him he flattereth, euer praising and offering his seruice. *Non imitatur amicitiam, sed praterit: He doth not imitate friendship,*
but

but passe by it. He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrariwise, inwardly he hath no affection; which are conditions quite contrary to a true friend. 4. He yeeldeth and alwaies giueth the victory to him he flattereth, alwaies applauding him, hauing no other end than to please, in such sort that he commendeth all and more than all, yea sometimes to his owne cost, blaming and humbling himselfe like a wrestler, that stoopeth the better to ouerthrow his companion. A friend goes roundly to worke, cares not whether he haue the first or the second place, and respecteth not so much how he may please, as how he may profit, whether it be by faire meanes, or by foule, as a good Physitian vseth to doe to cure his patient. 5. A flatterer sometimes vsurpeth the liberty of a friend to reprehend; but it is with the left hand and vntowardly. For he staies himselfe at small and light matters that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater; but yet he will be rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kindred and seruants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should doe vnto him. Or he faileth to haue vnderstood some light accusations against him, and that he could not be quiet vntill he knew the truth thereof, and if it fall out that he that is flattered deny them, or excuse himselfe, he taketh occasion to commend him the more. I was much astonished at it (saith he) and I could not beleue it, for I see the contrary. For how should I thinke that you will take from another man, when you giue all that is your owne, and take more care to giue than to take? Or at leastwise he will make his reprehension to serue his turne, that he may flatter the better, telling him that he takes not care enough of himselfe, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence so necessary to the common-weale, as once a Senatour did to *Tiberius* in a full Senat, but with an ill sent and a bad successe. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwaies respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honesty, and duty; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a malady in the minde of him that is flattered. And therefore he is a proper instrument for all things that belong to pleasure and licentious liberty, and not for that which is honest or

painfull and dangerous. He is like an Ape, who being vnfit for any other seruice, as other beasts are, serues for a play-game and to make sport.

5

*Of lying, the
fouleneſſe and
hurt thereof.*

A neere neighbour and alliance to flattery is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, That it was the part of ſlaues to lie, of free-men to ſpeake the truth. For what greater wickedneſſe is there, than for a man to belie his owne knowledge? The firſt ſteppe to the corruption of good manners, is the baniſhment of truth; as contrarily, ſaith *Pindarus*, To be true is the beginning of vertue. It is likewise pernicious to humane ſociety. We are not men, neither can we knit and ioine together in humane ſociety, as hath beene ſaid, if this be wanting. Doubtleſſe ſilence is more ſociable, than vntrue ſpeech. If a lie had but one viſage as truth hath, there were ſome remedie for it; for we would take the contrary to that which a lier ſpeaketh to be the certaine truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thouſand figures, and an indefinite and vnlimited field. That which is good, that is to ſay, vertue and verity, is finite and certaine, becauſe there is but one way to the marke: That which is euill, that is to ſay, vice and error, and lying, is infinite and vncertaine, becauſe there are a thouſand waies to miſſe the marke. Doubtleſſe if men knew the horror of lying, they would purſue it with ſword and fire. And therefore ſuch as haue the charge of youth, are with all inſtance and diligence to hinder it, and to withſtand the firſt birth and progreſſe of this vice, as likewise of opinatiue obſtinacie, and that in time, for they neuer leaue growing.

6

Of hypocrisie.

There is likewise a couered and diſguiſed lie, which is hypocrisie and diſſimulation (a notable quality of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongſt them as vertue) the vice of licentious and baſe mindes, for a man to diſguiſe and hide himſelfe vnder a maſke, as not daring to ſhew himſelfe to be that which he is, it is a cowardly and ſeruile humour.

7

*The difficulty
thereof.*

Now he that makes profeſſion of this goodly myſtery, liues in great paine, for it is a great vnquietneſſe for a man to endeavour to ſeeme other than that he is, and to haue an eie vnto himſelfe, for feare leſt he ſhould be diſcouered. It is a torment for a man to hide his owne nature, to be diſcouered, a
confuſion.

confusion. There is no such pleasure as to liue according to his nature, and it is better to be lesse esteemed and to liue openly, than to take so much paines to counterfait and liue vnder a canopie ; so excellent and so noble a thing is freedom.

But the mystery of these kinde of men is but poore ; for dissimulation continues not long vndiscovered, according to that saying ; Things fained and violent dure not long, and the reward of such people is, that no man will trust them, nor giue them credit when they speake the truth, for whatsoever comes from them is held for apocryphall and mockerie.

Now here is need of indifferencie and wisdom. For if nature be deformed, vitious and offensiuē to another, it must be constrained, and to speake better, corrected. There is a difference betweene liuing freely and carelessly. Againe, a man must not alwaies speake all he knowes, that is a follie, but that which he speaketh, let it be that which he thinketh.

There are two sorts of people in whom dissimulation is excusable, yea sometimes requisite, but yet for diuers reasons, that is to say, in the Prince for the publike benefit, and the good and peace of himselfe, or the state, as before hath beene said ; and in women for the conueniency thereof, because an ouer-free and bold liberty becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudencie. Those small disguisements, fained carriages, hypocrisies, which well besit their shamefastnesse and modestie, deceiue none but fooles, beseeme them well and defend their honors. But yet it is a thing which they are not to take great paines to learne, because hypocrisie is naturall in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make vse of it, and too much ; their visage, their vestments, their words, countenance, laughter, weeping ; and they practise it not only towards their husbands liuing, but after their death too. They faine great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Instantius morerent quam minus dolent : They mourne in shew, that grieue but little.*

CHAP. XI.

Of benefits, obligation and thankfulness.

THe science and matter of benefits or good turnes, and the thankfull acknowledgement of the obligation, actiue and passiue is great, of great vse, and very subtile. It is that wherein we faile most. We neither know how to doe good, nor to be thankfull for it. It should seeme that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgement is decayed, and reuenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are we thereunto. *Gratia oneri est, ultio in quaestu habetur: altius injuria quam merita descendunt: Thankfulness is a burthen, reuenge is accounted for gaine: Iniuries sinke deeper than deserts.* First then we will speake of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanity, liberality, almes-deeds, and their contraries, inhumanity, cruelty; and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgement, and forgetfulness, or ingratitude and reuenge.

Tacit,
Senec.

I
*An exhortation
to good works by
diuers reasons.*

God, nature, and reason, doe inuite vs to doe good, and to deserue well of another; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good; neither do we know any better meanes how to imitate God; *Nulla re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam beneficentia. Deus est mortalem succurrere mortali: In nothing we come neerer to the nature of God, than in doing good. It is of God that one mortall man succoureth another.* Nature witnesseth this one thing, that euery one delighteth to see him, to whom he hath done good: It best agreeth with nature; *Nihil tam secundum naturam, quam iuvare consortem natura: Nothing is more agreeable to nature, than to helpe him that partaketh of the same nature.* It is the worke of an honest and generous man to doe good, and to deserue well of another, yea to seeke occasions thereunto; *Liberalis etiam dandi causas querit: It is the part of a liberall man euen to seeke occasions of giuing.* And it is said, that good blood cannot lie, nor faile at a need. It is greatnesse to giue, basenesse to take; *Beatius est dare quam accipere: It is better to giue than to receiue.* He that giueth honoureth himselfe, makes himselfe master ouer the receiuer, he that takes,

Ambros.

takes, sells himselfe. He (saith one) that first inuented benefits or good turnes, made stocks and manacles to tie and captiuat another man. And therefore diuers haue refused to take, lest they should wound their libertie, especially from those whom they would not loue, and be beholding vnto, according to the counsell of the wise, which aduise a man not to receiue any thing from a wicked man, lest hee be thereby bound vnto him. Cesar was wont to say, that there came no sound more pleasing vnto his eares, than prayers and petitions : It is the mor of greatnelle, Aske me ; *Invoca me in die tribulationis (erua me te) & honorificabis me : Call vpon me in the day of tribulation, and I will deliuer thee, and thou shalt glorifie me.* It is likewise the most noble, and honourable vse of our means or substance, which so long as we hold and possesse them priuately, they carry with them base and abiect names, houses, lands, money, but being brought into light, and employed to the good and comfort of another, they are enobled with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificences. It is the best, and most commodious imployment that may be ; *Ars quaestuosissima, optima negotiatio*, whereby the principall is assured, and the profit is very great. And to say the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his owne, but that which he giues ; for that which hee retaines, and keepes to himselfe, benefits neither himselfe, nor another ; and if hee employ them otherwise, they consume and diminish, passe thorow many dangerous accidents, and at last death it selfe. But that which is giuen, it can neuer perish, neuer wax old. And therefore *Marc. Anthony* being beaten downe by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cried out that he had nothing, but that which he had giuen : *Hoc habeo quodcunque dedi.* And therefore this sweet, debonaire, and readie will to doe good vnto all, is a right excellent and honourable thing in all respects ; as contrarily, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature, than crueltie, for which cause it is called inhumanitie, which proceedeth from a contrarie cause, to that of bountie and benefits, that is to say, dastardly cowardlinesse, as hath beene said.

There is a two-fold manner of doing good vnto another, by
 profiting and by pleasing him : for the first a man is admired
 and

22
 The distinction
 of benefits.

and esteemed; for the second beloued. The first is farre the better, it regardeth the necessitie and want of a man, it is to play the part of a father and true friend. Againe, there are two sorts of bounties or good turnes, the one are duties, that proceed out of a naturall or lawfull obligation, the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection. These seeme the more noble, neuerthelesse if the other be done with attention and affection, though they be duties, yet they are excellent.

3
Inward and outward benefits.

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is giuen, is seene, is touched; this is but the grosse matter, the marke, the shew thereof, but it is the good will. That which is outward is many times but small, that which is inward very great; for this hath commonly with it a kinde of hunger and affection, and is alwayes seeking occasions to doe good; It giueth so much as it can, and what is needfull, forgetting it own benefit, *In beneficio hoc suspiciendum quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis sue oblitus*: In a benefit this is to be considered, that what he giueth to another, hee taketh away from himselfe, being forgetfull of his owne profit. Contrarily, where the gift is great, the grace may be small; for it is commonly giuen with an ill will, with an expectation of much intreaty, and leasure enough to consider whether he may giue it or no. This is to make too great preparation thereunto, and too great vse thereof, to giue it rather to himselfe, and his ambition, than to the good and necessity of the receiuer. Againe that which is outward may incontinently vanish, that which is inward remaine firme: The libertie, health, honour, which is to be giuen, may all at an instant, by some accident or other, be taken away, the benefit neuerthelesse remaining entire.

4
Rules of benefits.
1. To whom.

The aduiselements whereby a man should direct himselfe, in his bounties and benefits hee bestoweth, according to the rules and instruction of the wise, are these: First, to whom must hee giue? to all? It seemeth that to doe good vnto the wicked and vnworthy, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an ill name vpon the giuer, entertaineth and kindleth malice, giues that which belongs to vertue and merit, to vice also. Doubtlesse free and fauourable graces are not due, but to the good and worthy; but in a time of necessity,

lie, and in a generalitie all in common. In these two cases the wicked and vngratefull haue a part, if they be in necessitie, or if they be in such sort mingled with the good, that the one can hardly receiue without the other. For it is better to doe good to those that are vnworthy, for their sakes that are good, than to deprive the good for their sakes that are euill. So doth God good vnto all, he suffereth the Sunne to shine, and the raine to fall indifferently vpon all. But yet his speciall gifts he giueth not but to those whom he hath chosen for his; *Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum & projicere canibus: multum refert utrum aliquem non excludas an eligas*: It is not good to take the childrens bread, and cast it vnto dogs. There is a great difference betweene not excluding and choosing. At a need therefore, in a time of affliction and necessitie we must doe good vnto all; *hominibus prodesse natura iubet, ubicunq; homini beneficio locus*: Nature commandeth to doe good vnto men, whensoever opportunity is offered to benefit them. Nature and humanity teach vs, to regard and to offer our selues vnto them, that stretch out their armes vnto vs, and not vnto those that turne their backs towards vs; rather vnto those to whom we may doe good, than vnto those that are able to doe good vnto vs. It is the part of a generous mind to take part with the weaker side, to succour the afflicted, and to helpe to abate the pride and violence of the conquerour; as *Chalons* once did, the daughter and wife of a king, whose father and husband being at variance and wars, one against the other, whensoever her husband had got the better against her father, like a good daughter she followed and serued her father in all things, in his afflictions; but the chance turning, and her father getting the maistrie, like a good wife, she turned to her husband, and accompanied him in his hardest fortunes.

Secondly, he must doe good willingly and cheertfully; *Non ex tristitia aut necessitate; hilaris amatorum diligit Deus: Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultra offeras*: Not with discontent, or out of necessity; God loveth a cheertfull giver: that is twice acceptable, that is needfull, and offered of thine owne accord, not suffering himselfe to be ouer-intreated, and importuned; otherwise it will neuer be pleasing; *Nemo libenter debet quod non accepit sed expressit*: No man receiveth with that thankfulness when it is not willingly.

willingly giuen, but wrung out by importunity. That which is yeelded by force and intreatie and prayers, is dearly sold; *non tulit gratis qui accepit rogans, imo nihil charius emitur, quam quod precibus*: He hath it not freely, which receiveth by intreaty, yea nothing is dearer bought, than that which is had by earnest suit. He that prayeth and intreateth, humbleth himselfe, confesseth himselfe an inferiour, couereth his face with shame, honoureth him whom he intreateth: whereupon *Caesar* was wont to say, after he had ouercome *Pompey*, That he lent not his eares more willingly, nor tooke so much content in any thing, as to be intreated; whereby he gaue a kind of hope vnto all, euen his enemies, that they should obtaine whatsoeuer they should request. Graces are silken vestments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

6

3. Speedily.

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seemes to depend vpon the former, for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed; Now he that stayes long before he succor and giue, seems to haue been a long time vnwilling to doe it; *qui tarde fecit, diu noluit*. As contrarily, a readinesse herein doubleth the benefit; *Bis dat, qui celeriter*: Hee giueth twice that giueth quickly. That indifferency & carelesse regard, whether it be done, or not done, that is vsed herein, is not approved by any, but impudent persons. Diligence must be vsed in all points. Herein then there is a five-fold maner of proceeding, whereof three are reprobued; to refuse to do a good turne, and that slowly too, is a double iniurie: to refuse speedily, and to giue slowly, are almost one; and some there are that are lesse offended with a quick deniall; *Minus decipitur cui negatur celeriter: he is lesse deceived that is soon denied*. The best way then is, to giue speedily; but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demand, to preuent the necessitie and the desire.

7

4. Without hope of restitution.

Fourthly, without hope of restitution, this is that wherein the force and vertue of a benefit doth principally consist. If it be a vertue, it is not mercenarie; *Tunc est virtus dare beneficia non reditura*: Then it is vertue to bestow benefits, when they expect no requital. A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retrogradation and reflexion; but when there is no place for requital, yea it is not known from whence the good turne commeth, there it is in its true lustre and glorie. If a man looke
after

after the like he will giue slowly and to few. Now it is farre better to renounce all such hopes of like returnes, than to cease to merit, and to doe good; for whilest a man seeketh after that strange and accidentall payment, he deprieth himselfe of the true and naturall, which is that inward ioy and comfort he receiueth in doing good. Againe, hee must not be twice intreated for one thing. To do wrong, is in it selfe a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to disswade a man from it: so to deserue well of another, is an excellent and honourable thing, and there needs no other thing to inflame a man to it. And in a word, it is not to doe good to look after a like returne, it is to make merchandize and profit thereof; *Non est beneficium quod in quantum mittitur: That is not a benefit that is giuen for gaine.* A man should not confound and mingle together actions so diuers; *deus beneficia, non sœneremus: Let vs giue benefits, but not for vsurie.* It is pittie but such men should be deceiued that hope after such requitals; *dignus est decipi qui de recipiendis cogitaret, cum daret: he is worthy to be deceiued, who looketh for a recompence of that he giue.* She is no honest woman who either for feare, or the better to inflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *qua quia non licuit non dedit, ipsa dedit: She who hath not giuen her consent because she could not fitly doe it, hath notwithstanding consented.* So hee deserues nothing that doth good, to receiue good againe. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of returne, saith Hesiodus.

Fiftly, to doe good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiueth it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done vnto him. Concerning which point, you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits, the one are honourable to the person that receiueth, and therefore they should be done publicly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weaknesse, shame, or other necessitie of the receiuer. These are to be done secretly, yea if need be, that hee onely may take notice that receiueth them; and if it be fit, the receiuer should not know from whence they come (because it may be hee is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs be great) it is good

8.
5. According to
the desire of the
receiuer.

good and expedient to conceale it from him, and to suffer the benefit to drop into his hand, as it were vnawares. It is enough the benefactor know it, and his owne conscience serue him for a witness, which is better than if he had a thousand lookers on.

9
without the of-
fence of another.

10
7. Wisely.

Sixtly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the preiudice of iustice: to doe good not doing euill: To giue to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the sonne in the presence of the father, saith a wise man.

Seuenthly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demands and petitions, from refusing or yielding vnto them. This difficultie proceedeth from the euill nature of man, especially of the petitioner, who vexeth himselfe too much in the enduring of a repulse, be it neuer so iust and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimonie of weaknesse) yea, when they haue neither power, nor will to performe, and referring the auoiding of this difficultie to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so think to quit themselves of their obligation; or if it fall out there be question made therof, they finde excuses and auoidances, and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed; for a man ought not to promise or agree to anything, but to that which he can, will, and ought to performe. And finding himselfe betwene these two straits and dangers, either of a bad promise, because it is either vniust, or ill befitting, or an absolute deniall, which may stirre vp some sedition, or mis-conceit, the counsell is, that he salue this matter either by delaying the answer, or in such sort composing the promise in such generall and doubtfull termes, that they bind not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But here is craft and subtiltie, farre different from true freedome, but this iniquitie of the petitioner is the cause thereof, and he deserveth it.

11
8. From a bearty
affection.

Eightly, it must proceed from a manly heart, and heartie affection, *Homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto: I am a man, and I thinke nothing belonging vnto man strange vnto me;* especially towards those that are afflicted and in want, and this

this is that which we call mercie. They that haue not this affection, *asperos & immanes*, are inhumane, and carry the marks of dishonest men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous, not a soft, effeminate, and troubled minde: for that is a vicious passion, and which may fall into a wicked minde, whereof in this place we haue already spoken: for there is a good and an euill mercie. A man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himselfe, and applying the euill vnto himselfe, detract nothing from equitie, and honour; for God saith, that we must not haue pittie of the poore in iudgement: and so God and his Saints are said to be mercifull and pittifull.

Ninthly, it must be without boasting, and shew, or publike proclamation thereof, for this is a kinde of reproach: These kinde of vaunts do not onely take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perducere*. And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds. 12
Without boasting.

He must continue them, and by new benefits confirme, and renew the old, (this inuieth the whole world to loue him, and to seeke his loue) and neuer repent himselfe of the old, howsoeuer it may seeme, that he hath cast his seed vpon a barren and vnthankfull ground, *beneficij tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hac vox, vellem non fecisse*. Let euen the ill succeſſe of thy good deeds please thee: neuer haue this in thy mouth, *I would I had not done it*. An vnthankfull man wrongs none but himselfe, and a good turne is not lost by his ingratitude; It is a holy consecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to be good, or continue his office: and that which is more, the worke of a noble and generous heart is to continue to doe well, to breake and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners: *optimi viri & ingentis animi est tamdiu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum: vincit malos pertinax bonitas*. The best men and generous mindes will beare so long with an vngratefull person, vntill with their goodnesse they shall make him gratefull; perseuering goodnesse ouercommeth the euill. 13
10 Continue them without repentance.

14

11. Not to re-
voke or trouble
a good turne.

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiuer in the fru-
ition thereof, as they doe who hauing giuen an honour, or an
office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselues; or at
leastwise procure them one good, that they may reape another
themselues. He that is the receiuer, ought not to endure this,
and therefore is not vnthankfull; and the benefactor defa-
ceth the benefice, and cancellerth the obligation. One of our
Popes denying a Cardinall an vniust boone which he deman-
ded, alleaging vnto him that he was the cause why he was
made Pope, answered him, Why then giue me leaue to be
Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast giuen me.

15

Distinctions
of benefices.

After these rules and aduisements concerning good deeds,
we must know that there are some benefices more acceptable
and welcome than others, and which are more or lesse bin-
ding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendly
hand, from those whom a man is inclined to loue without this
occasion; and contrarily it is a griefe to be obliged vnto him,
whom a man likes not, and to whom he would not willingly
be indebted. Such benefices also are welcome, that come from
the hand of him, that is any way bound to the receiuer: for
here is a kinde of iustice, and they binde lesse. Those good
deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carrie
with them a greater force, they make a man forget all iniuries
and offences past, if there were any, and binde more strong-
lie; as contrarily the deniall in such a case, is very iniurious,
and makes a man forget all benefices past. Such benefices like-
wise, as may be requited with the like, are more gladly re-
ceiued, than their contraries, which ingender a kinde of hate;
for he that findeth himselfe wholly bound, without any pow-
er or possibilitie of repaiment, as often as he seeth his benefa-
ctor, he thinks he sees a testimonie of his inabilitie or in-
gratitude, and it is irksome to his heart. There are some be-
nifices, the more honest and gracious they are, the more bur-
thensome are they to the receiuer, if he be a man of credit, as
they that tie the conscience and the will, for they locke faster,
keepe a man in his right memorie, and some feare of forget-
fulness, and failing his promise. A man is a safer prisoner vn-
der his word, than vnder locke and key. It is better to be
tied by ciuill and publike bands, than by the law of honestie,
and

and conscience : two notaries are better than one. I trust your word, and your faith, and conscience : here is more honour done to the receiuer ; but yet constraint fastneth, solliciteth, and presseth much more, and here is more safety to the lender, and a man carrieth himselfe more carelesly, because he doubteth not but that the law, and those outward ties will awaken him, when the time shall serue. Where there is constraint, the will is more loose ; where there is lesse constraint, the will hath lesse liberty : *Quod me ius coget vix à voluntate impetrem : I can hardly request of my will, that which the law constraineth me vnto.*

From a benefis proceeds an obligation, and from it a benefis ; and so it is both the childe and the father, the effect and the cause, and there is a twofold obligation, actiue and passive. Parents, Princes, and superiours, by the duty of their charge, are bound to doe good vnto those that are committed and commended vnto them, either by law or by nature ; and generally all men that haue meanes are bound to relecue those that are in want, or any affliction whatsoever, by the command of nature. Behold here the first obligation, afterwards from benefis or good turnes, whether they be due and springing from this first obligation, or free and pure merits, ariseth the second obligation, and discharge, whereby the receiuers are bound to an acknowledgiment and thankfull requitall. All this is signified by *Hesiodus*, who hath made the Graces three in number, holding each other by the hands.

16
Obligation the
mother and
daughter of a
benefis or good
turne.

The first obligation is discharged by the good offices of euery one that is in any charge, which shall presently be discoursed of in the second part, which concerneth particular duties : but yet this obligation is strengthened, and weakned and lessened accidentally by the conditions and actions of those that are the receiuers. For their offences, ingraticudes, and vnworthinesse doe in a manner discharge those, that are bound to haue care of them ; and a man may almost say as much of their naturall defects too. A man may iustly with lesse affection loue that childe, that kinsman, that subiect, that is not onely wicked and vnworthy, but foule, misshapen, crooked, vnfortunate, ill borne ; God himselfe hath abated him much, from their naturall price and estimation : but yet

17
The first obligation
on and mother.

a man must in this abatement of affection, keepe a iustice, and a moderation, for this concerneth not the helps and succors of necessity, and those offices that are due by publike reason, but only that attention, and affection, which is in the inward obligation.

18

The second obligation which is thankfulness.

The second obligation, which ariseth from benefits, is that which we are to handle, and concerning which, we must at this time set downe some rules : First, the law of dutifull acknowledgement and thankfulness is naturall, witness beasts themselves, not only priuate and domesticall, but cruell and sauage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgement, as of the Lion towards the Roman slaue. *Officia etiam fera sentiunt: Eum wilde beasts haue a feeling of good offices done vnto them.* Secondly, it is a certaine act of vertue, and a testimony of a good minde, and therefore it is more to be esteemed than bounty or benefit, which many times proceeds from abundance, from power, loue of a mans proper interest, and very seldome from pure vertue, whereas thankfulness springeth alwaies from a good heart ; and therefore howsoeuer the benefit may be more to be desired, yet kinde acknowledgement is farre more commendable. Thirdly, it is an easie thing, yea a pleasant, and that is in the power of euery man. There is nothing more easie, than to doe according to nature, nothing more pleasing, than to be free from bands, and to be at libertie.

19

Of ingratitude.

By that which hath beene spoken, it is easie to see how base and villanous a vice forgetfulness and ingratitude is, how vnpleasing and odious vnto all men ; *Dixeris maledicta cuncta, cum ingratum hominem dixeris : Thou speakest all the euill that may be said, when thou namest an vngratefull man.* It is against nature, and therefore *Plato* speaking of his disciple *Aristotle*, calleth him an vngratefull mule. It is likewise without all excuse, and cannot come but from a wicked nature ; *Grave vitium, intolerabile, quod dissociat homines : A grieuous vice and intolerable, which breaketh the society of men.* Reuenge which followeth an iniurie, as ingratitude a good turne, is much more strong and pressing (for an iniury inforceth more than a benefit ; *Altius iniurie quam merita descendunt : Iniuries sinke deeper into the minde, than deserts.*)

Sence.

It

It is a very violent passion, but yet nothing so base, so deformed a vice as ingratitude. It is like those evils that a man hath, that are not dangerous, but yet are more grievous and painfull than they that are mortall. In reuenge there is some shew of iustice, and a man hides not himselfe, to worke his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but base dishonestie and shame.

Thankfulness or acknowledgement, that it may be such as it should be, must haue these conditions. First, he must gratefully receiue a benefit, with an amiable and cheerefull visage and speech: *Qui gratè beneficium accepit, primam ejus pensionem solvit: He which receiueth a benefit thankfully, dischargeth the first payment thereof.* Secondly, he must neuer forget it, *Ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus, nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cui totum beneficium elapsum est: He that forgetteth a benefit is of all other most ingratefull; for in no respect can he be made thankful, that hath utterly forgotten a good turne.* The third office is to publish it; *ingenui pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus, & hac quasi merces authoris: It is the part of an honest minde to confesse by whom we haue receiued profit, and this is as it were a reward to the author.* As a man hath found the heart, and the hand of another, open to doe good, so must he haue his mouth open to preach and publish it, and to the end the memorie thereof may be more firme and solemne, he must name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make restitution, wherein he must obserue these foure conditions: That it be not too speedy, nor too curiously; for this carries an ill sent with it, and it bewraies too great an vnwillingnesse to be in debt, and too much haste to be quit of that band. And it likewise giueth an occasion to the friend or benefactor, to thinke that his curtesie was not kindly accepted of; for to be too carefull, and desirous to repay, is to incurre the suspicion of ingratitude. It must therefore follow some time after, and it must not be too long neither, lest the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted young) and it must be vpon some apt and good occasion, which either offereth it selfe, or is taken, and that without noise and rumour. That it be with some vsurie, and surpasse the benefit, like fruitfull ground: *ingratus est qui beneficium reddit*

20

Rules of thankfulness.

Senec.

Idem.

Plin.

3 *sine usura* ; He is *unthankfull*, who restoreth a benefit without profit ; or at least equall it with all the shew and acknowledgement that may be, of great reason of a farther requitall, and that this is not to satisfie the obligation, but to giue some testimony that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it be willingly and with a good heart ; *Ingratus est, qui metu gratus est* ; He is *ungratefull*, who is *gratefull* for feare. For if it were so giuen ; *Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur : errat si quis beneficium libentius accipit, quam reddit* : A benefit ought to be restored with the same minde, wherewith it was giuen : he is to be blamed whosoever he be that receiveth a benefit more willingly than he restoreth it. Lastly, if his inability be such, as that he cannot make present restitution, yet let his will be forward enough, which is the first and principall part, and as it were the soule, both of the benefit and acknowledgement ; though there be no other witnesse hereof than it selfe ; and he must acknowledge not only the good he hath receiued, but that likewise that hath beene offered, and might haue beene receiued, that is to say, the good will of the benefactor, which is, as hath beene said, the principall.

The second part, which concerneth the
*speciall duties of certaine men, by certaine
 and speciall obligation.*

THE PREFACE.

Being to speake of speciali and particular duties, differing according to the diuersity of persons and their states, whether they be vnequall, as superiours and inferiours, or equall, we will beginne with married folkes, who are mixt, and hold with both equality and inequality. And so much the rather, because we are first to speake of priuate and domesticall iustice and duties, before publike, because they are before them ; as families and houses are before common-weales, and therefore that priuate iustice which is observed in a family, is the image, and source, and modell of a common-weale. Now these priuate and domesticall duties are three ; that is to say, betweene the husband and the wife, parents and children, masters

masters and seruants, and these are the parts of a household or family, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the masters and authours thereof. And therefore first of married folke.

CHAP. XII.

The dutie of married folke.

According to those two diuers considerations that are in marriage, as hath beene said, that is to say, equality and inequality, there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folke, the one common to both, equally reciprocall, of like obligation, though according to the custome of the world, the paine, the reproch, the inconuenience, be not equall: that is to say, an entire loyalty, fidelity, community, and communication of all things, and a care and authority ouer their familie, and all the goods of their house. Hereof we haue spoken more at large in the first booke.

Common duties.

The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them; for those of the husband are:

1. To instruct his wife with mildnesse in all things that belong vnto her duty, her honor, and good, whereof shee is capable. 2. To nourish her, whether she brought dowry with her or no. 3. To cloath her. 4. To lie with her. 5. To loue and defend her: The two extremities are base and vicious, to hold her vnder like a seruant, to make her mistresse by subiecting himselfe vnto her. And these are the principall duties. These follow after, to comfort her being sicke, to deliuer her being captiue, to bury her being dead, to nourish her liuing, and to prouide for his children he hath had by her, by his will and testament.

Particular duties of the husband.

The duties of the wife, 1. Are to giue honor, reuerence, and respect to her husband, as to her master and lord, for so haue the wisest women that euer were, termed their husbands, and the Hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth her selfe of this duty, honoreth her selfe more than her husband; and doing otherwise, wrongs none but her selfe. 2. To giue obedience in all things iust and lawfull, applying and accommodating her selfe to the manners

Of the wife.

and humours of her husband, like a true looking-glasse, which faithfully representeth the face, hauing no other particular designement, loue, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents, which haue no other proper action or motion, and neuer moue but with the body, she applieth her selfe in all things to her husband. 3. Seruice, as to prouide either by her selfe or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keepe the house, and therefore she is compared to the Tortois, and is painted hauing her feet naked, and especially in the absence of her husband. For her husband being far from her, she must be as it were inuisible, and contrary to the Moone (which appeareth in her greatnesse when she is farthest from the Sunne) not appeare, but when she comes neere her sunne. 5. To be silent, and not to speake but with her husband, or by her husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing, and hardly found, she is said to be a pretious gift of God. 6. To employ her time in the practise and study of huswiferie, which is the most commodious and honorable science and occupation of a woman; this is her speciall mistris quality, and which a man of meane fortune, should especially seeke in his marriage. It is the only dowry, that serueth either to ruinate, or preserue families, but it is very rare. There are diuers that are couetous, few that are good huswiues. We are to speake of them both, of household husbandry presently by it selfe.

In the priuate acquaintance and vse of marriage there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and deuout band, for that pleasure that is therein, must be mingled with some severity; it must be a wise and conscionable delight. A man must touch his wife discretely and for honesty, as it is said, and for feare, as Aristotle saith, lest pronoking her desires too wantonly, the pleasure thereof make her to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindreth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not ouer-languishing, barraine, and subiect to other diseases, he must offer himselfe vnto her though seldom. Solon saith, thrice in a moneth; but there can no certaine law or rule be giuen hereof.

The doctrine of household husbandry doth willingly follow, and is annexed vnto marriage.

a silent
woman god
sends
Eccles. 18.

4
An aduise-
ment
vpon the ac-
quaintance of
married folke.

Plutar. in So-
lon.

CHAP. XIII.

Household husbandry.

1 **H**ousehold husbandrie is an excellent, iust, and profitable occupation. It is a happy thing, saith *Plato*, for a man to goe through his priuate affaires without iniustice. There is nothing more beautifull than a household well and peaceably gouerned.

2 It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is capable of any thing else, is not vncapable of this; but yet it is carefull, and painfull, and troublesome, by reason of the multitude of affaires, which though they be small and of no great importance, yet forasmuch as they are common and frequent, and neuer at an end, they doe much annoy and weary a man. Domesticall thornes pricke, because they are ordinary; but if they come from the principall persons of the family, they gaule and exulcerate, and grow remediless.

3 It is a great happinesse, and a fit meane to liue at ease, to haue one whom a man may trust, and vpon whom he may repose himselfe; which that he may the better doe, he must choose one that is true and loyall, and afterwards binde him to doe well by that trust and confidence he putterh in him. *Habita fides ipsam obligat fidem; multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli; & alijs ius peccandi, suspicando dederunt: Faith being giuen, bindes faith againe; many haue taught to deceiue, whilst they feare to be deceiued, and haue giuen occasion vnto others of offending, by suspecting them.*

4 The principall precepts and counsels that belong to frugality, or good husbandry, are these: 1. To buy and sell all things at the best times and seasons, that is, when they are best and best cheape. 2. To take good heed lest the goods in the house be spoiled or miscarry, be either lost or carried away; This doth especially belong to the woman, to whom *Aristotle* giues this authority and care. 3. To prouide first and principally for these three; necessity, cleanness, order: and againe, if there be meanes, some aduise to prouide for these three too; but the wiser sort wish no great paines to be taken therein:

therein: *Non ampliter sed munditer convivium; plus salis quam sumptus*: A feast must not be costly, but cleanly; more mirth than cost. Abundance, pompe, and preparation, exquisite and rich fashion. The contrary is many times practised in good housen, where you shall haue beds garnished with silke, embroidered with gold, and but one simple couerlid in winter, which were a commodity farre more necessary. And so of the rest.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away superfluities, yet prouiding for necessity, and that which is fit and beseeming. A ducket in a mans purse will doe a man more honour and honesty, than ten prodigally spent, saith one. Againe (but this requires industry and good sufficiency) to make a great shew with a little charge, and aboue all, not to suffer the expence to grow aboue the receit and the income.

5. To haue a care and an eie ouer all; the vigilancy and presence of the master, saith the prouerbe, fatteth the horse and the land. And in any case the master and mistresse must take a care to conceale their ignorance and insufficiency in the affaires of the house, and much more their carelesnesse, making a shew as if they attended and thought of nothing else. For if officers and seruants haue an opinion that their masters lookenot vnto them, they may chance to make his haire grow thorow his hood.

CHAP. XIV.

The duty of Parents and children.

THe dutie of parents and children is reciprocall and reciprocally naturall: if that of children be more strait, that of parents is more ancient, parents being the first authours and cause, and more important to a common-weale: for to people a state, and to furnish it with honest men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is necessarie, which is the seed of a common-wealth. And there comes not so much euill to a weale-publike, by the ingratitude of children towards their parents, as by the carelesnesse of parents in the instruction of their children: and therefore with great reason

reason in *Lacedemon* and other good and politike states, there was a punishment and a penaltie laid vpon the parents when the children were ill conditioned. And *Plato* was wont to say, that hee knew not in what a man should be more carefull and diligent than to make a good sonne. And *Crates* cried out in choler, To what end doe men take so much care in heaping vp goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leaue them? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shooe and not of his foot. What should hee doe with riches that is not wise, and knowes not how to vse them? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle vpon a iades backe. Parents then are doubly obliged to this dutie; both because they are their children, and because they are the tender plants, and hope of the Common-weale: This is to till his owne land together with that of the weale publike.

Now this office or dutie hath foure successiue parts, according to those foure goods or benefits that a child ought to receiue successiue from his parents, life, nourishment, instruction, communication. The first regardeth the time, when the infant is in the wombe, vntil his comming into the world inclusiue: the second the time of his infancie in his cradle, vntill hee know how to goe and to speake: the third all his youth; this part must be handled more at large, and more seriously: the fourth concerneth their affection, communication and cariage towards their children now come to mans estate, touching their goods, thoughts, delignements.

2
The diuision of
the office of pa-
rents.

The first, which regardeth the generation and fruit in the wombe, is not accounted of and obserued with such diligence as it ought, although it haue as much part in the good or euill of a child (as well of their bodies as their soules) as their education and instruction after they are borne and come to some growth. This is that that giueth the subsistence, the temper and temperature, the nature; the other is artificiall and acquired: and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repaire it, no more than a fault in the first concoction of the stomacke, cannot be mended in the second nor third. We men goe vnaduisedly and headlong to this copulation, onely prouoked thereunto by pleasure, and a desire to dis-burthen our selues of that which tickleth and
prelleth

3
The first part,
the office of pa-
rents.

preſſeth vs thereunto : if a conception happen thereby, it is by chance, for no man goeth to it warily, and with ſuch deliberation and diſpoſition of bodie as he ought, and nature doth require. Since then men are made at aduerture, and by chance, it is no maruell if they ſeldome fall out to be beautifull, good, ſound, wiſe and well compoſed. Behold then briefly, according to Philoſophie the particular aduiſements touching this firſt point, that is to ſay, the begetting of male children, ſound, wiſe and iudicious : for that which ſerueth for the one of theſe qualities, ſerueth for the other. 1. A man muſt not couple himſelfe with a woman that is of a vile, baſe and diſſolute condition, or of a naughtie and vicious compoſition of body. 2. He muſt abſtaine from this action and copulation ſeuē or eight dayes. 3. During which time hee is to nourish himſelfe with wholeſome victuals, more hot and drie than otherwiſe, and ſuch as may concoct well in the ſtomacke. 4. He muſt uſe a more than moderate exerciſe. All this tendeth to this end and purpoſe, that the ſeed may be well concocted and ſeaſoned, hot and drie, fit and proper for a maſculine, ſound and wiſe temperature. Vagabonds, idle and lazie people, great drinkers, who haue commonly an ill concoction, euer beger effeminate, idle and diſſolute children (as *Hippocrates* recounteth of the *Scythians*.) Againe, a man muſt apply himſelfe to this encounter after one manner, a long time after his repaſt, that is to ſay, his belly being empty, and he faſting (for a full panch performes nothing good either for the minde or for the bodie) and therefore *Diogenes* reproched a licentious young man, for that his father had begotten him being drunke. And the law of the *Carthaginians* is commended by *Plato*, which enioyned a man to abſtaine from wine that day that hee lay with his wife. 6. And not neere the monthly tearmes of a woman, but ſix or ſeuē dayes before, or as much after them. 7. And vpon the point of conception and retention of the ſeed, the woman turning and gathering her ſelfe together vpon the right ſide, let her ſo reſt for a time. 8. This direction touching the viands and exerciſe muſt be continued during the time of her burthen.

Lib. 2. de leg.

4
The ſecond part

To come to the ſecond point of this office after the birth of the infant, theſe foure points are to be obſerued. 1. The infant muſt

must be washed in warme water, somewhat brinish, to make the members supple and firm, to cleanse and drie the flesh and the braine, to strengthen the sinewes, a very good custome in the Easterne parts and among the Iewes. 2. The nurse if she be to be chosen, let her be young, of a temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be, brought vp in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardned against cold and heat. I say if she be to be chosen, because according to reason, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother; and therefore they crie out against her, when she refuseth this charge, being inuited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end hath giuen her milke and dugs, by the example of beasts; and that loue and ieaousie that she ought to haue of her little ones, who receiue a very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustomed in a stranger, and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrary to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers, but by halves. *Quod est hoc contra naturam, imperfectum, ac dimidiatum matris genus peperisse, & statim ab se abjecisse, aluisse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo lacte, quod videat jam viventem, jam hominem, jam matris officia implorantem: It is a thing against nature, imperfect, and by halves, for a mother to bring forth a childe, and presently to cast it from her; to nourish in her wombe with her owne blood, I know not what, which shee saw not, and not nurse with her milke that which she seeth already liuing, a man, and imploring the duties of a mother.* 3. The nourishment besides the dug should be goats milke, or rather, creame, the most subtile and aerie part of the milke, sod with hony & a little salt. These are things very fit for the body and the minde, by the aduice of all the wise and great Physitians, Greeks and Hebrewes. *Butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum, & eligere bonum: Let him eat butter and hony, vntill he be able to refuse the euill, and choose the good.* The qualitie of milke or creame is very temperate, and full of good nourishment; the driness of the hony and salt consumeth the too great humiditie of the braine, and disposeth it vnto wisdom. 4. The infant must by little & little be accustomed and hardned to the aire, to heat and cold: and we are not to be fearefull thereof; for in the Northerne parts of the world they wash their

of the office of parents.

Ezech. 16.

Aul Gell.
lib. 12. c. 1.

Galen, multis
Iocis.
Homer. 10.
Iliad.
Esay 7.

their children so soone as they come out of the wombe of their mothers in cold water, and are neuer the worse.

5

The two first parts of the office of parents we haue soone dispatched; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that haue not that care, affection and diligence in these matters that is fit; for they are the cause and occasion, either by carelesnesse or otherwise, of the death and vntimely birth of their children, and when they are borne they care not for them, but expose them to their owne fortunes, for which cause they are depriued by law of that fatherly power ouer them that is due vnto them; and the children to the shame of their parents are made slaues by those that haue nourished them and brought them vp, who are farre from taking care to preferue them from fire and water, and all other crosses and afflictions that may light vpon them.

6

*The third part
of the office of
parents.*

*An instruction
very important.*

The third part which concerneth the instruction of children we are to handle more seriously. So soone as this infant is able to goe and to speake, and shall beginne to employ his mind & his body, and that the faculties thereof shall be awakened and shew themselues, the memory, imagination, reason, which begin at the fourth or fifth yeere, there must be a great care and diligence vsed in the well forming thereof: for this first tincture & liquor wherewith the mind must be seasoned, hath very great power. It cannot be expressed how much this first impression and formation of youth preuaileth, euen to the conquering of Nature it selfe. Nurture, saith one, excelleth Nature. *Lycurgus* made it plaine to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diuersly brought vp, to whom presenting before them in an open place, a pot of pottage and a hare, that which was brought vp tenderly in the house fell to the pottage; the other that had bin euer trained vp in hunting, forsooke the pottage and ran after the hare. The force of this instruction proceeds from this, that it entrencheth easily, and departeth with difficultie: for being the first that entrencheth, it taketh such place and winneth such credit as a man will, there being no other precedent matter to contest with it, or to make head against it. This minde then wholly new and neat, soft and tender, doth easily receiue that impression that a man will giue vnto it, and afterwards doth not easily lose it.

*Quint.
Senec.*

Now

7

Now this is not a thing of small importance, but a man may rather say it is the most difficult and important that may be. For, who seeth not that in a state all depends vpon this? Nevertheless (and it is the greatest, most dangerous and lamentable fault that is in our policies, noted by *Aristotle* and *Plutarch*) we see that the conduct and discipline of youth is wholly left vnto the charge and mercy of their parents what kinde of men soeuer they be, many times carelesse, foolish, wicked, and the publike state regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almost the onely states that haue giuen to the lawes the discipline of children, were that of *Lacedemon* and *Creet*: But the most excellent discipline of the world for youth, was the *Spartane*; and therefore *Agesslaus* perswaded *Xenophon* to send his children thither, for there, saith he, they may learne the most excellent science of the world, and that is to command and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at armes, Magistrates, Citizens. This youth and their instruction they esteemed aboue all things; and therefore *Antipater* demanding of them fiftie children for hostages, they answered him, that they had rather giue him twice as many men at their ripest yeeres.

Now before we enter into this matter, I will here giue an aduertisement of some weight. There are some that take great paines to discouer the inclinations of children, and for what employment they shall be most fit; but this is a thing so obscure, and so vncertaine, that when a man hath bestowed what cost, and taken what paines he can, he is commonly deceived. And therefore not to tie our selues to these weake and light diuinations and prognostications drawne from the motions of their infancie, let vs indeuour to giue them an instruction vniuersally good and profitable, whereby they are made capable, ready, and disposed to whatsoeuer. This is to goe vpon a sure ground, and to doe that which must alwayes be done. This shall be a good tincture, apt to receiue all others.

To make an entrance into this matter, we may referre it vnto three points, the forming of the spirit, the ordering of the bodie, the ruling of the manners. But before wee giue any particular counsell touching these three, there are generall aduiselements that belong to the manner of proceeding in this businesse,

9
The diuision of
this matter.

businesse, that shew vs how to carry our selues worthily and happily therein, which must be first knowne as a preamble to the rest.

I O

*The first generall
advice touching
instruction.
To guard the
eares.*

The first is carefully to guard his soule, and to keepe it neat and free from the contagion and corruption of the world, that it receiue not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to doe this, hee must diligently keepe the gates, which are the eares especially, and then the eies, that is to say, giue order, that not any, no not his owne father, come neere vnto him to buz into his eares any thing that is euill. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be, to make an euill almost past reparation. Guard thine eares about all, and then thy eies. And for this cause *Plato* was of opinion, that it was not fit that seruants and base persons should entertaine children with discourse, because their talke can be no better than fables, vaine speeches and fooleries, if not worse. This were to traine vp and to feed those tender yeeres with follies and fooleries.

I I

*The second generall
advice touching
the choise
of instructors.
Conference.
Bookes.*

The second aduice concerneth not onely the persons that must haue charge of this childe, but the discourse and conference wherewith he must be entertained, and the bookes hee must reade. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well borne, of a sweet and pleasing conuersation, hauing their head well framed, fuller of wisdom than of science, and that they agree in opinion together, lest that by contrary counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigour, the other by flatterie, they hinder one another, and trouble their charge and designements. Their bookes and communication must not be of small, base, sortish, friuolous matters, but great and serious, noble and generous; such as may rule and enrich the vnderstanding, opinions, manners, as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition, the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himselfe and others; such, I say, as may teach him what to feare, to loue, to desire; what passion is, what vertue, how he may iudge betwixt ambition and auarice, seruitude and subiection, libertie and licentiousnesse. He is deceiued that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the vnderstanding of those excellent examples of *Valerius Maxi-*

mms, and all the Greeke and Roman Histories (which is the most beautifull science and knowledge of the world) than to vnderstand *Amadis of Gaule*, and other like vaine and frivolous discourses. That childe that can know how many hens his mother hath, and who are his vncles and his cosens, will as easily carry away how many Kings there haue beene, and how many *Casars* in *Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacity and sufficiency of his minde, but know how to conduct and manage it.

The third is, to carry himselfe towards him, and to proceed not after an austere, rude, and seuer manner, but sweetly, mildly, and cheerefully. And therefore we doe here altogether condemne that custome which is common in all places, to beat and to box, and with strange words and out-cries to hazen children, and to keepe them in feare and subiection, as the manner is in free-schooles and colledges. For it is a custome too uniuersall, and as foule a fault, as when a Iudge or Physitian shall bee moued to choler against an offender and patient: preiudiciall and quite contrary to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir vp a desire in them, and to bring them in loue with vertue, wisdom, science, honesty. Now this imperious and rude carriage breeds in children a hatred, horreur and detestation of that they should loue; it prouoketh them, makes them head-strong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their minds become seruile, base and slavish, like their vsage; *Parentes ne provocetis ad iracundiam filios vestros, ne despondeant animum: Parents prouoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.* For seeing themselves thus handled, they neuer performe any thing of worth, but curse their master and their apprenticeship. If they doe that which is required at their hands, it is because the eye of the master is alwaies vpon them, it is for feare, and not cheerefully and nobly, and therefore not honestly. If they faile and performe not their taske, to saue themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they haue recourse to base vnlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, teares of despight, flights, triuings, all worse than the fault they haue committed.

12

The third general
all aduice.
Instruction
mild and free.

Coloss. 3.

*Dum id rescitum iri credit tantisper cavet;
Si sperat fore clam, rursum ad ingenium redit:*

Terent.

Kk

Ille

*Ille, quem beneficio adjungas, ex animo facit;
 Studet par referre, praesens, absensq; idem erit:
 The shame keepe knowledge, knowledge keepe the sinne
 In awe, which did in secrecy beginne:
 Whom good turnes with loue haue got
 To be thy friend, repose thy lot,
 Beeft thou there, or beeft thou not.*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, vsing therein reason, and sweet and milde perswasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame. The first will serue them as a spurre to what is good, the second as a bridle to checke and withdraw them from euill. There is something, I know not what, that is seruile and base in rigour and constraint, the enemy to honour and true liberty. Wee must cleane contrary fat their hearts with ingenuitie, libertie, loue, vertue, and honour.

Terent.

*Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere
 Sarius esse credo, quam metu.
 Hoc patrium est potius consuefacere filium
 Sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu.
 Hoc pater ac dominus interest, hoc qui nequit
 Fateatur se nescire imperare liberis.*

*I hold it better children vp to reare
 With modesty and bounty, than by feare.
 T'enure a childe 'tis rather fathers law
 To doe well of himselfe, than others awe.
 A father and a master differ so;
 So who can rot, to rule sonnes doth not know.*

Blowes are for beasts that vnderstand not reason: iniuries and brawles are for slaues. Hee that is once accustomed thereunto is mard for euer. But reason the beauty of action, the desire of honestie and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerefulnesse and comfort of heart, and the detestation of their contraries, as brutishnesse, basenesse, dishonour, reproach and the improbation of all men; these are the armes, the spurs, and the bridles of children well borne, and such as a man would make honest men. This is that which a man should alwaies sound in their eares; and if these means cannot preuaile,
 all

all other of rigour and roughnesse shall neuer doe good. That which cannot be done with reason, wisdom, endeuour, shall neuer be done by force; and if haply it be done, yet it is to small purpose. But these other meanes cannot be vnprofitable, if they be imploied in time, before the goodnesse of nature be spent and spilt. But yet for all this, let no man thinke that I approue that loose and flattering indulgence, and sottish feare to giue children cause of discontent and sorrow, which is another extremitie as bad as the former. This were like the Iuie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth, or the Ape that killeth her young with culling them; or like those that feare to hold him vp by the haire of the head that is in danger of drowning, for feare of hurting him, and so suffer him to perish. Against this vice the wise Hebrew spake much. Youth must be held in obedience and discipline, not bodily like beasts and madmen, but spirituall, humane, liberrall according to reason. Eccles. 30.

Wee come now to the particular and more expresse aduise-
ments of this instruction. The first head of them is, as wee haue said, to exercise, sharpen and forme the minde. Whereupon there are diuers precepts, but the first principall and fundamentall of all others, which respecteth the end of instruction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is least embraced and followed, and euery man runneth after the contrary, which is a common and ordinary error, is, to haue much more, and the chiefe and principall care to exercise, to husband and manure, to vse the proper good, and much lesse to get and to endeuour the attainment of that which is strange; to striue and study more for wisdom, than for Science and Art; rather well to forme the iudgement, and by consequence the will, and the conscience, than to fill the memory, and to inflame the imagination. These are the three mistresse parts of a reasonable soule: But the first is the iudgement, as before hath bene discoursed, to which place I resend the Reader. Now the custome of the world is quite contrary, which runneth wholly after Art, Science, and what is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their children wise, are at great charge, and their children take great paines.

Ve omnium rerum, sic literarum intemperantiam laboramus: Ve Tacit.

are troubled with an immoderate desire of learning, as of all things else. And many times all is lost. But to make them wise, honest, apt and dexterious, which is a matter of small charge or labour, they take no care at all. What greater folly can there be in the world, than more to admire science, that which is acquired, memory, than wisdom, than nature? Now all commit not this fault with one and the same minde; some simply carried by custome, thinke that wisdom and science are not things different, or at leastwise, that they march alwaies together, and that it is necessary a man haue the one to attaine the other; these kinde of men deserue to be taught: others goe out of malice, and they thinke they know well enough what they doe, and at what price soeuer it bee they will haue Art and Science: For this is a meane in these daies in the occidentall parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches. These kinde of people make of Science an Art and merchandise, science mercenarie, pedanticall, base and mechanicall. They buy Science to sell it againe. Let vs leaue these merchants as vncurable. Contrariwise, I cannot here but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our Gentlemen of France, (for in other Nations this fault is not so apparent) who haue knowledge or Art in such disdain and contempt, that they do lesse esteeme of an honest man only for this, because he hath studied: they discard it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their nobility. Wherein they shew themselves what they are, ill borne, worse aduised, and truly ignorant of vertue and honour; which they likewise bewray in their carriage, their idlenesse, their impertinencies, their insufficiency, in their insolencies, vanities, and barbarities.

14
A comparison
of science and
wisdom.

To teach others, and to discouer the fault of all this, wee must make good two things; The one that Science and Wisdom are things very different; and that Wisdom is more worth than all the Science or Art of the world; as Heauen exceeds the price of the Earth, gold of iron: The other, that they are not onely different, but that they seldome or neuer goe together, that they commonly hinder one another; hee that hath much knowledge or Art is seldome wise, and hee that is wise hath not much knowledge. Some exceptions there are heerein, but they are very rare, and of great, rich,
and

And happy spirits. Somewhere haue beene in times past, but in these daies there are no more to be found.

The better to performe this, we must first know what science and wisdom is. Science is a great heape, or accumulation and prouision of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath seene, heard and read in bookes, that is to say, of the excellent sayings and doings of great personages that haue beene of all nations. Now the garner or storehouse where this great prouision remaineth and is kept, the treasury of science and all acquired good, is the memory. He that hath a good memory, the fault is his owne if he want knowledge, because he hath the meane. Wisdom is a sweet and regular managing of the soule. He is wise that gouerneth himselfe in his desires, thoughts, opinions, speeches, actions, with measure and proportion. To be brieve, and in a word, wisdom is the rule of the soule: and that which manageth this rule is the iudgement, which seeth, iudgeth, esteemeth all things: rangeth them as they ought, giuing to euery thing that which belongs vnto it. Let vs now see their differences, and how much wisdom excels the other.

15
The definition
of science and
wisdom.

Science is a small and barraine good in respect of wisdom, for it is not only not necessary (for of three parts of the world two and more haue made little vse thereof) but it brings with it small profit, and serues to little purpose. 1. It is no way seruiceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poore, great and small, liue pleasantly and happily, that haue neuer heard any speech of science? There are many other things more commodious and seruiceable to the life of man, and the maintenance of humane society, as honor, glory, nobility, dignitie, which neuertheless are not necessary. 2. Neither is it seruiceable to things naturall, which an ignorant for may as well performe, as he that hath best knowledge: Nature is a sufficient mistris for that. 3. Nor to honestie, and to make vs better: *paucis est opus literis ad bonam mentem*, Little learning is requisite for a good minde: nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will marke it well, shall finde not onely more honest people, but also more excellent in all kinde of vertue amongst those that know little, than those that know most, witnesse Rome, which was more honest being young and ignorant,

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rant, than when it was old, craftie and cunning. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est:* That simple and open vertue is turned into obscure and craftie knowledge. Science serueth not for any thing, but to inuent crafts and subtleties, artificiall cunning, deuices, and whatsoeuer is an enimie to innocencie, which willingly lodgeth with simplicitie and ignorance. Atheisme, errours, sects, and all the troubles of the world haue risen from the order of these men of Art and knowledge. The first temptation of the deuill, saith the Scripture, and the beginning of all euill, and the ruine of mankind, was the opinion and the desire of knowledge: *Eritis sicut dij scientes bonum & malum:* Yee shall be as gods, knowing good and euill. The Sirenes to deceiue and intrap *Vlysses* within their snares, offered vnto him the gift of science; and *S. Paul* aduiseeth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam:* Let no man seduce you through their philosophie.

Salomon in his
Ecclesiast.

One of the sufficientest men of knowledge that euer was, spake of Science, as of a thing not onely vaine, but hurtfull, painfull, and tedious. To be brieft, Science may make vs more humane and courteous, but not more honest. 4. A-gaine, it serueth nothing to the sweetning of our life, or the quitting vs of those euils that oppresse vs in the world: but contrarily it increaseth and sharpeneth them, witnesse children and fooles, simple and ignorant persons, who measuring euery thing by the present taste, runne thorow them with the lesse griefe, beare them with better content, than men of greatest learning and knowledge. Science anticipateth those euils that come vpon vs, in such sort that they are sooner in the soule of man by knowledge, than in nature. The wise man said, that he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow: Ignorance is a more fit remedie against all euils, *iners malorum remedium ignorantia est:* Ignorance is the idle remedie of euils. From whence proceed those counsels of our friends; Thinke not of it, put it out of your head and memory. Is not this to cast vs into the armes of ignorance, as into the best and safest sanctuary that may be? But this is but a mockery, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would doe as Chirurgions vse to doe, who not knowing how to heale a wound, yet set a good shew vpon it by allaying the paine and bringing

Ecclesiastes 1.
18.

bringing it asleepe. They that counsell men to kill themselves in their extreme and remediless euils, doe they not send a man to ignorance, stupiditie, insensibilitie? Wisdome is a necessarie good, and vniuersally commodious for all things: it governeth and ruleth all: there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it selfe of the iurisdiction or knowledge thereof: It beareth sway euery where, in peace, in warre, in publike, in private: It ruleth and moderateth euen the insolent behaviours of men, their sports, their daunces, their banquets, and is as a bridle vnto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discretely and wisely; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

Secondly, Science is seruile, base, and mechanically, in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with paine. A learned man is like a Crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stolne from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another, and he had need to vaile his bonnet often, as a testimonie of that honour hee giues to those from whom he hath borrowed his Art. A wise man is like him that liues vpon his owne reuenues; for wisdom is properly a mans owne; it is a naturall good well tilled and laboured.

Thirdly, the conditions are diuers, the one more beautifull and more noble than the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opiniative, indiscreet, querulous, *Scientia inflat: Knowledge puffeth vp.* 2. Science is talkatiue, desirous to shew it selfe, which neuerthelesse knowes not how to doe any thing, is not actiue, but onely fit to speake and to discourse: wisdom acteth and governeth all.

Learning then and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent, more to be esteemed than science. For it is necessary, profitable to all, vniuersall, actiue, noble, honest, gracious, cheerefull. Science is particular, vnecessary, seldome profitable, not actiue, seruile, mechanically, melancholike, opiniative, presumptuous.

We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwayes together, but contrarily almost alwayes separated. The naturall reason (as hath beene said) is, that their temperatures are contrarie. For that of science and memorie is moist, and that of wisdom and iudgement, dry. This also is signi-

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18

19

*Learning and
wisdom meet
not together.*

Wisdom without science.

fied vnto vs, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soone as they cast their eyes vpon knowledge, they presently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdom wherewithall they were indued from their beginning; whereof we euery day see the like in common experience. The most beautifull and flourishing States, Common-weales, Empires, ancient and moderne, haue beene and are gouerned very wisely, both in peace and warre, without science. *Rome* the first fife hundred yeeres, wherein it flourished in vertue and valour, was without knowledge; and so soone as it began to be learned, it began to corrupt, to trouble, and ruinate it selfe by ciuill warres. The most beautifull policie that euer was, the Lacedemonian built by *Lycurgus*, from whence haue sprung the greatest personages of the world, made no profession of learning, and yet it was the schoole of vertue and wisdom, and was euer victorious ouer *Athens*, the most learned citie of the world, the schoole of all science, the habitation of the Muses, the store-house of Philosophers. All those great and flourishing realmes of the east and west Indies, haue stood for many ages together without learning, without the knowledge of bookes or writings. In these daies they learne many things, by the good leaue and assistance of their new masters, at the expence of their owne libertie, yea their vices and their subtilties too, whereof in former times they neuer heard speech. That great, and it may be the greatest and most flourishing state and Empire which is at this day in the world, is that of that great Lord, who like the Lion of the whole earth, makes himselfe to be feared of all the Princes and Monarks of the world; and euen in this state, there is not any profession of science, nor schoole, nor permission or allowance to reade, or teach publicly, no not in matters of religion. What guideth and gouerneth, and maketh this state to prosper thus? It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come wee to those states wherein learning and sciences are in credit. Who doe gouerne them? Doubtlesse not the learned. Let vs take for example this our realme, wherein learning and knowledge haue greater honor than in all the world besides, and which seemeth to haue succeeded Greece it selfe: The principall officers of this crowne, the Constable, Marshall, Admirall, the Secretaries of the

the state, who dispatch all affaires, are commonly men altogether illiterate. And doubtlesse, many great Lawyers, founders, and Princes haue banished science as the poyson and pestilence of a Common-wealth; *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lyncurgus*. And thus wee see what wisdom is without science. Let vs now see what science is without wisdom, which is not hard to doe. Let vs looke a little into those that make profession of learning, that come from Schooles and Vniuersities, and haue their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Bartolus*. Are there any people in the world more vntoward, more sottish, more vnfit for all things? From hence cometh that Prouerbe, that when a man would describe a foole, or an vntowardly person, hee calleth him Clerke, Pedante: And to expresse a thing ill done, it is the manner to say, It is Clerke-like done. It should seeme that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans braines, and makes him to turne sot and foole, as king *Agrippa* said to *S. Paul*; *Multe te litera ad insaniam adducunt*: Much learning maketh thee mad. There are diuers men, that had they neuer bene trained vp in schooles and colleges, they had bene farre more wise: and their brethren that haue neuer applied themselues to learning, haue proued the wiser men; *Vt melius fuisset non didicisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt*: So that it had bene better they had neuer bene learned: for after they became learned, they left off from being good. Come to the practise, chuse me one of these learned schollers, bring him to the common counsell of a city, or any publike assembly, wherein the affaires of the state are consulted of, or matter of policie, or household husbandry, you neuer saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at last knowes not what to say. And if he chance to speake, he entrench into a long discourse of definitions, and diuisions of *Aristotle*; ergo potlead. Marke in the selfe-same counsell, a merchant, a burgeise, that neuer heard speake of *Aristotle*, he will yeeld a better reason, giue a sounder iudgement, and more to purpose than these scholasticall Docters.

Science without wisdom.

Act. 26.

Now it is not enough to haue said, that wisdom and learning seldome concurre and meet together, vnlesse wee seeke the reason and cause thereof, not doubting thereby but sufficiently

20

The reason of this separation.

ciently to content and to satisfie those, that mislike what I haue said, or thinke me perhaps anemie to erudition and learning. The question thereof is, from whence it commeth that learning and wisdom doe seldome encounter and meet together in one and the same man : And there is great reason why wee should moue this question : for it is a strange thing, and against reason, that a man, the more learned he is, should not be the more wise, learning and knowledge being a proper meanes, and instrument vnto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none ; hee that hath studied, is, in some sort, bound to be farre the wiser of the two, because he hath all that the other hath, that is, nature, reason, iudgement, spirit ; and besides these the counsels, discourses, iudgements of all the greatest men of the world, by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterious, more honest than the other, since that with these proper and naturall meanes, he attaineth so many extraordinarie on euery side ? For as one saith well, the naturall good cohering and concurring with the accidentall, frameth an excellent composition : and yet neuerthelesse, we see the contrarie, as hath beene said.

21

An answer to
ill discipline.

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the euill and sinister manner of study and ill instruction. They learne out of bookes and schooles excellent knowledge, but with ill means, and as bad successe. Whereby it comes to passe, that all their studie profiteth them nothing at all, but they remaine indigent and poore, in the midst of their plentie and riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their dainties : the reason is, because whilest they pore vpon their bookes, they respect nothing so much as to stuffe and furnish their memories with that which they reade and vnderstand, and presently they thinke themselues wise : like him that put his bread into his pocket, and not into his belly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with a memorie fully stuffed, they continue fooles ; *Student non sibi & vite, sed alijs & schola* : They studie not for themselues, and for the benefit of their life, but for others, and for the schooles. They prepare themselues to be reporters ; *Cicero* hath said it, *Aristotle*,

Aristotle, Plato hath left it in writing, &c. but they for their parts know nothing. These men commit a double fault, the one is that they apply not that which they learne, to themselves, that so they may forme themselves vnto vertue, wisdom, resolution, by which meanes their knowledge is vnprofitable vnto them; the other is, that during all that time, which with great paines and charge they employ, to the heaping together and pocketing vp for another without any profit to themselves, whatsoever they can rob from other men, they suffer their owne proper good to fall to the ground, and neuer put it in practise. They on the other side that studie not, hauing no recourse vnto another, take a care to husband their naturall gifts, and so proue many times the better, the more wise, and resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious. One there is that hath said as much, though otherwise and more briefly; That learning marreth weake wits and spirits, perfecteth the strong and naturall.

Now hearken to that counsell that I giue hereupon; A man must not giue himselfe to the gathering and keeping the opinions and knowledges of another, to the end hee may afterwards make report of them, or vse them for shew or ostentation, or some base and mercenarie profit; but hee must vse them so, as that he may make them his owne. Hee must not onely lodge them in his minde, but incorporate and transubstantiate them into himselfe. He must not onely water his minde with the dew of knowledge, but he must make it essentially better, wise, strong, good, couragious; otherwise to what end serueth studie? *Non paranda nobis solum, sed fructuosa sapientia est: Wisdom is not onely to be gotten by vs, but to be imoyed.* Hee must not doe as it is the manner of those that make garlands, who picke here and there whole flowers, and so carry them away to make nose-gayes, and afterwards presents, heape together out of that booke and out of this booke many good things, to make a faire and a goodly shew to others; but he must doe as Bees vse to doe, who carry not away the flowers, but settle themselves vpon them, like a hen that couereth her chicken, and draweth from them their spirit, force, vertue, quintessence, and nourishing themselves,

turne

23

Good discipline.

turne them into their owne substance, and afterwards make good and sweet hony, which is all their owne; and it is no more either thyme or sweet marjoram. So must a man gather from bookes the marrow and spirit (neuer enthralling himselfe so much as to retaine the words by heart, as many vse to doe, much lesse the place, the booke, the chapter; that is a foolish and vaine superstition and vanitie, and makes him lose the principall) and hauing sucked and drawne the good, feed his minde therewith, informe his iudgement, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinions, rectifie his will; and in a word, frame vnto himselfe a worke wholly his owne, that is to say, an honest man, wise, aduised, resolute; *Non ad pompam nec ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi otium velis, sed quo firmior aduersus fortuita rem publicam capeffas*: Not for pompe, or ostentation, nor to the end thou wouldest follow ease with a glorious name, but that thereby thou mayest more firmly take vpon thee the gouernment of the Common-wealth against all accidents.

Tacit.

23

2. The second
advice touching
the choice of
science.

And hereunto the choice of sciences is necessarie. Those that I commend aboue all others, and that best serue to that end, which I propose, and whereof I am to speake, are naturall and morall, which reach vs to liue, and to liue well, nature and vertue; that which we are, and that which we should be: vnder the morall are comprehended, the Politickes, Oeconomicks, Histories. All the rest are vaine and frothie, and we are not to dwell vpon them, but to take them as passing by.

24

3. The meanes to
learne.

By word of
mouth.

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and wisdom, hath held mee too long, by reason of the contestation. Let vs now proceed to the other parts and aduisements of this instruction. The meanes of instructions are diuers, especially of two sorts; the one by word, that is to say, by precepts, instructions and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filing and refining our wits against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file; This meanes and manner is very pleasing and agreeable to Nature.

25

By example.

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten, not onely from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also wicked, by disagreement in opinions; For some there are that learne better by the opposition and horreur of that euill they see

see in another. It is a speciall vse of Iustice, to condemne one, that he may serue for an example vnto others. And old *Cato* was wont to say, That wise men may learne more of fooles, than fooles of wise men. The *Lacedemonians* the better to disswade their children from drunkenness, made their seruants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

Now this second meanes or manner by example, teacheth vs with more ease and more delight. To learne by precepts is a long way, because it is a painfull thing to vnderstand well, and vnderstanding to retaine well, and retaining to vse and practise well. And hardly can wee promise our selues to reape that fruit which they promise vnto vs. But example and imitation teach vs about the worke or action it selfe, inuite vs with much more ardour, and promise vnto vs that glory which we learne to imitate. The seed that is cast into the earth, draweth vnto it selfe in the end, the qualitie of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like vnto that which doth there naturally grow: So the spirits and manners of men conforme themselues to those with whom they commonly conuerse.

A comparison of these two.

Now these two manners of profiting by speech and by example, are likewise two-fold, for they are drawne from excellent personages, either liuing, by their sensible and outward frequentation and conference; or dead, by the reading of their bookes. The first, that is the commerce with the liuing, is more liuely and more naturall, it is a fruitfull exercise of life, which was much in vse amongst the ancients, yea the *Greeks* themselues, but it is casuall depending on another, and rare: It is a difficult matter to meet with such people, and more difficult to make vse of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by traouelling & visiting strange countries, not to be fed with vanities, as the most doe, but to carry with them the knowledge and consideration especially of the humours and customes of those nations. This is a profitable exercise, the body is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keeps a man in breath, the minde is in continuall exercise, by marking things knowne and new.

26
From the liuing.

There

There is not a better schoole to forme the life of man, than to see the diuersitie of so many other liues, and to taste a perpetuall varietie of the formes of our nature.

27
From the dead
by bookes.

The other commerce with the dead by the benefit of their bookes, is more sure, and more neere vnto vs, more constant, and lesse chargeable. Hee that knowes how to make vse of them, receiueth thereby great pleasure, great comfort. It dischargeeth vs of the burthen of a tedious idlenesse, it withdraweth vs from fond imaginations, and other outward things, that vex and trouble vs: It counselleth vs, and comforteth vs in our griefes and afflictions: but yet it is onely good for the minde, whereby the bodie remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

28
To make the
scholler to speake
and to reason.

Wee must now speake of that order of proceeding and formalitie which a teacher of youth must keepe, that hee may happily arriue to his proposed end. It hath many parts; we will touch some of them. First, hee must often examine his scholler, aske his iudgement and opinion of whatsoeuer shall present it selfe vnto him. This is quite contrary to the ordinarie stile, which is that the master doe alwayes speake and teach his childe with authoritie, and worke into his head as into a vessell, whatsoeuer he will, insomuch that children are only Auditors & Receiuers, which manner of teaching I cannot commend; *O best plerunq; ijs, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent: The authoritie of them which teach, hurteth for the most part those which would learne.* Their spirits must be awakened and inflamed by demands, make them first to giue their opinions, and then giue them the same liberty, to aske others, to enquire and to open the way at their owne will. If without questioning with them a man speake wholly vnto them, it is a labour in a manner lost, the childe is not profited thereby, because he thinks it belongs not vnto him, so long as he yeelds not an account thereof; he lends only his cares and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pace, as when he is a party in the businesse. Neither is it enough to make them giue their iudgement, but that they maintaine it, & be able to giue a reason of their saying, to the end that they speake not by rote, but that they be attentiu, and carefull of that they speake: and to giue them the better encouragement there-

thereunto, a man must not seeme to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and endeuour. This forme of teaching by questions and demands is excellently obserued both by *Socrates* (the principall in this businesse) as wee see euerie where in *Plato*, where by a long annexion and enfolding of demands wittily and dexteriously made, hee sweetly leadeth a man to the closet of verity; and also by the Doctor of veritie in his Gospell. Now these questions must not be only of things touching science and memorie, as hath beene said, but matter of iudgement. For to this exercise all things may serue, euen the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at table: for the worke of iudgement is not to handle and to vnderstand great and high matters, but iustly to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoeuer they be. Questions therefore must be moued touching the iudgement of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their iudgement and their conscience. The tutor or instructor of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this question; A great youth hauing a little coat or cassocke, gaue it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and tooke from him his cassocke, which was the greater: vpon which fact he demanded his iudgement. *Cyrus* answered, that it was well, because both of them were thereby the better fitted. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because hee considered onely the fitnesse and conuenienciethereof, and not the iustice, which should first and especially haue beene thought of, which was, that no man may be enforced in that which was his own. And this no doubt is an excellent maner of instruction. And though a man may recite authorities out of bookes, the sayings of *Cicero* or *Aristotle*, yet it is not only to recite them, but to iudge of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all vses, and to apply them to diuers subiects. It is not enough to report as a historie, that *Cato* killed himselfe at *Utique*, that hee might not fall into the hands of *Caesar*; and that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were the authours of the death of *Caesar*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and iudge, whether they did well herein, or no; whether they deserued well of the common-weale; whether they carried

Math. 16. 22.

Luk 10. & 24.

ried themselves therein according to wisdom, justice, valour, and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally and generally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the conueniencie, order, veritie, must be inquired into, a worke of iudgement and conscience. These things a man by any meanes must not dissemble, but euer presse them, and hold him subiect vnto them.

29
5. *An aduise-
ment touching
honest curiositie.*

Secondly, he must accustome and frame him to an honest curiositie to know all things, whereby hee must first haue his eyes vpon euery thing, the better to consider all that may be said, done or attempted concerning himselfe, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his iudgement; and then he must make an enquire into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing, knowes nothing, saith one; Hee that busieth not his minde, suffereth it to rust, and becomes a foole; and therefore hee must make profit of all, apply euery thing to himselfe, take aduice and counsell, as well of what is past, the better to see the error he hath committed, as of that which is to come, the better to rule and direct himselfe. Children must not be suffered to be idle, to bring themselves asleepe, to entertaine themselves with their owne prattle; for wanting sufficiencie to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed vpon vanities; they must therefore be alwayes busied in some employment, and kept in breath, and this curiositie must be ingendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spurre them forward, which being such as is said, shall be neither vaine in it selfe, nor tedious to another.

30
6. *Aduice.*

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the generall paterne and modell of the world and of nature, make it vniuersall, that is to say, represent vnto him in all things, the vniuersall face of nature: that the whole world may be his booke: that of what subiect soeuer a man talke, hee cast his eye and his thought vpon the large immensitie of the world, vpon so many different fashions and opinions, which haue beene, and are in the world touching that subiect. The most excellent and noble mindes, are the more vniuersall and more free; and by this meanes the minde is contented, learneth

neeth not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resolution and stedfast constancie. To be brieft, such a man doth no more admire any thing, which is the highest and last point of wisdom. For whatsoeuer doth happen, or a man may report vnto him, he easily findeth that there is nothing in the world either new or strange; that the condition of man is capable of all things, that they haue come from others, and that elsewhere diuers things passe more strange, more great. And in this sense it was that wise *Socrates* called himselfe a citizen of the world. And contrarily, there is not any thing that doth more deprave and enthrall the minde of man, than to make him taste and vnderstand but one certaine opinion, beleefe, and manner of life. What greater follie or weaknesse can there be, than to thinke that all the world walketh, beleeueth, speaketh, doth, liueth and dieth according to the manner of his country? like those bard block-heads, who when they heare onerecite the manners and opinions of forren countries, very different and contrary to theirs, they tremble for feare, and beleeue them not, or else doe absurdly condemne them as barbarous, so much are they enthralled and tied to their cradell, a kinde of people brought vp (as they say) in a bottle, that neuer saw any thing but thorow a hole. Now this vniuersall spirit must be attained by the diligence of the master or teacher, afterwards by trauell, and communication with strangers, and the reading of bookes and the histories of all nations.

Finally, hee must teach him to take nothing vpon credit and by authority: this is to make himselfe a beast, and to suffer himselfe to be led by the nose like an ox; but to examine all things with reason, to propose all things, and then to giue him leaue to chuse. And if hee know not how to chuse, but doubt, which perhaps is the better, sounder, and surer course, to teach him likewise to resolute of nothing of himselfe, but rather to distrust his owne iudgement.

After the minde comes the body, whereof there must likewise be a care taken, at one and the same instant with the spirit, not making two workes thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master must endeouour to keepe his child free from delicacie and pride in apparell, in sleeping, eating, drinking; he must bring him vp hardly to labour and paines,

accustome him to heat and cold, winde and weather, yea and vnto hazards too; harden his muscles and his sinewes, as well as his minde, to labour, and then to paine and griefe too; For the first disposeth to the second: *Labor callum obducit dolori: Labour hardeneth a man against griefe.* To be brieue, he must endeavour to make him lustie and vigorous, indifferent to all kinde of viands. All this serueth not onely for his health, but for publike affaires and seruices.

33
3. An aduise-
ment
touching man-
ners.

Wee come now to the third head which concerneth manners, wherein both body and soule haue a part. This is twofold; To hinder the euill, to ingraft and to nourish the good. The first is the more necessary, and therefore the greater care and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedie, to hinder the birth and growth of ill manners and conditions, especially these following, which are to be feared in youth.

1
Evill manners.

To lie, a base vice of seruants and slaues, of a licentious and fcarefull minde, the cause whercof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

2

A fottish shame and weaknesse, whereby they seek to hide themselves; hold downe their heads, blush at euery question that is proposed, cannot endure a correction, or a sharpe word, without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times beare a great sway herein; but it must be corrected by studie.

3

All affectation and singularitye in habit, carriage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimonie of vanity and vaine-glory, and marreth all the rest, euen that which is good; *Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia: A man may be wise without pompe, without enuie.*

4

But aboue all, choler, sullennesse, obstinacie; and therefore it is very necessariē that a childe neuer haue his will by such froward meanes, and that he learne and finde that these qualities are altogether vnprofitable and bootlesse, yea base and villanous; and for this cause he must neuer be flattered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be sullen and froward, if he haue not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent; that a man shall neuer worke any good vpon him; *Nihil magis reddit iracundos, quam educatio mollis*

& blanda : Nothing more maketh one prone to anger, than soft and cockering education.

By the selfesame meanes a man must ingraft into him good and honest manners; And first instruct him to feare and reuerence God, to tremble vnder that infinite and inuisible maiestie, to speake seldome and soberly of God, of his power, eternitie, wisdome, will, and of his workes; not indifferently and vpon all occasions, but fearefully, with shame and reuerence. Not to be ouer-scrupulous in the mysteries and points of religion, but to conformance himselfe to the gouernment and discipline of the Church.

34
Good manners.

Secondly, to replenish and cherish his heart with ingenuity, freedome, candor, integritie, and to teach him to be an honest man, out of an honorable and honest minde, not seruilely and mechanically, for feare, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, than vertue it selfe. These two are especially for himselfe.

For another and the company with whom he conuerseth, hee must worke in him a sweet kinde of affabilitie to accomodate himselfe to all kinde of people, to all fashions; *Omnis Aristippum decuit color, & status, & res*: Euery countenance, condition and gesture became Aristippus. Herein Alcibiades was excellent. That he learne how to be able, and to know how to doe all things, yea excelsse and licentious behaviours if need be; but that he loue to doe onely that which is good. That herefraine to doe euill, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledge, but will. *Multum interest utrum peccare quis nolit, aut nesciat*: There is great difference in not being willing to sinne, and not being able.

3

Modesty, whereby he contesteth not, nor tieth himselfe, either to all, as to the greatest and most respectiue persons, or such as are his inferiours, either in condition or sufficiencie, nor defendeth any thing obstinately, with affirmatiue, resolute, commanding words, but sweet; submisle and moderate speeches. Hereof hath beene spoken elsewhere. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents towards their children are dispatched.

35
See lib. 2. cap. 9.

The fourth concerneth their affection and communication with them, when they are great and capable of that where-

36
The fourth part

touching the dutie of parents.

The loue of parents greater than the loue of children.

unto they were instructed. We know that affection is reciprocal and naturall betwixt parents and their children, but that of parents towards their children is farre more strong and more naturall, because it is giuen by nature to loue those things that are comming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world, especially those in whom a man doth liue when hee is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not so strongly, nor so naturally; and it seemeth rather to be the payment of a debt, and a thankfull acknowledgement of a benefit receiued, than a pure, free, simple, and naturall loue. Moreouer, he that giueth and doth good, loueth more than hee that receiueh and is indebted: And therefore a father and euery agent that doth good to another, loueth more than he is beloued. The reasons of this proposition are many. All loue to be (which being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action.) Now he that giueth and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiueh. He that giueth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honourable; he that receiueh doth none of this: honestie is for the first, profit for the second. Now honestie is far more worthie, firme, stable, amiable, than profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Again, those things are most beloued that cost vs most; that is dearest vnto vs, which wee come more dearly by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring vp is a matter of greater charge, than to receiue all these.

37

The loue of parents twofold.

This loue of parents is two-fold, though alwayes naturall, yet after a diuers manner: the one is simply and vniuersally naturall, and as a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which parents loue and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milke-sops, and vse them like moppets, or little apes. This loue is not truly humane. Man endued with reason, must not seruilely subiect himselfe vnto nature as beasts doe, but follow it more nobly with discourse of reason. The other then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loueth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the seeds and sparkes of vertue, goodnesse, and towardlinesse to arise and spring vp in them. Some there are who being besotted and carried with the former kinde of affection, haue but little

little of this, and neuer complaining of the charge so long as their children are but small, complaine thereof when they come to their growth, and beginne to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses, that they may become honest men: these parents are brutish and inhumane.

Now according to this second, true, and fatherly loue in the well gouerning thereof, parents should receiue their children, if they be capable, into their societie and partnership in their goods, admit them to their counsell, intelligence, the knowledge and course of their domesticall affaires, as also to the communication of their designements, opinions and thoughts, yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require, alwayes reseruing their ranke and authoritie. For wee condemne the austere, lord-like, and imperious countenance and carriage of those that neuer looke vpon their children, nor speake vnto them but with authoritie, will not be called fathers but lords, though God himselfe refuse not this name of Father, neuer caring for the hearty loue of their children, so they may be feared, reuerenced, and adored. And for this cause they giue vnto them sparingly, keepe them in want, that they may the better keepe them in awe and obedience, euer threatening them some small pittance by their last Will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a sottish, vaine, and ridiculous foolery; It is to distrust their owne proper, true, and naturall authority, to get an Artificiall; And it is the way to deceiue themselves, and to grow into contempt, which is cleane contrary to that they pretend. It causeth their children to cary themselves cunningly with them, and to conspire and finde meanes how to deceiue them. For parents should in good time frame their mindes to dutie, by reason, and not haue recourse to these meanes more tyrannous than fatherly.

38
Of the true fatherly loue in communicating with his children being come to yeeres of discretion.

*Errat longè mea quidem sententia,
Qui imperium credit esse grauius aut stabilius
Vt quod sit, quàm illud quod amicitia adiungitur.*
In my opinion he is much amisse,
Who thinkes more graue or firme that rule of his
That's wrought by force, than what of friendship is.

39

The usage of
them in their
last wils accord-
ing to the
lawes.

In the last disposition of our goods, the best and surest way is to follow the lawes and customes of the Countrey. The lawes haue better provided for it than wee, and it is a safer course to suffer them to faile in something, than to aduenture vpon our owne defects, in our owne proper choice. It is to abuse that libertie we haue therein, to serue our foolish fantasies and priuate passions, like those that suffer themselues to be carried by the vnwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make vse of their last Wills and Testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conforme himselfe to reason and common custome herein, which is wiser than wee are, and the surer way.

40

Of the dutie of
children towards
their parents.

We come now to the dutie of children towards their Parents, so naturall and so religious, and which ought to be done vnto them, not as vnto pure and simple men, but demi-gods, earthly, mortall, visible gods. And this is the reason why *Philo* the Iew said; that the Commandement touching the dutie of children was written the one halfe in the first Table, which contained the Commandements that concerne our dutie towards God; and the other halfe in the second Table, wherein are the Commandements that concerne our neighbour, as being halfe diuine, and halfe humane. This dutie likewise is so certaine, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other dutie or loue whatsoeuer, be it neuer so great. For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, hee must forsake his sonne, and goe to his father, though his loue towards his sonne be greater, as before hath beene said. And the reason is, because the dutie of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priuiledge, and cannot be abrogated by any latter duty.

41

This dutie consisteth in five points.

Now this dutie consisteth in five points, comprehended in this word; *Honour thy father and thy mother*. The first is reuerence, not onely in ourward gesture and countenance, but also inward, which is that high and holy opinion and esteeme, that

that a childe ought to haue of his parents, as the authors and originall causes of his being, and of his good, a qualitie that makes them resemble God himselfe.

The second is obedience, euen to the roughest and hardest commands of a father, according to the example of the *Rechabites*, who to obey the command of their father, neuer dranke wine in all their liues: Nay more than that, *Isaac* refused not to yeeld his necke to the sword of his father.

Jerem. 35.

The third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotency, and want, to giue them their assistance in all their affaires. We haue an example and patterne hereof euen in beaſts. In the *Storke*, whose little ones (as *S. Basil* affirmeth) feed and nourish their old dams, couer them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themſelues together to carrie them vpon their backs. Loue furniſheth them with this Art. This example is ſo liuely and ſo ſignificant, that the dutie of children towards their parents hath beene ſignified by the qualitie of this creature, *ἐπιμαρυῖν*, *reciconiare*. And the Hebrewes call this bird for this cauſe, *chafida*, that is to ſay, the debonaire, the charitable bird. We haue likewiſe notable examples here amongſt men. *Cymon* the ſonne of great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in priſon, as ſome ſay for debt, and not hauing wherewithall to burie his bodie, much leſſe to redeeme it being arreſted for the debt, whiſt it was caried to the buriall, according to the lawes of that Countrey, *Cymon* ſold himſelfe and his liberty for money to prouide for his funerall: he with his plenty and goods releued not his father, but with his libertie; which is dearer than all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father liuing and in neceſſity, but dead, and being no more a father, nor a man. What had hee done to ſuccour his father liuing, wanting and requiring his helpe? This is an excellent preſident. Wee haue two the like examples, euen in the weake and feeble ſex of women, of two daughters which haue nourished and giuen ſucke the one to the father, the other to her mother, being priſoners and condemned to die by famine, the ordinarie puniſhment of the Ancients. It ſeemerh in ſome ſort a thing againſt nature, that the mother ſhould be nourished with the daughters milke; but this is truly

In examen

Lewit. 19.

according to nature, yea those first lawes, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

4 The fourth is, not to doe, to attempt, or enterprife any thing of weight or importance, without the aduice, consent, and approbation of Parents, and especially in mariage.

5 The fift is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testie and impatient humours of Parents, their seuerity and rigour. *Manlius* hath made good prooffe hereof: for the Tribune *Pomponius* hauing accused the father of this *Manlius* in the presence of the people of many crimes, and amongst others, that he ouer-cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bedde, putting the point of his dagger to his throat, inforced him to sweare, that he should desist from that pursuit he made against his father, desiring rather to endure his fathers rigour, than to see him troubled for it.

A childe shall finde no difficulty in these fve duties, if he consider how chargeable he hath beene to his parents, and with what care and affection he hath beene brought vp. But he shall neuer know it well, vntill he haue children of his owne, as he that was found to ride vpon a hobby-horse playing with his children, entreating him that so tooke him to hold his peace, vntill he were himselfe a father, reputing him till then no indifferent Iudge in this action.

CHAP. XV.

The dutie of Masters and Seruants.

HERE commeth the third and last part of priuate and domesticall iustice, which is the duties of masters and seruants. Touching which, it is necessarie to know the distinction of seruants: for they are principally three sorts. That is to say, of slaues, whereof all the world hath beene full in former time, and is at this present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free than here about France; they haue no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are wholly their masters, who may giue, lend, sell, resell, exchange, and vse them as beasts of seruice. Of these hath
beene

bee ne spoken of at large. There are inferiour seruants, and seruants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargain, or otherwise doe any thing to the prejudice of their owne liberty. But they owe honour, obedience, and serue vntill such times, and vpon such conditions, as they haue promised, and their masters haue power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subiect, they owe no seruice nor obedience, but only worke and labour for money; and they haue no authority in commanding or correcting them.

The duties of masters towards their seruants, as well of slaues as inferiour seruants, are, not to handle them cruelly, remembering they are men, and of the same nature with vs, but onely fortune hath put a difference, which is very variable and sporteth it selfe in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemne them. *Sunt homines, contubernales, humiles, amici, Senec. conserui, aequè fortuna subiecti: They are men, dwellers with thee, humble friends, fellow seruants, equally the subiects of fortune.* To handle seruants gently, seeking rather to be beloued than feared, is the testimony of a good nature; to vse them roughly and too seuerely, proceedeth from a crabbed and cruell minde, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsell, and those things that are requisite for their health and safety.

The duties of seruants are, to honour and feare their masters whatsoever they be, and to yeeld them obedience and fidelitie, seruing them not for gaine, or only outwardly and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without dissimulation. We reade of most worthy, noble, and generous seruices performed in former times by some towards their masters, euen to the engaging and hazard of their liues, for their masters safeguard and honour.

CHAP. XVI.

The dutie of Soueraignes and Subiects.

OF Princes and Soueraignes, their descriptions, notes, humors, markes, and discommodities hath beene discoursed in the first booke, chapter 49. Their duty to gouerne the common-wealth hath beene spoken at large in this present booke, chapter 2. and 3. which is of politike prudence: yet we will touch a little here the heads and generall points of their duty.

The dutie of
Soueraignes.

To be religious.

Mercur.
Trism.

The Soueraigne as the meane betweene God and the people, and debtour to these two, ought alwaies remember that he is the liuely Image, the Officer and Lieutenant generall of the great God his Soueraigne, and to the people a perfect mirrour, a bright beame, a cleere looking glasse, an eleuated theater for euery one to behold, a fountaine where all refresh themselves, a spurre to vertue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the Register of perpetuall memorie? He ought then first of all to feare and honour God, to be deuout, religious, to obserue piety not only for himselfe and for conscience sake, as euery other man, but for his state, and as he is a Soueraigne. The piety which we here require in a Prince, is the care he ought to haue, and to shew for the conseruation of religion and the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the country, prouiding by lawes, penalties and punishments that the Religion be neither changed, troubled, nor innouated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and security (for all doe reuerence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprise any thing against him whom they see seareth God; and beleeue to be in his protection and safeguard: *Vna custodia pietas: pius virum nec malus genius nec fatum devincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo.*) The onely safeguard is pietie: neither the euill genius nor fate can overcome a godly man: for God deliuereth him out of all euill. And also to the good of the state, for as all the wisest haue said, Religion is the band and cement of humane societie.

The

The Prince ought also to be subiect, and inuiolable to obserue and cause to be obserued the lawes of God, and nature, which are not to be dispensed with: and he that infringeth them is not only counted a tyrant, but a monster.

2

To obserue the lawes of superiors.

Concerning the people, he ought first to keepe his covenants and promises, be it with subiects or others with whom he is interested or hath to doe. This equity is both naturall and vniuersall. God himselfe keepeth his promise. Moreover, the Prince is the pledge and formall warrant of the law and those mutuall bargaines of his subiects. He ought then aboue all to keepe his faith, there being nothing more odious in a Prince than breach of promise and periury; and therefore it was well said, that a man ought to put it among those casuall cases if the Prince doe abiure or reuoke his promise, and that the contrary is not to be presumed. Yea he ought to obserue those promises and bargaines of his predecessours, especially if he be their heire, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the common-wealth. Also he may releue himselfe of his vnreasonable contracts and promises vnaduisedly made, euen as for the selfe-same causes priuate men are releued by the benefit of the Prince.

3

To keepe his promise.

He ought also to remember, that although he be aboue the law (I meane the ciuill and humane) as the Creator is aboue the creature (for the law is the worke of the Prince, and which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure, it is the proper right of the soueraignty) neuerthelesse though it be in force and authority, he ought to keepe it: to liue, to conuerse and iudge according vnto it: and it would be a dishonour and a very euill example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* hauing done something against the law, by his owne proper act would needs die for grieve: *Lycurgus*, *Ageflaus*, *Solenus*, haue left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

4

To obserue the lawes.

Thirdly, the Prince oweth iustice to all his subiects; and he ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of iustice. This is the proper vertue of a Prince truly royall and Prince-like, whereof it was rightly said by an old man to King *Philip* that delayed him iustice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist and leaue off to be King. But *Deme-*

5

To doe iustice.

trius

trins sped not so well, who was dispossessed of his realme by his subiects, for casting from a bridge into the Riuer many of their petitions, without answer, or doing them iustice.

3
To take care and
affect the com-
mon good.

Senec.

Finally, the Prince ought to loue, cherish, to be vigilant and carefull of his state, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the shepherd of his flocke, hauing alwaies before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subiects. The prosperity and welfare of the state is the end and contentment of a good Prince, *ut respub. apibus firma, copijs locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit*: That the common-wealth be strong in power, rich in plenty, abound in glory, honest in vertue. The Prince that tieth himselfe to himselfe, abuseth himselfe: for he is not his owne man, neither is the state his, but he is the states. He is a Lord, not to dominere, but to defend. *Cui non civium seruitus tradita, sed tutela*: To whom is committed not the seruitude of the citizens, but their safegard, to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilance may secure his sleeping subiects, his trauell may giue them rest, his prouidence may maintaine their prosperitie, his industry may continue their delights, his businesse their leisure, their vacation, and that all his subiects may vnderstand and know that he is as much for them, as he is about them.

7

To be such, and to discharge his duty well, he ought to demean and carry himselfe as hath beene said at large in the second and third Chapter of this booke, that is to say, to furnish himselfe of good counsell, of treasure, and sufficient strength within his state to fortifie himselfe with alliance, and forraigne friends to be ready, and to command both in peace and war; by this meanes he may be both loued and feared.

8

And to containe all in a few words, he must loue God about all things, be aduised in his enterprises, valiant in attempts, faithfull and firme in his word, wise in counsell, carefull of his subiects, helpfull to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pittifull to the afflicted, gentle and courteous to the good people, seuer to the wicked, and iust and vpright towards all.

9
The duty of
subiects.

Exod. 12.

The duty of subiects consisteth in three points, to yeeld due honour to their Princes, as to those that carry the Image of God, ordained and established by him; therefore they are most wicked, who detract or slander; such were the seed of Cham and

and Chanaan. 2. To be obedient, vnder which is contained many duties, as to goe to the warres, to pay tributes and imposts imposed vpon them by their authority. 3. To wish them all prosperity and happinesse, and to pray for them.

But the question is, Whether a man ought to yeeld these three duties generally to all Princes, if they be wicked or tyrants. This controuersie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore we must distinguish. The Prince is a tyrant and wicked, either in the entrance, or execution of his gouernment. If in the entrance, that is to say, that he treacherously inuadeth, and by his owne force and powerfull authority gaines the soueraignty without any right, be he otherwise good or euill (for this cause he ought to be accounted a Tyrant) without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of iustice, if there be opportunity and place, or by surprise: and the Grecians, saith Cicero, ordained in former times rewards and honors for those that deliuered the common-wealth from seruitude and oppression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the Prince, either by iustice or surprise, since he is neither received nor acknowledged to be a Prince.

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightfull and iust, but that he carrieth himselfe imperiously, cruelly and wickedly, and according to the common saying, tyrannically, it is then also to be distinguished; for it may be so three waies, and euery one requireth particular consideration. The one is in violating the lawes of God and nature, that is to say, against the Religion of the country, the Commandement of God, enforcing and constraining their consciences. In this case he ought not to yeeld any duty or obedience, following those diuine axiomes, That we ought rather obey God than men, and feare him more that commandeth the intire man, than those that haue power but ouer the least part. Yet he ought not to oppose himselfe against him by violence or sinister meanes, which is another extremity, but to obserue the middle way, which is eitherto flye or suffer, *fugere aut pati*; these two remedies named by the doctrine of verity in the like extremities. 2. The other lesse euill, which concerneth not the consciences, but only the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subiects, denying them iustice, imprisoning their persons,

10
Whether it be
lawfull to lay
violent hands
vpon the person
of a tyrant.
A double ty-
rant.
The entrance.

2
In the execution
three waies.

Hereof see aboue
Chap. 4. in Chap.
of tyranny and
rebellion.

Tacit.

sons, and depriuing them of their good. In the which case he ought with patience and acknowledgement of the wrath of God yeeld these three duties following, honour, obedience, vowes and prayers; and to be mindfull of three things, that all power and authority is from God, and whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God: *principi summum rerum iudicium di dederunt. Subditis obsequij gloria relicta est: bonos principes voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.* God hath giuen the soueraigne iudgement of affaires to the Prince. The glory of dutifull seruice is left to the subiects: to desire by prayer good Princes, and to tolerate them whatsoever they be. And he ought not to obey a superiour, because he is worthy and worthily commandeth, but because he is a superiour; not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawfull. There is great difference betweene true and good, euery one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and iust, but simply, because it is the law. 2. That God causeth an hypocrite to reigne for the sins of the people, though he reserue him for a day of his fury; that the wicked Prince is the instrument of his iustice, the which we ought to endure as other euils, which the heauens doe send vs; *quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres & cetera naturamala, sic luxum & auaritiam dominantium tolerare: As when we suffer sterility or vnseasonable weather, and other euils of nature, so must we endure the riot and conetousnesse of our rulers.* 3. The examples of *Saul, Nabuchodonasor*, of many Emperours before *Constantine*, and others since him as cruell tyrants as might be: towards whom neuerthelesse these three duties haue beene obserued by good men, and enioyned them by the Prophets and learned men of those dayes, according to the oracle of the great Doctour of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seat of gouernment, notwithstanding they oppresse vs with insupportable burthens, and their gouernment be euill.

Tacit.

The third concerneth the whole state, when he would change or ruinate it, seeking to make it electiue, hereditary, or of an Aristocracy, or Democracy, a Monarchy, or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of iustice or otherwise: for he is not master of the state, but only a guardian and a sueriy. But these

these affaires belong not to all, but to the tutors and maintainers of the state, or those that are interestted therein, as Electors of electiue states; or Princes apparent in hereditary states; or states generall, that haue fundamentall lawes. And this is the only case wherein it is lawfull to resist a tyrant. And all this is said of subiects, who are neuer permitted to attempt any thing against a soueraigne Prince for what cause soeuer, and the lawes say that he deserueth death, who attempteth, or giueth counsell and which intendeth, or only thinketh it. But it is honourable for a stranger, yea, it is most noble and heroicall in a Prince by warlike meanes to defend a people vniustly oppressed; and to free them from tyranny, as *Hercules* did, and afterward *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlaine*, Prince of the Tartars, who ouercame *Baiazeth* the Turkish Emperour, and besieged *Constantinople*.

*L. Cogitationis
ff. de poen. l. Si
quis non dicam
c. de sacros. Ec-
cles.*

These are the duties of subiects towards their liuing soueraignes: But it is a point of iustice to examine their life after they are dead. This is a custome iust and very profitable, which benefiteth much those nations where it is obserued: and which all good Princes doe desire, who haue cause to complaine, that a man handleth the memory of the wicked as well as theirs. Soueraignes are companions if not masters of the lawes; for seeing iustice cannot touch their liues, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, and the goods of their successors. We owe reuerence and duty equally to all kings, in respect of their dignity and office, but inward estimation and affection to their vertue. We patiently endure them, though vnworthy as they are: We conceale their vices; for their authority and publike order where we liue hath need of our common helpe: but after they are gone, there is no reason to reiect iustice, and the liberty of expressing our true thoughts; yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that we manifest to the posterity faithfully to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well knownen. They who for some priuate dutie commit a wicked prince to memory, doe priuate iustice to the publike hurt. O excellent lesson for a successor if it were obserued!

12

*Examinations
of Soueraignes
after their death.*

CHAP. XVII.

The duty of Magistrates.

1
For what cause
Magistrates are
allowed of.

Good people in a common-wealth would loue better to Genioy ease of contentment, which good and excellent spirits know how to giue themselues in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, than to vndertake publike charges, were it not that they feare to be ill gouerned, and by the wicked, and therefore they consent to be magistrates: but to hunt and follow publike charges, especially the iudgement fear, is base and vile, and condemned by all good lawes, yea euen of the Heathen, witnesse the law *Iulia de ambitu*: vnworthy a person of honour, and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiency, than by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by bribery or money to purchase them, and there is no merchandize more hatefull and contemptible than it: for it necessarily followeth, that he which buieth in grosse, selleth by retaile: Whereupon the Emperour *Seuerus* speaking against the like inconuenience, saith, That a man cannot iustly condemne him which selleth that he bought.

Lamprid.

2
How a Magistrate ought to
prepare himselfe
before he take the
charge.

Euen as a man apparelleth himselfe, and putterh on his best habit before he departeth his house to appeare in publike: so before a man vndertake publike charges, he ought priuately to examine himselfe, to learne to rule his passions, and well to settle and establish his minde. A man bringeth not to the turney a raw vnnmanaged horse, neither doth a man enter into affaires of importance, if he hath not beene instructed and prepared for it before: so, before a man vndertakes these affaires, and enters vpon the stage and theater of this world, he ought to correct that imperfect and sauage part in vs, to bridle and restraine the liberty of affections, to learne the lawes, the parts, and measures thereof, wherewith it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrarily it is a very lamentable and absurd thing, as *Socrates* saith, that although no man vndertaketh the profession of any mysteric or mechanickall Art, which formerly he hath not learned: yet

in

in publike charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to gouerne the world, the deepest and difficultest mystery of all, they are accepted, and vndertake it, that know nothing at all.

Magistrates are intermixed persons, placed betweene the soueraigne and private men, and therefore it behoueth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their soueraigne, yeeld to the power of superiour magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiours, defend the weake, make head against the great, and be iust to all : and therefore it was well said, That magistracy descrieth a man, being to play in publike so many parts.

3
A generall description of Magistrates.

In regard of his Soueraigne, the Magistrate according to the diuersitie of the commands, ought diuersly to gouerne, or readily, or not at all to obey, or surcease his obedience. First, in those commands which yeeld vnto him acknowledgement and allowance, as are all the warrants of Iustice, and all other where this clause, or any equiualent vnto it (if it appeare vnto you) or which are without attribution of allowance, iust and indifferent of themselves, he ought to obey, and he may easily discharge himselfe without any scruple and danger.

4
The duty of Magistrates as touching the Soueraigne.

2 In those commands which attribute vnto him no acknowledgement, but only the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be against right and ciuill iustice, and that haue in them clauses derogatorie, he ought simply to obey : for the Soueraigne may derogate from the ordinarie law, and this is properly that wherein Soueraigntie consisteth.

3 To those which are contrary to right, and containe no derogatory clause, but are wholly preiudiciall to the good and vtilitie of the common-wealth, what clause soeuer it hath, and though the Magistrate knoweth it to be false, and enforced against right and by violence, he ought not to yeeld readily in these three causes, but to hold them in suspence, and to make resistance once or twice, and at the second or third command to yeeld.

4 Touching those which are repugnant to the law of God, and nature ; he ought to dismisse and acquit himselfe of his

M m

office,

office, yea to endure any thing, rather than obey or consent: and he need not say that the former commands may haue some doubt in them: because naturall Iustice is more cleere than the light of the Sunne.

5 All this is good to be done in respect of the things themselves; But after they are once done by the Soueraigne, how euill soeuer they be, it is better to dissemble them, and bury the memory of them, than to stirre and lose all (as *Papinian* did.) *Frustraniti, & nihil aliud nisi odium querere, extrema demencia est: It is extreme folly to labour to no purpose, and to get nothing else but hatred.*

5
As touching
private men.

In respect of priuate Subiects, Magistrates ought to remember that the authority which they haue ouer them, they haue but at a second hand, and hold it of the Soueraigne, who alwaies remaineth absolute Lord, and their authority is limited to a prefixed time.

2
Deut. 16.

The Magistrate ought to be of easie accessse, ready to heare and vnderstand all complaints and suits, hauing his gate open to all, and himselfe alway at hand, considering he is not for himselfe, but for all, and seruant of the common-wealth. *Magna seruitus, magna fortuna: Great fortune is a great seruitude.* And for this cause the law of *Moyse* prouided, that the Iudges and iudgement-seats were held at the gates of the Cities, to the end euery man might haue easie accessse thereto.

3

He ought also indifferently to receiue and heare all, great and little, rich and poore, being open to all; Therefore a wise man compareth him to an altar whereto a man repaireth being oppressed and afflicted, to receiue succour and comfort.

4

But he ought not to conuerse and be familiar with many, but with very few, and those very wise and aduised, and that secretly: for it debaseth authority, it diminisheth and dissolueth the grace and reputation thereof. *Cleon* called to the gouernment of the common-wealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all intimation or inward amity with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge, for *Cicero* saith, he depriueth himselfe of the person of a friend, that vndertaketh that of a Iudge.

5
Cic lib. 1.
Officior.

His office is especially in two things, to vphold and defend the honour, the dignity, and the right of his Soueraigne, and
of

of the weale-publike which he representeth : *gerere personam civitatis, ejus dignitatem & decus sustinere*; to represent the person of the City, to uphold the dignity and glory thereof, with authority and a milde severity.

Then as a good and loyall interpreter and officer of the Prince, he ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say the law, of which he is the Minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all, therefore he is called the living law, the speaking law.

Although the Magistrate ought wisely to temper mildness with rigour, yet it is better for a Magistrate to be severe and cruell, than gentle, facill, and pittitull : And God forbideth to be pittifull in iudgement. A severe Iudge holdeth subjects in obedience of the lawes : a milde and pittifull makes them to contemne the lawes, the Magistrates, and the Prince, who made both. To be brieft, to discharge well his office, there is required two things, honesty and courage. The first hath need of the second. The first preserveth the Magistrate free from avarice, respect of persons, of bribes, which is the plague, and smotherer of truth, (*Acceptatio munerum pravariatio est veritatis : An accepting of gifts is a prevarication of the truth.*) from the corruption of iustice, which *Plato* calleth an hallowed virgin : Also from passions, of hatred, of loue, and others, all enemies to right and equity. But to carry himselfe well against the threatnings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his friends, the lamentations and teares of the poore distressed, which are all violent and forcible things, and yet haue some colour of reason and iustice, and which maketh sometimes the most resolute to relent, he had need of courage. Firme and inflexible constancy is a principall qualitie and vertue in a Magistrate, to the end he may not feare the great and mighty, and be not moued and mollified with the misery of another, though it carry with it some shew of goodnesse : But yet it is forbid to haue pity of the poore in iudgement.

CHAP. XVIII.

The duty of the great and small.

Exod. 2.

THe duty of the great consisteth in two things, in endeavouring by all meanes, to spend their blood and abilitie for the defence and conseruation of pietie, iustice, of the Prince, of the state, and generally for the welfare and good of the common-wealth; of which they ought to be the pillars and supporters; and after in defending and protecting the poore afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked: and like good blood to runne to the wounded part, according to the Proverbe; That good blood, that is to say, noble and generous, cannot lie, that is to say, deceiue where is need. By this meanes *Moyse* became the head of the Iewish nation, vndertaking the defence of men injured and vniustly trod vnder foot. *Hercules* was deified for deliuering the oppressed from the hands of tyrants. Those that haue done the like, haue beene called Heroes and demi-gods, and to the like all honours haue beene anciently ordained, that is, to such as deserued well of the common-wealth, and were the deliuerers of the oppressed. It is no greatnesse for a man to make himselfe to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some haue done, which also haue procured them hate. *Oderint dum metuant*: *They hate whom they feare*. It is better to be beloued, than adored. This commeth of a naturall pride, and inhumanity, to contemne and disdain other men as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruell, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weake, a thing wholly contrary to true greatnesse and honour, who ought to vndertake the defence thereof.

The duty of inferiors towards their superiors, consisteth in two points, in honouring and reuerencing them, not only ceremoniously and in outward shew, which he must doe as well to the good as the euill, but with loue and affection, if they deserue it, and are louers of the common-wealth. These are two things, to honour, and to esteeme, which are due to the good
and

and truly great: to others to bend the knee, to bow the body, not the heart, which is to esteeme and loue. Moreouer, to please them by humble and seruiceable duties, and to insinuate into their fauour.

Principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est:

The praise is not the least,

To please men of the best.

And to make himselfe capable of their protection, which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion. For ouer-greedily to auoid their indignation, or to seeke their grace and fauour, besides that it is a testimony of weaknesse, it is silently to condemne them of iniustice and cruelty: *Non ex professocauere aut fugere: nam quem quis fugit, damnat; Not of set purpose to beware and auoid: for he whom any man shunneth, he condemneth:* or to stirre vp in them a desire to execute their fury, seeing so base and fearefull a submission.

Of Fortitude the third vertue.

PREFACE.

THe two former precedent vertues rule and gouerne man in company, or with another: these two following rule him in himselfe and for himselfe: respecting the two visages of fortune, the two heads and kinds of all accidents, Prosperity, and Aduersity: for fortitude armeth a man against aduersity, Temperance guideth him in prosperity: moderating the two brutish parts of our soule, fortitude ruleth the irascible, temperance the concupiscible: These two vertues may wholly be comprised and vnderstood by this word Constancy, which is a right and equall staiednesse of the minde, in all accidents and outward things, whereby he is not puffed vp in prosperity, nor dejected in aduersity. *Nec aduersis frangitur, nec prosperis astat.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fortitude or Valour in generall.

1
The description
of valour.

Senec.

Valour (for this vertue is more properly so called than fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equall, and vniforme staiednesse of the minde against all dangerous, difficult, and dolorous accidents: in such sort, that difficultie and danger is the obiekt and matter wherein it is exercised: to be brieft, it is all that which humane weaknesse feareth. *Timendum contemptrix, quæ terribilia, & sub jugum libertatem nostram mittentia, despicit, provocat, frangit: It contemneth things to be feared, despiseth, challengeth and destroyeth dreadfull things, and bringeth our liberty into bondage.*

2
The praise
thereof.

Senec.

Of all the vertues in greatest estimation and honour, this is most renowned, who for the prerogative thereof is simply called a vertue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous and most excellent effects, it containeth magnanimitie, patience, constancy, an invincible resolution, heroicall vertues, whereupon many haue sought the inconueniences that belong thereunto, with greedinesse to attaine to honourable imploiment. This vertue is an impregnable bulwarke, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents, *Munimentum imbecillitatis humana inexpugnabile: quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vite obsidione perdurat: An invincible fortresse of humane weaknes, that whosoever armeth himselfe withall, continueth secure in this siege of life.*

3
Of imperfect or
false valours.

Military valour.

But because many doe mistake, and in place of the only true vertue conceiue the false and bastardly valours, I will in declaring more at large the nature and definition thereof, expell those popular errours, that are here intruded. We will note then in this vertue foure conditions; the first is generally and indifferently against all sorts of difficulties and dangers: wherefore they are deceiued that thinke there is no other valour than the military, which only they esteeme, because it may be it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honour, which is the tongue and trumpet of immortality; for to say truth, there is more fame and glory therein

therein than paine and danger. Now this is but a small part and a little raye or light of the true, entire, perfect, and vniuersall, whereby a man is one and the same, in company, in bed with his griefes, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house, as in the army. This military valour is pure and naturall in beasts, with whom it is as well in females as in males : in men it is often artificiall, gotten by feare and the apprehension of captiuitie, of death, of griefe, of pouerty ; of which things beasts haue no feare. Humane valour is a wise cowardlinesse, a feare accompanied with foresight to auoid one euill by another ; choler is the temper, and file thereof ; beasts haue it simply. In men also it is attained by vse, institution, example, custome, and it is found in base and slauish mindes : of a seruant or slaue, or a factor, or fellow trained vp in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instruct of vertue and true philosophicall valour.

The second condition, it presupposeth knowledge as well of the difficulty, paine, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented, as of the beauty, honesty, iustice, and duty required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceiued that make valour an inconsiderate temeritie, or a senselesse brutish stupidity : *Non est inconsulta temeritas, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est : & eadem patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est : It is not an inconsiderate rashnesse, nor a loue of danger, nor a desire of dreadfull things ; but fortitude is most diligent in the safegard of a mans selfe, and most patient in those things wherein there is a false shew of euils.* Vertue cannot be without knowledge and apprehension, a man cannot truly contemne the danger which he knoweth not ; if a man will also acknowledge this vertue in beasts. And indeed they that ordinarily attempt without any foresight or knowledge, when they come to the point of execution, the sent is their best intelligence.

4

*Temeritie or
stupiditie.*

Seneca.

The third condition ; this is a resolution and staiednesse of the minde grounded vpon the duty, and the honesty, and iustice, of the enterprise ; which resolution neuer slacketh, whatsoeuer hapneth, vntill he haue valiantly ended the enterprise,

5

Bodily strength.

terprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first and more grossely, they that seeke this vertue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limmes. Now valour is not a quality of the body, but of the minde; a seled strength, not of the armes and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and valour of a man, consisteth in his heart and will: here lieth his true honour: and the only aduantage and the true victory ouer his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arme himselfe against his constancy and vertue; all other helps are strange and borrowed: strength of armes and legs is the quality of a porter: to make an enemy to stoupe, to dazell his eies at the light of the sunne, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any feare of death, quelleth not in his constancy and resolution: and though he fall, is not vanquished of his aduersary, who perhaps may in effect be but a base fellow, but of fortune; and therefore he is to accuse his owne vnhappinesse, and not his negligence. The most valiant are oftentimes the most vnfortunate. Moreouer they are deceiued, which disquiet themselues, and make account of those vaine Thraasonicall brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their losly lookes, and braue words, would winne credit of those that are valiant and hardy, if a man would doe them so much fauour to belecue them.

6
Art and industry.

Moreouer, they that attribute valour to subtilty and craft, or to Art or industry, doe much more prophane it, and make it play a base and abiect part. This is to disguise things, and to place a false stone for a true. The Lacedemonians permitted no Fencers nor master-wrestlers in their cities, to the end their youth might attaine thereto by nature, and not by Art. We account it a bold and hardy thing to fight with a Lion, a Beare, a wilde Bore, which encounter a man only according to nature; but not with Wasps, for they vse subtilty. Alexander would not contend in the Olympique games, saying, there was no equality; because a priuate man might euercome, and a king be vanquished. Moreouer it is not fitting for a man of honour, to trie and aduenture his valour in a thing, wherein a base fellow instructed by rule may gaine the prise. For such victorie commeth not of vertue, nor of courage, but of certaine artificall trickes and inuections: wherein the basest will doe

doe that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither should he regard to doe it. Fencing is a tricke of Art, which may be attained by base persons, and men of no account. And although infamous and ruffinlike fellows are apt to fight or doe any thing in cities or townes, with the dexterity of the sword; if they see an enemy, would they not runne away? Euen so is it in that, which is attained by long habit and custome, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who vndertake dangerous things, and more difficult than the most valiant, being trained and instructed therein from their youth.

Finally, they which consider not sufficiently the motiue and circumstance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour *Passion.* and vertue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to some passion or particular intent. For as it is not properly vertue, nor iustice, to be loyall and officious towards some, which a man particularly loueth; nor temperance, to abstaine from the carnall pleasure of his sister, or of his daughter; nor liberality towards his wife and children: so is it not true valour to aduenture himselfe to any danger, for his owne benefit and particular satisfaction. Wherefore if it be for gaine, as spies, pioners, traitors, merchants on the sea, mercenary souldiers; if for ambition or repuration to be esteemed and accounted valiant, as the most part of our men of warre, who say, being naturally carried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not goe; if weary of his life through paine and griefe, as the souldier of *Antigonius*, who liuing in extreme torment by the meanes of a fistula he had, was hardy to attempt all dangers, being healed auoided them; if to preuent shame, captiuitie, or any other euill; if through furie and the heat of choler: to be brieft, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Aiax*, *Cataline*, it is neither valour nor vertue; *Sicut non martyrem poena, sic nec fortē pugna, sed causa facit:* *As the torment maketh not a martyr, so doth not the conflict make a valiant man, but the cause.*

The fourth condition. It ought to be in the execution thereof wise and discreet, whereby many false opinions are reiected in this matter, which are not to hide themselves from those euils and inconueniences that threaten them: neither to feare lest they surprise vs, nor to lie, yea not to seek the first blowes,

blowes, as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to vnderstand amisse : for so that the minde remaine firme and entire in it owne place and discourse, without alteration, he may outwardly disquiet and make a stir. He may lawfully, yea it is honourable, to ouerthrow, to vndoe; and to reuenge himselfe of euils, by all meanes and honest endeouours : and where there is no remedy, to carrie himselfe with a setled resolution. *Mens immota manet ; lachryma voluuntur inanes : Vaine teares flow apace, but the minde remaineth immoueable.* *Socrates* mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardlinesse to beat and vanquish them by giuing them place ? *Homer* commendeth in his *Vlysses* the skill to flie : the *Lacedemonians* professors of valour, in the iourney of the *Plateans*, retired, the better to breake and dissolue the *Persian* troupe, which otherwise they could not doe, and ouercame them. This hath beene practised by the most warlike people. In other places the *Stoickes* themselves allowed to wax pale, to tremble at the first sudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into the minde and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are iustly to be feared and fled, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedy, neither place of vertue, prudence, valour.

Of Fortitude or Valour in particular.

The proposition
and diuision of
this matter.

TO diuide the matter and discourse of that which is here to be said ; this vertue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth euill. Now this euill is two-fold, externall, and internall, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by diuers names, aduersitie, affliction, iniurie, vnhappinesse, euill and sinister accidents : The other is inward in the minde, but caused by that which is outward : These are hatefull and hurtfull passions, of feare, sadnesse, choler, and diuers others. We must speake of them both ; prescribe meanes and remedies to ouercome, suppress, and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our vertue, fortitude, and valour. It consisteth then here of two parts, the one of euils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The generall aduice against all good and euill fortune

fortune hath beene declared before: we will speake here more specially and particularly thereof.

CHAP. XX.

The first part of outward euils.

WEe will consider these outward euils three wayes, in their causes, which shall be declared in this Chapter; afterward in their effects; lastly in themselves distinctly, and particularly euery kinde of them: and wee will giue aduice and meanes in them all, by vertue to be armed against them.

1
*The distinction
and comparison
of euils by their
causes.*

The cause of euill and hatefull accidents which happen to vs all, are either common and generall, when at the same instant they concerne many, as pestilence, famine, warre, tyrannie; And these euils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heauen, or at least the proper and neereft cause thereof wee cannot easily know: Or particulars, and those that are knowne, that is to say, by the meanes of another. And so there are two sorts of euils; publique and priuate. Now the common euils, that is to say, proceeding of a publique cause, though they concerne euery one in particular, are in diuers kinde, more or lesse grievous, weighty, and dangerous, than the priuate, whose causes are knowne. More grievous, for they come by flocks and troopes, they assaile more violently, with greater stirre of vehemencie and furie: they haue a greater concourse and traine: they are more tempestuous, they bring forth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grievous: because generalitie and communitie seemeth to mitigate and lessen euery mans euill. It is a kinde of comfort, not to be alone in misery: it is thought to be rather a common unhappinesse, where the course of the world, and the cause is naturall, than personall affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth vs, torment vs more, wound vs to the quicke, and much more alter vs. Both these two haue their remedies and comforts.

Against publique euils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to marke their cause.

2
*The aduice against
publique
euils.*

Providence.

Destinie.

It is God, his providence, from whence cometh and dependeth an absolute necessitie, which governeth and ruleth all, whereunto all things are subiect. His providence, and destinie, or necessitie, are not, to say the truth, two distinct lawes in essence, *αἰετοὶ καὶ αἰδῶν*, neither are they one. The diuersitie is onely in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur, and to be grieved at the contrary, is first of all such impietie, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things doe quietly obey, man onely torments himselfe. And againe it is a folly, because it is vaine and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this soueraigne and absolute mistris willingly, it shall cary all by force; *Ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus ferre mortalia, nec perturbari ijs, quæ vitare nostræ potestatis non est: in regno nati sumus, Deo parere libertas est: We are brought to this necessitie, to suffer mortall things, and not to be troubled at those things which are not in our power to auoid: we are borne in a kingdome, it is freedome to obey God.*

De sine fata deum flecti sperare querendo:

Surcease to thinke that destiny

Can by complaining be put by.

There is no better remedie, than to apply our willes to the will thereof; and according to the aduice of wisdom to make a vertue of necessitie. *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quàm velle quod ipsa cogat: There is no other auoiding of necessitie, than to will that which it constraineth.* In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we doe but sharpen and stirre the euill; *Leto animo ferre quicquid acciderit, quasi tibi vulneris accidere, debuisses enim velle, si scisses ex decreto Dei fieri: To suffer with a cheerefull minde what soeuer shall happen, as if thou wouldest haue it happen vnto thee: for thou oughtest to be willing, if thou knowest it be done by the decree of God.* Besides we shall better profit our selues, we shall doe that which we ought to doe, which is to follow our generall and soueraigne, who hath so ordained it: *Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis; & Deum, quo auctore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuracione comitari. Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur: It is an excellent thing patiently to suffer what thou canst not remedie; And to yeeld vnto God without murmuring, from whom as author all things proceed,*

ceed. He is an euill souldier that followeth his Commander with grudging. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoever hee will. It is magnanimity of courage to yeeld vnto him. *Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit*: It is magnanimitie to yeeld himselfe vnto God. It is effeminacie and dastardlinesse to murmure or complaine; *pusillus & degener, qui oblectatur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare mavult Deum quam se*: He is base and ignoble that struggleth against him, hee iudgeth ill of the order of the world, and had rather amend God than himselfe.

Against those priuate euils, which doe proceed from the act of another, and which pierce vs more, wee ought first well to distinguish them, lest we mistake them, There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceiue ill of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended vs neither in deed nor will, as when hee hath either demanded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtfull vnto vs: for such causes it is too great simplicitie to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one crosseth our affaires against equitie; this is to wrong vs: the others are applied to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise than it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grieuous and harder to be endured, than any other kinde of affliction.

3
The distinction
of priuate euils.

The first and generall aduice against all these sorts of euils, is to be firme and resolute, not to suffer himselfe to be led by common opinion, but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to verity and reason. The world suffereth it selfe to be perswaded and led by impression. How many are there that make lesse account to receiue a great wound, than a little blow? more account of a word, than of death? To be brieve, all is measured by opinion: and opinion offendeth more than the euill; and our impatience hurts vs more, than those of whom wee complaine.

4
The aduice against them in
generall.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawne first from our selues, (and this is that we must first looke into.) These pretended offences may arise of our owne defects and weaknesse. This might be a folly grounded vpon some

5
Particular ad-
uisements drawn
from our selues.

some defect, in our owne person, which any one in derision would counterfeit. It is follie to grieue and vex himselfe for that which proceedeth not from his owne fault. The way to preuent others in their scoffes, is first to speake, and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you; if it be that the iniury hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we haue giuen the occasion of this abuse, why should wee be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receiue, and make vse of as a punishment.

3. But for the most part it proceedeth of our owne proper weaknesse, which makes vs melancholy. Now hee ought to quit himselfe of all those tender delicacies, which make him liue vnquietly, but with a manly courage, strong and stoutly to contemne, and tread vnderfoot the indiscretions and follies of another. It is no signe that a man is sound, if he complaine when one toucheth him. Neuer shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy selfe to all that is presented.

6
of those who
offend.

They are also drawne from the person that offendeth. We represent in generall the manners and humours of those persons with whom we are to liue in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to doe euill, and measure their power by the disdain, and the iniury of another. So few there are which take pleasure to doe well. We ought then to make account, that whithersoever wee turne vs, wee shall finde those that will harme, and offend vs. Wheresoever wee shall finde men, we shall finde iniuries. This is so certaine and necessary, that the Lawyers themselues, who rule the trafficke and affaires of this world, haue winked at, and permitted in distributiue and commutative iustice many escapes in Law. They haue permitted deceit and hinderances euen to the one halfe of the iust price. This necessitie to hurt and offend commeth first of the contrariety, and incompatibilitie of humours and wills; whereof it commeth that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affaires, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, dammage, and ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common and generall picture of the world, if he who offendeth thee is insolent, a foole, and rash (as hee is, for an honest man neuer wrongeth any) where

wherefore complaineſt thou, ſince hee is no more his owne man, than as a mad man? You can well endure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pitie him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, yee will laugh at them: a foole, a drunken man, a cholericke, an indiscreet man in like ſort. Wherefore when theſe people aſſaile vs with words, we ought not to anſwer them: wee muſt hold our peace, and quit our ſelues of them. It is an excellent and worthie revenge, and grieuous to a foole, not to make any account of him, for it is to take away that pleaſure which hee thinketh to haue in vexing vs, ſince our ſilence condemnes his ſimplicite, and his owne temeritie. is ſmothered in his owne mouth: if a man anſwer him, he makes him his equall, and by eſteeming him too much, he wrongs himſelfe. *Male loquuntur, quia bene loqui nesciunt, faciunt quod solent & sciunt, male quia mali, & secundum se: They ſpeake euill, becauſe they know not how to ſpeake well, they doe what they are uſed to, and what they know, euilly becauſe they are euill, and according to themſelues.*

Behold then for conſeſion the aduice and counſell of wiſdome: we muſt haue reſpect vnto our ſelues, and vnto him that offendeth vs. As touching our ſelues, wee muſt take heed wee doe nothing vnworthie and vnbeſitting our ſelues, that may giue another aduantage againſt vs. An vnwiſe man that diſtruſteth himſelfe, growes into paſſion without cauſe, and thereby giues encouragement to another to contradicte him. This is a weakneſſe of the minde, not to know to contemne offence; an honeſt man is not ſubiect to iniurie: he is inuiolable: an inuiolable thing is not onely this, that a man cannot beat, but being beaten, neither receiueth wound nor hurt: This reſolution is a more ſtrong bulwarke againſt all accidents; that wee can receiue no euill, but of our ſelues. If our iudgement be as it ought, we are invulnerable. And therefore wee alwayes ſay with wiſe *Socrates, Anitus* and *Melitus* may well put me to death, but they ſhall neuer enforce me to do that I ought not. Moreouer, an honeſt man, as he neuer giueth occaſion of iniury to any man, ſo he cannot endure to receiue an iniurie; *Ledere enim ladiq; conjunctum eſt: For to hurt, and to be hurt, are neere neighbours.* This is a wall of braſſe, which a man is not able to pierce; ſcoffes and iniuries trouble him

7

The conſeſion of theſe counſels with the rule of wiſdome.

him not. Touching him that hath offended vs, if you hold him vaine and vnwise, handle him accordingly, and so leaue him : if he be otherwise, excuse him ; Imagine that hee hath had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence ; he is vexation enough to himselfe, and hee wisheth he had neuer done it. Moreouer, I say, that like good husbands we must make profit and commodity of the iniuries that are offered vs. Which we may doe at the least two waies, which respect the offender and the offended. The one, that they giue vs occasion to know those that wrong vs, to the end we may the better flie them at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently that he is malicious ; and trust him no more : The other, that they discouer vnto vs our infirmitie, and the meanes whereby wee are easily beaten, to the end we should amend and repaire our defects ; lest another take occasion to say as much or more. What better reuenge can a man take of his enemies, than to make profit of their iniuries, and thereby better and more securely to manage our affaires ?

CHAP. XXI.

Of outward euils considered in their effects and fruits.

General effects
very profitable.

After the causes of euils we come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preseruatiues and remedies. The effects are many, are great, are generall and particular. The generall respect the good, maintenance and culture of the vniuerse. First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and bee lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renued by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, warre, mortalitie, which season, perfect and purifie it, to the end to sweeten the rest, and giue more libertie and ease to the whole. Without these a man could neither turne himselfe nor be settled. Moreouer, besides the varietie and interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beautie and ornament of this vniuerse, also all parts of the world are benefited thereby. The rude and barbarous are hereby polished and refined, Arts and Sciences are dispersed and im-
parted

parted vnto all. This is as a great nursery, wherein certaine trees are transplanted from other stockes, others pruned and pulled vp by the roots, all for the good and beauty of the Orchard. These good and generall considerations ought to remaine and resolute euery honest and reasonable minde, and to hinder the curious inquiry of men into those great and turbulent accidents, so strange and wonderfull, since they are the workes of God and nature, and that they doe so notable a seruice in the generall course of the world. For we must thinke, that that which is a losse in one respect, is a gaine in another. And to speake more plainly, nothing is lost, but such is the course of the world, so it changeth, and so it is accommodated.

Vir sapiens nihil indignetur sibi accidere, sciat q̃ illa ipsa quibus ladi videtur, ad conseruationem uniuersi pertinere, & ex his esse, quæ cursum mundi officiumq̃ consummant : Let a wise man disdaine nothing that shall happen vnto him, and let him know that those things that seeme hurtfull vnto him, pertaine to the preservation of the whole vniuerse, and to be of the nature of those things that finish vp the course and office of the world.

The particular effects are diuers, according to the diuers spirits and states of those that receiue them: For they exercise the good, releue and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of euery one a word, for hereof we haue spoken elsewhere. These outward euils are in those that are good, a very profitable exercise, and an excellent schoole, wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Mariners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers in their Academies, and all other sorts of people in the serious exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed vnto vertue, constancy, valour, the victory of the world and of fortune. They learne to know themselues, to make triall of themselues, and they see the measure of their valour, the vtermost of their strength; how farre they may promise or hope of themselues, and then they encourage and strengthen themselues to what is best, accustom and harden themselues to all, become resolute and inuincible; whereas contrarily, the long calme of prosperity mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, That there were no people more miserable, than they that had neuer felt any cross-

2

Particular effects diuers.
1. Lib. of the three verities, cap. 11.

ses or afflictions, that had neuer beene miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

3
*Medicine and
abasement.*

These outward evils to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction and fatherly rod after the fall to put them in remembrance of themselves, to the end they make not a second reuolt. They are a kinde of letting bloud, and medicine or preseruatiue to diuert faults and offences; or a purgation to void and purifie them.

4
Punishment.

To the wicked and forlorne they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserable languishment. And these are their wholesome and necessary effects, for which these outward evils are not only to be esteemed of, and quietly taken with patience and in good part, as the exploits of diuine iustice, but are to be embraced as tokens and instruments of the care, of the loue and prouidence of God, and men are to make a profitable vse of them, following the purpose and intention of him, who sendeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

Of outward evils in themselves and particularly.

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

AL these evils, which are many and diuers, are priuations of their contrary good, as likewise the name and nature of euill doth signifie. And therefore as many heads as there are of good, so many are there of evils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seuen; sicknesse, griefe, (I include these two in one) captiuitie, banishment, want, infamie, losse of friends, death, which are the priuations of health, liberty, home-dwelling, meanes or maintenance, honours, friends, life, whereof hath beene spoken before at large. We will here inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines against these seuen heads of evils, and that briefly without discourse.

*In the first
booke.*

CHAP. XXII.

Of Sicknesse and griefe.

WE haue said before that griefe is the greatest, and, to say the truth, the onely essentiall euill, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Neuerthelesse behold some few that regard the reason, iustice, vility, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessity to endure; there is no reason that for our sakes a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended if that happen vnto him, that may happen vnto euery man.

It is also a naturall thing; we are borne thereunto, and to desire to be exempted from it is iniustice, we must quietly endure the lawes of our owne condition. We are made to be old, to be weake, to grieue, to be sicke, and therefore we must learne to suffer that which we cannot auoid.

If it be long, it is light and moderate, and therefore a shame to complaine of it: if it be violent, it is short, and speedily ends either it selfe or the patient, which comes all to one end. *Confide, summus non habet tempus dolor. Si gravis, brevis; Si longus levis. Be bold of this, extreme paine hath no perpetuity. If it be grienous, it is soone gone; if long, then light.*

And againe, it is the body that endureth: it is not our selues that are offended, for the offence diminisheth the excellency and perfection of the thing, and sicknesse or griefe is so far from diminishing, that contrarily it serueth for a subiect and an occasion of a commendable patience, much more than health doth: And where there is more occasion of commendation, there is not lesse occasion of good. If the body be the instrument of the spirit, who will complaine when the instrument is imploied in the seruice of that whereunto it is destinated? The body is made to serue the soule: if the soule should afflict it selfe for any thing that hapneth to the body, the soule should serue the body. Were not that man ouer-delicate and curious, that would cry out and afflict himselfe, because some one or other had spoyled his apparell, some thorne had

taken hold of it, or some man passing by had torne it? Some base Broker perhaps would be aggrieved therewith, that would willingly make a commodity thereof: But a man of ability and reputation would rather laugh at it, and account it as nothing in respect of that state and abundance that God hath bestowed on him. Now this body is but a borrowed garment, to make our spirits for a time to appeare vpon this low and troublesome stage, of which only we should make account, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence commeth it that a man suffereth grieve with such impatieney? It is because he accustometh not himselfe to seeke his content in his soule; *non assuerunt animo esse contenti, nimium illis cum corpore fuit*: They haue not accustomed themselves to be content in minde, their contentment was too much with the body. Men haue too great a commerce with their bodies; And it seemeth that grieve groweth proud, seeing vs to tremble vnder the power thereof.

5 It teacheth vs to distaste that which we must needs leaue, and to vniwinde our selues from the vanity and deceit of this world, an excellent peece of seruice.

6 The ioy and pleasure we receiue by the recouery of our health, after that our grieve or sicknesse hath taken his course, is a strange enlightning vnto vs, in such sort that it should seeme that nature hath giuen sicknesse for the greater honour and seruice of our pleasure and delight.

7 Now then if the grieve be indifferent, the patience shall be easie: if it be great, the glory shall be as great: if it seeme ouerhard, let vs accuse our delicacy and nicenesse; and if there be but few that can endure it, let vs be of the number of those few. Let vs not accuse nature for hauing made vs too weake, for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we flie it, it will follow vs; if we cowardly yeeld vnto it, and suffer our selues to be vanquished, it will handle vs the more roughly, and the reproach will light vpon our selues. It would make vs asfeard, and therefore it standeth vs vpon to take heart, and that when it commeth it finde vs more resolute than was imagined. Our yeelding makes that more eager and more fierce, *stare fidenter, non quia difficilia non audemus, sed quia non audemus, difficilia sunt*. To stand confidently, we do not shrink at them because

because they be difficult: but they are difficult to endure, because we shrink at them.

8

Examples.

But lest these remedies should seeme but idle words and meere imaginations, and the practise of them altogether impossible, we haue examples both frequent and rich not only of men, but of women and children, who haue not only a long time endured long and grievous sicknesses with such constancy, that their griefe hath rather giuen them life than courage; but haue attended and borne euen with ioy, yea, haue sought after the greatest and most exquisite torments. In Lacedemon little children whipped one another, yea, sometimes to the death, without any shew in their countenance of any griefe or smart that they felt, only to accustome themselues to suffer for their country. *Alexanders* Page suffered himselfe to be burnt with a cole, without cry or countenance of discontent, because he would not interrupt the sacrifice: and a lad of Lacedemon suffered a Foxe to gnaw his guts out of his belly before he would discouer his theft. *Pompey* being surprised by King *Gentius*, who would haue constrained him to reueale the publike affaires of Rome, to make knowne that no torment should make him to doe it, did voluntarily put his finger into the fire, and suffered it to burne, vntill *Gentius* himselfe tooke it out. The like before that had *Mutius* done before another King, *Porfenna*: and that good old *Regulus* of Carthage endured more than all these: and yet more than *Regulus*, *Anaxarchus*, who being halfe pounded in a morter by the tyrant *Nicocreon*, would neuer confesse that his minde was touched with any torment; Beat and pound the sacke of *Anaxarchus* till you be gluttoned, as for himselfe you shall neuer touch him.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of captiuitie and imprisonment.

THis affliction is no more than nothing, and in respect of sicknesse and griefe it is an easie matter to vanquish it. For sicke folke are not without captiuitie in their beds, in their houses, for the time they lie in, yea, they ingrosse as it were

affliction aboue captiuitie ; neuerthelesse a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the body, the couer, the prison of the soule that is captiue ; the soule it selfe remaineth alwaies free, and at liberty, in despight of all ; and therefore how should that man know or perceiue that he is in prison, who as freely, yea and more freely too, may walke and wander whither he will, than he that is abroad ? The wals and dungeons of the prison are not strong enough to shut him vp, the body that toucheth him and is ioyned vnto him, cannot hold nor stay him. He that knoweth how to maintaine himselfe in his liberty, and to vse and hold his owne right, which is not to be shut vp, no nor in this world, will but laugh at these sleight and childish embarrments. *Christiannus etiam extra carcerem saculo renuntiavit : in carcere etiam carceri : nihil interest ubi sitis in saculo qui extra saculum estis ; auferamus carceris nomen, secessum vocemus, & si corpus includitur, caro detinetur, omnia spiritui patent, totum hominem animus circumfert, & quò vult transfert.* A christian man euen out of prison hath renounced the world : In prison also he hath renounced the prison : it mattereth nothing where thou art in the world, who art out of the world : Let vs take away the name of prison, and call it a quiet retiring place, and if the body be included, the flesh is prisoner, but the spirit is free to all things, the minde carrieth about the whole man, and whither he list it transporteth him.

The prison hath gently receiued into the lap thereof many great and holy personages ; it hath beene the sanctuary, the haue of health, and a fortresse to diuers that had beene vterly vndone if they had had their liberty, yea, that haue had recourse thereunto to be in liberty, haue made choice thereof, and espoused themselues vnto it, to the end they might liue at rest, and free themselues from the cares of the world ; *è carcere in custodiarium translatus ; Translated from the prison of affaires, to the quiet of 4. wals.* That which is shut vp vnder locke and key is in safest custody : and it is better to be vnder the safegard of a key, than to be bound and enthrallled with those fetters and stockes, whereof the world is full, that publike places and courts of great Princes, and the tumultuous affaires of this world bring with them, as iealousies, enuies, violent humours, and the like. *Si recogitemus ipsum magis mundum*

Tertul.

Tertul.

dum carcerem esse, exisse nos è carcere quàm in carcerem introisse intelligemus, majores tenebras habet mundus quæ hominum præcordia excæcant, graviores catenas induit, quæ ipsas animas constringunt, peiores immunditias expirat, libidines hominum, plures postremo reos continet universum genus hominum: If we consider that the world it selfe is a prison, we shall vnderstand that we are rather gone out of the world than entred into prison; the world hath greater darknesse, wherewith the inward cogitations of the hearts of men are blinded; it fethereth with more grienous irons, wherewith mens very soules are hackled; it breatheth forth worser uncleanneses in the lusts and sensualities of men; it containeth more guilty persons, euen whole mankinde. Many haue escaped the hands of their enemies, and other great dangers and miseries by the benefit of imprisonment. Some haue there written books, and haue there bettered their knowledge. Plus in carcere spiritus acquirit quàm caro amittit: The spirit getteth more in prison, than the flesh loseth. Diuers there are, whom the prison hauing kept and preserued for a time, hath resent vnto their former soueraigne dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world; others it hath yeilded vp vnto heauen, and hath not at any time receiued any that it restoreth not.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of banishment and exile.

EXile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion; it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginarie: for according to reason there is not any ill in it: In all places all is after one fashon, which is comprehended in two words, Nature, and Vertue. *Duo quæ pulcherrima sunt, quocunque nos mouerimus, sequentur, natura communis & propria virtus: There are two excellent things, which will follow vs whither soeuer we goe, common Nature, and mans owne vertue.*

In all places we finde the selfe same common nature, the same heauens, the same elements. In all places the heauens *Nature.* and the starres appeare vnto vs in the same greatnesse, extent, and that is it which principally we are to consider, and not

that which is vnder vs, and which we trample vnder feet. Againe, at a kenning we cannot see of the earth about ten or twelue leagues : *Angustus animus quem terrena delectant* : The minde is narrow and straight, whom earthly things delight. But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautifull and shining diamonds, doth alwaies shew it selfe vnto vs ; and to the end we may wholly behold it, it continually whirleth about vs. It sheweth it selfe all vnto all, and in all respects, in a day and a night. The earth which with the sea and all that it containeth, is not the hundredth and sixty part of the greatnesse of the sunne, sheweth not it selfe vnto vs but in that small proportion that is about the place where we dwell : yea and that change of that earthly floore that is vnder vs is nothing. What matter is it to be borne in one place and to liue in another ? Our mother might haue layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance that we are borne here or there. Againe, all Countries bring forth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoeuer is necessary. All Countries haue kindred : nature hath knit vs all together in bloud and in charity. All haue friends ; there is no more to doe but to make friends, and to win them by vertue and wisdom. Euery land is a wise mans countrey, or rather no land is his particular countrey. For it were to wrong himselfe, and it were weaknesse and basenesse of heart, to thinke to carry himselfe as a wrangler in any place. He must alwaies vse his owne right and liberty, and liue in all places as with himselfe, and vpon his owne ; *Omnes terras tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium* : To see all lands as their owne, and their owne as the land of all.

3
Vertue.

Moreover what change or discommodity doth the diuersity of the place bring with it ? Doe we not alwaies carry about vs one and the same spirit and vertue ? Who can forbid, saith *Brutus*, a banished man to carry with him his vertues ? The spirit and vertue of a man is not shut vp in any place, but it is euery where equally and indifferently. An honest man is a citizen of the world, free, cheerefull, and content in all places, alwaies within himselfe, in his owne quarter, and euer one and the same, though his case or scabberd be remoued and carried hither and thither : *Animus sacer & aternus ubique est, diu cognatus,*

natus, omni mundo & aeo par : The sacred and eternall soule is euery where, of neere affinity with God, a like to all the world, and to all ages. A man in euery place is in his owne countrey where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not vpon the place, but himselfe.

How many are there, that for diuers considerations haue willingly banished themselues ? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, haue refused to returne, and haue found their exile not only tolerable but pleasant and delightfull, yea, neuer thought they liued vntill the time of their banishment, as those noble Romanes *Rutilius, Marcellus* ? How many others haue beene led by the hand of good fortune out of their countrey, that they may grow great and puissant in a strangeland ?

4

Examples.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Pouertie, want, losse of goods.

THis complaint is of the vulgar and miserable sottish sort of people, who place their oueraigne good in the goods of fortune, and thinke that pouerty is a very great euill. But to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold pouerty, the one extreme, which is the want of things necessary and requisite vnto nature ; this doth seldome or neuer happen to any man, nature being so iust, and hauing formed vs in such a fashon, that few things are necessary, and those few are not wanting, but are found euery where ; *Parabile est quod natura desiderat, & expositum* : That which nature desireth is ready and easie to be had ; yea in such a sufficiency, as being moderately vsed, may suffice the condition of euery one. *Ad manum est, quod sat est* : That which sufficeth is ready and at hand. If we will liue according to nature and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall alwaies finde that which is sufficient. If we will liue according to opinion, whilest we liue we shall neuer finde it. *Si ad naturam viues, nunquam eris pauper ; si ad opinionem, nunquam dives : exiguum natura desiderat, opinio immensum* : If thou wilt liue according to nature, thou shalt neuer be poore ; if according to opinion, neuer rich : nature desireth

Pouerty two-fold.

I. Want of things necessary.

reth little, opinion much and beyond measure. And therefore a man that hath an Art or science to sticke vnto, yea, that hath but his armes at will, is it possible he should either feare or complaine of pouerty?

2
2. Want of things
superfluous.

Prouer. 30.

God send
me so

The praise of
sufficiency.

1. Tim. 6.

The other is the want of things, that are more than sufficient, required for pompe, pleasure, and delicacy. This is a kinde of mediocrity and frugality : and to say the truth, it is that which we feare, to lose our riches, our moueables, not to haue our bed soft enough, our diet well drest, to be depriued of these commodities, and in a word, it is delicatenesse that holdeth vs, this is our true malady. Now this complaint is vniust; for such pouerty is rather to be desired than feared: and therefore the wise man asked it of God; *Mendicitatem nec diuitias, sed necessaria*: Neither pouerty nor riches, but things necessary. It is farre more iust, more rich, more peaceable and certaine, than abundance, which a man so much desireth. More iust; for man came naked; *Nemo nascitur diues*; *No man is borne rich*; and he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man tearme that truly his, that he neither bringeth nor carrieth with him? The goods of this world, they are as the moueables of an Inne. We are now to be discontented so long as we are here, that we haue need of them. More rich; It is a large signory, a kingdome: *Magna diuitia lege nature composita paupertas: magnus questus pietas cum sufficientia*: *Moderate and quiet pouerty by the law of nature is great riches*: Godlinesse is great gaine with sufficiency. More peaceable and assured; it feareth nothing, and can defend it selfe against the enemies thereof: *Etiam in obsessa via paupertas pax est*: *Pouerty hath peace euen in a besieged way.* A small body that may couer and gather it selfe vnder a buckler, is in better safety than a great, which lieth open vnto euery blow. It is neuer subiect to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwaies more cheerefull and comfortable, for they neither haue so much care, nor feare such tempests. Such kinde of pouerty is free, cheerefull, assured, it maketh vs truly masters of our owne liues; whereof the affaires, complaints, contentions, that doe necessarily accompany riches, carry away the better part. Alas what goods are those, from whence proceed all

our

our euils? That are the cause of all those iniuries that we endure, that make vs slaues, trouble the quiet of our soules, bring with them so many iealousies, suspicions, feares, frights, desires? He that vexeth himselfe for the losse of these goods is a miserable man, for together with his goods he loseth his spirit too. The life of poore men is like vnto those that saile neere the shore; that of the rich, like to those that cast themselves into the maine Ocean. These cannot attaine to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the tide; the other come aboard, passe and repasse, as often as they will.

Finally, we must endeuour to imitate those great and generous personages, that haue made themselves merry with such kinde of losses, yea haue made aduantage of them, and thanked God for them, as *Zenon*, after his shipwracke, *Fabricius*, *Seranus*, *Curius*. It should seeme that pouerty is some excellent and diuine thing, since it agreeth with the gods who are imagined to be naked, since the wisest haue embraced it, or at least haue endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word, with such as are not ouer passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Infamie.

THis affliction is of diuers kindes. If it be losse of honors and dignities, it is rather a gaine than a losse: Dignities are but honourable seruitudes, whereby a man by giuing himselfe to the weale-publike, is deprived of himselfe. Honours are but the torches of enuy, iealousie, and in the end exile and pouerty. If a man shall call to minde the historie of all antiquity, he shall finde that all they that haue liued, and haue carried themselves worthily and vertuously, haue ended their course, either by exile, or poison, or some other violent death: witnesse amongst the Greekes, *Aristides*, *Themistocles*, *Phocion*, *Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camillus*, *Scipio*, *Cicero*, *Papinian*; among the Hebrewes the Prophets: In such sort that it should seeme to be the liuery of the more honest men,

men, for it is the ordinarie recompence of a publique state to such kinde of people. And therefore a man of a gallant and generous spirit should contemne it, and make small account thereof, for he dishonoureth himselfe, and shewes how little hee hath profited in the studie of wisdom, that regardeth in any respect the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good or euill.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the losse of Friends.

I Here comprehend parents, children, and whatsoeuer is neere and deare vnto a man. First wee must know vpon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether vpon the interest or good of our friends or our own. Vpon that of our friends? I doubt we shall say yea to that; but yet we must not be too credulous to belecue it. It is an ambitious faining of pietie, whereby wee make a shew of sorrow and griefe for the hurt of another, or the hinderance of the weale-publique: but if wee shall withdraw the veile of dissimulation, and sound it to the quicke, wee shall finde that it is our owne particular good that is hid therein, that toucheth vs neereft. Wee complaine that our owne candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger. This is rather a kinde of enuie, than true pietie: for that which wee so much complaine of touching the losse of our friends, their absence, distance from vs, is their true and great good: *Mœrere hoc eventum invidi magis quàm amici est*: To mourne for this event is rather the part of an envious person than of a friend. The true vse of death is, to make an end of our miseries. If God had made our life more miserable, he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is vpon our owne good that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth vs not; it is a kinde of iniurie to be griued with the rest and quiet of those that loue vs, because we our selues are hurt thereby. *Suis incommodis angī non amicū, sed seipsum amanti est*: To be griued for his owne discommodities, sheweth a man not to loue his friend, but himselfe.

Againe,

Againe, there is a good remedy for this, which fortune cannot take from vs, and that is, that suruiuing our friends, wee haue meanes to make new friends. Friendship, as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends : Hee that wanteth not vertue, shall neuer want friends ; It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith when he hath lost his old, he makes new. If fortune haue taken away our friends, let vs endeouour to make new ; by this meanes we shall not lose them, but multiply them.

Of death.

WE haue spoken hereof so much at large and in all respects in the eleuenth and last chapter of the second booke, that there remaineth not any thing else to be spoken, and therefore to that place I referre the Reader.

The second part of inward euils, tedious and troublesome passions.

THE PREFACE.

FROM all these aboue named euils, there spring and arise in vs diuers passions and cruell affections : for these being taken and considered simply as they are, they breed feare, which apprehendeth euils as yet to come, sorrow for present euils, and if they be in another, pitie and compassion. Being considered as comming and procured by the act of another, they stirre vp in vs the passions of choler, hatred, enuie, icalousie, despight, reuenge, and all those that procure displeasure, or make vs to looke vpon another with an enuious eye. Now this verue of fortitude and valour consisteth in the gouernment and receit of these euils according to reason in the resolute and couragious carriage of a man, and the keeping of himselfe free and cleere from all passions that spring thereof. But because they subsist not, but by these euils, if by the meanes and helpe of so many aduisements and remedies before deliuered, a man can vanquish and contemne them all, there can be

be no more place left vnto these passions. And this is the true meane to free himselfe, and to come to the end, as the best way to put out a fire is to withdraw the fuell that giues it nourishment. Neuerthelesse wee will yet adde some particular counsels against these passions, though they haue beene in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficultie to bring them into hatred and detestation.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Against Feare.

Let no man attend euils before they come, because it may be they will neuer come: our feares are as likely to deceiue vs as our hopes; and it may be that those times that we thinke will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many vnexpected aduentures may happen that may defend a man from that blow we feare? Lightning is put by with the winde of a mans hat, and the fortunes of the greatest states with accidents of small moment. The turne of a wheele mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour; and many times it falleth out that wee are preserued by that, which wee thought would haue beene our ouerthrow. There is nothing so easily deceived as humane foresight. That which it hopeth, it wan- teth; that which it fearerh, vanisherh; that which it expecteth, hapnerh not. God hath his counsell by himselfe; That which man determinerh after one manner, he resoluerh after another. Let vs not therefore make our selues vnfortunate before our time, nay when perhaps we are neuer likely to be so. Time to come which deceiueth so many, will likewise deceiue vs as soone in our feares, as in our hopes. It is a maxime commonly receiued in Physicke, that in sharpe maladies the predictions are neuer certaine; and euen so is it in the most furious threatnings of fortune; so long as there is life, there is hope, for hope continues as long in the body as the soule: *quamdiu spiro, spero.*

But forasmuch as this feare proceedeth not alwayes from the disposition of nature, but many times from an ouer-deli-
cate

cate education (for by the want of exercise and continuall tra-
uell and labour, euen from our youth wee many times appre-
hend things without reason) wee must by a long practise ac-
custome our selues vnto that, which may most terrifie vs, pre-
sent vnto our selues the most fearefull dangers that may light
vpon vs, and with cheerefulnesse of heart attempt sometimes
casuall aduentures, the better to trie our courage, to preuent
euill occurrents, and to sease vpon the armes of fortune. It is
a matter of lesse difficultie to resist fortune by assailing it, than
by defending our selues against it. For then wee haue leasure
to arme our selues, we take our aduantages, wee prouide for a
retrait; whereas when it assaulteth vs, it surpriseth vs vna-
wares, and handleth vs at her owne pleasure. Wee must then
whilest we assaile fortune, learne to defend our selues, giue vn-
to our selues false alarums, by proposing vnto vs the dangers
that other great personages haue passed, call to mind that some
haue auoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at
them, others haue beene ouerthrowne by the least, for want
of resolution.

CHAP. XXIX.

Against Sorrow.

THE remedies against sorrow (set downe before as the
most tedious, hurrfull, and vniust passion) are two-fold:
some are direct or straight, others oblique. I call those direct
which Philosophie teacheth, which concerne the confron-
ting and disdainng of euils, accounting them not euils, or at
leastwise very small and light (though they be great and grie-
uous) and that they are not worthy the least motion or alte-
ration of our mindes; and that to be sorrie for them, or to
complaine of them, is a thing very vniust and ill befitting a
man, so teach the *Stoickes*, *Peripateticks*, and *Platonists*. This
manner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholike
passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of
the first ranke. There is likewise another kinde of Philoso-
phicall remedie, although it be not of so good a stampe,
which is easie and much more in vse, and it is oblique, this is
by

by diuerting a mans minde and thought to things pleasant and delightfull, or at least indifferent from that that procureth our sorrow: which is to deale cunningly, to decline and auoid an euill, to change the obiect. It is a remedie very common, & which is vsed almost in all euils, if a man marke it, as well of the body as of the minde. Physicians when they cannot purge a rheume, they turne it into some other part lesse dangerous. Such as passe by steepe and precipitate deepes and downefals, that haue need of lancings, searing-irons, or fire, shut their eyes, and turne their faces another way. Valiant men in warre doe neuer taste nor consider of death, their mindes being carried away by the desire of victorie: in so much that diuers haue suffered death gladly, yea haue procured it, and beene their owne executioners, either for the future glorie of their name, as many Greekes and Romans; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the disciples of *Hegesius*, and others after the reading of *Plato* his booke to *Antiochus*, *De morte contemnenda*; or to auoid the miseries of this life, and for other reasons. All these are they not diuersions? Few there are that consider euils in themselues, that relish them as *Socrates* did his death; and *Flanius* condemned by *Nero* to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therefore in sinister accidents and misaduentures, and in all outward euils, wee must diuert our thoughts, and turne them another way. The vulgar sort can giue this aduice; Thinke not of it. Such as haue the charge of those that are any way afflicted, should for their comfort furnish affrighted spirits with other obiects. *Abducendus est animus ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia; loci denique mutatione saepe curandus est:* The minde is to be led away to other studies, cares, affaires; lastly by change of place it is often cured.

CHAP. XXX.

Against mercie and compassion.

THere is a two-fold mercie, the one good and vertuous, which is in God and in his Saints, which is in will and in effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting themselves, or diminishing any thing that concerneth honour or equitie; the other

other is a kinde of feminine passionate pity, which proceedeth from too great a tendernesse and weaknesse of the minde, whereof hath beene spoken before in the aboue-named passion. Againe this wisdome teacheth vs to succour the afflicted, but not to yeeld and to suffer with him. So is God said to be mercifull, as the Physitian to his patient; the aduocate to his client affordeth all diligence and industry, but yet taketh not their euils and affaires to the heart; so doth a wise man, not entertaining any grieffe, or darkning his spirit with the smoke thereof. God commandeth vs to aid, and to haue a care of the poore, to defend their cause; and in another place he forbids vs to pity the poore in iudgement.

CHAP. XXXI.

Against Choler.

THe remedies are many and diuers wherewith the minde must before hand be armed and defended, like those that feare to be besieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; The first is to cut off the way, and to stop all the passages vnto choler. It is an easier matter to withstand it, and to stay the passage thereof in the beginning, than when it hath sealed vpon a man to carry himselfe well and orderly. He must therefore quit himselfe from all the causes and occasions of choler, which heretofore haue beene produced in the description thereof, that is to say, 1. weaknesse and tendernesse; 2. malady of the minde in hardning it selfe against whatsoeuer may happen; 3. too great delicatenesse; the loue of certaine things doe accustome a man to facility and simplicity, the mother of peace and quietnesse. *Ad omnia compositi sumus: quæ bona & paratiora sint nobis meliora & graviora;* Let vs be settled to all things: let those things which are good and ready at hand be better and more acceptable to vs. it is the generall doctrine of the wise King Cotys hauing receiued for a present many beautifull and rich vessels, yet fraile and easie to be broken, brake them all, to the end he might not be stirred to choler and fury when they should happen to be broken. This was a distrust in himselfe, and a base kinde of feare

The first head.

that prouoked him thereunto. 4. Curiosity according to the example of *Cesar*, who being a Conquerour, and hauing recovered the letters, writings, and memorials of his enemies, burnt them all before he saw them. 5. Lightnesse of beleefe. 6. and aboute all, an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he must chase from him as vnworthy a man of spirit: for though it seeme to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high an esteeme of himselfe (which neuertheless is a great vice) yet it commeth of basenesse and imbecillity. For he that thinketh himselfe to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferiour, iudgeth himselfe, or feares that in truth he is so, or is so repured, and distrusteth himselfe.

Nemo non eo a quo se contemptum iudicat minor est: No man is lesse than he of whom he thinketh himselfe to be contemned. A man must therefore thinke that it proceedeth rather from any thing than contempt, that is, sortifnesse, indiscretion, want of good manners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiarity: If from his subiects or seruants, knowing that their master hath power to chasten them, it is not to be beleued that they had any such thought. If from base and inferiour people, our honour or dignity, or indignity, is not in the power of such people: *Indignus Cesaris ira: vnworthy the wrath of Cesar.* *Agathocles* and *Antigenus* laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not hauing them in their power. *Cesar* excelled all in this point; and *Moyse*, *Danid*, and all the greatest personages of the world haue done the like. *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet: A great mind becommeth a great fortune.* The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himselfe, not to be moued by another. To be stirred to choler is to confesse the accusation. *Conuicia si irascere agnita videntur, spreta exolescunt: Reproachfull speeches if thou be angry at them, seeme acknowledged, if thou despise them, they vanish to nothing.* He can neuer be great, that yeeldeth himselfe to the offence of another: If we vanquish not our choler, that will vanquish vs. *Iniurias & offensiones supernè despiciere: Highly to despise iniuries and offences.*

2
Head.

The second head is of those remedies that a man must imploy when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there is a likelihood that we may be moued thereunto, which are, first,

first, to keepe and containe our bodies in peace and quietnesse, without motion or agitation; which inflameth the bloud and the humours, and to keepe himselfe silent and solitary. Secondly, delay in beleeuing and resoluing, and giuing leasure to the iudgement to consider. If we can once discover it, wee shall easily stay the course of this Feuer. A wise man counselled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moued before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoever we say or doe in the heat of our bloud, ought to be suspected. *Nil tibi liceat dum irasceris. Quare? Quia vis omnia licere.* Nothing is lawfull for thee whilest thou art angry. Why? Because thou wilt then haue all things lawfull for thee. We must feare and be doubtfull of our selues, for so long as we are moued, we can do nothing to purpose. Reason when it is hindred by passions, serueth vs no more than the wings of a Bird being fastened to his feet. We must therefore haue recourse vnto our friends, and suffer our choler to die in the midst of our discourse. And lastly, diuersion to all pleasant occasions, as musicke, &c.

The third head consisteth in those beautifull considerations wherewith the minde must long before be seasoned. First, in the consideration of the actions and motions of those that are in choler, which should breed in vs a hatred thereof, so ill doe they become a man. This was the manner of the wise, the better to disswade a man from this vice, to counsell him to behold himselfe in a glasse. Secondly and contrarily, of the beauty which is in moderation; Let vs consider how much grace there is in a sweet kind of mildnesse and clemency, how pleasing and acceptable they are vnto others, and commodious to our selues: It is the Adamant that draweth vnto vs the hearts and wils of men. This is principally required in those whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honour, who ought to haue their motions more remisse and temperate, for as their actions are of greatest importance, so their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally, in the consideration of that esteeme and loue which we should beare to that wisdom which we here study, which especially sheweth it selfe in retaining and commanding it selfe, in remaining constant and inuincible; a man must mount his minde from the earth, and frame it to a disposition, like to the highest region of the aire,

which is neuer ouer-shadowed with clouds, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetuall serenity; so our minde must not be darkned with sorrow, nor moued with choler, but flie all precipitation, imitate the highest Planets, that of all others are carried most slowly. Now all this is to be vnderstood of inward choler, and couered, which endureth being ioyned with an ill affection, hatred, desire of reuenge; *qua in sinu stultire- quiescit, ut qui reponunt odia; quodq; saepe cogitationis indicium est; secreto suo satiantur: Which rest in the bosome of a foole, as he that layeth vp hatred; and which is a token of a cruell mind being inwardly glutted therewith:* For the outward and open choler is short, a fire made of straw without ill affection, which is only to make another to see his fault, whether in inferiours by reprehensions, or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit; it is a thing profitable, necessary, and very commendable. It is good and profitable both for himselfe and for another sometimes to be moued to anger, but it must be with moderation and rule.

4

To be angry
when it is good
and commodi-
ous.

For himselfe.

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it breake not forth, and that they may seeme wise and moderate; but they fret themselves inwardly, and offer themselves a greater violence than the matter is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not ouer-ardent and painfull within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should pricke a little without, than that it should be turned against it selfe. *Omnia vitia in aperto leuiora sunt, & tunc perniciosissima, cum simulata sanitate subsidunt: All diseases that appeare openly are the lighter; and then are most dangerous when they rest hidden with a counterfet health.*

5

For another
with conditions.

Moreouer, against those that vnderstand not, or seldome suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kinde of seruants that doe nothing but for feare, it is necessary that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or government in a family. But yet it must be with these conditions: First, that it be not often, vpon all, or light occasions. For being too common, it growes into contempt, and workes no good effect. Secondly, not in the aire, murmuring and railing behinde their backs, or vpon vncertainties,

uncertainties, but be sure that he feele the smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be used as a medicine.

All these remedies may serue against the following passions.

CHAP. XXXII.

Against Hatred.

THat a man may the better defend himselfe against hatred, he must hold a rule that is true, that all things haue two handles whereby hee may take them: by the one they seeme to be grieuous and burdensome vnto vs, by the other easie and light. Let vs then receiue things by the good handle, and we shall finde that there is something good and to be loued, in whatsoeuer we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth vs, we haue more cause to complaine thereof, than to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiueth the greatest damage, because it loseth therein the vse of reason, the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let vs turne our hate into pity, and let vs endeavour to make those worthy to be beloued, which we would hate, as *Lycurgus* did vnto him, that had put out his eye, whom he made, as a chastisement of that wrong, an honest, vertuous, and modest Citizen, by his good instruction.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Against Ennie.

Against this passion, we must consider that which we esteeme and enuie in another. We willingly enuie in others riches, honours, fauours, and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they haue cost them. He that shall say,

thou shalt haue as much at the same price, we would rather refuse his offer, than thanke him for it. For before a man can attaine vnto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, iniuries ; to be brieue, lose his liberty, satisfie and accomodate himselfe to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To thinke to attaine to goods, honours, states, offices, otherwise, and to peruert the law, or rather custome of the world, is to haue the money and wares too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour and of vertue, why dost thou afflict thy selfe if thou haue not these goods, which are not gotten but by a shamefull patience ? Doe thou therefore rather pitie others, than enuie them. If it be a true good that is hapned to another, we should reioice thereat ; for we should desire the good of one another: To be pleased with another mans prosperity, is to increase our owne.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Against Reuenge.

Against this cruell passion, we must first remember, that there is nothing so honourable, as to know how to pardon. Euery man may prosecute the law to right that wrong that he hath receiued ; but to giue grace, to remit and forgiue, belongeth to a soueraigne prince. If then thou wilt be a king of kings themselues, and doe an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardinesse and a couragious insensibility in the suffering of iniuries, whereby they returne and rebound wholly vpon the wrongers, as heauie blowes vpon a hard and steeled anuill, which doe no other but wound and benumme the hand and arme of the striker : To meditate reuenge is to confesse himselfe wounded : to complaine is to acknowledge himselfe guilty and inferiour. *Vltio doloris confessio est : non est magnus animus quem incuruat injuria : ingens animus & verus estimator sui non vindicat injuriam, quia non sentit : Reuenge is a confession of grieffe : a high and generous minde is not subiect to iniurie :*

iniurie : magnanimitie and true valour reuengeth not an iniurie, because it feeleth it not.

But some will obieſt, that it is irkſome and diſhonourable to endure an offence ; I agree thereunto, and I am of opinion not to ſuffer, but vanquiſh and maſter it ; but yet after a faire and honorable faſhion, by ſcorning it and him that offered it ; nay more than that, by doing good vnto him. In both theſe *Ceſar* was excellent. It is a glorious victorie to conquer, and make the enemy to ſtouple, by benefits, and of an enemy, to make him a friend, be the iniury neuer ſo great. Yea to thinke that by how much the greater the wrong is, by ſo much the more worthy it is to be pardoned ; and by how much more juſt the reuenge is, by ſo much the more commendable is clemencie.

Againe, it is no reaſon that a man ſhould be Iudge and a party too, as he that reuengeth is. He muſt commit the matter to a third perſon, or at leaſt take counſell of his friends, and of the wiſer ſort, not giuing credit vnto himſelfe. *Iupiter* might alone dart out his fauourable lightnings ; but when there grew a queſtion of ſending forth his reuenging thunderbolts, he could not doe it without the counſell and aſſiſtance of the twelue gods. This was a ſtrange caſe that the greateſt of the gods, who of himſelfe had power to doe good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular perſon, but after a ſolemne deliberation. The wiſdome of *Iupiter* himſelfe feareth to erre, when there is a queſtion of reuenge, and therefore he hath need of a counſell to deterine him.

We muſt therefore forme vnto our ſelues a moderation of the minde ; this is the vertue of clemencie, which is a ſweet mildneſſe and graciousneſſe, which tempereth, retaineth, and repreſſeth all our motions. It armeth vs with patience, it perſwadeth vs that we cannot be offended but with our ſelues ; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in vs, but that which we will retaine. It winneth vnto vs the loue of the whole world, and furniſheth vs with a modeſt carriage agreeable vnto all.

CHAP. XXXV.

Against Icalousie.

THe only meane to auoid it, is for a man to make himselfe worthie of that he desireth, for icalousie is nothing else but a distrust of our selues, and a testimonie of our little desert. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Faustine* his wife demanded what he would doe, if his enemy *Cassius* should obtaine the victory against him in battell, answered, I serue not the gods so slenderly, as that they will send me to hard a fortune. So they that haue any part in the affection of another, if there happen any cause of feare to lose it, should say, I honour not so little his loue, that he will deprue me of it. The confidence we haue in our owne merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

2 He that prosecureth any thing with vertue, is eased by hauing a companion in the pursuit, for he serueth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Imbecillity only feareth the encounter, because it thinketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presently appeare. Take away emulation, you take away the glory and spurre of vertue.

3 My counsell to men against this malady, when it proceedeth from their wifes, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world haue fallen into this misfortune, and haue beene content to beare it without stirring and molestation: *Lucretius*, *Cesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato*, *Augustus*, *Anianus*, and diuers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth it and speakes of it: and of whom speake they not in this sense, from the great to the least? how many honest men doe euery day fall into the same reproach? and if a man stirre therein, the women themselves make a iest of it: the frequency of this accident should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally, be thou such that men may complaine of thy wrong, that thy vertue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account neuer thelesse of thee, but rather curse the occasion.

As

As touching women, there is no counsell against this euill, for their nature is wholly composed of suspition, vanity, curiosty. It is true that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands, turning their euill vpon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsell, a man would aduise them not to care for it, nor to seeme to perceiue it: which is a sweet mediocrity betweene this foolish ieaousie, and that other opposite custome practised in the Indies and other nations, where women labour to get friends, and women for their husbands seeke aboute all things their honor and pleasure (for it is a testimony of the vertue, valour, and reputation of a man in those countries to haue many wiues.) So did *Linia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonice* to King *Deiotarus*; and for multiplication of stocke, *Sara*, *Lea*, *Rachel*, to *Abraham* and *Iacob*.

in England
tow

Of Temperancie, the fourth vertue.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of Temperancie in generall.

Temperancie is taken two waies, generally for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a speciall vertue, but generall and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest; and it is perpetually required, especially in those affaires where there is controuersie and contestation, troubles and diuisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, than to be free from particular phantasies and opinions, and simply to hold himselfe to his owne deuoiere. All lawfull intentions or opinions are temperate, choler, hatred, are inferiour to dutie, and to iustice, and serue only those that tie not themselves to their duty by simple reason.

1:
Temperancie
two-fold.
Generall.

Specially, for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightful, which tickle our senses and naturall appetites. *Habena Speciall. voluptatis, inter libidinem & stuporem natura posita, cuius due partes; verecundia in fuga turpium, honestas in obseruatione decori: The bridle of pleasure is placed betweene desire and dulnesse* of

2:

of nature, of which there is two parts : shamefastnesse in the auoiding of filthy dishonest things, and honestie in the obseruation of comelinesse and decencie. We will here take it more at large, for a rule and duty in all prosperity, as fortitude is the rule in all aduersity, and it shall be the bridle, as fortitude the spurre. With these two we shall tame this brutish, sauage, vntoward part of our passions which is in vs, and we shall carry our selues well and wisely in all fortunes and accidents, which is a high point of wisdom.

3
The description
of temperancie.

Temperancie then hath for the subiect and generall obiekt thereof all prosperity, pleasant and plausible things, but especially and properly pleasure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off strange and vitious superfluities; the rule of that which is naturall and necessary: *Voluptatibus imperat, alias odit & abigit, alias dispensat, & ad sanum modum redigit: nec unquam ad illas propter illas venit, scit optimum esse modum cupitorum, non quantum velis sed quantum debeas.* It commandeth our pleasures, some it hateth and chaseth away, others it setteth in order and bringeth to a sound mediocrity: neither doth it euer come vnto them for them, it knoweth that the best meane of things to be desired, is not so much as thou wouldest, but so much as thou oughtest. This is the authority and power of reason ouer concupiscence and violent affections, which carry our wils to delights and pleasures. It is the bridle of our soule, and the proper instrument to cleare those boyling tempests which arise in vs by the heat and intemperancie of our bloud, that the soule may be alwaies kept one, and appliant vnto reason, that it apply not it selfe to sensible obiects, but that it rather accommodate them vnto it selfe, and make them serue it. By this we weane our soule from the sweet milke of the pleasures of this world, and we make it capable of a more solid and soueraigne nourishment. It is a rule that sweetly accommodate:h all things vnto nature, to necessity, simplicity, facility, health, constancie. These are things that goe willingly together, and they are the measures and bounds of wisdom, as contrarily Art, lust, and superfluity, variety, and multiplicity, difficulty, malady, and delicatenesse, keepe company together, following intemperancy and folly.

Simplici cura constant necessaria, in delicijs laboratur. Ad parata

rata nati sumus : nos omnia nobis difficilia faciliū fastidio fecimus : There needs no great care for things necessarie, the labour is in delicacies. We are borne to things already prepared : but we haue made all things that were easie, difficult unto vs through loathsomnesse.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of Prosperitie, and counsell thereupon.

THat prosperity which sweetly falles vpon vs, by the common courie and ordinarie custome of the world, or by our owne wisdom and discreet carriage, is farre more firme and assured, and lesse enuied, than that which commeth from heauen, with fame and renowne beyond and against the opinion of all, and the hope euen of him that receiueth these bounties.

Prosperity is very dangerous : whatsoeuer there is that is vaine and light in the soule of man, is raised and carried with the first fauourable winde. There is nothing that makes a man so much to lose and forget himselfe, as great prosperity ; as corne lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs ouercharged with fruit breake asunder, and therefore it is necessary that a man looke to himselfe, and take heed, as if he went in a slipperie place, and especially of insolencie, pride, and presumption. There be some that swimme in a shallow water, and with the least fauour of fortune are puffed vp, forget themselves, become insupportable, which is the true picture of folly.

From thence it commeth that there is not any thing more fraile, and that is of lesse continuance than an ill aduised prosperity, which commonly changeth great and ioyfull occurrences into heauy and lamentable, and fortune of a louing mother, is turned into a cruell step-dame.

Now the best counsell that I can giue to a man, to carrie himselfe herein, is, not to esteeme too much of all sorts of prosperity and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them : If they shall happen to come, out of their good grace and fauour, to receiue them willingly and cheerefully ; but as things

things strange and no way necessarie, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason hee should make account of them, or thinke himselfe the worse or better man for them; *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum. Qui tutam vitam agere volet, ista viscata beneficia detinet, nil dignum putare quod speres. Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas?* It is not thine, which fortune hath made thine. He that will leade a safe life, let him eschew those alluring benefits, and thinke nothing worthy that thou shouldest hope for. What worthy thing hath Fortune that thou shouldest conet or desire?

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Pleasure, and aduice thereupon.

The description
and distinction
of pleasure.

PLeasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling: as contrarily, griefe or sorrow is vnwelcome and vnpleasing to the senses; neuerthelesse, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the soueraigne good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a priuation of euill and displeasure, in a word Indolence. According to their opinion, the not hauing of any euill, is the happiest estate that man can hope for in this life. *Nimum boni est cui nihil est mali: It is too much good which hath no euill.* This is as a mid way or neutralitie betwixt pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and griefe; it is as sometime the bosome of *Abraham* was said to be, betwixt *paradise* and the *hell* of the damned. This is a sweet and peaceable state and settling, a true, constant and staied pleasure, which resembleth, in some sort, the tranquillitie of the soule, accounted by Philosophers the chiefe and soueraigne good: the other first kinde of pleasure is actiue and in motion. And so there should be three estates, the two extreme opposites, Griefe and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, and both of them sickly: and that in the middle, stable, firme, sound, whereunto the Epicures gaue the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of griefe and sorrow) making it the chiefe and soueraigne good. This is that which hath so much defamed their schoole, as *Seneca* hath ingenuously acknowledged and said,

said, that their euill was in the title and words, not in the substance, hauing neuer had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemie to wickednesse and vice than theirs. And it is not altogether without reason that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure: for that tickling delight which seemeth to mount vs aboue indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of griefe, as it proper Butt; as for example, that appetite that rauisheth vs with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to flie that paine that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our lust bringeth with it, to quit our selues of this feuer, and to purchase our rest.

Pleasure hath diuersly beene spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly than was fit; some haue deified it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word, taking it alwayes in the worser part. They that doe wholly condemne it, say; First, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be liuely and actiue. Secondly, fraile and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marres a whole sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked peece of arillery. Thirdly, base, shamefull; exercising it selfe by vilde instruments, in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent and pompous pleasures. Fourthly, quickly subiect to satiety. A man knowes not how to continue long in his pleasures, he is impatient aswel in his delights as his griefes, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yeelds pernicious effects, the ouerthrow of men, families, common-weales. Fifthly, and aboue all they alleadge against it, that when it is in his greatest strength, it mastreth in such a manner, that reason can haue no entertainment.

On the other side, it is said to be naturall, created and established of God in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retails of the indiuiduall parts, as in grosse of the speciall kindes. Nature the mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessity, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to liue well, is to consent vnto nature. God, saith *Moses*, hath created pleasure, *Plantauit Dominus paradisum voluptatis*: The Lord planted the paradise of pleasure, hath placed and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life: and in the end, what

2

Against it.

3

For it, See lib. 2.
cap. 6.

what is the last and highest felicitie, but certaine and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tua, & torrente voluptatis tua potabis eos. Suis contenta finibus res est divina voluptas*: They shall be made drunken with the plenty of thy house, and thou shalt make them drinke in the streames of thy pleasure. *Divine pleasure is a thing that is content with her bounds.* And to say the truth, the most regular Philosophers, and the greatest professours of vertue, *Zeno, Cato, Scipio, Epaminondas, Plato, Socrates* himselfe, have beene in effect amorous, and drinkers, dancers, sporters, and haue handled, spoken, written of loue and other pleasures.

4
The distinction
of pleasures.

And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish, for pleasures are diuers. There are naturall, and not naturall: This distinction as more important we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant and difficult; others that are obscure, milde, easie and ready. Though to say the truth, Pleasure is a qualitie not greatly ambitious; it is accounted rich enough of it selfe, without the addition of any thing to the reputation thereof, and it is loued best in obscuritie. They likewise that are so easie and ready are cold and frozen, if there be no difficultie in them: which is as an inducement, a bait, a spurre vnto them. The ceremonie, shame and difficultie that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of loue, are the spurres, and matches that giue fire vnto it, and increase the price thereof. There are spirituall pleasures and corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they all belong to the entire man, and the whole composed subiect: and the one part of our selues hath not any to proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the marriage and amorous band of the soule and body continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soule hath a better part than the bodie, and therefore they better agree with men, than beasts, and are more durable, as those that enter into vs by the sense of seeing and hearing, which are the two gates of the soule, for hauing only their passage by them, the soule receiuech them, concocteth and digesterh them, feedeth and delighteth it selfe a long time; the body feeleth little. Others there are wherein the bodie hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste
and

and touch, more grosse and materiall, wherein the beasts beare vs company, such pleasures are handled, tried, vsed and ended in the bodie it selfe, the soule hath onely the assistance and company, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soone in, soone out.

The chiefe thing to be considered herein, is to know how we should carrie and gouern our selues in our pleasures, which wisdome will teach vs, and it is the office of the vertue of temperance. Wee must first make a great and notable difference betweene the naturall, and not naturall. By the not naturall, we doe not only vnderstand those that are against nature, and the true vse approued by the lawes ; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an excessse and superfluitie, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it selfe with the supply of necessitie ; whereunto a man may likewise adde decencie and common honestie. It is naturall pleasure to be couered with a house and garments against the rigour of the elements, and the iniuries of wicked men ; but that they should be of gold and siluer, of Iasper or Porphyrie, it is not naturall : Or if they come vnto a man by other means than naturall, as if they be sought and procured by Art, by medicines, or other vnnaturall meanes : Or if they be first forged in the minde, stirred by passion, and afterwards from thence come vnto the bodie, which is a preposterous order : for the order of nature is, that pleasures enter into the bodie, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend vnto the minde. And euen as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme-holes, is neither naturall nor pleasing, but rather a kinde of convulsion ; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soule, is not naturall.

5
*Aduise-
ments
thereupon.*

*Which are na-
turall.*

Now the first rule of wisdome concerning pleasure is this, to chase away, and altogether to condemne the vnnaturall, as vicious, bastardy (for as they that come to a banquet vnbidden, are to be refused ; so those pleasures that without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be reiected) to admit and receiue the naturall ; but yet with rule and moderation : and this is the office of temperance in general, to driue away the vnnaturall, to rule the naturall.

6
*The first and ge-
nerall rule.*

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points :

First,

Rules for the
naturall.

First, that it be without the offence, scandall, dammage and preiudice of another.

Secondly, that it be without the preiudice of himselfe, his honor, his health, his leasure, his dutie, his functions.

Thirdly, that it be with moderation, that he take them no more to the heart, than against the heart, neither couet them, nor flie from them, but take and receiue them, as men doe honie with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand, not to engage himselfe in them too farre, nor to make them his principall businesse, and onely worke; much lesse to enthrall himselfe vnto them, and of recreations make them necessities, for that is the greatest miserie of all others. Pleasure should be but as an accessarie, a recreation for the time, that he may the better returne to his labour, as sleepe which strengthneth the body, and giueth vs breath to returne the more cheerefully to our worke. To be short, a man must vse them, not inioy them. But aboue all, hee must take heed of their treason: for some there are, that whilest we giue our selues vnto them, and loue them ouer-dearely, returne euill for good, and more displeasure than delight: but this is treacherously: for they goe before to besot and deceiue vs, and hiding from vs their taile, they tickle vs and embrace vs to strangle vs. The pleasure of drinking goes before the paine of the head: such are the delights and pleasures of indiscreet and firy youth, wherewith they are made drunken. We plunge our selues into them, but in our old age they forsake vs, as it were drowned and ouerwhelmed, as the Sea in his reflux ouer-runne the sandie bankes: That sweetnesse which we haue swallowed so greedily, endeth with bitternesse and repentance, and filleth our soules with a venomous humour that infecteth and corrupteth it.

8
Want of gouern-
ment in pleasure
preiudicious.

Now, as moderation and rule in pleasures is an excellent and profitable thing according vnto God, nature, reason: so excelsse and immoderate vnruinesse is of all others the most pernicious, both to the publike and priuate good. Pleasure ill valued, softneth and weakneth the vigour both of soule and bodie; *Deblitat em induxere delitie, blandissima domina: Delicacies haue brought in debilitie, as a most alluring mistris:* it besotteth and effeminateth the best courages that are,
witness

witnesse Hannibal : and therefore the Lacedemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasure were called men, and the Athenians soft and delicate women. Xerxes to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, and to assure himselfe of them in time to come, tooke from them their armes, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitting all pleasures and delicacies whatsoeuer. Secondly, it banisheth and driueth away the principall vertues, which cannot continue vnder so idle and effeminate an Empire : *Maximas virtutes jacere oportet voluptate dominante : The chiefeest vertues must be laid aside when pleasure beareth all the sway.* Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly into the contrary thereof, which is griefe, sorrow, repentance : for as the riuers of sweet water run their course to dye in the salt sea, so the hony of pleasure endeth in the gall of griefe. *In precipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium abit, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudij luctus occupat. It is subiect to sudden downfall, it inclineth towards griefe, is conuerted into the contrary, unlesse there be kept a meane. Sorrow occupieth extremities of ioy.* Finally, it is the seminarie of all euils, of all ruine. *Malorum esca voluptas : Pleasure is the bait of euill.* From it come those close and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end euersions and ruines of common-weales. Now we will speake of pleasures in particular.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Of eating and drinking, Abstinence and Sobriety.

Vistuals are for nourishment, to sustaine and reparaire the infirmitie of the body; the moderate, naturall, and pleasant vse thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soule; as contrarily an vnnaturall excesse, weakeneth it, bringeth great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancy. *Simplex ex simplici causa valetudo; multos morbos supplicia luxuria, multa fercula fecerunt: A simple health proceeds from a single cause; many dishes haue caused many diseases, the punishments of excesse.* A man complaineth of his brain for sending down so many rheumes,

the foundation of all dangerous maladies ; but the braine may well answer him, *Desine fundere, & ego desinam fluere: Cease to powre in, and I will cease to powre out.* Be thou sober in powring downe, and I will be sparing in dropping downe. But what, the excesse and prouision, the multitude, diuersitie, and exquisite preparation of viands is come in request ; and it is our custome euen in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to craue pardon for not prouiding enough.

2

How preiudicate both to the minde and to the body a full diet, with diuersitie, curiositie, exquisite and artificiall preparation is, euery man may finde in himselfe. Gluttony and drunkennesse are idle and vndecent vices ; they bewray themselves sufficiently by the gestures and countenances of those that are therewith tainted ; whereof the best and more honest is, to be dull and drowsie, vnprofitable and vnfit for any good : for there was neuer man that loued his belly too well, that did euer performe any great worke. Moreouer, it is the vice of brutish men, and of no worth, especially drunkennesse, which leadeth a man to all vnworthy actions ; witnesse *Alexander*, otherwise a great Prince, being ouercome with this vice killed his dearest friend *Clitus*, and being come to himselfe, would haue kild himselfe for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and peruerteth his vnderstanding. *Vinum clauo caret, dementat sapientes, facit repuerascere senes: Wine wanteth gouernment, it maketh wise men fooles, and old men become children againe.*

3

Sobriety com-
mended.

Sobriety though it be none of the greatest and more difficult vertues, and which is not painfull to any but fooles and mad-men, yet it is a way and a kinde of progresse to other vertues : It extinguisheth vice in the cradle, and stiflieth it in the seed : It is the mother of health, and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that that lengthneth a mans life. *Socrates* by sobriety had alwaies a strong body and liued euer in health ; *Masimissa* the soberest King of all the rest got children at 86. yeeres of age, and at 92. vanquished the Carthaginians ; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkennesse died in the flower of his age, though he were better borne and of a sounder constitution than them all. Many subiect to gouts and other diseases by Physicke incurable, haue recovered their health

Hierom,

health by diet. Neither is it seruiceable to the body onely, but to the mind too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdom and good counsell. *Salubrium consiliorum parens sobrietas*: Sobriety is the mother of wholesome counsels. All the greatest personages of the world haue beene sober, not onely the professors of singular vertue and austerity of life, but all those that haue excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Caesar, Iulian* the Emperor, *Mahomet*: *Epicurus* the great Doctor of pleasure herein excelled all men. The frugality of the Roman *Curi* and *Fabritij* is more extolled than their great victories: The *Lacedemonians* as valiant as they were, made expresse profession of frugality and sobriety.

But a man must in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancy, and not stay till the infirmities of old age come vpon him, lest that he be vtterly cast downe with variety of diseases, as the Athenians, who were reproched for that they neuer demanded peace, but in their mourning garments, after they had lost their kindred and friends in warre, and were able to defend themselves no longer. This is to aske counsell when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parsimonia*; It is too late to spare when all is spent. It is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walles, to make his market when the faire is ended.

It is a good thing for a man not to accustome himselfe to a delicate diet, lest when he shall happen to be deprivied thereof, his body grow out of order, and his spirit languish and faint; and contrarily to vse himselfe to a grosser kinde of sustenance, both because they make a man more strong and healthfull, and because they are more easily gotten.

CHAP. XL.

*Of riot and excesse in apparell and ornaments,
and of frugality.*

IT hath beene said before that garments are not naturall, nor necessary to a man; but artificiall, inuented and vsed onely by him in the world. Now inasmuch as they are artificiall, (for it is the manner of things artificiall to varie and multiply,

without end and measure, simplicity being a friend vnto nature) they are extended and multiplied into so many inuentions (for to what other end are there so many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the couering and decking of our bodies?) dissolutions and corruptions, insomuch that it is no more an excuse and couering of our defects and necessities, but a nest of all manner of vices, *vexillum superbie, nidus luxurie*; The banner of pride, the nest of Luxurie, the subiect of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the propriety of things, mine and thine; and in the greatest communities or fellowships that are, apparell is alwaies proper, which is signified by this word distrobe.

2. It is a vice very familiar and proper vnto women (I meane excesse in apparell) a true testimony of their weaknesse, being glad to winne credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselues to bee too weake and vnable to purchase credit and reputation by better meanes: for such as are vertuous, care least for such vanities. By the lawes of the Lacedemonians it was not permitted to any to weare garments of rich and costly colours, but to common women: That was their part, as vertue and honour belonged vnto others.

Now the true and lawfull vse of apparell is to couer our selues against winde and weather, and the rigour of the aire, and should neuer be vsed to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessive nor sumptuous, so should they not be too base and beggerly. *Nec affectata sordes, nec exquisita munditie*: Neither affected vncleanesse, nor exquisite pickednesse. *Caligula* was as a laughing stocke to all that beheld him, by reason of the dissolute fashion of his apparell. *Augustus* was commended for his modesty.

CHAP. XLI.

Carnall pleasure, Chastitie, Continency.

1. *See the chap. 24.* **C**ontinency is a thing very difficult, and must haue a careful and a painfull guard: It is no easie matter wholly to resist nature, which in this is most strong and most ardent.

And

And this is the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficulty in it; as for the rest it is without action and without fruit, it is a priuation, a not doing, paine without profit; and therefore sterilitie is signified by virginitie. I speake here of simple continency, and onely in it selfe, which is a thing altogether barren and vnprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more than not to play the glutton, not to be drunken; and not of Christian continency, which to make it a vertue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpose alwaies to keepe it, and that it be for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus August. predicamus, quod sint virgines, sed quod Deo dicata;* We praise not this in Virgins, for that they be Virgins, but because they be dedicated to God: witnesse the Vestals, and the fine foolish Virgins shut out of doores; and therefore it is a common error, and a vanity, to call continent women honest women and honourable, as if it were a vertue, and there were an honour due vnto him that doth no euill, doth nothing against his duty. Why should not continent men in like sort haue the title of honesty and honour? There is more reason for it, because there is more difficulty, they are more hot, more hardy, they haue more occasions, better meanes. So vnlikely is it that honour should be due vnto him that doth no euill, that it is not due vnto him that doth good, but only, as hath beene said, to him that is profitable to the weale-publike, and where there is labour, difficulty, danger. And how many continent persons are there stult with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vaine-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are ready to iudge and condemne others? And by experience we see in many women how dearly they sell it vnto their husbands, for dislodging the deuill from that place where they row, and establishing the point of honour as in it proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appeare in the head, to make him beleue that it is not any lower elsewhere. If neuerthelesse this flattering word, honour, serue to make them more carefull of their duty, I care not much if I allow of it. Vanity it selfe serues for some vse, and simple incontinency and sole in it selfe is none of the greatest faults, no more than others that are purely corporall, and which nature committeth in her

actions either by excessse or defect without malice. That which discrediteth it, and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost neuer alone, but is commonly accompanied and followed with other greater faults, infected with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places, practised by wicked meanes, lies, impostures, subornations, treasons, besides the losse of time, distractions of those functions from whence it proceedeth by great and grievous scandals.

3.
An admonition

And because this is a violent passion and likewise deceitfull, we must arme our selues against it, and be wary in descrying the baits thereof, and the more it flattereth vs, the more distrust it: for it would willingly embrace vs to strangle vs; it pampereth vs with honey, to glut vs with gall; and therefore let vs consider as much, that the beauty of another is a thing that is without vs, and that as soone it turneth to our euill as our good, that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing and almost nothing but the colour of a body; and acknowledging in beauty the delicate hand of nature, we must prize it as the sunne and moone for the excellency that is in it: and coming to the fruition thereof by all honest meanes, alwaies remember that the immoderate vse of this pleasure consumeth the body, effeminateth the soule, weakneth the spirit, and that many by giuing themselves ouermuch thereunto, haue lost, some their life, some their fortune, some their spirit: and contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glory in vanquishing pleasure, than in possessing it: that the continency of *Alexander* and of *Scipio* hath beene more highly commended, than the beautifull countenances of those young damfels that they tooke captiues.

4.

There are many kindes and degrees of continencie and incontinencie. The coniugall is that which importeth more than all the rest, which is most requisite and necessary, both for the publike and particular good, and therefore should bee by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained within the chaste brest of that partie whom the destinies haue giuen for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not only violate his owne body, making it a vessell of ordure by all lawes; the law of God, which commandeth chastity; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common which is proper to one,

one, and imposeth vpon a man faith and constancy; of Countreies, which haue brought in marriages; of families, transferring vniustly the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly, Iustice it selfe, bringing in vncertainties, iealousies, and brawles amongst kindred, depriuing children of the loue of their parents, and parents of the piety and duty of their children.

CHAP. XLII.

Of Glory and Ambition.

AMbition, the desire of glory and honour (whereof we haue already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weale-publike as the world goeth, for it is it from whence the greatest of our honourable actions doth arise, that hartneth men to dangerous attempts, as we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who haue not all beene lead by a philosophical spirit, as *Socrates*, *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato* and *Scipio*, by the only true and liuely image of vertue; for many, yea the greatest number haue beene stirred thereunto by the spirit of *Themistocles*, *Alexander*, *Cesar*: and although these honourable archievements and glorious exploits haue not beene with their authors and actors, true workes of vertue, but ambition; neuerthelesse their effects haue beene very beneficiall to the publike state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wisest, it is excusable and allowable in two cases: the one in good and profitable things, but which are inferiour vnto vertue, and common both to the good and to the euill, as Arts and Sciences: *Honos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloria: Honor nourisheth the Arts: all are inflamed through glory to study*: inuentions, industrie, military valour. The other in continuing the good will and opinion of another. The wise doe teach, not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it bee for the auoiding of such inconueniences as may happen by their contempt of the approbation and iudgement of another.

But that a man should be vertuous, and doe good for glory, as if that were the salarie and recompence thereof, is a false

and vaine opinion. Much were the state of vertue to be pittied, if she should fetch her commendations and prise from the opinion of another, this coine were but counterfet, and this pay too base for vertue; Shee is too noble to beg such recompence. A man must serue his soule, and in such sort compose his actions, that the brightnesse of honour dazell not his reason, and strengthen his minde with braue resolutions, which serue him as barriers against the assaults of ambition.

3. Hee must therefore perswade himselfe that vertue seeketh not a more ample and more rich Theater to shew it selfe than her owne conscience: The higher the Sun is, the lesser shadow doth it make: The greater the vertue is, the lesse glory doth it seeke. Glory is truly compared to a shadow which followeth those that flie it, and flieth those that follow it. Againe, he must neuer forget, that man cometh into this world as to a Comedy, where he chuseth not the part that he is to play, but only bethinkes himselfe how to play that part well that is giuen vnto him: or as a banquer, wherein a man feedes vpon that that is before him, not reaching to the farre side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a man commit a charge vnto vs, which we are capable of, let vs accept of it modestly, and exercise it sincerely; making account that God hath placed vs there to stand sentinell, to the end that others may rest in safety vnder our care. Let vs seeke no other recompence of our trauell, than our owne conscience to witnesse our well-doing, and desire that the witnesse be rather of credit in the Court of our fellow-citizens, than in the front of our publike actions. To be short; let vs hold it for a maxime, that the fruit of our honourable actions, is to haue acted them. Vertue cannot finde without it selfe, a recompence worthy it selfe. To refuse and contemne greatnesse, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficulty. Hee that loues himselfe, and iudgeth soundly, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very active and passive are painfull, and are not desired but by feeble and sicke spirits. *Otanes* one of the seven that had title to the soueraignty of *Persia*, gaue ouer vnto his companions his right, vpon condition, that he and his might liue in that Empire free from all subiection and Magistracy, except that which the ancient lawes did impose, being impatient

gent to command, and to be commanded. *Dioclesian* renounced the Empire, *Celestinus* the Popedome.

CHAP. XLIII.

Of Temperancy in speech, and of
Eloquence.

THis is a great point of wisdom: he that ruleth his tongue well, in a word, is wise. *Qui in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est*: The reason hereof is, because the tongue is all the world, in it is both good and euill, life and death, as hath beene said before. Let vs now see what aduice is to bee giuen to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech besober and seldome: To know how to be silent is a great aduantage to speake well; and he that knowes not well how to doe the one, knowes not the other. 1. Rules of speech.

To speake well and much is nor the worke of one man; and the best men are they that speake least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barraine in good speech and good actions; like those trees that are full of leaues and yeeld little fruit, much chaffe, and little corne.

The Lacedemonians, great professors of vertue and valour, did likewise professe silence, and were enemies to much speech: And therefore hath it euer beene commendable to be sparing in speech, to keepe a bridle at the mouth: *Pone Domine custodiam ori meo: O Lord set a watch on my mouth.* And in the law of *Moses* that vessell that had not his couering fastned to it, was vncleane. By speech a man is knowne and discerned: The wise man hath his tongue in his hearr, the foole his heart in his tongue.

The second, that it be true: The vse of speech is to assist the truth, and to carry the torch before it to make it appeare; and contrarily to discouer and reiect lying. Insomuch that speech is the instrument whereby we communicate our wills and our thoughts: It had need be true and faithfull, since that our vnderstanding is directed by the only meanes of speech. Hee that falsifieth it, betrayeth publike society; and if this meane faile vs and deceiue vs, there is an end of all, there is

Cap. 10.

3.

no liuing in the world. But of lying we haue already spoken.

The third, that it be naturall, modest and chaste: not accompanied with vehemency and contention, whereby it may seeme to proceede from passion; not artificiall nor affected; not wicked, immodest, licentious.

4.

The fourth, that it be serious and profitable, not vaine and vnprofitable. A man must not bee too attentiu in relating what hath hapned in the market place or theater, or repeating of sonets and meriments, it bewraies too great and vnprofitable leasure, *otio abundantis. & abutentis: Of one abounding with ease and abusing it.* Neither is it good to enter into any large discourse of his owne actions and fortunes, for others take not so much pleasure to heare them as he to relate them.

5.

But aboue all, it must neuer be offensive, for speech is the instrument and fore-runner of charity, and therefore to vse it against it, is to abuse it, contrary to the purpose of nature. All kinde of foule speech, detraction, mockery, is vnworthy a man of wisdom and honour.

6.

The sixth, to be gentle and pleasing, not crabbed, harsh, and enuious; and therefore in common speech acute and subtile questions must bee auoided, which resemble crasfishes, where there is more picking worke than meat to eat, and their end is nothing else but brawles and contentions.

7.

Lastly, that it be constant, strong, and generous, not loose, effeminate, languishing, whereby wee auoid the manner of speech of Pedanties, pleaders, women.

8.

chap. 8.

To this point of Temperancy belongeth secrecy (whereof we haue spoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelity) not only that which is committed vnto vs, and giuen vs to keepe, but that which wisdom and discretion telleth vs ought to be suppressed.

9.

Of eloquence & the commendation thereof.

Now as speech makes a man more excellent than a beast, so eloquence makes the professors thereof more excellent than other men. For this is the profession or art of speech, it is a more exquisite communication of discourse and of reason, the sterne or roother of our soules, which disposeth the hearts and affections like certaine notes to make a melodious harmony.

10.

The description. Eloquence is not onely a purity and elegancy of speech, a discreet choise of words properly applied, ending in a true

true and a iust fall, but it must likewise bee full of ornaments, graces, motions; the words must bee liuely, first, by a cleere and distinct voice, raising it selfe, and falling by little and little; Afterwards by a graue and naturall action, wherein a man may see the visage, hands, and members of the Oratour to speake with mouth, follow with their motion that of the minde, and represent the affections: for an Oratour must first put on those passions which he would stirre vp in others. As *Brasidas* drew from his owne wound the dart wherewith he slew his enemy: So passion being conceiued in our heart, is incontinently formed into our speech, and by it proceeding from vs, entereth into another, and there giueth the like impression which we our selues haue, by a subtile and liuely contagion. Heereby wee see that a sweet and a milde nature is not so fit for eloquence, because it cannot conceiue strong and couragious passions, such as it ought, to giue life vnto the Oration; in such sort, that when he should display the master-faile of eloquence in a great and vehement action, he commeth farre short thereof; as *Cicero* knew well how to reproach *Callidius*, who accused *Gallus* with a cold and ouer milde voice and action, *Tunisi fingeres, sic ageres? Thou thy selfe, wouldst doe so if thou diddest not counterfeit?* But being likewise vigorous, and furnished as hath beene said, it hath not lesse force and violence than the commands of tyrants enuironed with their guards and halberds; It doth not only lead the hearer, but intangleth him, it reigneth ouer the people, and establissheth a violent empire ouer our soules.

A man may say against Eloquence, that truth is sufficiently maintained and defended by it selfe, and that there is nothing more eloquent than it selfe: which I confesse is true, where the minds of men are pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the world, either by nature, or art, and ill instruction, is preoccupied, and ill disposed vnto vertue and verity, whereby it is necessary that men be handled like iron, which a man must soften with fire before hee temper it with water: So by the fiery motions of eloquence, they must bee made supple and maniable, apt to take the temper of veritie. This is that whereunto Eloquence especially tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arme vertue against vice, truth
against

II.
Objections answered.

against lying and calumnies. The Orator, saith *Theophrastus*, is the true Physician of the soule, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of Serpents by the musicke of the Pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmony of reason. Now since no man can hinder, but that some there are that sease vpon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious designments, how can a man doe lesse than defend himselfe with the same armes; for if wee present our selues naked to the combat, doe we not betray vertue and verity? But many haue abused eloquence to wicked purposes, and the ruine of their country: It is true, but that is no reason why eloquence should be despised, for that is common to it, with all the excellent things of the world, to bee vsed or abused, well or ill applied, according to the good and bad disposition of those that possesse them. Most men abuse their vnderstanding, but yet we must not therefore conclude that vnderstanding is not necessary.


FINIS.



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